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The argument that digitalization fosters economic activity has been strengthened by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Because digital technologies are general-purpose technologies that are usable across a wide variety of economic activities, the gains from achieving universal coverage of digital services are likely to be large and shared throughout each economy. However, the Middle East and North Africa region suffers from a “digital paradox”: the region’s population uses social media more than expected for its level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita but uses the internet or other digital tools to make payments less than expected. The Upside of Digital for the Middle East and North Africa: How Digital Technology Adoption Can Accelerate Growth and Create Jobs presents evidence that the socioeconomic gains of digitalizing the economies of the region are huge: GDP per capita could rise by more than 40 percent; manufacturing revenue per unit of factors of production could increase by 37 percent; employment in manufacturing could rise by 7 percent; tourist arrivals could rise by 70 percent, creating jobs in the hospitality sector; long-term unemployment rates could fall to negligible levels; and female labor force participation could double to more than 40 percent. To reap these gains, universal access to digital services is crucial, as is their widespread use for economic purposes. The book explores how fast the region could approach universal coverage, whether targeting the rollout of digital infrastructure services makes a difference, and what is needed to increase the use of digital payment tools. The authors find that targeting underserved populations and areas can accelerate the achievement of universal access, while fostering competition and improving the functioning of financial and telecommunications sectors can encourage the adoption of digital technologies. In addition, building societal trust in the government and in related institutions such as banks and financial services is critical for fostering the increased use of digital payment tools.

Public debt in developing economies rose at a fast clip during 2020–21, at least partly due to the onset of the global Covid-19 pandemic. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman opined in early 2021 that “fighting covid is like fighting a war.” This paper argues that the Covid-19 pandemic shares many traits with natural disasters, except for the global nature of the pandemic shock. This paper empirically examines trends in debt and economic growth around the onset of three types of calamities, namely natural disasters, armed conflicts, and external-debt distress in developing countries. The estimations provide quantitative estimates of differences in growth and debt trends in economies suffering episodes of calamities relative to the trends observed in economies not experiencing calamities. The paper finds that debt and growth evolve quite differently depending on the type of calamity. The evidence indicates that public debt and output growth tend to rise faster after natural disasters than in the counterfactual scenario without disasters, thus illustrating how debt-financed fiscal expansions can help economic reconstruction. The findings are different for episodes of debt distress defined as periods of debt restructuring, however. Economies experiencing debt distress are associated with growth trends that are on average below the growth rates of unaffected economies prior to and after the beginning of an episode of debt restructuring.

For centuries states have engaged in collecting data to serve various interests. In modern times, a data gap has emerged between developing and developed economies, with the latter having more advanced data systems. The authors explore the effects of data transparency on longrun growth for a sample of mostly developing economies. Data transparency is defined as the timely production of credible statistics as measured by the Statistical Capacity Index. The paper finds that data transparency has a positive effect on real gross domestic product per capita, implying a statistically significant impact on transitional growth to a higher potential level of gross domestic product per capita. The estimates indicate an elasticity of the magnitude of 0.03 percent per year, which is much larger than the elasticity of trade openness and schooling in the estimation sample. The empirics employ a variety of econometric estimators, including dynamic panel and cross-sectional instrumental variables estimators, with the latter approach yielding a higher estimated elasticity. The findings are robust to the inclusion of several factors in addition to political institutions and exogenous commodity-price and external debt-financing shocks.

This paper investigates the empirical relationship between citizens' perceptions of economic and political conditions and the incidence of nonviolent uprisings. Perceptions are measured by aggregating individual-level data from regional barometer surveys. The main results show that negative perceptions of political conditions -- proxied by the share of the population that is generally dissatisfied with the way democracy works -- have a significant positive effect on the number of protests and strikes. Negative perceptions of economic conditions do not seem to be significantly related to the latter. This generally holds across a large sample of countries and is particularly the case for Western and Central European countries as well as high-income countries. In developing economies, however, social protests appear to be driven by dissatisfaction with economic and political conditions. The heterogeneous effects of perceptions on uprisings across geography and income groups, however, are not robust and susceptible to changes in estimators and model specification. In particular, the international contagion of protests eliminates this international heterogeneity, implying that the incidence of uprisings in nearby countries tends to generate protests at home through its effect on perceptions related to political conditions in high-income countries. Overall, the effect of perceptions about political conditions, along with protest contagion, is robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables that capture actual economic conditions and the quality of governance across countries. The results are also robust to the use of seemingly valid instrumental variables, alternative count-data estimators, and sample composition.

This paper presents firm-level estimates of revenue-based total factor productivity premiums of manufacturing firms adopting digital technology in 82 developing economies over 2002–19. The paper estimates productivity using the control function approach and assuming an endogenous revenue-based total factor productivity process, which is a function of multiple firm-choice variables. It estimates the effects of digital technology adoption, learning by exporting, and managerial experience on revenue-based total factor productivity and factor demand. The results reject the 0 hypothesis of an exogenous revenue-based total factor productivity process, in favor of one in which digital technology adoption, along with the other choice variables, affects revenue-based total factor productivity and factor demand. The estimated premiums are positive for 67.3 (email adoption), 54.6 (website adoption), 59.4 (learning by exporting), and 60.6 (managerial experience) percent of the sample. The probability-adjusted median (log) revenue-based total factor productivity premium associated with email adoption is 1.6 percent and that of website adoption is 2.2 percent, with the latter being higher than the premiums corresponding to exporting and managerial experience. On average, changes in digital technology adoption, email, and website are labor and capital augmenting. The paper also explores the role of complementarities among the firm choice variables.

This paper is the first to quantify the relationship between the incidence of the digital economy and long-term frictional unemployment across countries. The resulting evidence indicates that there is a robust, negative partial correlation between national unemployment rates and the incidence of the digital economy, proxied by the share of the adult population that reports using the internet to pay bills. Further, the absolute values of ordinary least squares estimates of the partial correlation suggest that it might be higher for developing economies than high-income economies. Controlling for the incidence of informal employment appears to be key for removing a positive omitted- variable bias in the estimate of the partial correlation between unemployment and the digital economy, which is due to the existence of a negative bivariate correlation between unemployment and informality on the one hand, and a negative bivariate correlation between informality and the incidence of digital payment on the other hand. The results from instrumental variable estimations suggest that the partial correlation between unemployment and digital payments is negative, with the absolute value of the estimates being larger than the absolute value of the ordinary least squares estimates.

This paper studies the evolution of three macroeconomic variables (namely current fiscal expenditures, public debt, and consumer-price inflation) around the time of the onset of armed conflicts during 1950-2016. The authors compare the performance of these variables in conflict-afflicted economies with economies that did not experience social conflict. The analyses cover episodes of conflict from around the world and study the evolution of these variables during the five years prior to and five years after the onset of conflicts. Further, four alternative definitions of social conflict are used to ascertain the robustness of the econometric results. The evidence suggests that current fiscal expenditures and public debt (both as a share of gross domestic product) in conflict-afflicted economies tend to be higher than in non-conflict economies prior to the onset of conflict, begin to rise further prior to the date of the onset of conflict, and stay relatively high after the onset of conflict. In contrast, there is little evidence that inflation is higher in conflict-afflicted economies, prior to or after the onset of conflict. These differential trends between conflict-afflicted and non-conflict economies shed new light on the existing literature on macroeconomic populism, and on key macroeconomic aspects of the economics of post-conflict reconstruction.

This paper explores the link between exports and the demand for skilled tasks. Using the Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual census of manufacturing firms, the analysis first shows that Chilean exporters utilize more skills than Chilean non-exporters. More importantly, there is a distinct pattern of task differentiation among exporters both within skilled and unskilled tasks. Exporting firms demand the services of skilled specialized workers (engineers) as opposed to skilled administrative workers and managers. In addition, exporters demand less unskilled labor, especially blue-collar operatives. This suggests that exporters substitute skilled engineers for unskilled blue-collar workers to perform export-related tasks.

This paper estimates a panel model in which the relationship between inequality and gross domestic product per capita growth depends on countries' initial incomes. Estimates of the model show that the relationship between inequality and gross domestic product per capita growth is significantly decreasing in countries' initial incomes. The results from instrumental variables regressions show that in low-income countries, transitional growth is boosted by greater income inequality. In high-income countries, inequality has a significant negative effect on transitional growth. For the median country in the world that in 2015 had a purchasing power parity gross domestic product per capita of around US$10,000, instrumental variables estimates predict that a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient decreases gross domestic product per capita growth over a five-year period by over 1 percentage point; the long-run effect on the level of gross domestic product per capita is around -5 percent.

Recent literature has shown evidence of positive contributions of export promotion agencies around the world in raising exports, through the intensive and extensive margins of trade. The number of export promotion agencies has increased substantially over the past two decades, and most of them focus on assisting exporters in understanding and finding markets for their products. This paper describes the characteristics of export promotion agencies around the world, using a novel database from the World Bank, in collaboration with the International Trade Center in Geneva, covering 2005-10. In addition, it presents a short summary of the literature on the impacts of export promotion agencies.

This paper presents estimates of the relationship between the share of income accruing to the middle class and gross domestic product per capita of economies from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The increase in gross domestic product per capita that these economies experienced during 1970–2010 significantly contributed to a higher share of income accruing to the middle class. The impact of the rise of the middle class on economic growth depends on the countries' initial level of gross domestic product per capita. In the majority of these countries, a rise of the middle class that is unrelated to gross domestic product per capita growth would have had a significant negative effect on economic growth, based on the values of the countries' gross domestic product per capita in 1970. In contrast, for recent values of gross domestic product per capita, a rise of the middle class would positively contribute to growth in gross domestic product per capita. The paper shows that human capital accumulation is an important channel through which a rise of the middle class affects economic growth.

Newly discovered oil reserves off the coast of Brazil present a unique opportunity for the country to boost an already successful trajectory of growth and development. This note examines potential choices for the government when it contemplates how to disburse this newfound wealth. This review suggests that Brazil would be well served by saving a large amount of the windfall, ensuring that the country’s increased wealth reaches the poor, putting in place strong fiscal planning to guide efficient investment, and building the country’s research and development capacity.

Combining macroeconomic and microeconomic data and three indicators of international market integration, this paper assesses the degree to which Latin American labor markets are integrated. The results suggest that relative to East Asia, Latin American labor markets are somewhat more integrated, but considerable differences across countries persist. In addition, the evidence indicates that the degree of labor market integration across Latin American borders is significantly less than that of labor markets within Mexico and within the United States in two of the three indicators. These differences may suggest opportunities for efficiency gains from further labor market integration.

The diffusion of knowledge plays a central role in endogenous growth theories. Simply put, in these models new knowledge can be generated from preexisting knowledge. In other words, existing knowledge is a pure public good, which can benefit any economic agent anywhere. More generally, endogenous growth theories rely on a broad set of assumptions that have not been tested sufficiently, especially for developing economies. The scope and nature of knowledge spillovers is, however, important for policy, because the presumed positive spillovers can justify government intervention (if the spillovers are localized) or laissez faire (if the spillovers are international). This paper empirically assesses the scope and direction of knowledge spillovers in national patenting and, separately, product innovation by firms. The first set of exercises tests whether the cumulative knowledge specifications of the knowledge production function can explain international patterns of patenting or whether own research and development is necessary to produce patents. The second set of exercises analyzes whether firm product-quality upgrading and the introduction of new products depend on product innovation within industries, within or across countries. The evidence supports the view that existing stocks of knowledge, domestic and foreign, enhance national innovation and entrepreneurship in the form of product innovation. More specifically, the evidence suggests that within-country and international knowledge spillovers are positive, but international spillovers can be negative for firms that are far from innovative firms in terms of productivity. The results depend on the concept of “distance” between countries and firms.

After investment, exports and imports are the most volatile components of aggregate demand within countries. Moreover, the volatility of growth and the volatility of trade flows tend to move together; they declined from the 1990s until 2009, followed by an increase since 2009. This paper explores the drivers of such movements in trade-flow volatility. The analysis decomposes trade growth into six components to study their contribution to the overall volatility of trade flows, and presents three findings. First, trade volatility is mostly explained by a factor common to all countries, country-specific factors, and changes in the gravity-related characteristics of a country's trading partners. Product composition and the identity of trading partners appear to be less important in explaining volatility. Second, the pre-2009 decline in volatility and the post-2009 increase in volatility appear to be driven by different factors. The former is mostly explained by a steady decline in the variance of country-specific factors. In contrast, the latter appears to be driven mainly by an increase in the volatility of factors common to all countries. Third, trade diversification is a likely force behind the steady decline in trade volatility driven by country-specific factors, especially in developing countries.

Using data on net exports and factor endowments for more than 100 countries, this paper studies the relationship between factor endowments and comparative advantage in 28 manufacturing sectors between 1975 and 2010. The authors allow for systematic technological differences across countries, including differences in factor intensities across countries with different ratios of skilled labor over unskilled labor. Capital seems to be a source of comparative disadvantage in manufacturing, and skilled labor is a source of comparative advantage in the global sample. However, skilled labor is a source of comparative disadvantage in economies with low human capital, whereas it is a source of comparative advantage in the sample of countries with high human capital. The authors attribute this heterogeneity to the rise of capital mobility across countries, particularly since the mid-1990s.

This paper investigates differences in the composition of employment between exporting and non-exporting firms. In particular, it asks whether exporting firms hire more engineers relative to blue-collar workers than non-exporting firms. In a stylized partial-equilibrium model, firms produce goods of varying quality and exporters tend to produce higher quality goods, which are intensive in engineers relative to blue-collar workers. Firms are heterogeneous and more productive firms become exporters and have a higher demand for engineers. The paper provides causal evidence in support of these theories using the Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual, an annual census of manufacturing firms. The results from an instrumental variable estimator suggest that Chilean exporters indeed utilize a higher share of engineers over blue-collar workers.

Surveys of export promotion agencies suggest that that they tend to focus on helping firms become exporters as a means to stimulate aggregate export growth, but the existing empirical evidence has paid little attention to the role of export promotion agencies in helping entry into exporting. This paper fills this gap with a panel of exporting and non-exporting firms from seven Latin American countries during the period 2006–2010. The results suggest that export promotion encourages exports mainly by helping firms enter into and survive in export markets. The impact on the intensive margin of exporting firms is not robust.

This paper provides an overview of the impact that onetime changes in commodity and other prices have on household welfare. It begins with a collection of stylized facts related to commodities based on household survey data from Latin America and Africa. The data uncovers strong commodity dependence on both continents: households typically allocate a large fraction of their budget to commodities, and they often also depend on commodities to earn their income. This income and expenditure dependency suggests sizable impacts and adjustments following commodity price shocks. The article explores these effects with a review of the relevant literature. The authors study consumption and income responses, labor market responses, and spillovers across sectors. The paper provides evidence on the relative magnitudes of various mechanisms through which commodity prices affect household (and national) welfare in developing economies.