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Despite years of crisis, the euro has enjoyed strong popular support across the Eurozone periphery. In light of the high costs of internal devaluation strategies, this begs the question why the public has remained in favor of the common currency. In this article, we propose a theoretical mechanism that accounts for both voters’ pocketbook preferences and their sociotropic assessments over the noisy trade-offs associated with the outcomes of euro membership and euro exit. Using original survey data from three consecutive survey waves in Greece (conducted in July, September, and December 2015, respectively), we analyze the attitudes of Greek voters toward the euro in an environment of acute uncertainty, austerity, high unemployment, and economic recession. First, we juxtapose our uncertainty mechanism of popular euro attitudes against other explanations put forward in the literature and find strong support for our argument. Second, we conduct a survey experiment to tap into attitudes toward the euro-austerity trade-off and find that as uncertainty over policy outcomes diminishes, framing effects abate in significance, especially among those who voted No in the July 2015 referendum. Finally, we derive distinct sets of euro preferences for different ‘vulnerability profiles’. Over time, as the trade-offs of euro membership become more pronounced, we find a marked fall in euro support between July and December 2015.

Referenda in Greece and the UK have recently sent shockwaves across Europe. This paper examines this popular challenge to international cooperation in a systematic fashion by focusing on foreign policy referenda in which a non-cooperative vote is associated with large negative externalities. Such high-stakes referenda are unusual because the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome cannot be controlled by the national government but instead depend on whether the other countries accommodate or penalize the non-cooperative vote. This implies that voters’ expectations about the likely reaction abroad will be highly influential for voting behavior. Foreign policymakers can influence these expectations by sending costly signals ahead of the vote, thus trying to sway the vote in favor of cooperation. Using original survey data from a recent high-stakes referendum, the 2015 Greek referendum, we show that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote had a powerful effect on voting behavior. Leveraging the bank closure in Greece, we also show that costly signals sent by the other member states made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a no-vote and increased the share of cooperative votes.

The Greek political system has come under intense scrutiny in the past few years. The two successive electoral contests that took place on May 6 and June 17 opened a Pandora’s box so to say of democratic ailments: extremism, populism, witch-hunting, and fear-mongering. Viewed from the perspective of five successive years of recession, unprecedented levels of austerity, and acute economic uncertainty, this should come as no surprise.

The results of the May 6 parliamentary elections have heralded the end of an era in its post-dictatorial democratic politics (metapolitefsi) characterized by alternation in power by two catch-all parties, cartelization of government, and heavy statism. The people have expressed a strong aversion to established political elites of the center-left PASOK and the center-right New Democracy (whose vote shares added up to 32%, less than half of their sum total in the 2009 elections). The rise of SYRIZA, a pre-electoral coalition of left-wing movements, has been the major story so far. However, the existing electoral system – designed by New Democracy in 2006 as a buttress for an entrenched two-party system and stable single-party government – has led to a significant distortion of the democratic will in terms of the translation of vote shares into seats (New Democracy gained more than a third of the seats with only 19% of the vote).

Last month, the Democratic Left party left Greece’s coalition government, leaving PASOK and New Democracy with a razor-thin majority and the expectation of fresh elections for the country. Nikitas Konstantinidis argues that Greece’s political system has become much more fragmented in the wake of the crisis, with voters also now paying more attention to populist promises than parties’ ability to deliver change. Party competition in Greece has also been further constrained by the intervention of the EU and the Troika into domestic political life, severely limiting policy alternatives.

David Cameron is committed to holding a referendum on the UK’s EU membership should he win a majority at the next general election. In an effort to understand why parties call for referendums on European integration, Andreas Dür and Nikitas Konstantinidis look at data from the ratification of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004. They find that the amount of time until the next election has a significant impact on whether parties choose to support referendums or not, and that parties are far more likely to advocate a referendum on unpopular and controversial issues.

In February, Greece agreed to a four month extension of its current bailout programme, subject to the approval of reform measures proposed by the Greek government. As yet, however, the country’s creditors have still not reached an agreement over the reforms which have been put forward. Nikitas Konstantinidis writes that with tough negotiations ahead, the piecemeal approach which has so far been adopted by Eurozone governments during the crisis is becoming increasingly unsustainable.

The final result of the Greek referendum saw 61.3 per cent of voters reject the proposal, with 38.7 per cent voting in favour. We asked some of EUROPP’s contributors for their reactions to the result and what it could mean for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. Kyriakos Moumoutzis: “To ‘live life on their own terms’ is to live life outside the Eurozone” Jonathan White: “The wider anti-austerity movement is likely to continue to make itself heard” Lorenzo Codogno: “In the long term, this whole saga may turn out to be positive as it may trigger a much-needed clarification on Eurozone governance and the future of the Union” Nikitas Konstantinidis: “Greece is fast degenerating into a regime of illiberal Chavism and there is not much Europeans can do to stem this tide” Eri Bertsou: “The big question is what Tsipras will choose to do next”

The Greek bailout referendum resulted in a clear victory for the ‘No’ side, but what explained the choices made by voters? Ignacio Jurado, Nikitas Konstantinidis and Stefanie Walter present results from a detailed survey conducted in Greece the day before the referendum was held. Among the findings, they note that voting intention was heavily influenced by partisan narratives concerning the likely consequences of the referendum, with a majority of Yes supporters believing a Grexit would occur following a No vote, but only a small percentage of No supporters believing this to be true.

Talks are continuing in an attempt to reach a deal between Greece and its creditors over the release of further financial assistance to the country. Nikitas Konstantinidis writes that even if a deal can be reached by the Greek government at the European level, there would remain uncertainty as to whether the coalition government’s majority could survive the parliamentary ratification process. He argues that while it was a politically motivated decision to let Greece into the euro, it will take a sizeable political compromise on many different levels to keep it in.

More than a week after Greece’s elections, a political stalemate still stands, with no party able to form a stable government. Nikitas Konstantinidis argues that the demands placed on Greece from international organisations such as the IMF and the EU have strained its political system to a near breaking point. The solutions to Greece’s crisis now rest with Paris, Berlin and Brussels rather than Athens.

Nikitas Konstantinidis examines Greece in the wake of the recent election, noting a deepening democratic deficit shown by a surprisingly low voter turnout. He argues that the root causes of the Greek predicament are deeply systemic and should be addressed as such.