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Ethical intuitionism traces its roots back to the early eighteenth century in the field of ethics. Despite apparent distinctions, intuitionism, especially in its recent development by Huemer, bears a striking resemblance to robust versions of rationalist foundationalism. In this paper, we will argue against the perspective of robust intuitionism. Furthermore, we commit to reviewing what theorists operating within the field of study known as Dual Process Theory hypothesize about intuition. Nonetheless, we do not claim that the origin of our moral beliefs is unreliable or discreditable. On the contrary, we entertain the prospect of reviving intuitionistic themes by leveraging the concept of a Kantian scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios de Derecho is the property of Estudios de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cogency: Journal of Reasoning & Argumentation is the property of Cogency Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Rendón Rojas has recently defended the idea that disciplines and particularly, information science, need some kind of foundation for their development. At the same time, in his attack on anti-foundationalism, he refers to the fact that it is not possible because it is unfeasible to evade the principle of sufficient reason, and that its adoption leads to relativism and subjectivism. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to develop a critical discussion of Rendón Rojas's proposal, from an antifoundationalist perspective. To do this, a literature review is carried out and are analyzed the various variants of foundationalism as a philosophical current, in order to establish the main criticisms that have been made of it. Sellars' arguments are presented when considering foundationalism and the myth of the given. The criticisms of relativity and subjectivity made to anti-foundationalism are examined. A critical discussion is carried out on the principle of sufficient reason as a bastion for the disciplines, it is sustained that its presentation is an area of controversy and debate. Also, it presented an anti-foundationalist vision for information science. It is concluded that anti-foundationalism offers a fertile field when it comes to thinking about how scientific disciplines are consolidated, how they achieve consensus and community agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This inquiry examines the structure of knowledge of nationalism. While numerous studies on nationalism focus on the nature and defining elements of nations, this research explores nationalism discourse from a purely epistemological viewpoint and asks two overarching questions: what are the constitutive beliefs in these various theories and how are they structured? The first section outlines a contemporary foundationalist argument and analyzes two widely accepted theories of nationalism from this theory of knowledge. The study finds that the linear constraints of a foundationalist approach, resting on the existence of non-inferentially justified beliefs, provide a weak framework for understanding the knowledge structures of nationalism. No single element alone can be deemed to be a sufficient basic belief of nationalism that is self-justified. The second part of this research utilizes contemporary coherence theory to assess the interconnected beliefs embedded in nationalism. Examining several theories of nationalism which arguably adopt coherentism, this particular theory of knowledge is shown to provide a more holistic approach. The study concludes that the very definition of nationalism incorporates interconnected beliefs and ideas about ideology, ethnic basis, shared culture and history, as well as unity and autonomy which imply a befitting epistemological refocus away from foundationalism and towards coherentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Usually, the criticism of the modern foundational epistemological project and the representational conception of knowledge is associated with the philosophies of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. However, in an epigone of British idealism such as Michael Oakeshott, one can also recognize a singular position against philosophical foundationalism, representational epistemology, the theory of truth as correspondence and universalist rationalism. This article aims to reconstruct Oakeshott's philosophical inquiries into the conditions of human experience and understanding. Through the exegesis of his philosophical essays, we propose an integral reading of his systematic reflection on the modalities of human knowledge, which coherently combines idealistic, skeptical, and hermeneutical motives beyond the temptations of traditional epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines that justice on the Supreme Court was a common law judge. Topics include reports that the common law still matters as it remains the foundation on which federal statutes are written; and considered that dispute seems at first to confront an ordinary problem of statutory construction, but in fact it requires linking the federal statute to foundational principles of the common law .

The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, and increase respect, fair cooperation and dialogue between adherents of different religions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism and Hilary Putnam's semantical externalism. In the second part of the paper, I analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review two important schools within business and society research, which we label positivist and postpositivist corporate social responsibility (CSR). The former is criticized because of its instrumentalism and normative vacuity and the latter because of its relativism, foundationalism, and utopianism. We propose a new approach, based on Jürgen Habermas's theory of democracy, and we define the new role of the business firm as a political actor in a globalizing society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our first-personal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to highlight the advantages of integrating biblical perspectives and professional practices of the leader through coaching. The three basic biblical principles this article explores are faith, truth, and perseverance anchored in the biblical accounts of James. The integration of these three practical teachings adds value to the coaching profession while it fosters the establishment of deep-rooted and trusting relationships. These biblical concepts provide insight, understanding, and solutions for coaching practitioners in order to develop the leader to enhance relationships within the organization providing foundational competencies which improve the leader's performance in all areas of life. Trusting relationships are an innate necessity for leaders to partake in any endeavor throughout their personal or professional life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The starting point of this article is the current need of a pedagogy which rethinks its relationship with tradition, with its social profile and its feasibility. Research has been conducted on the hermeneutics of pedagogical and philosophical texts. Firstly, it has been proposed that pedagogy as a discipline should not be a part of psychology anymore and should be reoriented towards postulates closer to philosophy; Secondly, it must be provided with elements that supply an analytical knowledge, plural and dialectical. By analyzing the legacy of the philosophers Habermas and Rorty, the article shows that the Theory of Communicative Action and the acceptance of knowledge as the exact representation of reality can become points of reference capable of making pedagogy provide guidance to all the educational sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said to be a grounding intention in On Certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an integrated theoretical approach to conceptualize and support transitions of students in higher education towards their professional lives. The life design paradigm serves as a foundational anchor to the integration of career construction theory, happenstance learning theory, and hope theory. These theories are then applied to the 4S transition model to provide potential avenues for career counselors to follow in their work with students. It is imperative for career counselors to partner with students in higher education in learning how to successfully navigate transitions as they will face a multitude of them throughout their lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A criticism of the book "Intuitionism" by David Kaspar is presented and mentions topics including the points of affinity and contrast between intuitionism and foundationalist-empiricism.

Viewed from a Western historical-philosophical perspective, there seem to be at least three broad philosophical orientations on the basis of which Christian educators could approach their pedagogical task. The first is to approach it from a modernist (foundationalist, rationalist) perspective in terms of which the principles and guidelines gleaned from the Bible are cast into a coherent and all-embracing theory that is deterministically applied to ensure certain pedagogical outcomes. The second is just the opposite, namely to operate post-foundationalistically on the basis of a loose collection of Biblical principles and values, and hence to expect the child or young person to muddle through in the postmodern maze in which they are growing up nowadays. The third, referred to in this article as a post-post-foundationalist orientation, an orientation that arguably also can respond appropriately to post-modern conditions, allows the educator to effectively steer through between these two extremes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Irony and solidarity are two key concepts characteristic of the vocabulary of Richard Rorty. Their thematization can be done on a narrower or wider basis of texts. In the present paper I attempt to contextualize and reconstruct them against the background of other important concepts of Rorty's vocabulary, such as, first of all, the concept of contingency. The concept of irony is shown to derive, for Rorty, from Sartre' conception of the humans who are claimed to be what they are not, and not to be what they are. The non coincidence of humans with themselves, or, with their „essence,” is argued to lead the way to the basic attitude of irony. The concept of contingency may be shown to lead up to the concept of solidarity as well, in that the realization that what we are we are in a contingent way implies the possibility of being radically other than what we happen to be. (I.) In a second step, the basic concepts of Rorty, thus far reconstructed, are shown to be dependent on Rorty's basic philosophical stance of anti-foundationalism; the latter is claimed to have a hermeneutical background. (II.) In a final part the outlines of a tradition are sketched from Kant to the present, characterized by an anti-metapyhsical flow, whereby the importance of solidarity and morality is stressed without the attempt to anchor it in a metaphysical theory of humans or any kind of epistemology destined to provide knowledge rather than hope. Indeed, Rorty shows that hope stands over and above knowledge, and it contributes to making us humans more than a project to attain any kind of (secure) knowledge is ever capable of. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A warranted belief may derive inferential warrant from warranted beliefs which support it. It may possess what I call coherential warrant in virtue of being consistent with, or lacking improbability relative to, a large system of warranted beliefs. Finally, it may have foundational warrant, which does not derive from other beliefs at all. I define and distinguish these sources of warrant and explain why all three must be included in the true and complete account of the structure of knowledge, and why the first two sources are significant at all levels of knowledge. Only foundherentism and a weak version of foundationalism can satisfy this criterion. My analysis has significant, and happy, consequences for the epistemological tradition. The project of describing the structure of knowledge is nearly complete. Those who have pronounced the death of epistemology are partially correct, not because epistemology has failed, but because it has been so successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analytic philosophy of language has often criticized classical pragmatism for holding to an unwarranted notion of experience which lapses into epistemological foundationalism; defenders of the classics have denied such a consequence. The paper tries to move this debate forward by pointing out that the criticism of the empiricist "given" is not wedded to a specific philosophical method, be it linguistic or pragmatist. From a broader historical perspective drawing in particular on Kant, antifoundationalism turns out to be deeply rooted in modern western philosophy and its ambivalent attitude towards the success of the empirical sciences. This diagnosis allows to reassess classical pragmatism beyond the perceived alternative "language vs. experience", and to concentrate on antifoundationalism as the real challenge to any modern, epistemologically oriented philosophy. In that perspective, classical pragmatism's genuine contribution is to do justice to antifoundationalism by focusing on the experimental dynamic of scientific practice, which is most commonly ignored by the analytic tradition. Pragmatism identifies rationality with the practical operation of reflexively determining and articulating what is being experienced. With this approach, it is argued, experiential pragmatism serves modern antifoundationalism ends better than its analytic siblings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconstructs the merits of John Dewey's conception of language by viewing it within the context of communication as the act of making something in common, as social and instrumental action. It shows that on the one hand this approach allows us to avoid the problems of the linguistic turn: the self-entanglement of language, the overemphasizing of language at the expense of the plurality of our world experiences, and the unquestioned, but sterile, supremacy of interpretation. On the other hand, the paper supports the thesis that Dewey's perspective on language does not produce a new form of foundationalism - according to which language itself is founded on experience, liable to be independently designated - by providing some arguments to interpret the relationship between language and experience in non-contrastive ways. In particular, the essay suggests a non-dualistic interpretation of the distinction between immediate qualitative experience and language, that is knowing in actu, by arguing that language cannot be reduced to the ordered discourse of inquiry since it also structurally includes qualitative and aesthetic aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Herein I investigate how four dogmas underpinning the traditional concepts of universality, the genus, class, and abstract universal, generate four paradoxes of self-reference. The four dogmas are the following: (1) that contradiction entails the total absence of determinacy, (2) the necessary finitude of the concept, (3) the separation of principles of universality and particularity, and (4) the necessity of appealing to foundations. I show how these dogmas underpin the paradoxes of self-reference and how one cannot make progress on these paradoxes as long as these four dogmas are in place. Corresponding to the abovementioned dogmas are the four paradoxes of self-reference: (1a) the problem of the differentia, (2b) the problem of psychologism, (3c) the problem of participation, and (4d) the problem of ontotheology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abraham Kuyper wanted his fellow countrymen to accept biblically informed academic output as scientific and therefore authoritative. If Kuyper's plans were to come to fruition, he would have to state the case for a Christian science in a way that made sense to an audience enamoured with empirical science. Kuyper did this when he adopted foundationalism as epistemological thought structure, just like empirical scientists did. He did also differ from empirical science in the sense that he took faith as the foundation for his epistemological thought structure. Although Kuyper's choice for faith as foundation gave him the opportunity to introduce the Bible to scientific endeavour, his acceptance of foundationalism resulted in him dehumanising knowledge the same way empiricist scientist's did. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically engages with Laclauian theory of populism by utilizing Michael Oakeshott's theory of politics. It argues that both build their works on similar post-foundationalist premises, accepting once the impossibility of a final ground of society as well as the possibility of its contingent political foundations. It then shows that both scholars conceptualise politics residing on a continuum between what they consider as two theoretical extremes: politics of faith and scepticism for Oakeshott, pure populism and pure institutionalism for Laclau. In terms of the ways in which they operate, functions they fulfil, and effects they have on politics, these extremes overlap with one another to such an extent that they can be considered as near synonyms. This synonymy serves as a fertile ground to spread the seeds of a reconsideration of Laclau's account of populism. Utilizing Fieschi and Heywood's concept of entrepreneurial populism, the article briefly problematizes his account and calls attention to this particular species of populism gaining increasing popularity in contemporary politics. It is every bit of populist in its modus operandi yet neither subverts the status quo nor aims to reconstruct a new one, but simply plays it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that Practical Theology has moved from the uncertainty of simply being applied theology to a point where its methodology, described as the pastoral cycle in this instance, has gained such confidence that it is viewed as the natural way of doing theology. This shift in confidence occurred because the inherent theological and epistemological fault lines in foundationalism are no longer obscure. The article defines foundationalism and then focuses on describing the local and global dimensions of the pastoral cycle as well as the importance of doing it in an interdisciplinary manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I defend the need for meaningful dialogue about the foundations of human rights. The article consists of four main parts. Part I provides context for the argument by discussing the status of foundations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several other human rights legal instruments. Part II outlines the main criticisms of foundationalism by Michael Ignatieff and Richard Rorty. Part III deals with two main problems raised by anti-foundationalist positions. First, the motivation to defend and implement human rights is often tied to a rational understanding of why these rights are worthy of protection. Second, rejecting the search for rational foundations can itself lead to ideological problems, even if this search cannot ultimately succeed. Silence concerning justifications for rights informs our conversation about them, and making any concealed underlying assumptions explicit can be valuable. Finally, Part IV discusses ways in which a genuinely dialogical foundationalism can be possible - one that does not fall into the trap of dogmatism. More specifically, this section addresses the possibility of a secular foundationalism by examining Michael Perry's critique of this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education is the property of Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses making the Bible relevant in the postmodern world. It is asserted that Christian theology tried showing the reasonability of the Christian faith in a way that makes it compatible with the modern paradigm of foundationalism. Postmodernism is said to have presented many challenges and opportunities for rethinking and revising evangelical theology.

An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney's argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism' (2007), 'Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition' (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism is most faithful to the central internalist intuition. I argue that Huemer's self-defeat argument fails, that classical foundationalism is able to accommodate fallible introspective beliefs, and that classical foundationalism has no difficulty accommodating a relatively clear internalist intuition. I also show that the motivation for phenomenal conservatism is less than clear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The title and subtitle entail the main claims of this article. In the face of the present debate on the question whether Wittgenstein was a foundationalist, a coherentist, or both things, I suggest that, at least in a certain important sense, he didn't adopt either of these positions. The point concerns the status of propositions that I characterize as "unheard-of propositions" and that constitute the most important subclass of so called "Moore-type propositions". Unheard-of propositions (and the corresponding beliefs) are neither doubted nor justified, they are not said and not even thought. We simply count on them or we take them for granted. In calling our attention on these primitive, spontaneous and instinctive certainties Wittgenstein is trying to correct an intellectualist bias in traditional conceptions of human being. This reading is confirmed through an analysis of the origin of our basic certainties: we have some of them naturally or instinctively, we acquire others by training, but in neither case there are rational processes at stake (nor irrational ones, of course). The debate between foundationalism and coherentism conceals precisely what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover: a stratum of certainties that, being objective, precede the order of knowledge and justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary details the process aimed at developing the Inaugural National Leadership Education Research Agenda. The goal of the project is to create a guiding document to assist in further defining Leadership Education as a discipline and provide directional research priorities for that discipline. The commentary provides a foundational understanding and creates transparency for the process in an effort to solicit collaborative partnerships and dialogue that will ultimately provide more holistic research priorities and enhanced opportunities for scholarship within Leadership Education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its short life in Jena, Early German Romanticism provided a productive theory of Aesthetics, which still remains a subject of discussion and even controversy in contemporary thought. What is most remarkable about these young thinkers is their radical attitude toward crucial problems such as the role of language in human knowledge, limits of understanding and also the form of philosophical writing. By discussing the problem of language and its position in romantic philosophical aesthetics, this article emphasizes the important role of "incomprehensibility" as a crucial concept in early German romantics view, which besides their Antifoundationalist philosophy, provides the basis of their fragmentary writing as a new manner of reflection. Drawing on Blanchot and Critchley, it will be argued that the self-consciousness of fragmentary text of its own failure and unworking is the very key to its infinity, and positive reaction toward the existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I will compare Lehrer's anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer's anti-skeptical approach, if one does not prefer coherentism to foundationalism for other reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first queries what type of concept of emergence, if any, could be connected with the different chemical activities subsumed under the label 'quantum chemistry'. In line with Roald Hoffmann, we propose a 'rotation to research laboratory' in order to point out how practitioners hold a molecular whole, its parts, and the surroundings together within their various methods when exploring chemical transformation. We then identify some requisite contents that a concept of emergence must incorporate in order to be coherent from the standpoint of the scientific practices involved. In this respect, we finally propose a relational form of emergence which pays attention to the constitutive role of the modes of intervention and to the co-definition of the levels of organization. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a plurality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization but, on the contrary, are considered to be active elements on which the constitution of those patterns depends. What is at stake in this paper is therefore not an ontological form of emergence but an agnostic one which fits what chemists do in their daily work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on knowing reality based on the ontologically reductive physicalist views of Nancey Murphy in various disciplines including neuroscience, philosophy and theology. It reviews the view of Aristotle on the essence or nature of substances, the ontological view of Murphy favoring nonreductive physicalism and her consideration of nonneural circumstances. It also notes ontological resources of Murphy for knowing reality and her rejection of foundationalism.

This article analyzes the novel El Magnicidio by Germán Espinosa in relation with modern/colonial foundational stories of the dictator's novel and the detective novel (in English classic and American side). These stories come into contact within the text and make place for enunciation and peripheral thought. The study is based on the critics that some Latin American thinkers have made about modernity and the importance of "the Latin-American" on it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling's discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling's discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling's dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research project is an attempt to develop a rich understanding about the relationship between seafarers and their families by means of a conversational construction between a number of co-researchers. In order to do this, the question that is explored is: How can there be a better understanding of the lives, the circumstances and the problems that seafarers are experiencing in the relationship with their families? The answer put forward in this research is that this can be accomplished through a narrative approach guided by the ABDCE formula which applies the metaphor of story writing to research. The research was motivated by pastoral and missionary concerns. The epistemologies that informed this research were social constructionism, the narrative approach and postfoundationalism with its emphasis on the interdisciplinary approach. In this article the main character for this research was a seafarer called John1 from Nigeria who was brought into conversation with a number of other coresearchers. The understanding that was developed found that the career choice of seafarers creates problems in their relationship with their family because they become in a sense strangers and outsiders to their loved ones. On the other hand seafarers are empowered, many times through their faith, to handle the challenges of their career, in addition to which this profession offers opportunities that would otherwise not have been possible. The relationship between a seafarer and his or her family was described as a complex one and thin, superficial and stereotypical conclusions were hopefully in the process deconstructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We propose a variant of the CCS process algebra with new features aiming at allowing multiscale modeling of biological systems. In the usual semantics of process algebras for modeling biological systems actions are instantaneous. When different scale levels of biological systems are considered in a single model, one should take into account that actions at a level may take much more time than actions at a lower level. Moreover, it might happen that while a component is involved in one long lasting high level action, it is involved also in several faster lower level actions. Hence, we propose a process algebra with operations and with a semantics aimed at dealing with these aspects of multiscale modeling. We give both a reduction semantics and an SOS semantics for our new algebra with a result of operational correspondence between the two. Moreover, we study behavioral equivalences for such an algebra and give some examples. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Migrant workers in the Deciduous Fruit Industry are part of the marginalised communities in South Africa who have been severely affected by HIV and/or AIDS. A postfoundationalist approach and the Seven Movements proposed by Müller were traced to present the research undertaken amongst migrant workers with HIV or AIDS. The practical theological investigation was developed from the praxis of HIV and AIDS and the question that it aimed to answer was: 'What is the experience of God in the lives of persons affected by or infected with HIV/AIDS?' Whilst it is understood that Christian belief has its own, exclusive integrity, if it is to be valid, it should be able to incorporate the different dimensions of our modern practice to give it the maximum level of meaning and significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I challenge an influential understanding of naturalization according to which work on traditional problems in the philosophy of law should be replaced with sociological or psychological explanations of how judges decide cases. W.V. Quine famously proposed the 'naturalization of epistemology'. In a prominent series of papers and a book, Brian Leiter has raised the intriguing idea that Quine's naturalization of epistemology is a useful model for philosophy of law. I examine Quine's naturalization of epistemology and Leiter's suggested parallel and argue that the parallel does not hold up. Even granting Leiter's substantive assumption that the law is indeterminate, there is no philosophical confusion or overreaching in the legal case that is parallel to the philosophical overreaching of Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology. Moreover, if we take seriously Leiter's analogy, the upshot is almost the opposite of what Leiter suggests. The closest parallel in the legal case to Quine's position would be the rejection of the philosophical positions that lead to the indeterminacy thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ' x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it 'a remnant of rationalism'. The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as it were. By presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite number of steps. Next we show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification. Finally we discuss the question where justification can come from if not from a ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, but only if it is supplemented by an abstractionist theory of concept-formation, the view that it is possible to abstract concepts directly from the empirically given. Critics of direct realism like Laurence BonJour are correct that an account of direct perception by itself does not provide an adequate account of justification. However a direct realist account of perception can inform the needed theory of concept-formation, and leading critics of abstractionism like McDowell and Sellars, direct realists about perception themselves, fail to appreciate the ways in which their own views about perception help fill gaps in earlier accounts of abstractionism. Recognizing this undercuts both their objections to abstractionism and (therefore) their objections to foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]