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This article attempts to determine the source of moral obligation in al-Māturīdī’s thought. First of all, a classification of concepts of morality in his writings is presented. These concepts are found to be three in number: Utility, Virtue and Right. However, of these, the concept of right is found to be the ultimate representative of moral obligation, since it alone offers us the idea of a categorical imperative which is essential for morality to be objective. Thereafter, two main sources of moral obligation are noted. One is revelation and the other is reason. Revelation presents the notions of divine lordship and sovereignty together with the divine command and prohibition. Yet, at the same time, reason determines our moral understanding with objective principles and supports revelatory teachings. This means that the findings of reason in the field of morality are usually in accord with revelation; where they differ, it is often because humanity lacks access to the necessary knowledge, which makes it impossible for them to reach the correct conclusions. Hence, al-Māturīdī also notes that revelation is especially needed in regards to areas of morality that are obscure and controversial, since it offers answers that humans would not otherwise be able to know with certainty. At the same time, it is understood that reason is a source of obligation in accordance with natural law theory, and therefore this latter theory is a basic way to categorize al-Māturīdī’s thought. The natural world offers guidance to reason and is a source of knowledge from which moral conclusions can be derived that are in line with basic human needs and desires. Al-Māturīdī, in particular, cites peace and prosperity as fundamental aims for humanity that can only be ensured by a guiding foundation. However, since God is the creator and designer of the world, the principle that ultimately determines the form of morality is divine wisdom. In the third section of this article, the topic of moral motivation is addressed. This is the key to understand how people can behave morally, and it is concluded that al-Māturīdī shows that we can act for objective reasons and judge actions morally without only taking into consideration their consequences. This is because reason allows one to judge actions according to criteria that are not based only on contingent and subjective aspects of reality but also on categorical principles and imperatives. In the last part of this study, it is suggested that al-Māturīdī views reason as independently bringing moral obligations. This allows us to overcome the gap that David Hume presented between is- and ought- statements. Thus, it is concluded that for al-Māturīdī the source of moral obligation is not simply based on revelatory commands, but also derived from the principles of reason. These principles are to a significant degree the result of derivations made from observations on human nature and the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenal socialism says that what we actually, directly, literally perceive is only or primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties; this paper argues for phenomenal socialism in the weaker, primarily version. Phenomenal socialism is the philosophy of perception that goes with recognitionalism, which is the metaethics that goes with epiphanies. The first part states the recognitionalist manifesto. The second part situates this manifesto relative to some more global concerns, about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory vs. anti-theory in ethics. The third part rehearses two familiar views about the possible contents of perceptual experience, Phenomenal Conservativism and Phenomenal Liberalism. It notes that the usual catalogue omits two other theoretical possibilities, Phenomenal Socialism and Phenomenal Nihilism, and it defends a watered-down form of Phenomenal Socialism from four main objections. The fourth part makes some connections with the epistemology of modality and with the role of the imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the ethics of AI and the principles behind it. Prior to the rules governing AI, it is necessary to understand the ethical issues related to the development, implementation and responsible use of AI systems. These ethical foundations are necessary to protect the rights and dignity of individuals, ensure fairness in data access and processing, minimise biases and risks associated with algorithms, promote transferability in automated decisions, and promote trustworthiness in technology, human benefit and social welfare. It is also proposed to study the ethics of AI from an all-encompassing point of view that integrates both applied ethics and metaethics of AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results.

The present research seeks to explain and clarify the ontology of ethics and the existence of moral attributes such as good and bad based on the fundamental views of Aakhund Khorasani. At first glance, the opinions of Khorasani Aakhund use a kind of essentialist moral reductionism, in such a way that moral attributes such as good and bad are reduced to the compatibility of the act with the power of reason, and of course, this compatibility is because the act has expediency and existence and good effects are compatible with the inherent beauty and ugliness of his consideration. With some reflections on the discussions of Aakhund Khorasani, it is possible to present an amendment to his first opinion and distinguish between the truth of the act and the performance of the act. In this case, to act, the element of intention must be added to the expediency and existence capacity and compatibility with the intellectual power. The implications of Aakhund's moral reductionism include 1) Posterior moral knowledge, 2) absolutism, 3) Lack of moral independence, and 4) Inference of must and value from being. In this research, first, the moral reductionism of Aakhund is explained and analyzed, and then its implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Procedure of Morality" is an article that examines the concept of procedural norms in moral discourse. The authors argue that procedural norms, similar to those found in law, also exist in morality. Procedural norms are second-order norms that guide how to engage with other norms, and they are outcome neutral. The article addresses objections to the existence of procedural moral norms and provides examples to support its argument. It aims to offer insights into the structure and tensions within moral discourse. [Extracted from the article]

This article explores the work of philosopher William James and his contribution to moral thought. It discusses James's views on moral philosophy and his belief in constructivism. The article compares James's constructivism to that of other philosophers, such as Sharon Street, and highlights the unique features of a Jamesian constructivism. It also discusses James's views on moral motivation and the role of religious beliefs in achieving it. Overall, the article provides insights into James's philosophical perspective and its implications for moral theory. [Extracted from the article]

This document is a list of references and citations for various philosophical works on topics related to metaethics, moral realism, and ontology. The works cover a range of perspectives and arguments, including discussions on supervenience, tropes, nonnaturalism, and the nature of universals. The document provides a comprehensive list of sources for library patrons conducting research on these topics, allowing them to explore the underlying texts further. [Extracted from the article]

This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moore’s moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moore's narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moore's claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individual’s mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moore's arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops Mark D. Linville's brief description of "a sort of moral fine-tuning argument". I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 20th century, two new disciplines emerged in the tradition of analytic philosophy: meta-ethics and political epistemology. Nevertheless, debates on such questions go back to the ancient Greeks and, in particular, to the debates between Plato and Protagoras. This article elucidates the controversy between Plato and the influential sophist Protagoras from the perspective of contemporary meta-ethics and political epistemology. It argues that the main motivation of Plato's philosophical endeavors is to overcome Protagoras's skeptical claims that no moral facts and no moral knowledge applicable to political issues exist. The paper defends the thesis that there exists a deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato on the existence of moral facts and moral knowledge. A deep disagreement is a disagreement that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Applying the foundationalist approach Robert J. Fogelin proposes in his seminal paper "The Logic of Deep Disagreements", this article argues that the deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato exists because their political thought is based on "underlying principles" that clash. While Plato's political philosophy rests on his religious and theological convictions, the political thought of Protagoras is based on his skepticism, relativism, and agnosticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek Parfit, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Erik J. Wielenberg—is that such a view entails that not even cruel or horrendous acts are to be called wrong by any universal or objective standard. I suggest that this motivation also applies to the ethical theory of egoism, as it may imply that no one has any obligation to refrain from cruel or horrendous acts as long they are beneficial to the agent. On that basis, I will demonstrate that egoism is a problem for robust moral realists that also, to a large degree, is being overlooked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Again, Wielenberg's fascinating I argument from psychopathy i from moral psychology against Divine Command Theory (DCT) focuses on the pathology known as psychopathy - a perennial interest for those concerned with abnormal and moral psychology. Furthermore, if the argument does present a serious problem for DCT, then it does so for Wielenberg's own view, Robust Normative Realism (RNR), just as much as for DCT. In the penultimate chapter, Martin Jakobsen's "A Christological Critique of Divine Command Theory" revisits DCT by presenting a theological critique of Divine Command Theory. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead mutually constituted through the relationships that they participate in. By emphasizing relationships and understanding goodness as harmony, the theory allows God and creation to jointly constitute goodness. This alternative theory is compared to the metaethical theories proposed by Robert M. Adams and Mark C. Murphy, which represent the two primary strands of theistic metaethics: theological voluntarism and natural law theory, respectively. The alternative theory exhibits certain advantages and resolves some of the issues found in Adams' and Murphy's theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article gives a new explanation for why the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma and argues that it is a middle position that both the theist and the atheist could accept. The argument is that both the will of God and the preferences of individuals are necessary truthmakers for what the good is. Each of the components is insufficient on its own, but jointly they are sufficient. Individual preferences are necessary to provide the normativity of the good, while God is necessary for the objectivity of the good. It is the combination of individual preferences into a possible world that is valuated the most by the most that gives the normative goal for moral choices. It is the knowledge of God of what would most probably be valuated the most by the most that makes a concrete choice the morally right thing to do in a concrete situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the history of what is termed the secular moral project by providing a synopsis of the history of the moral argument for God's existence and the various historical processes that have contributed to the secularization of ethics. I argue that three key thinkers propel the secular moral project forward from the middle of the 19th century into the 20th century: John Stuart Mill, whose ethical thinking in Utilitarianism serves as the background to all late 19th century secular ethical thinking, Henry Sidgwick, who, in the Methods, indisputably establishes the secular autonomy of ethics as a distinctive discipline (metaethics), and finally, G.E. Moore, whose work, the Principia Ethica, stands at the forefront of virtually all secular metaethical debates concerning naturalism and non-naturalism in the first half of the 20th century. Although secular metaethics continues to be the dominant ethical view of the academy, it is shown that theistic metaethics is a strong reemerging position in the early 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Motif Academy Journal of Folklore is the property of Motif Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God's divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theological critique of divine command theory, a metaethical theory stating that moral wrongness is constituted by God's command. First, I argue that this theory does not qualify as a Christian moral theory because it lacks connections to central parts of Christian theology, such as Christology. This argument does not imply that the theory is wrong nor that it is inconsistent with Christianity—only that it is not Christian as such. Second, I argue that divine command theory does not fit well with the New Testament's vision of the moral life, in which being conformed to the image of Christ has primacy over adherence to law. This argument implies that the Christian ethicist should look elsewhere for a metaethical theory. I next argue in favour of a moral theory of imitation, in which the moral life consists of imitating God, the prime exemplar of goodness, which is made possible through an imitation of Christ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Atheist moral philosopher Erik Wielenberg recently argued that Divine Command Theory is implausible as an explanation of objective morality because it fails to explain how psychopaths have moral obligations. In this paper I explain that everyone agrees the consciences of psychopaths don't work as they should, but there's disagreement among experts as to whether: A. The consciences of psychopaths don't inform them of what's right and wrong and that they should do what's right or B. The consciences of psychopaths do inform them of these things but merely don't generate the appropriate moral emotions. I argue that, based on the psychological research, a strong case can be made for B and thus under DCT psychopaths do have moral obligations because their consciences inform them of what's right from wrong and that they should do what's right. I also argue that even if A is true, God can, and does, make psychopaths aware of what's right and wrong and that they should do what's right through other means such as rationality, society, parents, culture, direct verbal commands, etc. Therefore, even if A is true, then psychopaths still have moral obligations under DCT because they do know what's right from wrong and that they should do what's right. Lastly, I turn the tables on Wielenberg and point out that his theory is even worse than DCT when it comes to providing an explanation for the moral rights and obligations of psychopaths [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this text, the author concentrates on an analysis of the concept of tolerance, which plays an important role in moral and political thought. The semantic framework that he uses in his analysis is moral expressivism. This is one of the influential and intensively discussed theories of contemporary metaethics. The author starts from the assumption that if we are to take tolerance seriously, we must consistently distinguish it from other moral attitudes (approval, indifference, excuse). Only a precise understanding of the concept of tolerance will make it possible for us to better identify tolerance or, as the case may be, appreciate it. Tolerance is understood here as a practical attitude, specifically as a second-order attitude. To tolerate X means to suppress your negative attitude towards X. This approach has surprising consequences. It reveals, in fact, that conservative moral thinking gives us a wider space for the application of tolerance than liberal moral thinking. At the same time, it problematizes the classical tenet of political philosophy that tolerance is a quintessentially liberal virtue.

The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt.

Copyright of Turkish Culture & Haci Bektas Veli Research Quarterly is the property of Turkish Cultur & Haci Bektas Veli Research Quarterly and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Erik Wielenberg has offered a fascinating argument from moral psychology against a sophisticated theistic account of moral obligations: Divine Command Theory (DCT). This argument focuses on the pathology known as psychopathy—a perennial interest for those concerned with abnormal and moral psychology. The argument can be labeled the argument from psychopathy for convenience. The strength of the argument is that it forces the DCT-ist to maintain that there are some human beings who have no moral obligations yet still do evil actions. This, he argues, is an implausible thesis. Therefore, DCT is false. In this paper, I defend DCT and argue that there is good reason to be neutral or skeptical that psychopaths have moral obligations and, to the degree that they do, they are able to grasp morality in a way consistent with DCT. Furthermore, if the argument does present a serious problem for DCT, then it does so for Wielenberg's own view, Robust Normative Realism (RNR), just as much as DCT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two main positions in metaethical discussions. The first, cognitivist, position is that moral evaluations may be true or untrue, and the second, internalist, position is that these evaluations guide actions such that the agent is internally motivated to act based on the content of that evaluation. These two positions conflict. Cognitivism has to deal with the problem of moral motivation, and internalism has to explain the relevance of moral evaluations. In this article we will explore the moral philosophy of Philippa Foot as presented in her Natural Goodness. Our aim is to reconstruct and explain Foot's arguments in favour of cognitivist and externalist views. Hence the final part proffers a summary of the metaethical aspects of Foot's moral philosophy, and thereby highlights both the originality and contribution it makes to contemporary ethical thinking, and sketches a constructivist interpretation of Foot's moral philosophy that emphasises the function of practical reason in constituting moral normativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In We Have Always Been Cyborgs, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner presents an entire philosophical system, blending Nietzschean scepticism with the transhumanist impulse to embrace technology. He integrates ideas that range from fundamental issues in epistemology, metaphysics, and metaethics to specific recommendations for new European institutions. Much of this is attractive and impressive, and Sorgner's growing body of work makes an important contribution to debates over regulatory policy arising from new technologies such as digital surveillance, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and techniques for genome editing. At the same time, there is room for concern at Sorgner's use of a cluster of ideas related to the politics of emerging technologies. Sorgner usefully invokes the concept of negative freedom, but this alone cannot settle the boundaries of freedom in a liberal democratic society. He appears to embrace an expansive concept of violence and is quick to find violent elements in ideas and opinions that he rejects. Again, he appears to underestimate and understate the importance of privacy. These criticisms are cautionary rather than definitive, and they may not provide adequate grounds to reject any of Sorgner's policy recommendations. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests a need for further philosophical work on key concepts in the politics of emerging technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg.

As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek Parfit, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Erik J. Wielenberg—is that such a view entails that not even cruel or horrendous acts are to be called wrong by any universal or objective standard. I suggest that this motivation also applies to the ethical theory of egoism, as it may imply that no one has any obligation to refrain from cruel or horrendous acts as long they are beneficial to the agent. On that basis, I will demonstrate that egoism is a problem for robust moral realists that also, to a large degree, is being overlooked.

Technology affects human life both positively and negatively. In the 21st century, all societies have begun to move away from their own cultures and values. There are many ethical problems in the world today. These ethical problems vary according to the structure of each society. Due to this change in the understanding of ethics, it is seen that many ethical problems are experienced in the Turkish world. In order to contribute to the resolution of these problems, I have revealed my Folkloric Grounding Metaethics Analysis Method, which is the method of analysis of my theory and Metaethic Theory of Folklore, with my interdisciplinary work in the fields of folklore and ethics. Metaetic Theory of Folklore moral life; It puts forward the proposition that it can be justified on the basis of traditions, customs and traditions, proves this claim with the ethical index of the Book of Dede Korkut, the complete scholar of the Turkish world.The subject of this study is the ethical analysis of the Negative Ethical Values of Creating Animosity and Slandering, which is one of the negative ethical values in the Dede Korkut Book of Ethics Index. The aim of our study; It is to make an exemplary study at the point of applying the Metaethic Theory of Folklore to the narratives by determining the folk ideas in the folklore sense, the propositions in the metaethical sense, which are the source of the emergence of the ethical understanding of the Turkish society.

Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.

Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren't propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the "logical problem") this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements do have a truth-value). I will present the difficulty and argue that some constructivists, who are cognitivists, cannot contend with it at all, and others must resort to more complex ways than the one available to other cognitivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research shows that civility norms, such as morality norms, are necessary navigational charts to orient an individual in social life. However, there are no studies that establish the extent to which people consider civility norms as objective facts in a similar way to how many moral norms are considered. This research examines the perceived objectivity of civility norms in contrast to morality norms. The results show, firstly, that immoral norms are perceived to be significantly more objective than moral norms, but the opposite occurs with civility norms. Second, there is a high correlation between what participants consider objective and what they believe the rest of their community considers objective. However, this correlation was greater for immoral behaviors than for moral behaviors, and the opposite occurred for civility behaviors. Finally, participants estimated that the percentage of people in their group who engage in uncivil behaviors is higher than those who engage in immoral behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our daily existence is affected by how we perceive death, be it our own's death to- come or others' death. The intimidating nature of death has the potential to affect our daily ethical existence in relation to the other, as is seen in various crises in human history. In such a context, since expansive literature in various approaches such as biological, sociological, psychological, and political addressing the question of death is already available, this essay presents an ethico-philosophical perspective on death and argues if death should be seen as the worst event that is to be experienced by being. In this essay, I correlate language, time, and death, contrasting popular analogies, i.e., death is possibility of impossibility (Hegel and Heidegger), and death is impossibility of possibility (Lévinas and Blanchot). Firstly, the essay stages the discussion with contrasting synchronic and diachronic perspectives of language, i.e., historical understanding of language and time in Hegelian terms and the messianic time in Lévinasian terms, to see how sensibility, i.e., universal meaning, is expressed through concept. Secondly, the essay sees how sensibility is expressed through a concept beyond dialectic opposition and negativity while acknowledging that the question of ethics arises only after the end of philosophy, for something is always inexpressible through expression; there is always remnant beyond philosophical significance. This essay not only argues language, time, and death as the ethical responsibility of the self towards the other, but also contributes to the understanding of language as ethics beyond philosophy, and death as passivity beyond ontology following Lévinas's idea of messianic time and Blanchot's views on literature and death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the language used to discuss concepts of good or bad, beautiful or ugly, tasty or disgusting, and how it has been a subject of interest for philosophers, particularly in the context of evaluative language, which was historically considered different from truth-conditional language but later developed into concepts like emotivism and expressivism.

This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving “up close and personal” harm back to our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene’s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous (gene-independent) moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism.