Search

Author(s): S. Gavrilets [1] Gavrilets replies -- Tregenza et al. maintain that my model's predictions [1] run counter to the model of Parker and Partridge [2], but it is not [...]

Testing whether some species traits have a significant effect on diversification rates is central in the assessment of macroevolutionary theories. However, we still lack a powerful method to tackle this objective. I present a new method for the statistical analysis of diversification with species traits. The required data are observations of the traits on recent species, the phylogenetic tree of these species, and reconstructions of ancestral values of the traits. Several traits, either continuous or discrete, and in some cases their interactions, can be analyzed simultaneously. The parameters are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The statistical significance of the effects in a model can be tested with likelihood ratio tests. A simulation study showed that past random extinction events do not affect the Type I error rate of the tests, whereas statistical power is decreased, though some power is still kept if the effect of the simulated trait on speciation is strong. The use of the method is illustrated by the analysis of published data on primates. The analysis of these data showed that the apparent overall positive relationship between body mass and species diversity is actually an artifact due to a clade-specific effect. Within each clade the effect of body mass on speciation rate was in fact negative. The present method allows to take both effects (clade and body mass) into account simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present here a stochastic two-locus, two-habitat model for the evolution of migration with local adaptation and kin selection. One locus determines the migration rate while the other causes local adaptation. We show that the opposing forces of kin competition and local adaptation can lead to the existence of one or two convergence stable migration rates, notably depending on the recombination rate between the two loci. We show that linkage between migration and local adaptation loci has two antagonist effects: when linkage is tight, cost of local adaptation increases, leading to smaller equilibrium migration rates. However, when linkage is tighter, the population structure at the migration locus tends to be very high because of the indirect selection, and thus equilibrium migration rates increases. This result, qualitatively different from results obtained with other models of migration evolution, indicates that ignoring drift or the detail of the genetic architecture may lead to incorrect conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the Diptera, two different selfish genetic elements are known to cause the production of female-biased sex ratios: maternally inherited bacteria that kill male zygotes (male-killers), and X chromosomes causing the degeneration of Y-bearing sperm in males (meiotic drive). We here develop a mathematical model for the dynamics of these two sex-ratio distorters where they co-occur. We show that X chromosome meiotic drive elements can be expected to substantially lower the equilibrium frequency of male-killers and can even lead to their extinction. Conversely, male-killers can also decrease the equilibrium frequency of X drivers and cause their extinction. Thus, we predict that there will be some complementarity in the incidence of X chromosome meiotic drive and male-killing in natural populations, with a lower than expected number of species bearing both elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sexual conflict, where male and female reproductive interests differ, is probably widespread and often mediated by male or sperm proteins and female or egg proteins that bind to each other during mating or fertilization. One potential consequence is maintenance of polymorphism in these proteins, which might result in reproductive isolation between sympatric subpopulations. I investigate the conditions for polymorphism maintenance in a series of mathematical models of sexual conflict over mating or fertilization frequency. The models represent a male or sperm ligand and a female or egg receptor, and they differ in whether expression of either protein is haploid or diploid. For diploid expression, the conditions imply that patterns of dominance, which involve neither overdominance nor underdominance, can determine whether polymorphism is maintained. For example, suppose ligand expression is diploid, and consider ligand alleles L1 and L2 in interactions with a given receptor genotype; if L1/L1 males are fitter than L2/L2 males in these interactions, then polymorphism is more likely to be maintained when L1/L2 males more closely resemble L1/L1 males in these interactions. Such fitter-allele dominance might be typical of a ligand or its receptor due to their biochemistry, in which case polymorphism might be typical of the pair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the population genetics of adaptation in nonequilibrium haploid asexual populations. We find that the accumulation of deleterious mutations, due to the operation of Muller's ratchet, can considerably reduce the rate of fixation of advantageous alleles. Such reduction can be approximated reasonably well by a reduction in the effective population size. In the absence of Muller's ratchet, a beneficial mutation can only become fixed if it creates the best possible genotype; if Muller's ratchet operates, however, mutations initially arising in a nonoptimal genotype can also become fixed in the population, since the loss of the least-loaded class implies that an initially nonoptimal background can become optimal. We show that, while the rate at which adaptive mutations become fixed is reduced, the rate of fixation of deleterious mutations due to the ratchet is not changed by the presence of beneficial mutations as long as the rate of their occurrence is low and the deleterious effects of mutations (sd) are higher than the beneficial effects (sa). When sa > sd, the advantage of a beneficial mutation can outweigh the deleterious effects of associated mutations. Under these conditions, a beneficial allele can drag to fixation deleterious mutations initially associated with it at a higher rate than in the absence of advantageous alleles. We propose analytical approximations for the rates of accumulation of deleterious and beneficial mutations. Furthermore, when allowing for the possible occurrence of interference between beneficial alleles, we find that the presence of deleterious mutations of either very weak or very strong effect can marginally increase the rate of accumulation of beneficial mutations over that observed in the absence of such deleterious mutations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although reinforcement is ostensibly driven by selection against hybrids, there are often other components in empirical cases and theoretical models of reinforcement that may contribute to premating isolation. One of these components is local adaptation of a trait used in mate choice. I use several different comparisons to assess the roles that local adaptation and selection against hybrids may play in reinforcement models. Both numerical simulations of exact recursion equations and analytical weak selection approximations are employed. I find that selection against hybrids may play a small role in driving preference evolution in a reinforcement model where the mating cue is separate from loci causing hybrid incompatibilities. When females have preferences directly for purebreds of their own population, however, selection against hybrids can play a large role in premating isolation evolution. I present some situations in which this type of selection is likely to exist. This work also illustrates shortfalls of using a weak selection approach to address questions about reinforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it now appears likely that sympatric speciation is possible, its generality remains contentious. If it really is rare, then most natural populations must not fit the assumptions of sympatric speciation theory. A better understanding of these assumptions may help identify when sympatric speciation is or is not likely. This paper investigates two such assumptions: that genetic variation for stringent assortative mating is not limiting and that females are not penalized for mating assortatively. Simulations demonstrate that the speed of sympatric speciation is very sensitive to the population's capacity for stringent assortative mating and is potentially extremely slow. The rapid divergence often thought to be a hallmark of sympatric speciation may only occur in a restricted area of parameter space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning processes potentially play a role in speciation but are often ignored in speciation models. Learning may, for instance, play a role when a new niche is being colonized, because the learning of niche features may cause niche-specific assortative mating and a tendency to produce young in this niche. Several animal species learn about their environmental features that may be important in finding or attracting mates. We use a gene-culture coevolutionary model to look into the effect of such learning on the colonization of new niches and on the genetic divergence between groups using different niches, which are steps necessary in achieving speciation. We assume that density is regulated separately in each of the two niches and that the viability of an individual depends on its genotype as well as on which niche it exploits. Our results show that genetic adaptation to the new niche is enhanced by a high female fecundity and a low viability selection against heterozygotes. Furthermore, when initial colonization (without genetic adaptation) fails, genetic divergence is more difficult when the mating preference is stronger. In contrast, when colonization without genetic adaptation is successful, a stronger mating preference makes genetic divergence easier. An increase in the number of egg-laying mistakes by females can have a positive or negative effect on the success of genetic adaptation depending on other parameters. We show that genetic divergence can be prevented by a niche shift, which can occur only if viabilities in the two niches are asymmetrical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twenty years ago, Bulmer and Bull suggested that disruptive selection, produced by environmental fluctuations, can result in an evolutionary transition from environmental sex determination (ESD) to genetic sex determination (GSD). We investigated the feasibility of such a process, using mutation-limited adaptive dynamics and individual-based computer simulations. Our model describes the evolution of a reaction norm for sex determination in a metapopulation setting with partial migration and variation in an environmental variable both within and between local patches. The reaction norm represents the probability of becoming a female as a function of environmental state and was modeled as a sigmoid function with two parameters, one giving the location (i.e., the value of the environmental variable for which an individual has equal chance of becoming either sex) and the other giving the slope of the reaction norm for that environment. The slope can be interpreted as being set by the level of developmental noise in morph determination, with less noise giving a steeper slope and a more switchlike reaction norm. We found convergence stable reaction norms with intermediate to large amounts of developmental noise for conditions characterized by low migration rates, small differential competitive advantages between the sexes over environments, and little variation between individual environments within patches compared to variation between patches. We also considered reaction norms with the slope parameter constrained to a high value, corresponding to little developmental noise. For these we found evolutionary branching in the location parameter and a transition from ESD toward GSD, analogous to the original analysis by Bulmer and Bull. Further evolutionary change, including dominance evolution, produced a polymorphism acting as a GSD system with heterogamety. Our results point to the role of developmental noise in the evolution of sex determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To address claims of human exceptionalism, we determine where humans fit within the greater mammalian distribution of reproductive inequality. We show that humans exhibit lower reproductive skew (i.e., inequality in the number of surviving offspring) among males and smaller sex differences in reproductive skew than most other mammals, while nevertheless falling within the mammalian range. Additionally, female reproductive skew is higher in polygynous human populations than in polygynous nonhumans mammals on average. This patterning of skew can be attributed in part to the prevalence of monogamy in humans compared to the predominance of polygyny in nonhuman mammals, to the limited degree of polygyny in the human societies that practice it, and to the importance of unequally held rival resources to women's fitness. The muted reproductive inequality observed in humans appears to be linked to several unusual characteristics of our species-including high levels of cooperation among males, high dependence on unequally held rival resources, complementarities between maternal and paternal investment, as well as social and legal institutions that enforce monogamous norms.

Human decision-making is controlled by various factors including material cost-benefit considerations, values and beliefs, social influences, cognitive factors and errors. Among social influences, those by external authorities (e.g. educational, cultural, religious, political, administrative, etc.) are particularly important owing to their potential reach and power. To better understand the effects of 'soft' power of authorities we develop a unifying theoretical framework integrating material, cognitive and social forces controlling the joint dynamics of individual actions and beliefs. We apply our approach to three different phenomena: evolution of food sharing in small-scale societies, participation in political protests and effects of priming social identity in behavioural experiments. For each of these applications, we show that our approach leads to different (or simpler) explanations of human behaviour than alternatives. We highlight the type of measurements which can be helpful in developing practical applications of our approach. We identify and explicitly characterise the degree of mismatch between individual actions and attitudes. We assert that the effects of external authorities, of changing beliefs and of differences between people must be studied empirically, included in mathematical models, and accounted for when developing different policies aiming to modify or sustain human behaviour., Competing Interests: There are no competing interests., (© The Author(s) 2022.)

During the Holocene, the scale and complexity of human societies increased markedly. Generations of scholars have proposed different theories explaining this expansion, which range from broadly functionalist explanations, focusing on the provision of public goods, to conflict theories, emphasizing the role of class struggle or warfare. To quantitatively test these theories, we develop a general dynamical model based on the theoretical framework of cultural macroevolution. Using this model and Seshat: Global History Databank, we test 17 potential predictor variables proxying mechanisms suggested by major theories of sociopolitical complexity (and >100,000 combinations of these predictors). The best-supported model indicates a strong causal role played by a combination of increasing agricultural productivity and invention/adoption of military technologies (most notably, iron weapons and cavalry in the first millennium BCE).

Technological innovations drive the evolution of human societies. The success of innovations depends not only on their actual benefits but also on how potential adopters perceive them and how their beliefs are affected by their social and cultural environment. To deepen our understanding of socio-psychological processes affecting the new technology spread, we model the joint dynamics of three interlinked processes: individual learning and mastering the new technology, changes in individual attitudes towards it, and changes in individual adoption decisions. We assume that the new technology can potentially lead to a higher benefit but achieving it requires learning. We posit that individual decision-making process as well as their attitudes are affected by cognitive dissonance and conformity with peers and an external authority. Individuals vary in different psychological characteristics and in their attitudes. We investigate both transient dynamics and long-term equilibria observed in our model. We show that early adopters are usually individuals who are characterized by low cognitive dissonance and low conformity with peers but are sensitive to the effort of an external authority promoting the innovation. We examine the effectiveness of five different intervention strategies aiming to promote the diffusion of a new technology: training individuals, providing subsidies for early adopters, increasing the visibility of peer actions, simplifying the exchange of opinions between people, and increasing the effort of an external authority. We also discuss the effects of culture on the spread of innovations. Finally, we demonstrate that neglecting the cognitive forces and the dynamic nature of individual attitudes can lead to wrong conclusions about adoption of innovations. Our results can be useful in developing more efficient policies aiming to promote the spread of new technologies in different societies, cultures and countries., (© 2022 The Authors.)

Economic, social and political inequality between different identity groups is an important contributor to violent conflicts within societies. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we develop a mathematical model describing cooperation and conflict in a society composed of multiple factions engaged in economic and political interactions. Our model predicts that growing economic and political inequality tends to lead to the collapse of cooperation between factions that were initially seeking to cooperate. Certain mechanisms can delay this process, including the decoupling of political and economic power through rule of law and allegiance to the state or dominant faction. Counterintuitively, anti-conformity (a social norm for independent action) can also stabilize society, by preventing initial defections from cooperation from cascading through society. However, the availability of certain material resources that can be acquired by the state without cooperation with other factions has the opposite effect. We test several of these predictions using a multivariate statistical analysis of data covering 75 countries worldwide. Using social unrest as a proxy for the breakdown of cooperation in society, we find support for many of the predictions from our theory.

Evolutionary scientists studying social and cultural evolution have proposed a multitude of mechanisms by which cultural change can be effected. In this article we discuss two influential ideas from the theory of biological evolution that can inform this debate: the contrast between the micro- and macro-evolution, and the distinction between the tempo and mode of evolution. We add the empirical depth to these ideas by summarizing recent results from the analyses of data on past societies in Seshat: Global History Databank . Our review of these results suggests that the tempo (rates of change, including their acceleration and deceleration) of cultural macroevolution is characterized by periods of apparent stasis interspersed by rapid change. Furthermore, when we focus on large-scale changes in cultural traits of whole groups, the most important macroevolutionary mode involves inter-polity interactions, including competition and warfare, but also cultural exchange and selective imitation; mechanisms that are key components of cultural multilevel selection (CMLS) theory.

Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Human decision-making is affected by a diversity of factors including material cost-benefit considerations, normative and cultural influences, learning and conformity with peers and external authorities (e.g. cultural, religious, political, organisational). Also important are dynamically changing personal perceptions of the situation and beliefs about actions and expectations of others as well as psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and social projection. To better understand these processes, I develop a unifying modelling framework describing the joint dynamics of actions and attitudes of individuals and their beliefs about the actions and attitudes of their groupmates. I consider which norms get internalised and which factors control beliefs about others. I predict that the long-term average characteristics of groups are largely determined by a balance between material payoffs and the values promoted by the external authority. Variation around these averages largely reflects variation in individual costs and benefits mediated by individual psychological characteristics. The efforts of an external authority to change the group behaviour in a certain direction can, counter-intuitively, have an opposite effect on individual behaviour. I consider how various factors can affect differences between groups and societies in the tightness/looseness of their social norms. I show that the most important factors are social heterogeneity, societal threat, effects of authority, cultural variation in the degree of collectivism/individualism, the population size and the subsistence style. My results can be useful for achieving a better understanding of human social behaviour and historical and current social processes, and in developing more efficient policies aiming to modify social behaviour., (© The Author(s) 2021.)

Injunctive social norms are behaviours that one is expected to follow and expects others to follow in a given social situation; they are maintained by the threat of disapproval or punishment and by the process of internalization. Injunctive norms govern all aspects of our social life but the understanding of their effects on individual and group behaviour is currently rather incomplete. Here I develop a general mathematical approach describing the dynamics of injunctive norms in heterogeneous groups. My approach captures various costs and benefits, both material and normative, associated with norm-related behaviours including punishment and disapproval by others. It also allows for errors in decision-making and explicitly accounts for differences between individuals in their values, beliefs about the population state, and sensitivity to the actions of others. In addition, it enables one to study the consequences of mixing populations with different normative values and the effects of persuasive interventions. I describe how interactions of these factors affect individual and group behaviour. As an illustration, I consider policies developed by practitioners to abolish the norms of footbinding and female genital cutting, to decrease college students' drinking, and to increase pro-environmental behaviours. The theory developed here can be used for achieving a better understanding of historical and current social processes as well as for developing practical policies better accounting for human social behaviour., (© The Author(s) 2020.)

Inequality or skew in reproductive success (RS) is common across many animal species and is of long-standing interest to the study of social evolution. However, the measurement of inequality in RS in natural populations has been challenging because existing quantitative measures are highly sensitive to variation in group/sample size, mean RS, and age-structure. This makes comparisons across multiple groups and/or species vulnerable to statistical artefacts and hinders empirical and theoretical progress. Here, we present a new measure of reproductive skew, the multinomial index, M , that is unaffected by many of the structural biases affecting existing indices. M is analytically related to Nonacs' binomial index, B , and comparably accounts for heterogeneity in age across individuals; in addition, M allows for the possibility of diminishing or even highly nonlinear RS returns to age. Unlike B , however, M is not biased by differences in sample/group size. To demonstrate the value of our index for cross-population comparisons, we conduct a reanalysis of male reproductive skew in 31 primate species. We show that a previously reported negative effect of group size on mating skew was an artefact of structural biases in existing skew measures, which inevitably decline with group size; this bias disappears when using M . Applying phylogenetically controlled, mixed-effects models to the same dataset, we identify key similarities and differences in the inferred within- and between-species predictors of reproductive skew across metrics. Finally, we provide an R package, SkewCalc, to estimate M from empirical data.

Many animal and human societies exhibit hierarchical structures with different degrees of steepness. Some of these societies also show cooperative behavior, where cooperation means working together for a common benefit. However, there is an increasing evidence that rigidly enforced hierarchies lead to a decrease of cooperation in both human and non-human primates. In this work, we address this issue by means of an evolutionary agent-based model that incorporates fights as social interactions governing a dynamic ranking, communal work to produce a public good, and norm internalization, i.e. a process where acting according to a norm becomes a goal in itself. Our model also includes the perception of how much the individual is going to retain from her cooperative behavior in future interactions. The predictions of the model resemble the principal characteristics of human societies. When ranking is unconstrained, we observe a high concentration of agents in low scores, while a few ones climb up the social hierarchy and exploit the rest, with no norm internalization. If ranking is constrained, thus leading to bounded score differences between agents, individual positions in the ranking change more, and the typical structure shows a division of the society in upper and lower classes. In this case, we observe that there is a significant degree of norm internalization, supporting large fractions of the population cooperating in spite of the rank differences. Our main results are robust with respect to the model parameters and to the type of rank constraint. We thus provide a mechanism that can explain how hierarchy arises in initially egalitarian societies while keeping a large degree of cooperation.

There has been much interest in the evolutionary forces responsible for, and underlying the diversity in, female primate reproductive cycles. While there has been limited research on sexual receptivity in primates, this has been one recurring topic of interest. Some primate species are like humans, sexually receptive to mating throughout their entire estrus cycle, while other species are the opposite, receptive for mere hours out of their several-week cycles. Why is there such prominent variation in sexual receptivity length among primate species? Here we examine the evolutionary trade-offs associated with sexual receptivity length using mathematical modeling. We investigate how various factors, including having ovulation signs present versus concealed ovulation, female physiological costs, and group size, each influence the length of females' receptive periods. We find that both continuous receptivity and very short lengths of receptivity are able to evolve. Our model predicts that increasing the impacts of infanticide will increase the length of the female receptive period, emphasizing the possible importance of paternity confusion. Similar effects can also be achieved by increasing the non-genetic benefits provided by males. Overall, our work offers a theoretical framework for understanding the evolution and diversity of mating traits in female primates.

Modern speciation theory has greatly benefited from a variety of simple mathematical models focusing on the conditions and patterns of speciation and diversification in the presence of gene flow. Unfortunately the application of general theoretical concepts and tools to specific ecological systems remains a challenge. Here we apply modeling tools to better understand adaptive divergence of whitefish during the postglacial period in lakes of northern Fennoscandia. These lakes harbor up to three different morphs associated with the three major lake habitats: littoral, pelagic, and profundal. Using large-scale individual-based simulations, we aim to identify factors required for in situ emergence of the pelagic and profundal morphs in lakes initially colonized by the littoral morph. The importance of some of the factors we identify and study - sufficiently large levels of initial genetic variation, size- and habitat-specific mating, sufficiently large carrying capacity of the new niche - is already well recognized. In addition, our model also points to two other factors that have been largely disregarded in theoretical studies: fitness-dependent dispersal and strong predation in the ancestral niche coupled with the lack of it in the new niche(s). We use our theoretical results to speculate about the process of diversification of whitefish in Fennoscandia and to identify potentially profitable directions for future empirical research.

Leadership can be effective in promoting cooperation within a group, but as the saying goes "heavy is the head that wears the crown". A lot of debate still surrounds exactly what motivates individuals to expend the effort necessary to lead their groupmates. Evolutionary game theoretic models represent individual's thought processes by strategy update protocols. The most common of these are random mutation, individual learning, selective imitation, and myopic optimization. Recently we introduced a new strategy update protocol - foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one's own strategies. Here we apply our approach to a new 2 × 2 game, where one player, a leader, ensures via inspection and punishment that the other player, a subordinate, produces collective good. We compare the levels of inspection and production predicted by Nash Equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, level-k cognition, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, selective payoff-biased imitation, and foresight. We show that only foresight and selective imitation are effective at promoting contribution by the subordinate and inspection and punishment by the leader. The role of selective imitation in cultural and social evolution is well appreciated. In line with our prior findings, foresight is a viable alternative route to cooperation.

A long-standing evolutionary puzzle surrounds female sexual signals visible around the time of ovulation. Even among just primates, why do some species have substantial sexual swellings and/or bright colorations visible around females' genital regions, while other species are like humans, with no signs of ovulation visible? What is the evolutionary purpose behind not just these signs, but also this great variation seen among species? Here, we examine the evolutionary trade-offs associated with visual ovulation signalling using agent-based modelling. Our model predicts how various factors, including male genetic heterogeneity and reproductive inequality, female physiological costs, group size, and the weighting of genetic versus non-genetic benefits coming from males, each influence the strength of ovulation signalling. Our model also predicts that increasing the impacts of infanticide will increase ovulation signalling. We use comparative primate data to show that, as predicted by our model, larger group size and higher risk of infanticide each correlate with having stronger visual ovulation signs. Overall, our work resolves some old controversies and sheds new light on the evolution of visual female sexual signalling., (© 2018 The Author(s).)

Human behavior is strongly affected by culturally transmitted norms and values. Certain norms are internalized (i.e., acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions). Humans' capacity to internalize norms likely evolved in our ancestors to simplify solving certain challenges-including social ones. Here we study theoretically the evolutionary origins of the capacity to internalize norms. In our models, individuals can choose to participate in collective actions as well as punish free riders. In making their decisions, individuals attempt to maximize a utility function in which normative values are initially irrelevant but play an increasingly important role if the ability to internalize norms emerges. Using agent-based simulations, we show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions so that cooperation becomes "instinctive." Norm internalization evolves much more easily and has much larger effects on behavior if groups promote peer punishment of free riders. Promoting only participation in collective actions is not effective. Typically, intermediate levels of norm internalization are most frequent but there are also cases with relatively small frequencies of "oversocialized" individuals willing to make extreme sacrifices for their groups no matter material costs, as well as "undersocialized" individuals completely immune to social norms. Evolving the ability to internalize norms was likely a crucial step on the path to large-scale human cooperation., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

When group cohesion is essential, groups must have efficient strategies in place for consensus decision-making. Recent theoretical work suggests that shared decision-making is often the most efficient way for dealing with both information uncertainty and individual variation in preferences. However, some animal and most human groups make collective decisions through particular individuals, leaders, that have a disproportionate influence on group decision-making. To address this discrepancy between theory and data, we study a simple, but general, model that explicitly focuses on the dynamics of consensus building in groups composed by individuals who are heterogeneous in preferences, certain personality traits (agreeability and persuasiveness), reputation, and social networks. We show that within-group heterogeneity can significantly delay democratic consensus building as well as give rise to the emergence of informal leaders, i.e. individuals with a disproportionately large impact on group decisions. Our results thus imply strong benefits of leadership particularly when groups experience time pressure and significant conflict of interest between members (due to various between-individual differences). Overall, our models shed light on why leadership and decision-making hierarchies are widespread, especially in human groups.