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The role of technical, scientific and operational expert support is analysed through case studies and scenarios. The technology demonstrations show that cooperation between competent authorities is necessary for the successful handling of a nuclear security event both nationally and internationally. Once an event occurs in a state, it could involve other states as well. For this reason, high-level agreement is necessary between states to allow horizontal exchange of information between states during a nuclear security event. Expert support is a crucial cross-cutting element of a Nuclear Security Detection Architecture. An attempt is made to identify the basic elements and capabilities of a national expert support system., JRC.E.2-Technology Innovation in Security

Radiation detectors are used in nuclear security to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. In nuclear security, both the operational environment and detector technologies are constantly evolving. This document provides an overview on recent development on radiation detection technologies that are likely to have an impact on nuclear security in the near future. The four main topics covered are: detectors for gamma-ray spectrometry, neutron detectors, data acquisition and source localisation. This document will be published together with another report that concentrates on the impact of novel detection technologies from operational point of view. Therefore, the focus of this document is on technical aspects of the technologies., JRC.E.2-Technology Innovation in Security

Independent isotopic yields for elements from Zn to La in the 25 MeV proton-induced fission of natUnatU were determined with the JYFLTRAP facility. In addition, isotopic yields for Zn, Ga, Rb, Sr, Zr, Pd and Xe in the 50 MeV proton-induced fission of natUnatU were measured. The deduced isotopic yield distributions are compared with a Rubchenya model, the GEF model with universal parameters and the semi-empirical Wahl model. Of these, the Rubchenya model gives the best overall agreement with the obtained data. Combining the isotopic yield data with mass yield data to obtain the absolute independent yields was attempted. The result depends on the mass yield distribution. peerReviewed

In the frame of Commission Mandate M/487 'Security standards', CEN/TC 391 assigned the highest priority to the standardisation of list-mode data, together with three other standardisation proposals. In response, the JRC ERNCIP Thematic Group on Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure described the state-of-the-art on list-mode data acquisition and proposed the basic elements of a standard data format. In addition, the RN Thematic Group conducted a survey addressed to users of digital data acquisition for nuclear instrumentation to investigate their needs with respect to the standardisation of the data format. This report presents the results of the survey, which will serve as an important input for the development of a preliminary draft standard that will accompany a New Work Item Proposal for a new international standard, to be submitted to the IEC in the frame of the EMPIR Project 14SIP07 'DigitalStandard', which will continue on the work initiated by the ERNCIP RN Thematic Group., JRC.D.4-Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards

Operational systems for nuclear security in Finland, France, Denmark, UK, US and Canada were reviewed. The Finnish case is a holistic approach to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; reachback is only one component of the system, albeit an important crosscutting element of the detection architecture. The French and US studies concentrate on the reachback itself. The Danish nuclear security system is information-driven, relying on the cooperation of the competent authorities. The British and Canadian analyses describe nuclear security planning and operations in a Major Public Event (MPE), Olympics, where cooperation between the frontline officers and the reachback centre plays a key role to reduce radiological and nuclear risks. For the implementation of an efficient reachback system there is a strong need for standardizing the data acquisition, storing, and the final distribution of the analysis results. Major nuclear powers take this activity very seriously and they have 24/7 all year national service for information processing. The case studies of Finland and France show that efficient European reachback is manageable and technically possible on a country-wide basis. The case study on Denmark reveals that countries with limited reachback resources need an adequate and standardized technical information sharing mechanism to aid their national analysis services in a precise and timely manner., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

The ERNCIP thematic group for Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure (RN thematic group) produced in its working programme 2014 a report on radiological and nuclear information sharing between the EU Member States in case of a nuclear security event. As part of its working programme in 2015 the group collected views from the EU Member States regarding this report as a key step in the work towards future European format and protocol standardisation to be implemented for the technical reachback and other analysis purposes. The RN thematic group designed a simple questionnaire, which was sent to the relevant authorities in the Member States. The answers (10 out of 28) came from very different organizations working on domains of security, safety or military. The different background of the responding organizations shows that the responsibility on nuclear and radiological matters, including information sharing in a nuclear security event, varies strongly among different Member States. This knowledge alone is an important outcome of the questionnaire. Some replies showed that much work needs to be done for raising European awareness regarding prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear security events, including information sharing nationally and internationally. Some Member States have not yet identified the need of cooperation in sharing nuclear spectrometric data and analysis results. One of the basic requirements of the proposed new information-sharing system for nuclear security is that advanced national analysis resources can be provided for Member States that do not have such capabilities. Even though the future arrangements for information sharing would be based on a standard technological structure, all data exchange is voluntary and bilateral between the Member States., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

There is a significant potential in the use of unmanned remote controlled vehicles in sampling and measuring radiological events. No attempts to standardise sampling and measurement methods using these types of vehicles have been made so far. Common standards would simplify the use of remote controlled vehicles in an emergency scenario and would thus be very valuable in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The main advantage of using unmanned systems in radiological events is the protection of the involved human personnel. This document focuses on possible scenarios for remote controlled radiation measurements and sampling using unmanned systems. We identified scenarios that can be separated in two categories. First, there are prevention scenarios, where unmanned systems can be used for prevention of incidents involving radioactive material and deterrence. Second, there are response scenarios, where unmanned systems can be used to gather information after incidents with radioactive material have occurred. We further condensed three main tasks (spatial mapping, search of sources and sampling) for unmanned systems in the identified scenarios. Additionally, this report summarises possible standards for unmanned systems. A very widely known standard collection of software frameworks for robot software development is the Robot Operating System (ROS). Additional important standards concerning communication with robots and control of unmanned systems are Battle Management Language (BML), Interoperability Profile (IOP) and Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS)., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

There is a significant potential in the use of unmanned remote controlled vehicles in sampling and measuring radiological events. No attempts to standardise sampling and measurement methods using these types of vehicles have been made so far. Common standards would simplify the use of remote controlled vehicles in an emergency scenario and would thus be very valuable in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The main advantage of using unmanned systems in radiological events is the protection of the involved human personnel. This report is about current state-of-the-art of unmanned systems that have potential to be used for radiation measurements and sampling. It is believed that Search and Rescue robotics is the domain that is closest to the robots applicable to the radiation measurement scenarios. Therefore, a definition for Search and Rescue robots and outlines of their major subsystems are given. This is followed by a review of deployment scenarios for Search and Rescue robots outlining case studies of major emergencies at which robots have been deployed – with an assessment of their value to the emergency services. Additionally, research and development in Search and Rescue robotics, including current projects, testing environments, and Search and Rescue robotics competitions are outlined. Furthermore, this report shows unmanned robots and concepts for sensor systems capable of radiation detection based on state-of-the-art radiation sampling using unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles with rotary wings or unmanned aerial vehicles with fixed wings., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

This report deals with digital radiation detection systems employing list-mode data collection, which improves data analysis capabilities. Future data acquisition systems shall also ultimately enable the movement of detection data from first responders electronically to analysis centres rather than the costly and time consuming process of moving experts and/or samples. This new technology is especially useful in crisis events, when time and resources are sparse and increased analysis capacity is required. In order to utilise the opportunities opened by these new technologies, the systems have to be interoperable, so that the data from each type of detector can easily be analysed by different analysis centres. Successful interoperability of the systems requires that European and/or international standards are devised for the digitised data format. The basis of such a format is a list of registered events detailing an estimate of the energy of the detected radiation, along with an accurate time-stamp for recorded events (and optionally other parameters describing each event)., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

Strengthening CBRNE security in the European Union reduces the threat of and damage from CBRNE incidents. One of the main issues facing the EU security industry is its highly fragmented nature, exhibiting a lack of standardization and harmonised certification procedures. The need for standardised information exchange between competent authorities and international bodies regarding radiation measurements and data analysis has been recognised by several experts in response to Commission mandate M/487 for the establishment of European security standards. This report will suggest a way forward to develop protocols for more efficient cooperation between competent authorities and reachback centres at the national and international level. Not all EU Member States have the capabilities to process data provided by nuclear security instruments, and thus should consider instigating a coordinated capability yielding a more efficient and comprehensive approach in responding to future nuclear emergencies. This could be achieved by reachback centres across Europe (built upon existing national facilities and expertise) and would provide analysis services for alarm adjudication. Efficient data sharing and processing across EU Member States requires the use of standard data formats and protocols., JRC.G.5-Security technology assessment

Recent developments of digital data acquisition systems allow real-time pre-processing of detector signals at a high count rate. These so-called pulse processing digitizers are powerful and versatile instruments offering techniques which are important for nuclear security, critical infrastructure protection, nuclear physics and radiation metrology. Certain aspects of digital data acquisition affect the performance of the total system in a critical way and therefore require special attention. This report presents a short introduction to digital data acquisition, followed by a discussion of the critical parameters which affect the performance in the lab and in the field. For some of the parameters, tests are proposed to assess the performance of digital data acquisition systems. Good practices are offered to guide the selection and evaluation of digital data acquisition systems. More general performance criteria which are not specifically related to digital data acquisition systems are discussed separately., JRC.D.4-Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards

The beta feeding probability of Tc-102,Tc- 104,Tc- 105,Tc- 106,Tc- 107, Mo-105, and Nb-101 nuclei, which are important contributors to the decay heat in nuclear reactors, has been measured using the total absorption technique. We have coupled for the first time a total absorption spectrometer to a Penning trap in order to obtain sources of very high isobaric purity. Our results solve a significant part of a long-standing discrepancy in the gamma component of the decay heat for Pu-239 in the 4-3000 s range., This work was supported by the following projects: Spanish FPA 2005-03993 and FPA2008-06419-C02-01; Hungarian OTKA K72566; the EC Contract No. MERG-CT-2004-506849; the Finnish Center of Excellence Programme 2006-2011, the EU 6th Framework Programme (Contract No. 506065 (EURONS), and the Hungarian-Spanish collaboration program.

Absolute branching ratios to unbound states in C12 populated in the β decays of N12 and B12 are reported. Clean sources of N12 and B12 were obtained using the isotope separation on-line (ISOL) method. The relative branching ratios to the different populated states were extracted using single-alpha as well as complete kinematics triple-alpha spectra. These two largely independent methods give consistent results. Absolute normalization is achieved via the precisely known absolute branching ratio to the bound 4.44 MeV state in C12. The extracted branching ratios to the unbound states are a factor of three more precise than previous measurements. Branching ratios in the decay of Na20 are also extracted and used to check the results. © 2009 The American Physical Society., Supported by the Academy of Finland (Project No. 44875), by the Spanish Agency CICYT (Nos. FPA2007–62170 and FPA2007–62216), by the European Union Sixth Framework Programme “EURONS” (No. 506065), by the Swedish Research Council, and the Knut and Alice Wallenberg foundation.

In an experiment performed at the LISE3 facility of GANIL, we studied the decay of 22Al produced by the fragmentation of a 36Ar primary beam. A beta-decay half-life of 91.1 +- 0.5 ms was measured. The beta-delayed one- and two-proton emission as well as beta-alpha and beta-delayed gamma decays were measured and allowed us to establish a partial decay scheme for this nucleus. New levels were determined in the daughter nucleus 22Mg. The comparison with model calculations strongly favours a spin-parity of 4+ for the ground state of 22Al.

Yields of He, Ne, Ar, Kr and Xe isotopic chains were measured from UC$_{x}$/graphite and ThC$_{x}$/graphite targets at the PSB-ISOLDE facility at CERN using isobaric selectivity achieved by the combination of a plasma-discharge ion source with a water-cooled transfer line. %The measured half-lives allowed %to calculate the decay losses of neutron-rich isotopes in the %target and ion-source system, and thus to obtain information on the in-target %productions from the measured yields. The delay times measured for a UC$_x$/graphite target allow for an extrapolation to the expected yields of very neutron-rich noble gas isotopes, in particular for the ``NuPECC reference elements'' Ar and Kr, at the next-generation radioactive ion-beam facility EURISOL. \end{abstract} \begin{keyword} % keywords here, in the form: keyword \sep keyword radioactive ion beams \sep release \sep ion yields \sep ISOL (Isotope Separation On-Line) \sep uranium and thorium carbide targets. % PACS codes here, in the form: \PACS code \sep code \PACS 25.85.Ge \sep 28.60+S \sep 29.25.Rm.

The mirror $\beta^+$-decay of $^{61}$Ga was investigated by means of $\beta$-ray and $\gamma$-ray spectrometry at the ISOLDE-PSB facility using laser ionisation and mass-separation. The results for the $^{61}$Ga half-life and the $Q\scriptstyle_\textrm{EC}$ value are 168(3) ms and 9255(50) keV, respectively. The $\beta$-decay strength to the ground and low-lying excited states of the daughter $^{61}$Zn was deduced. The experimental results are in a good agreement with large-scale shell model calculations.

The magnitude of the Coulomb mixing parameter $\delta^1\!\scriptstyle_\textrm{IM}$ has been experimentally deduced, for the first time, for the $\beta$-decay of $^{74}$Rb. The estimated magnitude is derived from the feeding of the non-analog first excited $0^+$ state in $^{74}$Kr. The inferred upper limit of 0.07% is small compared to theoretical predictions. The half-life was measured to be 64.90(9) ms.