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American criminal law is facing a crisis of meaning. On one hand, the "traditional school" invokes the archetype of the violent criminal--a murderer, rapist, or thief--who must be prosecuted and punished. On the other hand, the "critical school" invokes the archetype of the low-level drug offender, sentenced to a draconian prison term for mere possession of low levels of marijuana. On this account, the criminal legal system is itself systemically pathological, perhaps even warranting abolition. Like ships passing in the night, the two schools appear irreconcilable. This Article helps break this impasse and builds toward a justification for criminal law minimalism. It shows that, in fact, both schools share a hidden consensus: redressing wrongs. For the traditional camp, the wrong is harmful human conduct. For the critical camp, the wrong is the criminal legal system. Furthermore, such consensus extends to deep, shared values in American society. It includes fair elections, public integrity, and law enforcement equity--counterintuitively, evident in polarized debates about prosecution of January 6th insurrectionists, Congressman George Santos and Senator Robert Menendez, and Officer Derek Chauvin. Thus, criminal law is not and should not be confined to the archetypes of the murderer or low-level drug offender--it also concerns itself with the election insurrectionist, corrupt politician, and deadly police officer. Finally and prescriptively, this Article will show that this hidden consensus is both a sword and shield for the existing system, guiding us toward a justification for criminal law minimalism., TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE IMPASSE: THE TRADITIONAL AND CRITICAL SCHOOLS II. THE HIDDEN CONSENSUS: REDRESSING WRONGS III. FURTHER CONSENSUS: DEEPER VALUES A. Analogy: The Plagiarizing 1L B. Values [...]

INTRODUCTION: Personal status is an example of legal pluralism in Egypt, where several laws are enforced by several judicial bodies, all with the goal of regulating the personal status of [...]

I am honoured to deliver this keynote address on the conference theme, Public Law in a Plural World. A caveat is necessary at the outset: legal pluralism is manifested in [...], This article is a lightly edited version of the keynote address delivered at the 2023 ICON'S Annual Conference, held at Victoria University of Wellington--Te Herenga Waka, on 5 July 2023. I provide an overview of legal pluralism and its implications, addressing why legal pluralism heretofore has been overlooked by jurists, the historical roots of legal pluralism, how to identify what qualifies as law, internal and external legal pluralism, three categories of law that help frame legal pluralism, why customary law is difficult to incorporate within state law, the implications of legal pluralism for legal development and human rights, and much more.

I. ALEXANDER SOMEK 437 II. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN 446 III. RALF MICHAELS 454 IV. NICOLE ROUGHAN 462 I. ALEXANDER SOMEK I appreciate the generous praise that introduces Alexander Somek's comments [...], It is a rare privilege to receive such a perceptive set of comments to Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion (henceforth Authority, in italics) by Paul S. Berman, Ralf Michaels, Nicole Roughan, and Alexander Somek. I am grateful to all of them for their probing questions, which open up a space for renewed reflection about key issues broached in this book. Their concerns and suggestions will continue to command my attention well beyond this initial, tentative response.

INTRODUCTION 381 I. THE PLURALIST CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL THEORY 386 II. THE INTERNATIONALIST CHALLENGE TO 393 PLURALIST THEORY 393 III. THE PROVISIONAL COMPROMISE: RESTRAINED COLLECTIVE SELF-ASSERTION 399 CONCLUSION 402 INTRODUCTION [...]

INTRODUCTION 423 I. LINDAHL ON INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AUTHORITY 428 II. INTERACTION THAT IS NEITHER ON MY SIDE OR YOURS 430 III. THE OVERLAPPING MIDDLE: PLURAL SUBJECTS 433 IV. BEYOND [...]

INTRODUCTION When two communities or social systems interact, problems of pluralism inevitably arise. This is because different communities--whether such communities are defined as international, national, transnational, nonstate, or epistemic--will often [...], Global Legal Pluralism recognizes the inevitability (and sometimes even the desirability) of multiple legal and quasi-legal systems purporting to regulate the same act or actor. However, the resulting pluralism--just as inevitably--creates conflicts among norms that are potentially intractable. Thus, legal systems must address how best to respond to the realities of pluralism. This inquiry has constitutional dimensions because it goes to the constitutive character of communities and their relationships with other communities, be they international, transnational, national, subnational, or epistemic. One response to pluralism isjurispathic: "kill off" all competing laws by declaring that one set of norms--and only one--shall win. This is a constitutional declaration founded solely on power or messianism, and I argue that it is both unsatisfying as a normative matter and doomed to failure as a descriptive one. Instead, this article offers principles that would undergird a more jurisgenerative constitutionalism, one that seeks to manage, without eliminating, the plural voices clamoring to be heard. These principles can be used to design procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices that better respond to the reality of a world of multiple competing voices. In addition, such principles may bring more such voices into the constitutional discourse, thereby creating at least the possibility that enemies can be turned into adversaries, resulting in more fruitful (and peaceful) constitutional interactions.

AS IT manifested itself in the writings of its principal exponents, during its moment of ephemeral hegemony in contemporary political philosophy, the new liberalism was recognizable by virtue of its [...]

WHAT IS THE condition of liberalism today? Recent years have produced startlingly different assessments. They range from Francis Fukuyama's celebrated claim that no significant ideological opposition to liberal democracy remains [...]