Search

O presente relatório visa refletir no cumprimento do estágio no Grupo Sana Hotels no âmbito do Mestrado em Direção e Gestão Hoteleira da Escola Superior de Gestão, Hotelaria e Turismo da Universidade do Algarve. O relatório tem como finalidade comprovar a aprendizagem no processo da realização de tarefas que decorreram no ano 2016 e 2017 nos diversos departamentos do hotel Epic Sana Algarve, resultando na aquisição e evolução de conhecimentos e capacidades na área operacional e estratégica na indústria hoteleira. O estágio teve como foco a passagem pelas várias realidades departamentais em busca de conhecimentos, dificuldades, metodologias, desafios, para conseguir ter uma noção abrangente, geral e detalhada do funcionamento de um hotel resort 5 estrelas para conseguir encontrar soluções e decisões acertadas no que toca à sua gestão e à melhor estratégia a ser tomada com base na sua realidade. Mediante esta oportunidade, tive a possibilidade de estagiar em áreas em que estive em contacto direto com o cliente, desempenhei funções de back office, lidei pessoalmente com os fornecedores do hotel e, sempre que possível, ajudei com o meu conhecimento científico, sugerindo a quem possuía o poder de decisão. Desde o início, procurei analisar como era a interação dos diversos departamentos e secções entre si e quais eram as ações que tinham um impacto e influência direta no funcionamento geral do hotel, podendo assim afetar positivamente ou negativamente a satisfação geral do cliente hospedado.

This paper analyses how the functional components of public expenditure and spending-driven consolidations affect the economic growth, unemployment and income inequality. A dynamic panel data LSDVC estimator is employed over a sample of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990-2012. The empirical results show that real GDP growth decreases when fiscal austerity measures are implemented, especially if they are spending-driven. Cuts in public expenditure undermine economic growth, namely if they slash spending on public order, recreation and education. Spending cuts on education, in particular, affect the investment in human capital, harming not only growth but also economic, social and human development. The unemployment rate also proved to be significantly boosted when austerity measures restrict spending on education, while income inequality rises when social protection expenditures are cut., COMPETE, FEDER, QREN, PORTUGAL 2020, Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT)

This paper analyses how the functional components and sub-components of government expenditures are affected by fiscal consolidations. A fixed-effects estimator is employed over a panel of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990-2012. The results show that spending on public services increases during fiscal consolidations, while spending on defence, public order, health, education and social protection is significantly cut. A more disaggregated analysis proves that fiscal consolidations are harmful for important social public expenditures, undermining citizens‟ safety, health assistance, investment in human capital and social protection. Public services are likely to be increased due to a rise in public debt transactions observed during periods of fiscal consolidation. All this evidence has proved to be stronger in a particular group of countries, known in the literature as PIIGS., The author also wishes to thank the financial support provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology under the research grant SFRH/BSAB/113588/2015 (partially funded by COMPETE, QREN and FEDER).

NIPE - WP 01/ 2016, In this paper, we analyse whether the likelihood of the bank-firm relationships ending is dependent on their age or not and whether the respective behaviour is smooth or changes over their length. A parametric duration analysis is employed in this analysis. We start by estimating a continuous-time Weibull duration model over the duration of the relationships between 1185 firms and one of the major French banks. Our findings show that the likelihood of the relationships between them ending increases over their duration, but other specific factors to the firms, to the bank, to their own relationship and certain pricing conditions also play an important role in the duration of those relationships. Additionally, we extend the baseline Weibull duration model in order to allow for changepoints in the duration dependence parameter. The empirical findings support the presence of a change-point: positive duration dependence is observed for those relationships that last less than 23 years, but no evidence of duration dependence is found for longer events. Hence, we conclude that the likelihood of these relationships ending increases over time, but only until about 23 years of duration; then the relations become stronger and the likelihood of they ending is no longer dependent on its duration but on other conditionings.

Building on a narrative approach to identify episodes of fiscal consolidation, data for a group of 17 industrial countries over the period 1978-2009 and both continuous-time and discrete-time duration models, we find evidence suggesting that likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending increases over time, but only for programs that last less than six years. Additionally, fiscal consolidations tend to last longer in non-European than in European countries. Our results emphasize that chronic fiscal imbalances might lead to a vicious austerity cycle, while discipline in the behavior of fiscal authorities is a means of achieving credible and shorter adjustment measures., Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Using a data set that covers all Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979-2005, this study performs an empirical analysis of the economic determinants of Mayors' choice to run for another term. The literature on the subject is mainly centered on the United States and, as far as we know, no papers are found addressing the economic factors of this choice. Probit panel estimations show that local economic conditions matter more than the national or regional economic environment. The results also confirm that political variables are important and that they influence the likelihood of seeking reelection in the same way as they affect vote and popularity functions., Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Mestrado em Engenharia Informática Submitted by João Silva (jpps@estgf.ipp.pt) on 2015-05-15T15:30:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DM_VitorCastro_MEI_2010.pdf: 5396978 bytes, checksum: e16f1ae0d185c74c06b784ff99585cd9 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-15T15:30:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DM_VitorCastro_MEI_2010.pdf: 5396978 bytes, checksum: e16f1ae0d185c74c06b784ff99585cd9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010

The Taylor rule establishes a simple linear relation between the interest rate, inflation and output gap. However, this relation may not be so simple. To get a deeper understanding of central banks’ behaviour, this paper asks whether central banks are indeed following a linear Taylor rule or, instead, a nonlinear rule. At the same time, it also analyses whether that rule can be augmented with a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and financial variables. A forward-looking monetary policy reaction function is employed in the estimation of the linear and nonlinear models. A smooth transition model is used to estimate the nonlinear rule.\ud The results indicate that the European Central Bank and the Bank of England tend to follow a nonlinear Taylor rule, but not the Federal Reserve of the United States. In particular, those two central banks tend to react to inflation only when inflation is above or outside their targets. Moreover, our evidence suggests that the European Central Bank is targeting financial conditions, contrary to the other two central banks. This lack of attention to the financial conditions might have made the United States and the United Kingdom more vulnerable to the recent credit crunch than the Eurozone.

One widespread idea in the business cycles literature is that the older is an expansion or contraction, the more likely it is to end. This paper tries to provide further empirical support for this idea of positive duration dependence and, at the same time, control for the effects of other factors like leading indicators, the duration of the previous phase, investment, price of oil and external influences on the duration of expansions and contractions. This study employs for the first time a discrete-time duration model to analyse the impact of those variables on the likelihood of an expansion and contraction ending for a group of industrial countries over the last fifty years. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that the duration of expansions and contractions is not only dependent on their actual age: the duration of expansions is also positively dependent on the behaviour of the variables in the OECD composite leading indicator and on private investment, and negatively affected by the price of oil and by the occurrence of a peak in the US business cycle ; the duration of a contraction is negatively affected by its actual age and by the duration of the previous expansion.

Several studies have identified the factors that cause public deficits in industrial democracies. They consider that economic, political and institutional factors play an important role in the understanding of those deficits. However, the study of the determinants of excessive deficits remains practically unexplored. Since excessive deficits can have large negative spillover effects when countries are forming a monetary union without a centralised budget – as it is the case for a group of European countries – this paper tries to explore that gap in the literature by identifying the main causes of excessive deficits and the ways of avoiding them. Binary choice models are estimated over a panel of 15 European Union countries for the period 1970-2006, where an excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. Results show that a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, the timing of parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of excessive deficits in the EU countries. Moreover, the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries’ fiscal policy have succeeded in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in Europe, especially in small countries. Therefore, this study concludes that supranational fiscal constraints, national efforts to reduce public debts, growth promoting policies and mechanisms to avoid political opportunism and partisan effects are essential factors for an EU country to avoid excessive deficits. Finally, the results presented in this paper raise the idea that a good strategy for the EU countries to avoid excessive deficits caused by the opportunistic behaviour of their policymakers would be to schedule elections for the beginning or the end of the year.

This study intends to provide an empirical answer to the question of whether Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules have affected growth of European Union countries. A growth equation augmented with fiscal variables and controlling for the period in which fiscal rules were implemented in Europe is estimated over a panel of 15 EU countries (and 8 OECD countries) for the period 1970-2005 with the purpose of answering this question. The equation is estimated using both a dynamic fixed effects estimator and a recently developed pooled mean group estimator. GMM estimators are also used in a robustness analysis. Empirical results show that growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht. This is the case when the recent performance of EU countries is compared both with their past performance and with the performance of other developed countries. Results even show that growth is slightly higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed. Therefore, this study concludes that the institutional changes that occurred in Europe after 1992, especially the implementation of Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules, should not be blamed for being harmful to growth in Europe.

Desde a década de 50 que um grupo de países tem vindo a evidenciar níveis de inflação elevados durante longos períodos de tempo sem que as necessárias medidas de estabilização sejam adoptadas com a devida celeridade. Essas medidas são muitas vezes adiadas, sendo os respectivos programas de estabilização, baseados na massa monetária ou na taxa de câmbio, implementados apenas quando a situação económica se agrava. Porque é que isso acontece? Essa é a questão que se procura responder neste trabalho. Na literatura encontram-se várias explicações para esse adiamento ou atraso. As que parecem fazer mais sentido são as que se baseiam na racionalidade dos agentes ou no entendimento das relações económicas básicas. Essas explicações são avançadas pelos modelos políticos de conflito, nos quais o atraso resulta geralmente de problemas de coordenação causados pelos mecanismos de tomada de decisões colectivas. Embora vários estudos tenham já procurado testar os efeitos da instabilidade e fragmentação política na senhoriagem, na dívida pública, nos défices orçamentais, na inflação e mesmo na probabilidade de implementação de um programa de estabilização da inflação, nenhum deles chega a testar directamente a influência desses factores no atraso em estabilizar a inflação. Este trabalho é inovador ao proceder a esses testes. É usado um modelo tobit para se aferir os determinantes do atraso na estabilização da inflação. Os resultados empíricos destacam o grau de fragmentação do sistema político e o índice de fragmentação da distribuição dos lugares no Parlamento como importantes factores desse atraso. Estes resultados são reforçados com o uso de um modelo logit binário para a análise dos factores que poderão influenciar a propensão para implementação de um programa de estabilização. Nesta última análise verifica-se ainda que à medida que a inflação aumenta, a predisposição para que seja desencadeada a estabilização também aumenta. Since the 1950s, several countries have been showing high levels of inflation for long periods of time without the necessary stabilization measures being adopted with celerity. Often these measures are postponed, and the money-based or exchange rate-based stabilization programs are adopted only when the economic situation is very bad. Why does that happen? That is the question one will try to answer in this study. In the literature there are several explanations to that postponement or delay. Those that seem to make more sense are the ones based in the agents’ rationality or in the understanding of basic economic relations. These explanations are given by the political models of conflict, in which delays are generally the result of coordination problems caused by the mechanisms of making collective choices. Although previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, public debt, budget deficits, inflation, and on the probability of starting a program of inflation stabilization, no one tests directly the influence of these factors on the delay of stabilization. This study is innovator in making those tests. A tobit model is used to determine the causes of the delays of inflation stabilizations. The empirical results clearly show that the degree of fragmentation of the political system and the fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in the lower house of the Parliament are important determinants of delays. These results are sustained by a binary logit model, which was estimated to analyze the probability of starting an inflation stabilization program. This last analysis also shows that as inflation increases the predisposition to start a stabilization increases as well.

Este estudo compara a incidência de baixos salários em Portugal com outros países, usando uma medida relativa, e caracteriza o perfil do trabalhador e da empresa de baixos salários em Portugal, estimando um modelo probit. Verifica-se que mulheres, jovens e aqueles com mais baixo nível de escolarização, apresentam um risco mais elevado de receber uma baixa remuneração. São particularmente atingidos os trabalhadores de pequenas empresas, da restauração e hotelaria, comércio a retalho, e das indústrias têxtil, do vestuário e calçado, da alimentação e bebidas e da madeira e cortiça. O risco de baixos salários é reduzido nas empresas públicas e sociedades anónimas., The evolution of low wages in Portugal is described, and its incidence is compared to other countries, based on a relative measure. A probit model is estimated to explain the probability of earning a low wage, based on worker and firm attributes. Despite the contrasts across countries in the share of low wage workers, the groups most likely affected tend to be common: women, youngsters and those with low schooling level; the probability of earning a low wage is particularly high in small companies, restaurants and hotels, trade, textiles, food and wood industries. It is very low in public or joint-stock companies.

The implementation of the Maastricht criteria, establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) raised several challenges for the European Union (EU) countries. The main aim of this dissertation is to analyse the economic implications of those institutional changes. Chapter 2 provides an empirical answer to the question of whether Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules have affected growth in the EU countries. Results from the estimation of a growth equation show that growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht. The main conclusion of this analysis is that the institutional changes that occurred in some European countries after 1992 were not harmful to growth.\ud \ud Chapter 3 tries to identify the main causes of excessive deficits in the EU. A conditional logit model is estimated over a panel of EU countries, where an excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. Results indicate that a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, elections and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of excessive deficits. They also show that the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries have succeeded in reducing the probability of excessive deficits, especially in small countries and in countries traditionally affected by large fiscal imbalances.\ud \ud A widespread idea in the business cycles literature is that the older is an expansion or contraction, the more likely it is to end. Chapter 4 provides further empirical support for this idea of positive duration dependence controlling simultaneously for the effects of other factors on the duration of expansions and contractions. This study employs for the first time a discrete-time duration model to analyse the impact of some variables on the likelihood of an expansion and contraction ending for a group of EU and non-EU countries. The evidence suggests that the duration of expansions and contractions is not only dependent on their actual age: the duration of expansions is also positively dependent on the behaviour of the OECD composite leading indicator and on private investment, and negatively affected by the price of oil and by the occurrence of a peak in the US business cycle; the duration of a contraction is negatively affected by its actual age and by the duration of the previous expansion.\ud \ud Finally, Chapter 5 raises the question of whether central banks’ monetary policy can be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a more complex nonlinear rule. This chapter also analyses whether those rules can be augmented with a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and financial variables. A forward-looking specification is employed in the estimation of the linear and nonlinear rules. A smooth transition model is used to estimate the nonlinear rule. The results indicate that the behaviour of the Federal Reserve of the United States can be described by a linear Taylor rule, whilst the behaviour of the ECB and Bank of England is best described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. In particular, these two central banks tend to react to inflation only when inflation is above or outside their targets. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the recently created ECB is targeting financial conditions, contrary to the other two central banks.

Fiscal rules are typically seen as government constraints. Yet, the extent to which they are substituted or complemented by market discipline (especially, during financial stress) remains unexplored. Using data for 71 countries over the period 1985–2015, we estimate an “augmented” fiscal reaction function to assess the impact of both fiscal and market discipline. We find that different market signals influence fiscal policy, but fiscal discipline depends on market incentives. In the EU and the OECD, market signals complement fiscal rules. These are less effective in the EMU and non-OECD countries that are “debt intolerant”. Yet, there are unintended consequences: (i) neither output and debt stabilisation, nor fiscal rules affect the fiscal stance in the absence of financial crises; and (ii) financial stress makes fiscal discipline a destabilising factor, while central bank actions almost dismiss it. Finally, market (fiscal) discipline effects are (not) persistent and stronger (more uncertain) for the EMU.

Using long-term sovereign ratings data for a panel of 130 countries over the last three decades, we investigate the duration and determinants of sovereign rating phases through the lens of discrete-time Weibull models. We find that the likelihood of the end of the ‘speculative-grade’ phase increases as time goes by (i.e. there is positive duration dependence), but the ‘investment-grade’ phase is not duration dependent. Thus, for sovereigns rated as speculative, the build-up of reputation as good borrowers is a gradual process, whereas the reputation of investment-grade sovereigns solidifies and remains unchanged as time passes. However, the length of both phases significantly depends on the country's economic conditions. In particular, lower inflation, stronger growth and sounder fiscal policies shorten (prolong) the speculative- (investment-) grade phase. In addition, better governance quality helps to reduce the duration of speculative-grade phases.

We use a novel continuous-time Weibull model (without and) with a change-point in the duration dependence parameter to investigate the duration of the exit and re-entry of sovereigns to international capital markets. Relying on annual data for a large panel of countries over the period 1970-2011, we find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episodes are more likely to end - i.e. the "legacy of time". Debtor countries can take advantage of the "benefit of doubt" of creditors during short exit spells. However, when exits are long and the reputation as a bad borrower emerges, no more "complacency" makes it more difficult for them to borrow again in international capital markets - i.e. the "tyranny of time". We also find that: (i) government stability and multilateral financial assistance play a crucial role; (ii) the dynamics of the duration of exit (re-entry) spells is robust to the presence of default episodes, the default length and the haircut size; and (iii) exit and re-entry have shortened over time.

We investigate the role of global factors in explaining the length of commodity price cycle phases, using a continuous-time Weibull duration model and data for a panel of 33 countries over the period 1980Q1-2015Q4. We find evidence of increasing (constant) positive duration dependence for commodity price booms and busts (normal time spells). Global macroeconomic conditions - in particular, inflation, economic policy uncertainty and monetary policy actions - significantly affect the duration of all commodity price cycle phases. Global environmental conditions also impact the duration of commodity price booms, with a rise in average temperature (rainfall) increasing (reducing) their length. A rise in the number of military conflicts around the globe is associated with shorter booms and busts. Finally, we find that a rise in oil prices is linked with longer booms and shorter busts.

Dissertação de mestrado em Monetary, Banking and Financial Economics, In this work, I use data for the US at both quarterly and monthly frequencies and estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) to assess the macroeconomic impact and the wealth effects of unconventional monetary policy. I show that neither a positive shock to the interest rate spread, nor a positive shock to the central bank s reserves significantly affect the output and the aggregate price level. However, both shocks give a strong boost to asset prices, which is temporary in the case of stock prices and gradual and persistent in the case of housing prices. Thus, the main channel via which unconventional monetary policy operates is through wealth re- allocation: by expanding the size of its balance sheet and purchasing troubled assets, the central bank releases money that economic agents use to increase their exposure to risk by investing in real estate, stocks and long-term debt. Finally, I account for the three rounds of quantitative easing put in place by the Federal Reserve. I show that, if anything, the magnitude and the persistence of the effects are lower in the case of QE2 and QE3., Neste trabalho, é estimado o impacto macroeconómico e os efeitos riqueza da política monetária não convencional tendo por base dados trimestrais e mensais para os Estados Unidos da América e um Vector Auto-Regressivo Estrutural Bayesiano. Mostra-se que um choque positivo sobre o spread entre a taxa de juro de longo-prazo e a taxa de juro de curto-prazo ou um choque positivo sobre a taxa de crescimento das reservas do banco central não tem um efeito significativo sobre o produto e o índice de preços. Contudo, ambos os choques estimulam fortemente os preços dos activos, sendo o efeito temporário no caso dos preços das acções e gradual e persistente no caso dos preços da habitação. Logo, o principal mecanismo de transmissão da política monetária não convencional opera por via do efeito riqueza: ao expandir o seu balanço e adquirir activos problemáticos, o banco central gera a liquidez de que os agentes económicos necessitam para aumentar a sua exposição ao risco, assim como o seu investimento em habitações, acções e dívida de longo-prazo. Finalmente, é analisado o impacto à luz dos três programas de exibilização da política monetária levados a cabo pela Reserva Federal Americana. Mostra-se que, quando muito, a magnitude e a persistência dos efeitos são menores no caso do segundo e do terceiro programas.