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The article analyzes the meaning of the words with intent, destroy, in part or in whole, drawing upon evidence of the Genocide Convention and defends the genocide label as acts of mass killing with the goal of displacement rather than extermination consistent with the lost history of the Convention, and the link of ethnic cleansing to genocide. Topics discussed include intent to destroy in the Bosnia cases, moral coherence of genocide in language and law, and the Convention's drafting history.

The article explores how arbitral rules in an unsophisticated arbitration agreement invalidates an employee's clear and unmistakable manifestation of intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. Topics discussed include role of delegation clauses in the agreement of parties to arbitrate questions of arbitrability, contract of adhesion theory, doctrine of unconscionability and principles of incorporation by reference, and rebuttable presumption of unsophistication for certain contracts.

On March 9, 2021, in United States v. Lancaster, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a district court ruling on a First Step Act motion must consider intervening factual and legal developments when deciding whether to resentence an offender under the Act. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit exacerbated a circuit split regarding the proper scope of the First Step Act. Four circuits, led by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have taken the opposite position and do not allow their district courts to consider intervening circumstances at all. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, on the other hand, allow their district courts to consider intervening circumstances but do not require them to do so. Within the latter group, the First Circuit created a two-step framework for ruling on a First Step Act motion where a district court may not consider intervening circumstances when deciding whether to resentence but may do so when actually resentencing. This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly expanded the First Step Act's scope of relief in United States v. Lancaster because it did not properly balance the Act's statutory text with the Act's discretionary grant. Additionally, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the First Circuit's two-step framework because that approach best realizes Congress's intent within the Act's textual limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Will construction--the process wherein a trier of fact must determine the testator's probable intent because the testator's actual intent is not clear--is too little discussed and too often misunderstood in succession law jurisprudence. Yet, construction issues are becoming increasingly important due to a growing number of will and trust disputes concerning the determination of beneficiaries in a post-Obergefell United States. Currently, courts are being asked to construe terms like "spouse," "husband," "wife," "child," "son," "daughter," and "descendants" in estate planning documents during a time in which understandings of marriage, identity, reproduction, religious liberty, and public policy are rapidly evolving. Interestingly, these various construction cases may have disparate legal outcomes depending upon the states in which the cases are litigated, even in cases with similar underlying facts. In fact, these definitions and consequent outcomes may correlate with the views of the state's dominant political party--whether a state is red or blue. Data support the notion that red states and blue states generally have different attitudes toward LGBT issues, artificial reproductive technology, and religion. Data also support the inference that judges-- particularly elected judges--tend to be influenced by their respective state's attitude. Where a judge's decision-making is influenced one way or the other--toward the red side or the blue side--her approach to will construction and her understanding of public policy may reflect that tendency. Therefore, diverging public policies in red states and in blue states may affect judicial construction and govern dispositions. Accordingly, this Article addresses real-world construction issues in the estate planning context where a particular state's approach to the redefinition of both words and policy may influence the deemed intent ascribed to a donor's words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the issues behind the integration of 'no contest clauses' in estate planning. Topics include the primacy of testamentary freedom as reason for the enforcement of said clauses in wills and other estate planning documents, how California testators and their lawyers allegedly overuse the 'no contest' provisions, and the use of sticky default rules to avoid issues emanating from testators' intent in boilerplate no contest clauses.

The article discusses issues in contractual boilerplate and a party's intent in the construction of contracts. Topics include the duty of the courts to refrain from enforcing contract terms that are illegal or contrary to vital public policy, the hard boilerplate contracts or contract of adhesion, and the pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts.

North Carolina should abolish its location requirement for making a holographic will. Under the North Carolina holographic wills statute, a handwritten document must be found in an approved location after its author's death in order to be regarded as a holographic will. No other state has mandated a location requirement for holographic wills since 1941. The location requirement furthers neither of the core functions of will execution formalities: it makes probate courts' decisions less efficient but no more accurate. And, because holographic wills in North Carolina are not technically executed until they are found postmortem, confounding doctrinal issues arise when testators attempt to revoke them before death. The location requirement of the holographic wills statute imposes costs without countervailing benefits. Thus, the North Carolina General Assembly should abolish the location requirement from the holographic wills statute. In its place, the location in which a decedent stores a purported holographic will should be relegated to simply one contributing factor in assessing testamentary intent. Such a revision would reflect sound policy and bring North Carolina into accord with the rest of the country when it comes to the making of holographic wills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thousands of patients in the United States live in limbo every day waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant, and the gap between the number of people who need a transplant and the number of available organs widens every year. Every state currently allows individuals to unilaterally indicate their intent to donate their organs upon death, but in practice, family members are frequently allowed to override the express intentions of decedents. In addition, the current U.S. "opt-in" system fails to reach its full potential because many eligible decedents never express their desires to become or not to become organ donors, and family members refuse to consent to donation or cannot be contacted in time. This Note argues that states should again take the lead in organdonation regulation to solve the organ-shortage crisis and proposes a twofold solution for states to adopt. First, states should switch to a presumed-consent, or opt-out, model. Second, states should implement a monitoring and enforcement mechanism through which state attorneys general and state health departments enforce first-person authorization. Organ procurement organizations should be required to adopt bylaws requiring their strict compliance with decedents' wishes, and a failure to do so would give state attorneys general grounds to sue for breach of 501(c)(3) status obligations. The result would be to increase the supply of viable organs for transplant by interpreting an individual's failure to opt out as a desire to donate and to enforce this choice by not allowing anyone to override it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the analysis of intent element of generic burglary in the case United States v. McArthur by U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It discusses that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated requirement of intent to form at the moment of unlawful entry or remaining in for the purposes of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Although in German and in Spanish legal systems there are no express provisions with regard to the criminal negligence (culpa), this has not hindered the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to thoroughly analyse this form of guilt. This made it possible to qualify as intentional offences some deeds which in our legal system are considered to be committed with conscious negligence (involving foresight). The difficulty to distinguish between indirect intention (dolus eventualis) and conscious negligence (luxuria) has nonetheless determined Spanish courts to ask the legislator to provide a clear definition of indirect intention, which could be an additional argument with respect to the weaknesses entailed by such a legal approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts. Increasingly, when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal's vicarious liability for its agent's acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to supervise or control its agent. From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities. Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability does). This raises questions. Why doesn't direct employer negligence liability suffice, in terms of deterring employees' intentional torts? Or conversely, so long as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at all? In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer's preventative measures. Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration. The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability. The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers when their employees commit intentional torts. Specifically, I argue that the under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages imposed in vicarious liability cases. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. And seen through this lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal--typically defended as a "complicity rule" limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds--is justified on economic deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the facilitation of the intent of deceased social media users, regarding their social media accounts. Topics discussed include the post-life policies of social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram; its comparison with traditional trusts and estates law; and the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA) and the Privacy Expectation Afterlife Choices Act (PEAC) in the U.S.

Federal substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies might seem to be distinct bodies of law. But since the closing decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an increasing unwillingness in both areas to impose either direct or indirect sanctions on persons who violate the law but whose conduct is not necessarily indicative of an unlawful or antisocial intent. Instead, the Court has tended to narrow liability or remedy to instances in which there is evidence that the regulated actor contravened not just the law on the books but also a social understanding of legality. We call this supervening criterion for individual criminal or civil liability an apparent fault requirement. This Article documents the contemporaneous rise of an apparent fault requirement across two domains of Supreme Court jurisprudence and explores its causes as well as its effects. We argue that the demand for apparent fault is likely to make some kinds of coercive regulation less costly even as it imposes an inhibiting tax on other species of state intervention. Rather than diagnosing apparent fault's rise as an endogenous product of legal reasoning, we situate it within a broader historical and intellectual context as a way of showing the value of understanding doctrine in the context of its sociocultural moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to "purpose." Typically, these references pertain to the motivations of individual officers and occasionally to those of public institutions. That courts pay attention to purpose is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer's intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both. Purpose analysis in Fourth Amendment cases, however, is surprisingly confused. The Supreme Court has, without explanation, advanced separate frameworks for analyzing purpose--objective, subjective, and programmatic. The only consistent thing about the three approaches is that they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently and honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the increasingly salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme Court cases. This Article contends that courts and policy makers should use purpose as an ex ante institutional design principle. This would be in stark contrast to its current role as a judicial device for ascertaining an actor's past motivations. A single enforcement bureaucracy should not be responsible for too broad a range of functions, particularly i f those functions implicate very different levels of state coercion--for example, enforcing felony narcotics laws as opposed to traffic laws. Modern police departments tend to have sprawling mandates that sometimes make it impossible for policy makers and officers to differentiate and rank distinct goals. Mandate sprawl is particularly problematic because it creates opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures--police have access to a broad range of rationales to justify conduct actually carried out for impermissible motives. Were enforcement bureaucracies required to differentiate enforcement activities by purpose, it would go a long way in curing this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal aspects of the branding and trademark practices of charitable organizations in America as of 2017, and it mentions judicial interpretations of the U.S. Lanham Act, the over-enforcement of trademarks, and several trademark litigation matters in the country. The concept of trademark bullying by charities is addressed, along with shaming in the nonprofit sector, trademark costs, a defendant's deceptive intent, and pleading requirements in the U.S.

The article discusses the controversy surrounding the criminal liability of a person whose intent is to inflict harm or loss on another person in the U.S., focusing on Elonis v. United States court case. Topics discussed include analysis of objective intent approach to true threats; Elonis case concerning whether conviction of threatening another person over interstate lines requires proof of subjective intent to threaten; and laws governing the same by First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

Studies consistently show that African Americans face more employment scrutiny and negative employment actions than their white coworkers. Recognizing thatmuch of the explicit racism of the twentieth century has given way to subtle and often unconscious discriminatory biases, this Note argues that current Title VII jurisprudence contains the tools and legal distinctions to provide legal redress for this implicit bias. Discriminatory intent, a requisite showing for plaintiffs bringing Title VII disparate treatment claims, should not be understood to require proof of a particular mental state. Instead, the current law should--and could--simply require that plaintiffs demonstrate a causal link between their membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action that they suffered. Discriminatory actions by employers produce costs for society at large and for individual workers. Employers must therefore pay for the harms they cause, even if the employer did so because of implicit biases. Without employer liability for implicit bias and its discriminatory effects, this Note argues that barriers to equal employment opportunities will persist and victims of discrimination will bear the costs of unfair decisions made by employers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the “Maine Rule” for adverse possession, only possessors who have the requisite intent can perfect an adverse possession claim. The Maine Rule has been consistently criticized. The history behind the adoption of the Maine Rule, however, and the purpose it was to serve, have been ignored. This Article fills that void. This inquiry leads to some surprising revelations about the Maine Rule. The Maine Rule was originally adopted so as to distinguish prior Maine cases rejecting adverse possession in mistaken boundary situations. The purpose behind the Maine Rule, then, was to enable—rather than prohibit— adverse possession. The history surrounding the adoption of the Maine Rule has contemporary value; this history powerfully demonstrates the pitfalls of using a claimant’s state of mind as part of an adverse possession analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments, firms, and consumer agencies promote third-party arbitration to end consumer-firm disputes that arise from dissatisfying services and failed service recoveries in the hope that third-party arbitration will (1) resolve the dispute, (2) repair the relationship with the service provider, and (3) empower the consumer. Literature, however, doubts these positive expectations because arbitration uses an adversarial intervention mode and does not allow consumer control of process and outcome. The results of a field experiment in the context of the Dutch Foundation for Disputes Committees diminish some of the doubts raised about arbitration: (1) complainants are more committed to the decision after the hearing, even though they are less convinced the decision is going to be in their favor, (2) complainants remain intent on never visiting the service provider again, but (3) complainants feel more in control, even though they have ceded control to the third party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the limits of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's legal protections in relation to technology and the role of intent in constitutionally protected expression in America. The legal aspects of smartphones, social media, and cloud computing are examined, along with American criminal statutes addressed communications. The 2015 U.S. Supreme Court case Elonis v. United States, which deals with threatening messages on the Facebook social networking service, is examined.

The article focuses on the enforcement of merger rule in criminal law to use the transferred-intent doctrine. Topics discussed include the liability for a murder that was meant to kill someone else, the concept of attempt, and the culpability of the guilty person. Also mentioned are the works of legal professional Mitchell Keiter related to it and the punishment of accidental murders.

The article examines law professor William Prosser's views on U.S. tort law and discusses how what he asserted to be the law in his article on transferred intent was not actually law. It goes on to cover how transferred intent does not extend beyond the rules established in the First and Second Restatements of Torts. The author concludes that despite Prosser's influence on U.S. tort law, the professor's position on transferred intent should not be the law.

The article examines the framework for securities liability regulation in the U.S. during the early 21st century's trend toward automated trading that relies upon algorithms measured by high-frequency (HF) trading, specialized traders, and increasing market interaction. It discusses the reliance upon credible information within markets, the evolution of securities liability regulation laws and rules, particularly concerning intent, negligence, and strict liability, and possibilities for reform.

The circumstances, if any, that permit non-uniform, or differentiated, treaty interpretation are difficult to define. Generally, a differentiated approach stands in tension with the Vienna Convention's rules of interpretation, which apply a methodology based on plain meaning to all treaties. Yet courts, states, and scholars widely accept the notion that some treaties warrant special interpretive rules. Thus far, however, efforts to justify differentiated treaty interpretation on the grounds of subject matter or treaty purpose have proven inadequate. A more promising avenue is the examination of the objective characteristics shared within a treaty type. One such characteristic, I argue, is the treaty's degree of completeness. Specifically, all else being equal, standalone instruments call for less reliance upon extrinsic materials; interstitial instruments demand more. This Article argues that such instruments should not be viewed as complete; consequently, reference to plain meaning or even the treaty parties ' mutual intent is often incoherent. Specifically, I contend that tax treaties are jurisdictional overlays to the parties ' tax systems and substantially rely upon domestic law. Tax treaties also are not heavily negotiated and instead borrow from concepts that are embedded in model treaties, domestic law, and other international instruments. The highly complex nature of tax lain and the factual situations to which it applies, the connection between revenue collection and state sovereignty, and the necessity to combat tax abuse retrospectively further explain the interstitial nature of treaties. Courts are thus justified in relying upon extrinsic, and at times unilateral, materials in the interpretation of tax treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagine buying a game from a seller and promising to repay him at a later date. However, instead of repayment, you decide to give the game to your friend, who in turn allows you to use it. Then your friend declares bankruptcy to discharge the price of the game from his debts, thus allowing you both to use it without paying. This repayment runaround is the issue that the First and Fifth Circuits were asked to decide in two recent cases. Specifically, the question was whether a debt incurred by "actual fraud" may be discharged by the recipient of the transfer without a misrepresentation of repayment. The Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") serves as a vehicle to help those who have encountered unsuccessful ventures to discharge their obligations and start anew. The Code does not, however, grant a debtor the absolute right of discharge, as many exceptions exist to prevent fraudulent behavior. One of these exceptions is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which excepts from discharge any debt obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Circuit courts have differed in their application of the statute, thus creating a circuit split concerning whether a debtor must make a misrepresentation in order to constitute "actual fraud." This Note argues that "actual fraud" is meant to encompass a fraudulent transferee's intent to defraud and does not require a misrepresentation concerning the prospect of repayment. By focusing on the transferee's intent, these debts would be nondischargeable, thus requiring repayment to the seller. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT) with other forms of gamete donation to resolve the parentage disputes in the context of assisted reproductive technology (ART) for women with mitochondrial disease. It mentions that parentage disputes should be resolved using the intent test and the concern over determining legal parentage in the context of MRT is not a persuasive objection to its therapeutic use.

The article discusses the Supreme Court of Texas' ruling in the 2013 case Rachal v. Reitz which deals with the claim that successor trustee and attorney Hal Rachal Jr. breached his fiduciary duty by failing to provide an accounting to the beneficiaries of a trust, and it mentions the impact of the court's judgment on arbitration provisions in trust agreements. The history of American trust law is examined, along with the intent of settlor and a direct benefits estoppel theory in Texas.

This article presents the first comprehensive critique of the work of leading academic textualist John F. Manning, identifying serious flaws in the two major premises of his theory of statutory interpretation. First, Manning's reliance on Joseph Raz's "Intention in Interpretation" is misplaced, leaving textualism's search for "semantic" meaning without a sound theoretical foundation. Second, Manning's claim that the procedural requirements of Article I, Section 7, presumptively favor minority stakeholders is unsupported both by political theory and by recent empirical studies. The article concludes that Manning's version of textualism lacks meaningful support from interpretive theory or the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American disability discrimination laws contain few intent requirements. Yet courts frequently demand showings of intent in disability discrimination lawsuits. Intent requirements arose almost by accident: through a false statutory analogy; by repetition of obsolete judicial language; and by doctrine developed to avoid a nonexistent conflict with another law. Demanding that section 504 and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claimants show intent imposes a burden not found in those statutes or their interpretive regulations. This Article provides reasons not to impose intent requirements for liability or monetary relief in section 504 and ADA cases concerning reasonable accommodations. It demonstrates that no intent requirement applies to ADA employment cases, then explains that the same conclusion should apply to cases under the ADA's state and local government provisions and section 504. It rebuts an analogy to caselaw under Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act that some courts use to impose intent requirements. It then discusses the reasoning of cases relying on the inappropriate analogy, cases resting on obsolete precedent, and cases refusing to apply remedies to avoid conflicting with federal law. This Article relies on a contextual reading of Supreme Court decisions, the history of the ADA, and policy considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the need of a correct approach to imputing scienter to a corporation by means of the collective scienter theory is through the absurdity analysis taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It discusses the provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, against the corporation without being able to plead that any specific individual within the corporation had scienter.

The doctrine of chances remains a divisive rule in the law of evidence. Proponents of the doctrine argue that evidence of multiple unlikely events of a similar nature supports an objective, statistical inference of lack of accident or random chance on a particular occasion. Opponents argue that admissibility is improper because the underlying inference ultimately requires a forbidden form of character or propensity reasoning. Using formal probability modeling and simple numerical examples, this article shows that neither side is correct. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, the doctrine of chances provides no novel or independent theory of relevance. But contrary to the claims of its opponents, the doctrine of chances does not require character or propensity reasoning. An intuitive way to understand these properties is to interpret the doctrine-of-chances inference as a weak form of any inference that could be permissibly drawn if extrinsic events were simply bad acts for which culpability or intent were certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article shows that, in adverse possession disputes, a uniform approach to the claim of right inquiry can produce undesirable results. To reach the desired result in one type of adverse possession case, a court might be forced to adopt a particular approach for determining whether the possessor had the required state of mind ("claim of right"). In a different type of adverse possession case, however, using this same approach might produce a result that the court finds objectionable. Thus, to reach the desired outcome for each type of adverse possession case a court must resolve, a court might be compelled to adopt a different test for measuring the possessor's state of mind. This Article suggests that much of the confusion regarding the claim of right inquiry can be attributed to a failure to recognize the analytical point made herein--namely, that a uniform approach to the claim of right inquiry will often be problematic. Recognizing that adverse possession arises in factually distinct contexts-- and accepting that different rules could apply in each of these contexts--should resolve much of the confusion associated with the claim of right inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental law of contract formation has retained the formalistic character of classical contract law. The offer-and acceptance paradigm fits poorly with modem contracting practice, and it obscures and complicates contract doctrine. More importantly, extending it threatens to produce undesirable results. Instead of the offer-and-acceptance paradigm, this Essay proposes that contract formation be analyzed using the same general interpretive inquiry that governs other questions concerning the intent of contracting parties. Analyzing the processes of contract formation in this manner points the way toward a further-reaching reconsideration of the purposes of contract-formation law in the first place. In particular, this Essay proposes a reevaluation of the rule that parties cannot unilaterally rescind a contract immediately after the law deems it to be formed. Such a rule, too, is largely formalistic. In its place, the Essay offers a rule of contract formation that is more closely tied to the moral and instrumental purposes of contract remedies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article explores the role of intent in the context of fair use. Specifically, it examines whether a claim of fair use of a copyrighted work should be assessed solely from an "objectively reasonable " vantage point or should, additionally, allow for evidence from the subjective perspective of the user. Courts and scholars have largely sided with the former view but have failed to explain fully why this should be the case or whether there might be countervailing benefits to considering evidence of subjective intent. Crucially overlooked is the possibility that taking the user's perspective into account would serve copyright's utilitarian structure by stimulating socially beneficial uses that would not otherwise occur. In addition, formal recognition of the role intent plays in fair use would bring needed transparency to judicial practices in this area. This Article first develops a framework for evaluating the degree to which courts, parties, and scholars have deemed a user's conscious compliance with fair use principles relevant to the fair use analysis. It then argues for a limited role for evidence of subjective intent, proposing criteria for when such evidence should, and should not, be weighed in the fair use calculus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal aspects of unplanned coauthorship under American and British copyright laws, focusing on issues related to mutual intent, the concept of collaborative impulse, and the development of Anglo-American copyright law. A legal protection against copying is mentioned, along with creative expression laws and methodological individualism. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, American contract laws, and the legal rights of parties in creative relationships are assessed.

The article reflects on the use of preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof for intentional trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Topics discussed include the history and evolution of the trademark law and the Lanham Act, four major areas of Lanham Act claims that deals with the proof of the defendant's intent and the diverging standards used by the Courts in addressing a defendant's intent. It mentions the court case Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Name.

It is axiomatic that whether speech is protected turns on whether it poses a serious risk of harm--in Holmes's formulation, a "clear and present danger." If this is correct, then the state of mind, or intent, of the speaker should be irrelevant. Yet First Amendment law makes speaker's intent a factor in the protection of many different kinds of speech. This Essay offers an account of why and how speaker's intent matters for speech protection. It argues that strong intuitions work against imposing strict liability for speech. These intuitions are best explained by an interest in speaker's intent. An autonomy-based account of free speech provides reasons for this interest. Such an account also suggests what kind of intent is necessary before a given speaker may be subject to regulation. Elucidating speaker's intent thus explains a mysterious aspect of First Amendment law and uncovers a new argument for autonomy theories of free speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the "Restatement (Third) of Torts" legal treatise and the reported causal relevance of intent as of May 2014, focusing on Professor David Robertson's development of a causation hypothetical involving an alleged tortfeasor named Harriet. America's cause-in-fact legal doctrine is mentioned, along with tort cases involving issues such as cyber-torts, child pornography possession, and intentional or reckless contributions to terrorism. Liability is also examined.

The article focuses on the impact of jurisprudence of the U.S. and Republic of Korea on the intent of the single-firms to refuse for business deals. Topics discussed include fairness of the intent to refuse under the antitrust laws of both the jurisdictions, legal standards implied by the jurisdictions for limiting the intent-to-refuse cases and the anti-competitive intent of the refuser. It further analyses the antitrust liability for single firm refusals.

As customers' repurchase behavior leads to long-term corporate profitability, managers should know the success factors influencing repurchase intent. Knowledge of gender differences in these success factors would enable managers to separately optimize repurchase intent for men and women. This research thus develops original hypotheses on gender differences in the formation of repurchase intent. Based on hierarchical linear modeling of data from five countries and ten industries, this research finds that public brand image more strongly influences customer satisfaction and repurchase intent for women than for men. Perceived value has a weaker effect on repurchase intent for women than for men. The analyses do not detect any gender difference in the influence of customer satisfaction on repurchase intent. Contrary to conventional wisdom, relational switching costs more strongly influence repurchase intent for men than for women. Further analyses illustrate moderating effects of country differences in gender egalitarianism and of contextual differences between products and services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on intentionalism of expert testimony in U.S. art appropriation and infringement cases. Topics include the fair use doctrine, the impact of the decision in the U.S. court case Cariou v. Prince, and if artist testimony is relevant in art appropriation cases. Information is provided on statements of intent.

The article discusses the effects of the United States Supreme Court cases Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Brown v. Board of Education on the anti-discrimination protections available for nonwhite plaintiffs. Topics mentioned include how discrimination is defined by the law, an overview of lawsuits involving affirmative action in education, and whether intent is needed in cases of discrimination.

Deliberate firesetting costs our community in destruction to property and lives. Public concern heightens when similar fires occur in a series, raising the specter of copycat firesetting. Difficulties associated with researching copycat crimes in general mean that not a lot is known about copycat firesetting. As an initial step toward filling this research gap, we explore connections between research on copycat crime and research into deliberate firesetting. The intention is to extract salient features from what is known about the phenomena of deliberate firesetting and copycat crime, map them together, and point out shared and unique characteristics. It is argued that a “copycat firesetter” is likely to exist as a distinct subgroup and potentially requiring targeted interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the aspects of fairness and antitrust law. Topics discussed include anticompetitive intent, competitive harm and fairness. It also discusses the American antitrust jurisprudence, reconsideration of the fairness and antitrust law and also presents the views of evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson regarding the evolutionary stable strategy.