Search

The article delves into the analysis of Orientalist conceptions put forth by the Russian military scholar, D. A. Milyutin, in his narrative about the peoples of the North Caucasus. This study is anchored in “postcolonial critiques”, a lens extensively applied by international researchers to evaluate the actions of European powers in global peripheries. The aim of this research is to introduce the hitherto overlooked unpublished manuscripts of D. A. Milyutin into academic discourse. Specifically, this focuses on his descriptions of Kabarda and Chechnya, which form the foundation for analyzing the scholarly issue discussed. The paper reveals that, when describing local populations, Russian military scholars actively leaned on Orientalist conceptions. They not only furnished those conceptions with empirical data but also interpreted them in context of the realities faced on the Russo-Caucasian frontier. Assertions that juxtapose Europe with the East, the interplay between the scholarly study of the region and its governance structure, and notions about the inherent stagnation of Eastern societies, as well as the belief in the necessity of external control for the development of Eastern communities, are all echoed in D. A. Milyutin’s works. Concurrently, his rendition of pan-European thoughts introduces a unique “frontier Orientalism”. This perspective captures descriptions of the militarized lifestyle of local residents, their raiding habits along the Line, and provides reasoning for the extended duration of Russian military engagements in the ethnic territories of the Caucasus. This article is tailored for a diverse range of scholars, as well as anyone with a keen interest in the intellectual history of the Caucasus and the evolution of socio-political thought in the mid-19th century Russian Empire.

The article aims at a comparative analysis of the Russian military operations in Kyiv, during the current war in Ukraine, and those carried out in Grozny, during the 1st Chechen War, namely from a discursive and operational standpoint, in order to highlight similarities and differences between both cases and clarify the comparisons used during the attempted siege of Kyiv. The analysis shows the existence of several similarities between the Russian invasion of Kyiv and that of Grozny, notwithstanding the end result, namely from the discursive, the Russian armed force’s preparation and planning, the adversary’s response and the invader’s moral standpoints, as well as in the use of heavy artillery, namely against civilian populations. These similarities raise additional questions about the Russian armed force’s loss of quality during the Putin era, following several military successes. Lastly, the use of this comparison served essentially to raise awareness in the public and in international institutions about what could happen in Kyiv (and in the rest of Ukraine) and to emphasise the need for support to Ukraine on the West’s behalf.

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Aim. Following the discovery of a number of iconographically unique masonry petroglyphs depicting a red deer solar stag (i.e. bearing the sun between its antlers) in settlements of the Chamalal ethno‐linguistic group in the upper Andiiskoe Koisu region of the Tsumadinskiy district of Dagestan, the aim of the research has been: (1) to survey the region to ascertain whether other images of this nature existed and to understand the relationship of the corpus to other petroglyphs produced within the Avar‐Ando‐Dido metacultural zone and of neighbouring ethnic groups in the Caucasus; (2) to study the evolution and meaning to the community of the petroglyphic imagery and (3) to understand the mechanisms by which peoples of the Caucasus shared and adapted polytheistic belief systems arising from the deep past following their conversion to Christianity and Islam.Materials and Methods. Research activities involved field surveys of traditional buildings within the ethno‐linguistic enclaves of the upper Andiiskoe Koisu which might contain masonry petroglyphs and their photographic documentation. A thorough survey of the scientific literature impacting on this field in the Caucasus was undertaken in the libraries and institutions of Dagestan, Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This data added to the documentation of masonry petroglyphs already undertaken in the Gidatli communities of the upper Avarskoe Koisu region.Results. Field surveys resulted in the discovery of more petroglyphs of the solar stag iconography both within Chamalal territory and that of the neighbouring Tindals as well as other petroglyphs of interest in neighbouring republics of the North Caucasus. A socioecological assessment of local habitats which might have sustained both red deer and bezoar goat (the principal game animals since human presence in the region) indicated that the bezoar goat inhabited the territories of both groups but were now rarely found in Chamalal lands. While red deer did inhabit the forests of the Tindals, it appears that they never frequented those of the Chamalals, who must have travelled to hunt them in forests further to the south.Conclusion. The research confirmed the presence of a unique corpus of petroglyphic imagery attesting to beliefs in a solar stag which may date back to period of man’s re‐inhabiting the upper Andiiskoe Koisu region in the early Holocene. Indigenous beliefs relating both to the red deer and the bezoar goat initially represented in rock face petroglyphs of the eastern Dagestan piedmonts and rock paintings of the mountainous regions were by the late Bronze Age represented on masonry blocks used in building in the Avar‐Ando‐Dido metacultural zone. As Christianity spread in Transcaucasia and the Great Caucasus Range, including north‐western Dagestan, indigenous images representing the solar stag were conflated with those of the popular Christian cult of the Miracle of Saint Eustace, resulting in the unique petroglyphs of the solar stag common to

Copyright of Zoophilologica: Polish Journal of Animal Studies is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slaskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Russia is a state with a multi-ethnic federal structure inherited from the USSR. Implementing an ethnic policy that would unite and integrate its citizens is one of its most important goals. Among Russia’s federal subjects are also national republics pursuing their own ethno-political concepts, either conciliatory or conflictual. Tatarstan and Chechnya are examples of such republics. With the use of the comparative method, the article is an attempt at demonstrating many factors that have an impact on the shaping and implementing of the ethnic policy through such criteria as the status of the republics, the concept of the nation, and ethnocentrism, historical memory, the role of Islam and its politicization, and the language policy. The article also outlines their consequences and possible future scenarios.

This article intends to revisit the role of foreign fi ghters in the Chechen war and its aftermath, looking particularly at their impact on Islamic developments in Chechnya and Dagestan during the 1990s–2010s. The article challenges the argument, which is predominant in the literature, that foreign jihadists were primarily responsible for transforming the Chechen insurgency from a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies and Salafi circles were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First Chechen war. Secondly, this article contends that local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction with foreign jihadist fi ghters, provided the mobilization structures and the ideological framing for the radicalization of the Chechen/ North Caucasus rebel movement. By examining the Salafi -jihadist discourse of both foreign and local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and 2000s, the article shows how foreign Salafi s infl uenced and helped shape the ideological framing of local Salafi politicians and rebel jihadist groups. Yet, this article also shows that many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed to gain broader societal support. They did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s–2000s. A fi nal section of this article looks at events in the past decade, particularly at developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In this context, the article explains why many young Muslims in Dagestan became themselves foreign fi ghters and travelled to Syria/Iraq to fi ght for and live in the Islamic State. It concludes that Salafi projects, although not indigenous to the region, prospered as a result of the interaction between local Salafi s and foreign jihadist fi ghters and recruiters.

This paper examines the Chechen Black Widows and how they carry symbolic terrorist attacks against Russian targets - the authors' newly created concept of feminevil. By and large, feminevil is a growing phenomenon of girl-militancy in human violence. The theory used in this paper is Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT). Developed by Bormann (1972), SCT posits that a group can unite to form a collective culture so as to achieve ambitious objectives. Whether it is a word, phrase, narrative, or physical symbol, each tenet - (a) fantasy theme, (b) symbolic cue, (c) fantasy type, and (d) saga - merges with all the others to recognize anything that helps generate, increase, and sustain a rhetorical society's awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ajalooline Ajakiri is the property of Ajalookirjanduse Sihtastutus Kleio and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines the image of radical Islamists, which was created in the publications of the largest domestic periodicals during the military operations in Dagestan in August–September 1999. The author analyses front-line reports and interviews with high-ranking military leaders published in such central newspapers and magazines as Nezavisimaya gazeta, Trud, Izvestiya, Kommersant, Echo planety, Novoe vremya and some others. Among the sources, there are both serious analytical broadsheets and tabloids. The author also pays attention to the regional press, for example, the Yaroslavl periodicals Karavan-Ros and Yaroslavskie novosti. These publications delivered valuable information on the ideology of the enemy, their weapons and equipment, and the war crimes they committed, and also reflected the attitude to the militants of the Russian soldiers and policemen who opposed them. The detachments of militants who opposed the federal forces and the Dagestani law enforcement officers appeared in these reports as cruel religious fanatics, intolerant of the bearers of any other ideology, ready to impose it on other people by force. At the same time, following military and law enforcement officials, Russian journalists were forced to recognize high combat qualities of the enemy, their perseverance and steadfastness in battle. Most of the pieces mentioned the fact that the rebels possessed a large number of modern weapons, both domestic and foreign-made, and also said that they had developed professionally competent in-depth defense. The author draws a conclusion about the antipathy of Russian reporters to the rebel combat units and identifies the reasons for the change in the attitude of the media towards them in comparison with the First Chechen War of 1994–96. In those years, journalists condemned military actions of the federal forces in the Caucasus, but in 1999 they supported the operation in Dagestan and considered Islamic radicals as ordinary bandits.

The paper concerns the documentary Welcome to Chechnya (2020), made in response to the mass purge of gay men and women that started in the Chechen Republic in 2017. The main aim of this paper is to highlight the problem of LGBTQIA+ society in Russia and Chechnya and give a voice to the victims of discriminated minorities. In the face of the war in Ukraine, it seems more important than ever. It is done through presenting the legal situation of LGBTQIA+ in both countries, explaining possible causes of the lack of acceptance of homosexuality in Russia and Chechnya, clarifying the Kremlin's point of view in the domain of homosexuality and explicating the reason for which artificial intelligence (AI) is used in the documentary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic confl icts are a challenge to the state as it impacts the foreign policy as well as the domestic politics of a nation. The region of North Caucasus has been the most unstable region among the Republics of the Russian Federation. The present article will analyse the causes of the rising tensions among the ethnic groups and the role of Russia in solving the problems in the region. It will further explain the drawbacks of the Russian authorities and will recommend policies which could bring a positive change in the confl ict. The use of force would not be able to bring any change in the region rather it would be more fruitful if efforts are made to address the causes for the ethnic violence.

The paper analyzes the difficulties of the Soviet-party leadership in the Chechen Autonomous Region in implementing the first five-year plans. The study of this problem is caused by the fact that modern Russia is experiencing a new round of modernization processes, and today the experience of previous generations is important so as not to repeat their mistakes. The subject of this study is of continuous interest among scientists who consider the present as a direct continuation of the past. Given the fact that the North Caucasus has a special place in the recent history of Russia in the last two decades, therefore, a deep study of the trends and contradictions of socio-economic development in Chechnya in the 1928–1937 allows identifying the historical origins and causes of modern problems in this region, which are a direct consequence of the accumulated contradictions in historical development. The policy of industrialization by the Soviet leadership was considered as a decisive factor in creating the material and technical base of socialism and ensuring the country’s defense potential. The industrial jump was caused primarily by the foreign policy aspect, so the leadership emphasized that to delay the pace means to lag behind. Industrialization for the Chechen Autonomous Region meant the creation of industrial production, because here it was almost absent, the main population was employed in agriculture. The city of Grozny with its factories was an independent region. In 1928, the Soviet leadership began to implement the directives of the first congress. The directives of the XV Party Congress emphasized the need for special attention to the issues of economic recovery and culture of backward national outskirts, which was the Chechen Autonomous Region by the beginning of the first five-year plans.

The high level of terrorist threat to the security of the Russian Federation, which has been persisting for decades, is a process of many aspects. The conducted internal policy, involvement in armed conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria, the unstable situation in the Caucasus and the undertaken international co-operation have a significant impact on the activation of terrorist groups in Russia. Already in 2012, before the series of attacks in the French Republic, the on-going conflict in the North Caucasus was described as the most brutal in Europe. Since 2007, Russia has started to cope with international terrorism. What is even worse, it has undergone evolution, permanently destabilizing the internal security of the state. The recent attacks have been associated with the emergence of extremist groups from the Middle East, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and their cooperation with rebels from the South and North Caucasus. International terrorist groups began their expansion into the whole territory of the Russian Federation, mobilizing the local government to undertake activities counteracting terrorism. Nowadays, the situation is slowly returning to normal, but new threats are still worth noting. The past experience and new threats of attacks urge us to re-analyse the current situation and define the goals of the anti-terrorist actions of the Russian Federation. This is also important in view of the consequences for other countries which are immediate neighbours of Russia, including possible terrorist consequences for Poland.

The main purpose of my work is to present the determinants and dependencies that characterize the Russian-Chechen relations for international political and economic security in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, especially the Russian Federation. At the beginning, I intend to trace the process of the Chechen war and consolidate the power of the current leader of the country, Ramzan Kadyrov with the help of the President Russia, Vladimir Putin. At the same time, I will present the geopolitical significance of Chechnya in the international security system. In the following, I would like to present the implications of Russian-Chechen relations for other countries of the former USSR area- Ukraine, where in all probability Chechen “volunteers” participated in the fighting in Donbas. Finally, an important element of this work will be signaling, that President Kadyrov, despite aware of the Kremlin’s dependence on many matters, especially in economic terms, is starting to pursue an increasingly independent policy, as exemplified by the growing islamization of Chechnya, the participation of Chechen the Syrian conflict, Kadyrov active participation in the persecution of the Russian opposition, and finally the defense by the Chechen policy of the Muslim population of Rohingya in Myanmar against Moscow abstemious position. I would like to present the possible consequences of the above actions for the Russian Federation. It is not a secret that President Putin, despite the declared support for Kadyrov, is increasingly disapproving of some of his actions. In addition, it will be reasonable to present the reception of Kadyrov’s activities in other post-Soviet areas. In summary, I intend to answer the question whether major changes in the relations of both countries should be expected – and whether and how any changes will affect the architecture of international security.

The article focuses on the film House of Fools (Dom Durakov, 2002) of Andrei Konchalovsky, who is one of the most recognized contemporary Russian directors. The selected work is analyzed from the point of view of its intertextual relationships with Russian literary texts and cultural phenomena. The motif of the train, the paradigm of jurodivyj and the reference to the artistic worlds of acclaimed Russian writers (Anton Chekhov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Vyrypaev) are among the main parallels which are discussed in the publication. The eclectic nature of the film allows treating it as a cultural archive founded on the storage capacity of the cultural memory. In the context of war, the sphere of art and the imagined can be seen as the most stable reality.

It is a national conflict. The region of the North Caucasus has been the most unstable region among the Republics of the Russian Federation. It is a list of trends in the region. It will further clarify the situation. It would be a little bit more than a lot of fruit.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the first days of the Chechen war of 1994-96 presented by several well-known foreign journalists (Jan Rozdzynski, E. Lieven, and F. Kukurina). Their publications describe skirmishes between the Russian troops and the Chechen militants, the devastation in Grozny and the deaths of civilians. The parallels with similar publications in the Rus-sian press of that time are drawn. The conclusion about sympathies of foreign correspondents with regards to the Chechen separatists and their proximity to the anti-war publications of the Russian press was made.

The article characterizes the unique high-rise monumental architectural structures of the 18th century - tower and crypt buildings on the territory of Chechnya that form a special complex of historic monuments and material artifacts of the Chechens. As compared to residential towers the military ones are the pinnacle of the ancient Chechens’ architecture and engineering. The Chechen military towers are especially distinguished by “mashikuls” - small protective balconies in the upper floor for successful defense - and large stylized depictions of crosses, snakes, animals and people carved in stone. Some of the tower complexes on the territory of Chechnya can be referred to as “castles” (Pakoch Castle in the valley of the Chanty-Argun river; Aldam-Gezi in the village of Kezenoy; a castle near Galanchozh). A substantial proportion of the architectural monuments in the mountainous areas of Chechnya are those of sepulchral nature - underground and semi-underground crypts as well as elevated ones (malkh-kash). At times the crypt constructions made up “towns of the dead” with houses of various shape and size - the local necropolises. Next to the “towns of the dead” Chechens used to build up sanctuaries - temples. There were two types of sanctuaries. In the 16th through the 18th centuries the pagan sanctuaries and Christian temples were replaced by Muslim mosques that were built of stone and retained features of the traditional architecture. During the period under consideration the Chechens’ settlements were located both in the mountains and on the plains. Living conditions on the plains were found more comfortable by the local population.

The article deals with the problems of historiography of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic. The author analyzes the approaches to disclosure of the nature and the causes of the armed conflict in Chechnya, existing in modern Polish historiography. The active phase of the military operations of the armed conflict in Chechnya was completed in 2001. At that time, historians, analysts and journalists create a wide range of theoretical works concerning the conflict. A number of common features on the use of basic resources are discussed in these publications. The degree of accessibility of the sources which focus on the description of the conflict and its socio-political assessment is of great importance for researchers and their objectives. Modern Polish historiography, dedicated to the armed conflict in Chechnya, is in the stage of development and the state of its documentary complex is characterized by a number of qualitative changes. The article highlights the scientific and objective truth, comparing it with the comments of the contemporaries. In terms of methodological aspects it is an interesting work for specialists in the fields of history and political science. The author urges us to meditate on the objective truth and subjective opinion about the events. Versions of the causes of the conflict, conflict results and prospects set out in the Polish historiography may have significance not only for understanding of the situation in the Chechen Republic itself but also for the international relations.

Hal Foster (2015) asserts that art should address emergencies. While he speaks of visual and performance arts, I extend his claim to poetry. As such, I use my positionality of queer individual as an entrance point to using poetry to address queer emergencies. Starting with Hegel’s (1975) articulation that the lyric form of poetry starts with our own subjectivity and shows a “coming to consciousness” (Culler, 2015, p. 2) through thought and reflection, this poetry addresses a pressing queer emergency of our current political moment (Chechnya), while also extending its reach to/through the intersections with other queer emergencies of today’s climate. Through this inscription of the present, I strive to illuminate the personhood of queer victims, the intersections of current queer emergencies, and the temporal and real proximity of emergency to those of us who might feel safe based on other identity intersections.

Starting from the example of the post-Soviet space, this article is interested in how conflicts are caused by - or result in - tensions between groups promoting different types and versions of historical memory. In the neo-authoritarian, (post-) conflict setting of Chechnya, Jan Assman's concept of cultural and communicative memory offers an interesting entry point to analyse the different types and levels of conflict, between the Chechens and Moscow, and within society in Chechnya proper. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the nationalisation of historiography in the 1990s, the new elites of Chechnya formulated local alternatives to the dominant Russian (and Soviet) narrative of the past. During the second war in Chechnya in the early 2000s, and with the strengthening of authoritarianism under the Kadyrov regime, the formerly open conflict with Moscow was again pushed underground. Ramzan Kadyrov's instrumentalisation of history as a means to legitimise his cult of the Kadyrov family and the political choice for Moscow, that is, for Vladimir Putin, plays an important role in fuelling these grievances. Civil society, and expecially young people are an important actor in this conflict between official (or cultural) and popular (or communicative) forms of historical memory - a new conflict that is smouldering within the Chechen society, only waiting to eventually break out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the broad social and relational drivers behind mobilization of Chechens into armed jihad in the Levant. It suggests that the core mobilizing tool in a process toward violent (re-)action is a narrative that projects the Other as so different from, and so dangerous to the Self that the use of violence is legitimized. Moreover, the shift to more radical representations of the other group occurs in a mutual pattern of imagining and interaction between groups. The mobilization of Chechens into armed jihad is explained with reference to the physical and social exclusion of Chechens in Russia and how these experiences have been interpreted and narrated on the one hand and the attempted inclusion of Chechnya/North Caucasus by the global jihadi milieu on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The activity and the memoirs of General Ion Dumitrache are undoubtedly important, if not capital, for knowing our history and especially the history of the Second World War. It is notorious that Mountain Troops represented the only elite troops of the Romanian Infantry during the entire Eastern Campaign. In today's jargon a kind of "green berets". The best known of them was the 2nd Mountain Division. The courage of the fighters under the command of General Dumitrache made the 2nd Mountain Division to acquire on the front a well-deserved renown, in sync with the determination demonstrated by the troops of that great unit: "Divizia de Cremene". Historian Alesandru Duțu noted in his most recent volume that "General Dumitrache led large units of the Romanian Army that reached the easternmost point in the Second World War. The Romanian troops under his command fought in the Caucasus Mountains, the 2nd Romanian Mountain Division reaching close to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya!" [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the film House of Fools (Dom Durakov, 2002) of Andrei Konchalovsky, who is one of the most recognized contemporary Russian directors. The selected work is analyzed from the point of view of its intertextual relationships with Russian literary texts and cultural phenomena. The motif of the train, the paradigm of jurodivyj and the reference to the artistic worlds of acclaimed Russian writers (Anton Chekhov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Vyrypaev) are among the main parallels which are discussed in the publication. The eclectic nature of the film allows treating it as a cultural archive founded on the storage capacity of the cultural memory. In the context of war, the sphere of art and the imagined can be seen as the most stable reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up three related questions: (1) what is the difference between ethnic and religious conflict; (2) are theories of ethnic conflict equally applicable to religious conflict; and (3) can available theories of collective violence explain why the nature of internal conflict changes over time, either with respect to individual conflicts or globally? The author argues that distinguishing among types of internal conflict is more difficult than is often assumed and that theories of ethnic conflict typically explain not ethnic conflict as distinct category but sustained internal violence in general, including "religious" conflict. Further, while these theories typically attempt to explain why conflict breaks out in some multiethnic regions but not others, they do not attempt to explain why conflict when it occurs is "ethnic" rather than something else, why the nature of individual conflicts changes over time, or why certain kinds of internal conflict are characteristic of particular periods in history and not others. The paper investigates these questions by looking at three cases: Afghanistan since 1978, Tajikistan from 1992-1997, and Chechnya since 1994.

Over the last decades, the strategic profile of the discourse with which wars are narrated has been reinforced. This discourse has also varied in the light of a recent – and alleged – peace culture permeating Western societies. Whereas the war discourse in Russia during the Second Russian-Chechen War has been widely studied, this has not been the case of the rhetoric of the Chechen Islamist guerrillas. The aim of this paper is to contribute to bridging this gap in the academic literature on the North Caucasus, employing to this end a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of a selection of texts posted by the Kavkaz Center (KC) news agency. On the basis of this analysis, it can be concluded that one of the main discursive strategies revolved around the construction of an “us” embodying the Chechen victims of the initial aggression in a conflict provoked by the Russian “other”.

The article deals with the problems of historiography of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic. The active phase of the military operations of the armed conflict in Chechnya was completed in 2001. At that time, historians, analysts and journalists created a wide range of theoretical works concerning the conflict. A number of common features on the use of basic resources are discussed in these publications. The degree of accessibility of the sources which focus on the description of the conflict and its socio-political assessment is of great importance for researchers and their objectives. The author analyzes the European (French) historiography of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, considers publications and specialized monographs by French authors on the given subject. The author reveals the ideas about the consequences of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, articulated in the works of the European researchers. For the first time within the study of the Western historiography of the war in Chechnya the author analyzes these consequences for both the Russian and Chechen sides. Being one of the most influential historical traditions, French historiography dedicated to the armed conflict in Chechnya is in the stage of development and is characterized by a number of qualitative changes and conceptual approaches.

The article deals with the case of Chechen separatism, which resulted in the secession of the Republic from Russia in 1991. The theoretical framework for this study is based on considering secession as a dynamic process triggered by a shift in the perception of a cost-benefit equilibrium regarding a possible attempt at secession. The second section of the article briefly analyzes the most important structural prerequisites, which could have been conducive for Chechen secessionism at the beginning of the 1990s. The last section explains the factors, which could have been crucial in changing the initial calculation of a costs and benefits equilibrium regarding the possible attempt at secession. Among the above mentioned factors, the rise of ethno-nationalism and nationalist elites creating discourse justifying the secession of the Chechen Republic. The role of the center-periphery relationship and the weakening position of the federal center in Moscow are also considered in the article.

Russia's literary tradition was the primary locus of Russian debate on the Caucasus until the media revolution of the post-Soviet 1990s. This paper examines how the idiom of nineteenth-century literary romanticism, both in its representations of the North Caucasian peoples and in its implied critique of the Russian state, collided with the verbal and visual material of the post-Soviet 1990s. In the past, writers such as Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy had employed the literary figures of the Savage, the Captive, and the Corpse, who each represented the political, psychic, and physiological dimensions of the Russian mythology of the Caucasus. In the first half of the 1990s, the media inherited the prophetic function formerly accorded to the artist. During the Chechen war of 1994-1996, press freedom brought with it a new ethical responsibility, as well as a ready spectacularization of violence and a loosening of the internal coherence of received ideas, experiences, and narratives. The paper concludes by examining whether and how the nineteenth-century literary myths of the Chechen as "savage" and the Russian nation as "captive," that is victim both of the imperial state and of anti-imperialist resistance, persisted in the changed political and symbolic landscape of the post-Soviet era.

The activity and the memoirs of General Ion Dumitrache are undoubtedly important, if not capital, for knowing our history and especially the history of the Second World War. It is notorious that Mountain Troops represented the only elite troops of the Romanian Infantry during the entire Eastern Campaign. In today's jargon a kind of "green berets". The best known of them was the 2nd Mountain Division. The courage of the fighters under the command of General Dumitrache made the 2nd Mountain Division to acquire on the front a well-deserved renown, in sync with the determination demonstrated by the troops of that great unit: "Divizia de Cremene". Historian Alesandru Duţu noted in his most recent volume that "General Dumitrache led large units of the Romanian Army that reached the easternmost point in the Second World War. The Romanian troops under his command fought in the Caucasus Mountains, the 2nd Romanian Mountain Division reaching close to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya!". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The collapse of the Soviet Union was remarkably peaceful, but its aftermath has been remarkably violent. To keep its multiethnic empire together, the Soviet regime used a mixed bag of political and economic instruments, developed over decades of Communist power and centuries of Russian imperial rule. The sudden end of the Soviet system destroyed most of these instruments and left the leaders of the new states of Eurasia holding the bag. As a result, these countries have become fertile ground for demagoguery, separatism, and ethnic strife. The ongoing conflict in Chechnya is the most visible manifestation of the potential for ethnic violence that exists throughout the region. To assess the likelihood of further conflict in the former Soviet states, and to debate various approaches for its control and moderation, IGCC invited some of the region’s leading specialists on ethnic affairs to a conference held at the University of California, Davis in March 1995. Part of the Institute’s project “The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” the meeting featured an animated panel discussion on the causes and consequences of the war in Chechnya. The articles collected in this Policy Paper are based on presentations by panelists Sergei Arutiunov, Andranik Migranyan, Emil Payin, and Galina Starovoitova. Their contributions reflect the pronounced political and intellectual controversies over ethnic issues now underway in the former Soviet states.Although they adopt widely varying perspectives and advocate very different solutions to problems of ethnic conflict, three major themes run throughout each presentation: 1) the legacy of imperialism; 2) federal supremacy versus local authority; and 3) Russia’s role as regional peacekeeper.As with many contemporary conflicts, it remains to be seen whether ethnic violence in the former Soviet states will be a transitory artifact of the end of the Cold War or a defining feature of a new era in global politics. The persistence of ethnic conflicts in Russia and its neighbors, and their susceptibility to peaceful and violent means of resolution, will set major precedents for conflict management and other political questions far beyond the borders of the late USSR.

Quantum Leap 2.0 or the Western gaze on Russian homophobia This paper analyzes recent discourses about Russian homophobia within Anglophone media. It argues that western liberal media, supranational institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and gay rights activists create discourses that center gay issues in the midst of an East-West oppositionality. Such a binary construction creates the image of a just, democratic and homophile West in opposition to an undemocratic, unjust, homophobic East, dominated by Russia. It attaches the notions of progress, equality and freedom not only to a homo-tolerant or homo-inclusive legislation and society, but actually binds all these aspects to the global territory of Western nations. Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia, on the other hand, become attached to the notion of homophobia, hence backwardness, and anti-modern conservatism. The key figures and visual representations of all these discourses, that simultaneously signify western homo-tolerant progress as well as Russian anti-gay backwardness are white young gay men, who became victims of anti-gay violence. In using images of frightened, beaten or otherwise harmed young white men, liberal media, supranational institutions, and gay rights activists render the gay subject not only as vulnerable, and without agency, but also as globally uniform and carrier of western insignia. In this way, gays are symbolized by western signs, and become symbols themselves, standing in for western progress, modernity and development. Somehow paradoxically, such a focus on gay men allows for ignorance towards lesbians, transgender, intersex and other queers as well as the troubling nationalism, homophobia and racism within Western, Anglophone countries, such as the USA or the UK. Moreover, it allows for what Kulpa calls “leveraged pedagogy,” a condemnation or reprimand of Russian policies, from a point of moral and ethical (western) superiority. „Zagubiony w czasie” 2.0 albo zachodnie spojrzenie na rosyjską homofobię Przedmiotem niniejszej analizy są dyskursy o rosyjskiej homofobii obecne we współczesnych mediach anglojęzycznych. Autorka stwierdza, że zachodnie liberalne media, aktywiści gejowscy oraz organizacje ponadnarodowe, takie jak Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, budują dyskurs umieszczający kwestię gejowską w centrum opozycji Wschód-Zachód. Taka binarna konstrukcja tworzy obraz praworządnego, demokratycznego i przyjaznego homoseksualistom Zachodu przeciwstawionego niedemokratycznemu, niesprawiedliwemu i homofobicznemu Wschodowi, zdominowanemu przez Rosję. Łączy ona idee postępu, równości i wolności nie tylko z tolerancyjnym i włączającym prawodawstwem, ale wiąże te aspekty z samym terytorium państw zachodnich. Z drugiej strony Rosja, Europa Wschodnia i Eurazja zostają skojarzone z ideami homofobii, zacofania i antynowoczesnego konserwatyzmu. Kluczowymi postaciami i reprezentacją wizualną tych dyskursów, która ukazuje zarówno zachodni tolerancyjny dla homoseksualizmu postęp, jak i rosyjskie antygejowskie zacofanie, stają się młodzi biali mężczyźni, którzy padli ofiarą homofobicznej przemocy. Wykorzystując obrazy przerażonych, pobitych, czy w inny sposób skrzywdzonych młodych białych mężczyzn, liberalne media, instytucje międzynarodowe i aktywiści gejowscy nie tylko przedstawiają gejów jako bezbronnych i pozbawionych sprawczości, ale również jako jednolitą grupę nosicieli zachodnich wartości. W ten sposób utożsamieni z symbolami Zachodu geje sami stają się symbolami zachodniego postępu, nowoczesności i rozwoju. Paradoksalnie, skupienie się na homoseksualnych mężczyznach pozwala lekceważyć lesbijki, osoby transpłciowe, interseksualne czy w inny sposób nieheteronormatywne. Pozwala również przemilczeć kłopotliwy nacjonalizm, homofobię i rasizm w państwach anglojęzycznego Zachodu, takich jak USA i Wielka Brytania. Umożliwia ono wreszcie potępianie przez Zachód rosyjskiej polityki z pozycji moralnej i etycznej wyższości, które Robert Kulpa określa mianem „pedagogiki nacisku”.

This article examines the narrative construction of borders through an analysis of "non-professional writing" produced by the residents of Pskov. It discusses the construction of national borders and the symbolic meanings invested in them, with the empirical focus being placed on the symbolic Russian-Chechen border. The theoretical essence is the realization that due to the constructive and narrative na-tures of border production, the creation of a national borderline does not necessarily pre-suppose that the two sides share a geographical border. The article also addresses questions of traumatic memory and links border production with the concept of cultural trauma. By asking where Russia's borders currently located, this article provides an example of the cultural construction and symbolic displacement of the "national border", and a representation of how the national b/ordering processes differ when viewed from both "bottom up" and "top-down" perspectives in the contemporary Russian Federation.

Chechens have fought against Russian occupation and administration since 1750 by themselves or with other Caucasian nations. This struggle has reached its peak once in 1850s and then again in 1990s. The main thesis of this article is that both Chechens and Russians had applied the same pointless strategy and methods and that they had not learned anything from history. If this vicious circle is examined thoroughly, a peaceful conflict resolution will be available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adeptus is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Slavic Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Politicae is the property of Studia Politicae and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)