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Arguments for so-called citizen responsibilisation, the transfer of responsibilities for public services to citizens, are increasingly put forward in several Western-European countries. An important domain in which citizen responsibilisation is advocated is that of urban climate change adaptation. However, in practice, the advocated shift is taking place only to a limited extent. This study aims to help explain this by researching Dutch local governments' perceptions on citizens' capabilities as well as these governments' preferences regarding the tasks they want to delegate to citizens in the different stages of adaptation planning. Findings from three workshops with policy practitioners from local governments show that these practitioners have moderate trust in citizens' capabilities, but a low willingness to transfer responsibilities. Concerns of local governments include how to: (i) ensure an equal division of resources between different citizen groups/neighbourhoods; (ii) address citizens who are pursuing their own benefits more than producing a public adaptation good; (iii) address potential externalities for other citizens; (iv) guarantee a certain quality level for the public space. The study shows that local governments have an implicit awareness of different dimensions of responsibility and the tensions between them, including at least: responsibility as a task, as a legal duty, and as something for which one can be held accountable. We recommend a more explicit discussion of these dimensions in practice and a more systematic treatment of them in conceptual and in empirical studies.

Human societies face significant difficulties in the governance of environmental land-use problems. The challenges involved must be thoroughly understood to develop effective and legitimate governance of these often inherently wicked problems. However, in environmental governance literature, governance challenges have been described rather generally, and the characteristic features of different types of problems have not been specified. Drawing on this literature, this paper presents an analytical framework for governance challenges typical of a “wicked problem” and a “creeping crisis”. We empirically illustrate the combined framework by applying it to the environmental land-use problem of land subsidence in the Dutch peatlands. Land subsidence exemplifies a wicked problem because it is neither definable nor solvable. Due to the lack of effective governance, the problem has allowed threats with crisis potential to develop. However, land subsidence represents a “creeping” crisis because, despite the increasing risk of damage, there is little sense of urgency. The case study illustrates that governance challenges posed by such problems often originate from a lack of comprehensive sense-making of these problems’ complexity and that responses, therefore, tend to be counterproductive. Hence, the paper empirically substantiates the need for governance approaches that help achieve the systemic change that is arguably needed to address environmental land-use problems adequately.

In the past few years, we have seen growing calls for a transformation in global food systems in response to multiple challenges, including climate change. Food systems are responsible for a third of global greenhouse gas emissions from human activity and agricultural yields are at risk due to climate change impacts. Although many proposals have been made, there are fewer insights on what these imply for knowledge and innovation systems. We seek to advance the literature on transforming food systems under a changing climate, by identifying concrete next steps for scientists and practitioners. We do this by adapting a theory of change proposed by Campbell et al. (2018). We used the adapted theory of change to design the 5th Global Science Conference on Climate-Smart Agriculture, which brought together different stakeholders within global food systems. Through conference sessions and a survey with 262 of the participants, we validate elements of the Campbell et al. framework, identify additional elements, and offer further nuance. The findings point at nine priority areas for a transformation in food systems under climate change: (1) Empowering farmer and consumer organizations, women and youth; (2) Digitally enabled climate-informed services; (3) Climate-resilient and low-emission practices and technologies; (4) Innovative finance to leverage public and private sector investments; (5) Reshaping supply chains, food retail, marketing and procurement; (6) Fostering enabling policies and institutions; (7) Knowledge transfer; (8) Addressing fragmentation in the knowledge and innovation systems; (9) Ensuring food security. We have identified three types of scholarly insights from innovation, transition and sustainability transformations studies that may inform the next steps: these relate to stimulating novelty across the priority areas, ensuring participation in knowledge production, and reconfiguring incumbent systems to enable implementation of the theory of change.

Citizens' initiatives for climate action are actively encouraged by governments to enhance the resilience of communities to climate change. This increased responsibilisation of citizens has implications for the roles of governments. The degree of government involvement does not necessarily decline, but government roles may need to shift: from a regulating and steering government towards a more collaborative and responsive government that enables and facilitates community initiatives that are self-governed by citizens. However, we lack a conceptual understanding of such new government roles, as well as empirical insights into how local governments participate in citizens' initiatives and how they take up such new roles. In this paper, a ?ladder of government participation? is introduced, which is used to explore the roles of local governments in citizens' initiatives for climate change adaptation in the Netherlands. The results show that local governments are slowly but gradually shifting towards more networking, stimulating, and facilitating roles. Key concerns of local practitioners are (a) a lack of flexibility and support of their own municipal organisation to facilitate citizens' initiatives, (b) uncertainty about the continuity of citizens' initiatives over time, and (c) a potential increase of inequity among citizen groups resulting from facilitating citizens' initiatives. An important finding is that the roles of local governments tend to be flexible, in that they can move from one role to the other over time for one and the same citizens' initiative depending on its stage of development, as well as take up several roles simultaneously for different citizens' initiatives.

Citizens' initiatives for climate action are actively encouraged by governments to enhance the resilience of communities to climate change. This increased responsibilisation of citizens has implications for the roles of governments. The degree of government involvement does not necessarily decline, but government roles may need to shift: from a regulating and steering government towards a more collaborative and responsive government that enables and facilitates community initiatives that are self-governed by citizens. However, we lack a conceptual understanding of such new government roles, as well as empirical insights into how local governments participate in citizens' initiatives and how they take up such new roles. In this paper, a ?ladder of government participation? is introduced, which is used to explore the roles of local governments in citizens' initiatives for climate change adaptation in the Netherlands. The results show that local governments are slowly but gradually shifting towards more networking, stimulating, and facilitating roles. Key concerns of local practitioners are (a) a lack of flexibility and support of their own municipal organisation to facilitate citizens' initiatives, (b) uncertainty about the continuity of citizens' initiatives over time, and (c) a potential increase of inequity among citizen groups resulting from facilitating citizens' initiatives. An important finding is that the roles of local governments tend to be flexible, in that they can move from one role to the other over time for one and the same citizens' initiative depending on its stage of development, as well as take up several roles simultaneously for different citizens' initiatives.

To address the increase in the amount of Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment in Europe (WEEE), in 2003 the European Commission issued its WEEE Directive, introducing an extended producer responsibility (EPR). While there is arguably a relationship between modes of e-waste governance and the successful handling of e-waste, the empirical evidence explaining the performance of different modes of e-waste governance is limited. We address this knowledge gap by proposing a framework for analysing and evaluating e-waste governance, inspired by literature on WEEE, reverse logistics and environmental governance. This framework distinguishes between four success conditions that are seen as indicators for the performance of e-waste governance: inclusion of all stakeholders, overall strategic collaboration, an adequate rule system and knowledge sharing/performance management. In addition, the framework distinguishes between different modes of e-waste governance which are assumed to influence the extent to which the success conditions are met. We applied the framework to the case of Dutch e-waste governance to test its usefulness and derive initial lessons and good practices from it. Our findings show that the Dutch e-waste governance arrangement is performing relatively well in terms of meeting the success conditions. We identified some concrete local (pilot) approaches that added an interactive twist to the Dutch e-waste system, which appears to be conducive to the fulfilment of success conditions. These findings suggest that a combination of ‘hard’ public-private and ‘soft’ interactive modes of governance – combining the strong points of formal rules and voluntary action taking – is desirable.

Diversification of Flood Risk Management Strategies (FRMSs) is debated both in research and practice. A comparative analysis and evaluation of diversification of FRMSs in Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden showed large inter-country differences in their approaches to diversification. In the Netherlands, Poland, France and Belgium, we see a desire to create a back-up layer of contingency. England has been diversified for 65 years, while Sweden is currently diversifying due to climate change concerns. In most countries the practical on the ground implementation of diversified strategies is lagging behind intentions as laid down in discussions and policy plans. Main drivers for diversification are: policy entrepreneurs; bottom-up initiatives by local stakeholders; a broader discursive shift towards sustainability and resilience; the presence of enforceable rules and regulations; the availability of financial resources; technical improvements; broader shifts ‘from government to governance’; and Europeanisation. Main barriers for diversification are: a lack of resources and path dependency. Floods as trigger events have been found to contribute both to stability and change, but under different circumstances. To enhance societal resilience to flooding, diversification of flood risk management strategies (FRMSs) is both necessary and important. However, each strategy must be effective in its own right and needs sufficient investment to make its implementation sensible.

Diversification of Flood Risk Management Strategies is accompanied by a diversification in rules and regulations. However, in some cases a lack of rules can be witnessed, especially in cases in which certain strategies have not yet been implemented to a significant extent. This chapter reviews several of these rules, including the Floods Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC). While we found evidence that supports its general scope, we also discuss points at which the Directive or its implementation can still be improved, most notably by adding more substantive requirements and increasing its enforceability. Regarding resources (finance, knowledge, skills, ICT tools, public support) we found that their availability differs significantly between countries. This may be problematic since the lack of resources was shown to be an important reason for underinvestment in and underdevelopment of FRM strategies. An important policy issue for the coming years will be to have political debate and make political choices in order to combine the (perceived and sometimes already legally settled) ‘right to be protected’ of citizens by public authorities with the decreasing resource base many public authorities are facing. Resources may also play a key role in bridging, for instance by ensuring that actors involved have the necessary skills, and that private actors receive sufficient payment to increase their willingness to let their land function as flood storage.

Flood risks in European countries are increasing due to urbanisation and the consequences of climate change. To address these increasing risks, several countries are attempting to diversify their portfolio of flood risk management strategies. Besides improvement of flood defences, the strategies of pro-active spatial planning; flood mitigation, flood preparation and recovery are prominently on the agenda. Governance and legal scholars have engaged with flood risk management, but only in a fragmented manner and without adopting a comparative approach, leaving crucial questions on how to govern towards resilient, efficient and legitimate flood risk governance underexposed. The book of which this chapter forms the introduction provides an overview of the main results of the EU FP7 project STAR-FLOOD (2012–2016). This was a multi-disciplinary project involving governance and legal scholars. It made a comparative analysis and evaluation of flood risk governance arrangements in Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden in order to derive design principles for appropriate and resilient flood risk governance. The chapter sets the scene by substantiating the relevance of adopting a governance and legal perspective on FRM. It furthermore explains the main features of STAR-FLOOD’s research approach in some detail, highlights connections with relevant existing literature and provides a reading guide to the forthcoming chapters.

The STAR-FLOOD project (2012–2016) was an integrated project funded by the European Commission under the FP7 programme. It carried out combined social scientific and legal studies, whereby flood risk governance in six European countries was analysed, explained and evaluated. This chapter first reflects on strengths and weaknesses of the chosen research approach. Especially the intensive interdisciplinary interaction as well as intensive interaction with stakeholders has contributed to a significant advancement of the state of the art of flood risk governance literature and practice. Such an approach that goes beyond ‘working in silos’ is recommendable for future European projects. In so doing, the project has led to governance design principles pertaining both to the process and outcome of flood risk governance. The chapter reviews each of them in turn, thus specifying how following these principles may lead to the best possible achievements in terms of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. A dominant message to be derived from the findings is that there are no panaceas when it comes to improving flood resilience. The appropriateness of the followed approaches in a particular geographical, social, administrative and cultural context is of pivotal importance.

The adoption of a broader portfolio of flood risk management strategies inevitably leads to involvement of more different public and private actors; different governmental levels and different sectors. This may lead to fragmentation. To remedy this, bridging processes and mechanisms are needed. The spatial planning and insurance sector are vital players in this respect. Furthermore, businesses, citizens and NGOs need to be involved further through comprehensive multi-actor co-production, since not all resources and capacities needed for resilient flood risk governance are available within governmental institutions. Besides that, in Europe participation in decision making is considered of crucial importance and strongly established through the Aarhus convention. Decentralisation may help in bridging different levels of government to ensure a good combination of top-down and bottom-up governance, however provided that the shifting of financial and executive tasks is accompanied by a shifting of formal powers and resources. Open, broad (political and societal) debate about the division of responsibilities between public and private actors is needed, leading to more clearly defined roles for governments/businesses/NGOs/citizens.

Diversification of flood risk management strategies can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient precondition for enhancing societal resilience to floods. This chapter identifies three relevant capacities of resilience: the capacity to resist flooding, the capacity to absorb/recover when a flood event occurs and the capacity to adapt to future risks and transform deliberately. These are to be seen as different views on desired outcomes for flood risk governance and have been found to be to some extent mutually exclusive. Resilience is closely linked to the notion of appropriateness: desired outcomes in terms of resilience should be considered in the light of physical circumstances and existing institutional and social contexts. The presence of links between strategies is crucial for countries’ achievements in all three capacities. The chapter goes on to review two other evaluation criteria for flood risk governance: efficiency and legitimacy. Efforts to improve resource efficiency by increased application of (societal) Cost Benefit Analyses are underway in different countries, albeit to a different extent. These CBAs were found to contribute to resource efficiency, but in some countries were perceived as rather technocratic. In terms of legitimacy, the researched countries are doing well on access to information and transparency; procedural justice and accountability. The most potential for improvement lies with the criteria of social equity; public participation and acceptability.

Climate adaptation literature has hitherto devoted limited attention to the roles of residents. Yet their role is crucial in addressing non- or maladaptation, as their initiative or consent is often necessary to take adaptation measures in or around the house. To address this knowledge gap, this paper explores mainstream and additional roles for residents through a literature review. Mainstream roles are those roles that residents usually take, while additional roles are more specific and local in nature. The latter may, however, provide the seeds for wider change. To structure the results, we made a distinction between three forms of residents' commitment to adaptation: as (1) citizens falling under the jurisdiction of various governmental levels; (2) consumers (including home owners) in the market; and (3) civil society members/partners. While this is an established categorization in other domains of environmental governance, it has not yet been systematically applied to the adaptation domain. The paper's empirical focus regarding mainstream and additional roles is on the Dutch adaptation domains of flood risk management, stormwater management and dealing with heat stress. We found scope for additional roles for residents, especially as consumers in the market and civil society members. The findings are of significance for the global debate on residents' roles in climate adaptation and suggest that addressing all three forms of commitment may enhance the implementation of measures as well as their legitimacy, residents' awareness and societies' potential to innovate. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment