Search

Copyright of Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Historyczne is the property of Polska Akademia Nauk, Warszawska Drudkarnia Naukowa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses eugenic policies for social and biological improvement implemented by the Hungarian government between 1940 and 1941. Particular focus is given to the relationship between practical politics and the rhetoric surrounding social and biological renewal. Topics discussed include antisemitism, territorial expansion, population control, and Hungarian nationalism.

Hungary was controlled by a Commission of Military Control after the 1st World War. The supervision was done by an international military commission of control, which got involved in both military decisions and issues of foreign policy. While the commission was originally planned to be a neutral and politically independent, the political attachment of the involved nations essentially made the organization a lobby group stationed in Hungary. The analysis of how conflicts of interest were dealt with during crisis situations should be especially interesting for academics. The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control (hereinafter IMCC) was lead by three consecutive Italian officers, who not only managed to keep IMCC together, but even found a way to use their connections to improve Italian positions in Hungary. This study aims to explain the structure and the function of IMCC in addition to showing its influence on the Army's improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the response of the aristocracy to militia and mob violence in Hungary between 1919 and 1922. It argues that the experience with radical paramilitary groups in the era after the first world war colored the political behavior of the aristocracy and its political representatives, especially in their attitude to fascism, in the 1930s and 1940s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The study trip to Finland, realized in 1924 under the leadership of Pal Teleki, was the first major result of the new direction found after WW I for Turanism and Hungary's kinship ideology. The reasons behind the journey may have been the outcome of several factors: the country's isolation after the Paris Treaties, its politicians' attempt to express their views abroad and the young Finnish nation state's effort to represent itself and its national propaganda. The Hungarian's stay in Finland was organized by Finnish organizations interested in kinship ideology but other national and public bodies were also mobilized to make the visit a success story. The Hungarian group was made up of professors, students and their family members, while the recipient party also aligned prominent scientists to help educational objectives realized. The Hungarian's visit attracted broad public interest all over Finland, and for this reason the country's revisionist stance and its political state of affairs received wide coverage. For Teleki himself, the study tour meant spiritual and intellectual refreshment and a cure for his depression. To analyse the experiences gathered during the trip, he used the concept of "geographic landscape and gender", summarized in a volume published four years later and entitled Finnek. Esztek. A magyarok eszaki testvernepei (Finns, Estonians. Hungarians' relatives in the North). This work highlighted some relevant viewpoints put forward by the representatives of different disciplines, and outlined the experiences gained by the scientists during the journey to Finland. Hungarians saw an optimistic, progressive world in Finland; a rather contradictory imagery to a dismantled, looted Hungary that was conveyed to the Finnish public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US-Hungarian bilateral relations from the Hungarian declaration of war on the United States in 1941 to the collapse of the communist system in 1989. It deals with bilateral issue from both the American and the Hungarian angles on the basis of archival sources from both countries. Throughout the period bilateral relations were subject to changes in world politics. Hungary was never an independent actor -- being under the influence of Germany and then the Soviet Union -- and the United States was unable to assert its political will in the sphere of influence of another great power. Even though -- as sources reveal -- the Hungarian public's attitude was generally favorable and even friendly towards the United States, and Washington regarded the majority of Hungarian public to be generally favorably disposed towards the United States, with the exception of the 1945-1947 period relations ranged from hostile to uneasy accommodation but never cooperation. The United States viewed Eastern Europe in the paradigm of national self-determination and continental stability. Stability always had priority over self-determination; Washington supported self determination in case that condition seemed compatible with stability. This was the case between 1948 and the early 1960s; in that period Washington sought to roll back the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe to enhance Western security and stability. In 1942-1944 Hungary sought to jump out of the war in the hope that it could avoid both evils: German and Soviet invasion of the country. Hungarian strategy was built on erroneous assumptions: namely that the Anglo-Americans would invade the Danubian Basin and would count on Hungary as a bastion against Bolshevism. Even though Hungary, which was allied to Germany, performed some services to the Allied (including intelligence gathering) and was the last haven for European Jewry, Washington made it clear that it could offer no inducements to Hungary. In fact Washington and its allies sought to force Hungary (as well as Romania and Bulgaria to jump out of the war) in order to elicit their invasion by the Wehrmacht so as to relieve the Western theater or war. Winning the war dictated post-war planning as well: in order to secure Soviet cooperation in winning the peace, Washington accepted an open sphere of influence in Eastern Europe for Moscow. Hungary was not immediately written down; the US hoped to keep it economically open to the West. But Washington had no leverage on Moscow; Stalin opted for an exclusive sphere in Eastern Europe at the expense of cooperation with his former allies. The weakness of the Hungarian democratic opposition dampened American enthusiasm for championing Hungary's independence; US inaction convinced the Hungarian to give in to the Soviets. In 1956 the revolution presented an opportunity to roll back the Soviets from Eastern Europe, a prime objective of American foreign policy since 1948. Since military intervention was ruled out, the US hoped that it could work out a political solution for Eastern Europe o the basis on Finlandization. But simultaneously -- even though the State Department deemed armed struggle against the Soviet suicidal -- US propaganda urged the Hungarians to fight possibly in the hope that self-liberation would work. The failure of 1956 spelled the end of liberation; from the early 1960s the earlier policy of destabilizing Eastern Europe to maximalize Western security was changed to one of consolidating the communist regimes. Instead of isolating them bridges would be built for trade and cultural contacts. This policy met with Hungary's economy-driven desire to open up to the West and the US in particular. But for a long time the policy of bridge-building was little more than rhetoric just like Budapest's claim that it wanted normal relations with the West. From the mid sixties it became apparent that the US accepted the European status quo. Washington still pushed for domestic reform and external autonomy to make the continent more stable but gave up the idea of eventual continental reunification. From the early 1970s the policy of engaging the East Europeans economically and culturally overcame political and security obstacles. Hungary sought foreign loans to modernize its economy and thereby consolidate its political system. In order to do so Kadar opened the country to Western cultural penetration and thrust the country into a indebtedness. Hence he inadvertently undermined the system he wished to consolidate. In 1989 when events spiraled out of the control of the ruling party, which gradually relinquished its monopoly of power, the West, including the United States, anxious to keep Gorbachev in power and to safeguard European stability, sought to keep a lid on transformation in Eastern Europe. The Bush administration's position was to support political reform and economic transformation without, however, challenging the Soviet Union's security interests in Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses everyday life as an analytical type of social category. The author explains that material forces can determine the optional ways of life both for individuals and their categories. Factors which make up preliminary conditions include the world of work, income differences and the location of residence. The author presents the identification of social categories through examples taken from documents on the history of mentality during the reign of Hungarian leader Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya.

The article discusses relations between the various Hungarian social classes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focusing on the bourgeoisie's interactions with workers and white-collar employees. It is said that the Hungarian bourgeoisie maintained a paternalistic approach into the 20th century. Hungary is said to have had no labor laws until 1937. Social security legislation and insurance are particularly pointed to as playing a part in preserving this paternalist pattern. The polarization of politics in the 1930s also reduced the power of the Hungarian bourgeoisie.

Examines the history of the Red Army in Hungary during the period 1944 to 1945. Details about the rape of Budapest women by soldiers from the Red Army during the Soviet Union occupation of Budapest; History of the Red Army's behavior in Eastern Europe; Indications of war history and politics.

Hungarian-Romanian relations were extremely tense throughout the inter-war period. The two sides' failure to come to some form of rapprochement has traditionally been blamed on Hungary's obsession with territorial revision and her desire to reclaim Transylvania which had been assigned to Romania after World War I. This article argues, however, that even during the premiership of Gyula Gömbös, one of the most vocal Hungarian revisionists, Hungary was prepared to come to rapprochement with Romania. Continuing distrust of Romania's intentions, fuelled by the negative reporting of the Hungarian legation in Bucharest, nevertheless ensured there would be no improvement in relations between the countries in the period 1932-36. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the political and diplomatic challenges in Hungary under the administration of German leader Adolf Hitler. It discusses some issues of Hungarian policy after World War I to reveal facts about the events in the country's history including the exile and death of several Hungarian statesmen and diplomats. It cites that diplomats have defended the interests of their countries, however, they have not been given freedom of action and diplomacy in their own country.