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The present report makes an overview of the progresses made so far in Work Package 5. At this initial stage, the main aim was to develop a new coding for core state powers in EU legislation. Such coding serves the purpose of expanding EUDIFF1 through new information on core state powers integration. The report is structured as follows: after a brief introduction, Section I presents a tripartite categorization of core state powers modes of integration. Section II tests the plausibility of the proposed categorisations through an empirical analysis that explores primary legislation from 1952 to 2016. Section III discusses the possibility of a more fine-grained distinction.

This paper studies two areas of Core State Powers (CSP), i.e. the EU budget and Justice and Home Affairs. The two cases have the aim to reconstruct how Differentiated Integration (DI) has developed over time in these two specific domains. While the aim is the same for both cases, the way the cases are structured is substantially different. This is due to various reasons. First, the politics of the EU budget go back to the early days of the EU, while JHA is a post-Maastricht feature. This implies that the budget case study concentrates on a much longer time span. Second, DI in the budget interests several member states, while in JHA it is a phenomenon circumscribed to fewer members. Finally, the politics of the budget are decided through intergovernmental negotiations, while JHA is a rather supranationalised policy that relies a lot on secondary legislation and EU executive bodies such as EU agencies. This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains

This report provides a general overview of the dataset under construction for WP5, EUDIFF-RES, focusing on differentiated integration in core state powers (CSP) in the European Union (EU). The report explains the rationale behind the data collection and provides an outline of the information gathered so far. The aim of the report is to make the dataset easily accessible to anyone who wishes to utlise it for further research.

The paper summarises different patterns of differentiation and reintegration in core state powers during the post-Maastricht period, based on the EUDIFF-RES dataset. Moreover, it offers a theoretical framework able to explain the observed variation. The framework is further tested by means of short empirical illustrations taken from different policy areas. Overall, the EUDIFF-RES dataset substantially contributes to our understanding of CSP differentiated integration by revealing that the behaviour of states vis-a-vis core state powers varies greatly according to the kind of resource, as well as the costs and opportunities attached to it.

Published online: 6th June 2022 It is striking how vocal and proactive the European Commission and other European Union institutions (such as the European Central Bank) have become on issues of European solidarity in recent years. The European Pillar of Social Rights of 2017 reflected a genuine commitment to enhance the social dimension of the single market and economic and monetary union. Since 2020, NextGenerationEU has promoted fiscal solidarity to overcome the aftershocks of the Great Recession and the pandemic, with quite assertive country-specific recovery-and-resilience plans. This year has seen an even stronger resurgence of geopolitical solidarity in confronting Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. Support for a more robust EU has also shone through the citizens’ panels of the Conference on the Future of Europe and the favourable political reaction to their recommendations. European solidarity has always been in high demand—but today, at long last, there is also fairly strong supply.

Date written: February 21, 2020 We argue that the independent agency of EU institutions can serve not only to tie the member states to previous policy commitments, as argued in the extant literature, but also to untie member states from commitments that have become outdated and harmful. The European Central Bank saved the Euro in 2012 not by enforcing the monetary financing prohibition or the no-bail-out clause of the Treaty more strictly but by flouting them. We develop our de-commitment account of supranational agency theoretically, show its workings empirically by a case study of the Eurozone crisis, and discuss its scope conditions. We surmise that supranational de-commitment is a common feature of EU politics.

No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agent competence and risks policy failure; if it emphasizes competence, it provides opportunistic agents freedom to maneuver and risks control failure. This competence-control tradeoff applies in all governance domains: democratic or autocratic, domestic or international, public or private. We extend principal-agent theory by identifying four modes of indirect governance based on ex ante and ex post control relations: delegation, trusteeship, cooptation and orchestration. We then theorize the principal's choice among these modes as it seeks to balance competence and control. Finally, we analyze how the competence-control tradeoff contributes to dynamic instability within and across the modes of indirect governance. Kein Regierungschef hat ausreichend Fähigkeiten, um alleine zu regieren zu können. Daher vertrauen alle Regierenden auf Agenten (Beauftragte) und werden so zum Prinzipal (Auftraggeber). Das "Dilemma der Regierenden" resultiert aus dem Trade-off zwischen der Kompetenz der Agenten und den Kontrollmöglichkeiten des Prinzipals. Kompetente Agenten sind schwierig zu kontrollieren, da sie durch ihre Policy-Expertise eine Hebelwirkung besitzen. Eine Kontrolle durch den Prinzipal verhindert die Entfaltung der Kompetenz des Agenten, indem die Entwicklung sowie die Umsetzung der Fähigkeiten des Agenten eingeschränkt werden. Setzt der Prinzipal also auf Kontrolle, limitiert er die Kompetenz des Agenten und riskiert das Scheitern von Policies. Setzt er hingegen auf die Kompetenz, riskiert der Prinzipal die Kontrolle zu verlieren, da opportunistische Agenten zu viel Bewegungsfreiheit besitzen. Dieser Trade-off zwischen Kompetenz und Kontrolle existiert in allen Regierungsbereichen, egal ob demokratisch oder autokratisch, innen- oder außenpolitisch, öffentlich oder privat. Wir erweitern die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie, indem wir vier Modi des indirekten Regierens identifizieren, die auf ex ante- und ex post-Aspekten der Kontrollmöglichkeiten basieren: Delegation, Treuhandschaft, Kooptation und Orchestrierung. Anschließend befassen wir uns mit den daraus entstehenden Möglichkeiten des Prinzipals, Kompetenz und Kontrolle gleichermaßen auszubalancieren. Abschließend analysieren wir, wie der Trade-off zwischen Kompetenz und Kontrolle zu einer dynamischen Instabilität innerhalb und zwischen den Modi des indirekten Regierens beiträgt.

The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU’s shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar functional demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spill-over) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, and high political salience. We show how these constraints structured the initial design of EMU and Schengen, made them vulnerable to crisis, and shaped policy options during the crises: they made horizontal differentiation unattractive, re-regulation ineffective, centralized risk and burden sharing unfeasible and the externalization of adjustment burden to non-EU actors necessary by default. In conclusion, we explore possible escape routes from the trap.

We map the pattern and extent of the European integration of core state powers (coercive force, public finance, and public administration) and analyze causes and consequences. We highlight two findings: First, in contrast to historical examples of federal state building, where the nationalization of core state powers precipitated the institutional, territorial and political consolidation of the emerging state, the European integration of core state powers is associated with the institutional, territorial and political fragmentation of the EU. Second, in contrast to European market integration, state elites and mass publics, not organized business interests, are the prime drivers of integration.

The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. We find that the EU’s own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: Its revenues have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly intergovernmental system. Based on a comprehe nsive analysis of EU tax legislation and ECJ tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, we show that at the same time, the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the member states’ taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on member state taxes than the US federal government imposes on state taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity which specializes in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves political issues to the member states: Despite strong safeguards, the EU massively regulates the highly salient issue of member state taxation.

How does international tax competition affect fiscal democracy? To what extent does it constrain the autonomy of democratic governments in choosing the level and structure of national taxation? While tax competition has not reduced the level of total taxation in OECD-22 countries, it has revenue effects at the level of selected taxes, especially taxes falling on mobile tax bases such as the corporate tax or taxes on private capital income. The nominal tax burden has shifted from capital to labor and consumption (domestic redistribution). While this result suggests that tax competition has a negative effect on national tax autonomy, because all competing countries see their ability to tax mobile capital constrained, small countries see their capacity to raise revenue from mobile capital increased at the expense of large countries (international redistribution). Because of these countervailing effects, the overall effect on small countries is ambiguous. By contrast, the tax autonomy of large countries has unambiguously declined because international and domestic pressures work in the same direction. Given that governments have to meet mandatory spending requirements on the expenditure side this may have contributed to higher fiscal deficits in large countries.

There are basically three stories about the globalisation-welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalisation is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state (globalization theory). The second maintains that whatever the cause of the welfare state crisis, globalisation is not part of it (globalization sceptics). The third story holds that globalisation, far from causing the welfare state’s troubles, is a consequence of these troubles and part of their solution (revisionism). The paper reviews each of these stories and traces their intellectual origins., Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, Bd. 20 Nr. 1 (2009): Fortschritt

We show that tax competition in the EU is shaped by four interrelated institutional mechanisms: 1) Market integration, by reducing the transaction costs of cross-border tax arbitrage in the Single Market, 2) enlargement, by increasing the number and heterogeneity of states involved in intra-EU tax competition, 3) tax coordination, by restricting the range of competitive instruments at the disposal of governments, and 4) supranational judicial review by limiting the scope of unilateral defences against tax competition (judicialization). As a consequence, tax competition is significantly stronger in the EU, and the race to the bottom in corporate tax rates more pronounced than in the rest of the world.

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political authority that was typical for much of the State’s history since the seventeenth century has come to a standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. Non-state actors acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex network of political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Yet, the denationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-state authority, be it an international institution, a private business or transnational organization, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the State because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state actors lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. For this reason, the State remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the accretion of political authority by non-state entities. Its role has changed, however. The State no longer exercises authority always directly and exclusively through its own powers and resources, but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing the powers and resources of non-state actors. The state remains the central authority but its role is transforming: once monopolist, the state is now becoming a manager of political authority.

Staatlichkeit zerfasert. Der seit dem 15. Jahrhundert verlaufende Prozess der Aneignung von Herrschaftsbefugnissen durch den Staat hat sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts umgekehrt. Der Staat übt Herrschaft oft nicht mehr alleine aus, sondern koordiniert, integriert, initiiert und ergänzt die Herrschaftsausübung anderer nicht-staatlicher Herrschaftsträger. Er wandelt sich vom Herrschaftsmonopolisten zum Herrschaftsmanager.

Im Sonderforschungsbereich 597 (TranState) wird seit 2003 der Wandel von Staatlichkeit in der OECD-Welt des ausgehenden 20. und beginnenden 21. Jahrhunderts untersucht. Ausgangspunkt und Vergleichsmaßstab ist dabei der demokratische Rechts- und Interventionsstaat – im Folgenden DRIS – der 1960er und 1970er Jahre. Der DRIS war durch eine hohe Konzentration von Verantwortung für die Erbringung eines breiten Portfolios normativer Güter gekennzeichnet. Der DRIS war Gewaltmonopolist und Rechtsgarant, zentrale Legitimationsinstanz und universelle Wohlfahrtsversicherung. Jenseits des DRIS gab es keine Institution, die wesentlich an der Erbringung dieser normativen Güter beteiligt gewesen wäre. Deshalb sprechen viele im Rückblick auf diese beiden Jahrzehnte vom „Goldenen Zeitalter des Staates“. Der Sonderforschungsbereich (Sfb) untersucht, wie sich Staatlichkeit seit diesem vermeintlich Goldenen Zeitalter gewandelt hat, analysiert die Ursachen des Wandels und fragt nach dessen Auswirkungen.

Einleitung und Zusammenfassung Renate Mayntz 1 Auftrag und Ablauf 2 Zum Instrument der Ergebnissynthese 3 Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag 4 Zur Evaluation der Förderinitiative Auswertung der rechtswissenschaftlichen Projekte Armin von Bogdandy Vorbemerkungen 1 Globalisierung: rechtswissenschaftliche Phänomenbeschreibungen 1.1 Beschreibungsperspektive „Recht als Regelungsinstrument“ 1.2 Beschreibungsperspektive „Recht als Kulturerscheinung“ 1.3 Beschreibungsperspektive „Staatendämmerung“ 2 Die Problematik der Globalisierung: Steuerungsverlust des Rechts? 3 Governance 3.1 Institutionen der Governance 3.1.1 Governance durch ein fortentwickeltes UN-System 3.1.2 Andere Institutionen der Governance und Kompetenzfragen 3.2 Steuerungsziele 3.2.1 Menschenrechte 3.2.2 Andere Ziele, insbesondere „reflexive Selbststeuerung“ 3.3 Völkerrecht als Globalisierungssteuerungsrecht 3.3.1 Zur Leistungsfähigkeit des Völkerrechts 3.3.2 Institutionen und Akteure 3.3.3 Instrumente und Verfahren rechtlicher Steuerung 3.3.4 Verantwortlichkeit und Legitimität 3.4 Andere Regulierungsinstanzen und -instrumente 3.4.1 Neue staatliche Regulierungstechniken 3.4.2 Akte privater Akteure zur Regelung und Steuerung der Globalisierung 4 Evaluierung Literatur und ausgewertete Projekte Auswertung der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Projekte Philipp Genschel unter Mitarbeit von Thomas Rixen und Ingo Rohlfing Einleitung und Methode 1 Globalisierung: Beschreibungsformen des Phänomens 1.1 Art und Stärke grenzüberschreitender Austauschprozesse 1.2 Welche Rolle haben neue Technologien, Organisationen, Institutionen bei der Entwicklung dieser Ströme gespielt? 2 Globalisierungsprobleme 2.1 Was ist das Problem? 2.2 Welche sachliche und räumliche Reichweite hat das Problem? 2.3 Wer ist vom Problem betroffen? 2.4 Wie sieht die Konfliktstruktur aus? 3 Governance 3.1 Normative Kriterien für eine optimale Problemlösung 3.2 Empirische Ansätze zu einer internationalen Problemlösung 3.3 Welche Verteilungswirkung hat die Lösung? 3.4 Räumliche Reichweite der Lösung 3.5 Sachliche Reichweite der Lösung 4 Schlussbemerkung Literatur und ausgewertete Projekte Auswertung der sozialwissenschaftlichen Projekte Susanne Lütz unter Mitarbeit von Thomas R. Eimer Vorbemerkungen 1 Was ist Globalisierung? 1.1 Ökonomische Dimensionen von Globalisierung 1.2 Ursachen von Globalisierung 1.3 Probleme von Globalisierung 2 Probleme 2.1 Voraussetzungen und Folgen von Globalisierung 2.2 Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes und die Folgen 2.3 Steuerungstheoretische Fragestellungen 3 Konflikttypen 3.1 Verteilungskonflikte 3.2 Kognitive Konflikte 3.3 Machtkonflikte 4 Steuerungsstrukturen 4.1 Internationale Organisationen 4.1.1 UNO-Netzwerke 4.1.2 Internationaler Gerichtshof (IGH) 4.1.3 International Labour Organization (ILO) 4.1.4 Weltbank 4.1.5 Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF) 4.1.6 Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) 4.2 Regionale Kooperationsverbünde 4.2.1 NATO und OSZE 4.2.2 EU 4.2.3 Regionale Kooperationen in Mittel- und Südamerika 4.2.4 Interregionale Kooperationen 4.3 Hegemonie 4.4 Zwischenstaatliche Regime 4.5 Private Akteurnetzwerke 4.6 Öffentlich-private Akteurnetzwerke 5 Steuerungs- und Koordinationsformen 5.1 Steuerungsinstrumente 5.1.1 Zwang 5.1.2 Militärische Gewalt 5.1.3 Klagen / Gerichtsverfahren 5.1.4 Konfliktschlichtungsverfahren 5.1.5 Finanzielle Anreize 5.1.6 Prozedurale Vorgaben 5.1.7 Naming und Shaming 5.1.8 Expertise 5.1.9 Leitbilder und Feindbilder 5.1.10 Symbolische Politik 5.2 Koordinationsmechanismen 5.2.1 Verhandlung / Bargaining 5.2.2 Diskurse / Arguing 5.2.3 Rhetorische Sprechakte 5.2.4 Private Selbstregulierung 5.2.5 Markt 5.3 Koordination in Mehrebenenstrukturen 5.3.1 Zweiebenenspiele 5.3.2. Ebenenübergreifende Diffusionsprozesse 6 Implementation 6.1 Erfolgsbedingungen 6.2 Probleme Literatur und ausgewertete Projekte Abkürzungen

How does globalisation affect taxation? The academic wisdom is split on this question. Some argue that globalisation spells the beginning of the end of the national tax state while others maintain that it hardly constrains tax policy choices at all. This paper comes down in the middle. It finds no indication that globalisation will fatally undermine the national tax state, but still maintains that national tax policy is affected in a major way. The effect is not so much to force change upon the tax state as to reduce its freedom for change. Comparing the first three decades of the twentieth century to the last three decades, it is remarkable how much change and innovation there was then and how much incrementalism and stasis there is today.

There are basically three stories about the globalisation-welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalisation is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state. As national economies open to the international market, governments are forced to adapt to the imperatives of global competition, and this means cutting cost-intensive welfare programs (globalisation theory). The second story argues that whatever the cause of the welfare state crisis, globalisation is not part of it. There is neither theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to believe that national policy autonomy has decreased due to increasing economic interdependencies (globalisation sceptics). The third story holds that globalisation, far from causing the welfare state´s troubles, is a consequence of these troubles, and part of their solution (revisionism). The paper reviews each of these stories, and counterposes them to simple descriptive statistics on OECD countries.

In der Politikwissenschaft gibt es drei verschiedene Thesen zum Zusammenhang von Globalisierung und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Die erste behauptet, die Globalisierung sei schuld an der chronischen Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Der Prozess der außenwirtschaftlichen Öffnung und internationalen Integration setze die Regierungen unter Druck, sich marktgerecht zu verhalten und zwinge sie dadurch, sich von kostenintensiven Sozialprogrammen zu verabschieden (Globalisierungstheorie). Die zweite These ist genau entgegengesetzt. Was immer die Gründe der chronischen Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates sein mögen, der Prozess der außenwirtschaftlichen Öffnung habe damit nichts zu tun (Globalisierungsskepsis). Die dritte These schließlich lautet, dass die Globalisierung nicht nur an der Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates unschuldig sei, sondern selbst als Produkt dieser Krise und Teil ihrer Lösung verstanden werden müsse (Revisionismus). Das Papier stellt alle drei Thesen ausführlich vor und zeichnet ihre intellektuellen Entwicklungslinien nach.

Warum macht die Harmonisierung der Unternehmens- und Kapitalertragsbesteuerung in der Europäischen Union kaum Fortschritte, obwohl sie im Binnenmarkt heftigem Steuerwettbewerb ausgesetzt ist, und warum ist die Umsatzbesteuerung weitgehend harmonisiert worden, obwohl sie gegen Steuerwettbewerb ziemlich immun ist? Das Buch forscht nach der politischen Logik der europäischen Steuerpolitik. Es rekonstruiert die Entwicklung des Politikfeldes seit den fünfziger Jahren, untersucht, warum der Integrationsgrad insgesamt bisher so gering geblieben ist, und analysiert die Bedingungen, unter denen partielle Harmonisierungserfolge dennoch möglich waren. Am Ende steht die Frage, was sich aus alldem für die Zukunft lernen lässt. Kapitel 1 Die europäische Steuerpolitik als Untersuchungsproblem 1.1 Ein Fall von Integrationsresistenz 1.2 Untersuchungsmethode und Plan für das Buch Kapitel 2 Integrationstheoretische Perspektiven 2.1 Neofunktionalismus 2.2 Intergouvernementalismus 2.3 Mehrebenensystem Kapitel 3 Zur Vorgeschichte der europäischen Steuerpolitik 3.1 Nationale Steuern und internationale Märkte 3.2 Die Anfänge der europäischen Integration und ihre steuerpolitischen Folgen Kapitel 4 Die Harmonisierung der Umsatzsteuer 4.1 Die Harmonisierung des Steuersystems 4.2 Die Harmonisierung der Steuerbemessungsgrundlage 4.3 Der Abbau der Steuergrenzen 4.4 Warten auf das endgültige Mehrwertsteuersystem Kapitel 5 Die Harmonisierung der Kapitalbesteuerung 5.1 Die Harmonisierung der Kapitaleinkommensbesteuerung 5.2 Die Harmonisierung der Unternehmensbesteuerung Kapitel 6 Umsatz- und Kapitalsteuerharmonisierung im Vergleich 6.1 Zielsetzungen 6.2 Intergouvernementale Konflikte 6.3 Supranationale Einflüsse 6.4 Allgemeine Muster und steuerspezifische Unterschiede Kapitel 7 Warum ist die Steuerpolitik so integrationsresistent? 7.1 Die intergouvernementalistische Perspektive 7.2 Die neofunktionalistische Perspektive 7.3 Die Mehrebenenperspektive 7.4 Fazit

Does globalization undermine the fiscal basis of the welfare state? The conventional wisdom believes so: open borders cause tax competition, which in turn leads to a race to the bottom in capital taxation. However, the data show that revenues from capital taxation are fairly stable in OECD countries. Some observers conclude from this that globalization does not pose much of a challenge to the welfare state. This conclusion is unwarranted because it overlooks that tax competition was not the only challenge facing welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s. There was also slow growth, rampant unemployment, and high levels of precommitted spending. These problems exerted countervailing pressures that prevented a race to the bottom in taxation. Yet, this does not mean that national autonomy has not been diminished. The welfare state is trapped in between external pressures to reduce the tax burden on capital and internal pressures to maintain revenue levels and relieve the tax burden on labor. The conventional wisdom and its critics 2 Did tax competition change the structure of taxation? 3 Would total taxation be higher without tax competition? 4 Would capital tax revenues be higher without tax competition? 4.1 Corporate taxes 4.2 Taxes on financial income 5 Would taxes on labor and consumption be lower without tax competition? 5.1 Labor taxes 5.2 Consumption taxes 5.3 Green taxes

English version of 'Wenn Kriege chronisch werden : der Bürgerkrieg', (1997), in the journal 'Leviathan'

Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's "California effect" argument, this paper shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international cooperation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardisation of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonise interest taxation across EC member states.

There is a tendency in the new institutionalist literature to equate institutional inertia with stasis and 'no-change'. Using case studies from the international telecommunications regime and the German health care system, the paper tries to show that this equation is wrong. Inertia does not necessarily prevent institutional change. It can interfere with the replacement of old institutions, but it is compatible with other forms of institutional transformation. Inert structures can be patched up with new structures or transposed to new functions. The paper analyzes patching up and transposition as distinct modes of institutional change and assesses their potential for adapting institutional arrangements to new environmental conditions. It concludes that inertia should not be contrasted with institutional change per se because inertia allows for and may even be a prerequisite of change.

Die Konvergenz von Telekommunikation und Datenverarbeitung hat eine globale Expansion von Netzen und Diensten ausgelöst, die von einer Deregulierung des Sektors begleitet wurde. Eine Vielzahl heterogener Akteure auf dem Weltmarkt muß die jeweiligen Entwicklungs- und Produktionsaktivitäten ebenso wie das Angebot neuer Dienste koordinieren. Der alte Modus hierarchischer Koordination, der technische, ökonomische und politische Steuerung internalisierte und sich in der Ära souveräner Nationalstaaten früherer Jahrzehnte etablierte, ließ sich nicht in eine transnationale Hierarchie transformieren. Koordination beschränkt sich daher auf die Herstellung technischer Kompatibilität von Systemen der Telekommunikation. Es hat sich ein Netz internationaler und regionaler Standardisierungsgremien herausgebildet, das ständig größer wird. Diese Gremien erarbeiten die benötigten Empfehlungen, die eher optional und komplementär als substitutiv sind, was eine Arbeitsteilung anstelle von Konkurrenz begünstigt hat. The convergence of telecommunications and computer technology stimulated a global expansion of networks and services which was accompanied by a deregulation of this industry. In the liberalized worldmarket a great number of heterogeneous actors must coordinate the development and production of technology as well as the provision of new services. The old mode of hierarchical coordination internalizing technical, economic and political control, which originated from the sovereign state system of earlier decades, could not be transformed into transnational hierarchy. Thus coordination is widely restricted to achieving technical compatibility of telecommunications systems. A network of international and regional standardization committees, growing in number, has evolved. They issue the required technical recommendations, which are usually more complementary and optional than substitutive, so that division of labor instead of competition prevails. Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Large Technical Systems in National Containment: The Old Order in Telecommunications 3 From National Isolation to Minimal International Coordination 3.1 Modes of International Coordination: Some Theoretical Considerations 3.2 The Long Road to Little International Coordination 4 Trans-border Expansion of Telecommunications and the Erosion of the Old Order 5 Technical Systems' Compatibility Requirements and the Proliferation of International Standardization 5.1 Basic Problems of International Standardization Procedures 5.2 The Proliferation of International Standardization Organizations 6 Conclusion Bibliography