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Background and methods: Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified. Results: We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa's competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including 'Black Economic Empowerment' and potential harms to workers. Conclusion: Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public's health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Future emergencies from climate degradation or diseases are likely, prompting ongoing investment in emergency readiness and learning from country responses. South Africa’s healthcare system, divided into public and private sectors, required a coordinated, intersectoral response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A coordinated action that the South African government took was adapting competition regulations. The South African Department of Trade, Industry and Competition on 19 March 2020, published a block exemption (easing of competition rules) for healthcare to promote standardization of practices across the health sector and facilitate agreements between the National Department of Health and the private sector to ensure adequate service delivery to all South Africans. Methods We assessed how much coverage the block exemption for healthcare received in the media and if the scope included details of what the exemption meant, how stakeholders and the public could use it, and the resulting public sentiment. We conducted a media content analysis to select, screen and assess the media material. Online and social-media articles in the public domain from 19 March 2020 to 19 March 2021, in English were considered. Results We analysed 22 online media articles that matched our inclusion criteria. Twenty of these reflected a positive sentiment, and two were negative. Media reported on the COVID-19 block exemption in healthcare only in the first three months of our study period. The articles primarily communicated what the block exemption meant, focusing on allowing collaboration, the purpose of the exemption, the activities granted under the exemption and the actors to whom it applied. It’s estimated that these media articles could have been read by up to 432,003 people out of a total population of just under 43 million people over the age of 15 years. Conclusion In times of crisis, the media has a significant responsibility to provide accurate information to the public. However, the accuracy and reliability of such information depends on the quality of official sources on which the media relies. Our research shows that very few media reports were available about the block exemption for healthcare. While the government implemented the exemption, it did not communicate its purpose directly to the public. Our research highlights the need for better communication between policymakers and the media.

Abstract Background and methods Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified. Results We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa’s competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ and potential harms to workers. Conclusion Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public’s health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries.

The European automotive industry is transitioning from combustion engines to electric vehicles but lags behind international competitors. This geoeconomic competition has contributed to the revival of industrial policy in the EU. However, EU competition policy restricts more vertical industrial policy approaches. In this context, the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) have emerged as a novel governance tool. This article examines this transformation in EU industrial policy by focusing on the Battery IPCEIs. The article includes an in-depth case study of the Battery IPCEIs, using secondary literature and 11 expert interviews. It concludes that IPCEIs represent a gradual regulatory-developmental turn within EU industrial policy by drawing on developmental state theory in a European context, critical EU integration literature, and global production networks research. In response to geoeconomic competition and the region's lack of productive capacities, the EU is indirectly facilitating the development of European battery innovation and production networks by issuing direct state aid at the national level. However, the EU's participation in the subsidy race and the global green-tech race via "green" industrial policy indicates only a partial shift in the relationship between states and markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Building a new development pattern is a strategic choice made in the light of China's own development stage and conditions, taking full account of economic globalization and changes in the external environment. It is an inevitable choice for China to rebuild its competitive advantage after entering a new development stage. In-depth exploration of the industrial policy system's evolution and main trends that adapt to the new development pattern is not only the need for actively responding to the actions of developed countries to suppress China with the stick of industrial policy. but also the need for promoting China's high-quality development. For more than 40 years since the reform and opening up, the main goal of industrial policy system has been to promote China's economic growth. The selective industrial policy committed to catching up with developed countries has promoted economic growth, but also caused great damage to the market environment of fair competition. Under the new development pattern, stimulating internal competition and strengthening external security have become the new main goals of industrial policy system. To build a new development pattern, industrial policy is still an indispensable tool for promoting domestic and international double circulation and promoting high-quality economic development due to great changes in internal and external environment and factors such as the development environment of the times and industrial policy objectives. However, the previous industrial policy objectives and pattern should be adjusted and upgraded. The narrow industrial policy which is represented by industrial structure policy and industrial development policy with selective characteristics, scientific and technological innovation policy and competition policy and some other polices together constitute the broad industrial policy system closely related to economic development, but the implications of above policies overlap. Based on the perspective of economic development stage, this paper clarifies the integration. coordination withdrawal and reconstruction of industrial policy, scientific and technological innovation policy and competition policy. And we clarify the evolution of the three types of policies in the four stages of economic development, and try to explore the basic role of various policies in the construction of new development pattern. The new development pattern that makes the national economy supply and demand to achieve a virtuous cycle is a dynamic process. It requires that industrial policy and competition policy, special science and technology innovation policy dedicated to overcome the"stuck neck" difficulties and conventional science and technology innovation policy are balanced and coordinated with each other. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes that under the diversified policy goals of the new development pattern. the relationship between the three types of economic policies is not the opposite but the complementary and coordinated. And China's policy system should be structured as follows: competition policy should be the basis of all policies: industrial policy and competition policy coordinate with each other; selective industrial policy gradually gives way to functional industrial policy; science and technology policy pay more attention to the front of the innovation chain than the back and the new nationwide system keeps the selective character. Finally, this paper further puts forward some suggestions to improve the industrial policy system under the new development pattern. such as establishing anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. establishing a multi-level policy coordination mechanism. improving the whole-process governance mechanism of industrial policy. The conclusion in this paper is of great significance for exploring what kind of industrial policy system is needed in the new development pattern and what is the evolution trend of China's industrial policy system in the future. It also provides institutional innovation impetus and important policy tools for China to build a new development pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the role that innovation plays in EU merger control analysis, and seeks to integrate perspectives highlighted by the philosophical literature on the so-called ‘direction of innovation’ in order to critically assess the impact of market concentration on the diversity of innovation and its ability to address larger normative questions and challenges, such as the transition to more sustainable economies. While normative goals other than competition are not an inherent part of merger control, this paper argues that in concentrated markets, ignoring such questions can play into the hands of the powerful merging entities, allowing them to further determine the direction of innovation to best serve their interests and business models rather than public interests. This is illustrated by critically discussing the merger between Bayer and Monsanto as an example.

The European automotive industry is transitioning from combustion engines to electric vehicles but lags behind international competitors. This geoeconomic competition has contributed to the revival of industrial policy in the EU. However, EU competition policy restricts more vertical industrial policy approaches. In this context, the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) have emerged as a novel governance tool. This article examines this transformation in EU industrial policy by focusing on the Battery IPCEIs. The article includes an in-depth case study of the Battery IPCEIs, using secondary literature and 11 expert interviews. It concludes that IPCEIs represent a gradual regulatory-developmental turn within EU industrial policy by drawing on developmental state theory in a European context, critical EU integration literature, and global production networks research. In response to geoeconomic competition and the region’s lack of productive capacities, the EU is indirectly facilitating the development of European battery innovation and production networks by issuing direct state aid at the national level. However, the EU’s participation in the subsidy race and the global green-tech race via “green” industrial policy indicates only a partial shift in the relationship between states and markets.

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms’ rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a ‘Polanyian’ double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process.

Antitrust policymakers in the United States and the European Union have announced that certain mergers should be blocked because of the presumed harm to innovation. Companies increasingly engage in innovation as a primary means of competing with rivals. This article considers the implications of innovation competition for antitrust merger policy. We argue that the presumption of innovative harm risks diminishing competition and reducing innovation. We propose an approach to evaluating whether mergers may lead to innovative efficiencies or harm. Furthermore, we suggest that the application of advances in the economics of technology and innovation can help determine the effects of mergers on welfare. We find that horizontal mergers can promote innovation competition by increasing innovative investment and expanding the benefits of innovation. We also find that vertical mergers can promote innovation competition by increasing innovative investment and improving commercialization. We further find that acquisition of entrants can increase entrepreneurship and innovation. We recommend that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines should apply economic analysis to evaluate the effects of mergers on innovation competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teece asserts that competition policy is so outdated that it now significantly degrades the ability of Big Tech firms to bring socially beneficial innovations to market. He suggests that strategic management research is essential in the struggle to update such policies. We counter that none of these assertions are accurate, let alone backed by evidence. While the larger goal of improving laws and policies through scientific research is a worthy one, the specific focus on doing so to aid a set of powerful firms that have allegedly caused—directly or indirectly—great societal damage is quite unappealing. To balance his pro-Big Tech perspective, we provide logical and theory-based arguments and evidence that indicates Big Tech has often been bad for innovation and society while their regulation has been good, and that more oversight—specifically tailored to digital platforms—would be better. We then offer three alternative paths for us, as management scholars, to take that leverage our distinctive skills and that fulfill our ethical and professional mandates, in the pursuit of improving the strategic decisions and actions that policymakers and firms take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed Digital Markets Act has been under severe scrutiny in the past couple of years. While it received mostly positive feedback, there were numerous authors and scholars arguing that the new legislation does not provide anything useful or new. The common denominator of most of the analyses is that the Digital Markets Act is an ex-ante antitrust legislation and that the obligations tackle the (abusive) dominance of the gatekeepers to be designated. In this article, I try to deconstruct the requirements for determining whether an undertaking is a gatekeeper and to assess whether the proposal fits into a regulatory compliance type of legislation or ex-ante competition law. In addition to the analytical approach, I will take the example of the Intel and Microsoft cases and the intricacies that arose from them. I will further assess possible implications that the proposal might have for innovation and other aspects of the market.

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Productivity growth has declined in Australia and other developed countries over the past two decades. It has been argued that reduced dynamism and the failure of competition at an economy‐wide level is to blame, leading to calls for broad competition policy reforms. In this paper we consider the theoretical and empirical evidence to support this "failure of competition" narrative. We find that the evidence, at best, is ambiguous. Competition failures in some areas support the need for reform, but the competition landscape across Australia is complex and there is no simple link between indicators of competition, such as concentration levels; indicators of reduced dynamism, such as falling business investment, and falling productivity growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hilmer Review and National Competition Policy reforms were an important part of the 1990s productivity surge and have been estimated to have delivered a permanent 2.5 per cent lift in GDP. I outline the key elements of these reforms and identify seven lessons for modern competition reformers. In the 2020s, with the startup rate falling and market concentration rising, boosting competition is one way of increasing productivity and improving the dynamism of the Australian economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Promoting contracted family doctor services is an important way to implement tiered diagnosis and treatment, and to safeguard people's health, as well as a cornerstone of achieving Health China 2030 goals. However, the development of this system is constrained by some problems, such as contracting a family doctor but making no appointments. Many countries have introduced competition mechanisms in the supply of contracted services in different degrees to enhance the quality of family doctor services. However, China is now lack of theoretical and empirical studies about introducing competition mechanisms inthe delivery of contracted family doctorservices. We reviewed the latest developments in theoretical and empirical studies involving the use of competitive mechanisms in the provision of contracted family doctor services, which will contribute to the study and implementation of family doctor system in China.

So far, the notion of food sovereignty has not claimed a place at the table of competition law. Although competition law developments in the last four decades have promoted the exclusive dominance of efficiency considerations, the next few years may bring a turning point through the recognition that in the long term economic efficiency also requires social and environmental sustainability, especially in a sector like agriculture. Although family farming has always been dominant in Europe, recent trends of concentration and consolidation in the agricultural and food supply chain as well as globalisation itself have shaken European agricultural producers who face several competition-related problems. This article aims to shed light on whether the theoretical framework of EU competition law and policy are appropriate for the notion of food sovereignty to join the discourse. In order to do so, the article presents the main tenets of ordoliberalism, the prevailing school of thought in EU competition policy, in particular the findings of those ordoliberal scholars who deal with the issues of agriculture. Moreover, the article aims to theorise sovereignty in food sovereignty, in parallel with bringing it into line with ordoliberalism, in order to explore whether the concept of social market economy, one of the key concepts of ordoliberalism explicitly followed by the EU, and in particular ordoliberal competition policy to be realised within the framework of the social market economy, is suitable to take into account food sovereignty’s core elements at least at a theoretical level. If it is, it may bring to the fore a viewpoint of EU competition policy which ensures appropriate protection for the agricultural sector to overcome the newly emerging anomalies faced by European agricultural producers as a consequence of globalising markets.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 981-992 | European Forum Insight of 23 December 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. A competition policy fit for the digital transition? The Commission's view. - II. The complementary role of competition law: a dynamic balance between rules and exceptions. - III. The degree of (de)centralisation of public enforcement to ensure the dynamic balance. - IV. Final considerations. | (Abstract) The European responses to the COVID-19 outbreak have triggered an ongoing review process of competition rules and enforcement procedure to support the Union's priorities. In this context, the European Commission published the Communication 'A Competition Policy Fit for New Challenges' with the aim of underlining the ability of competition law to facilitate the green and digital transitions, and to strengthen the resilience of the Single Market. This Insight reflects on the substantive and procedural challenges posed by the digital transition. Indeed, the complementary role of competition law to stimulate the achievement of the digital targets is characterised by two tensions, relating respectively to the interpretation and application of competition rules and to the degree of centralisation with regard to the enforcement mechanisms. In the author's view, EU competition law will offer dynamic substantive and procedural responses to the challenges of the digital transition.

Developing nations use contemporary competition laws based on international models for reasons ranging from achieving international legitimacy to achieving domestic economic objectives. Although passing such laws gives these nations competition regimes more legitimacy, doing so does not guarantee that their economic goals will be met unless the laws are also effectively implemented. Comparative legal scholarship suggests that effective enforcement requires, among other things, a positive link between the passed laws and the nation's pre-existing legal systems in light of development economics. The globalization of national competition laws, particularly the application of international soft law, is responsible for the existence of modern competition law. Secondly, the competition regimes in Pakistan and China face a number of long-term difficulties, many of which are the product of globalization, which must be addressed as soon as possible. In order to examine the aims and objectives, this study employs qualitative data analysis. The results of this research suggest that for both nations to successfully implement competition law, innovation and unconventionality are required. Although the goal of competition law is to prevent anti-competitive activities and practices by promoting fair and open market competition, this goal is achieved through protecting consumers from businesses' use of unfair business practices. Because of this, the act encourages the formation of agreements that limit and restrict market dominance. In addition, the law specifies how investigations, acquisitions, mergers, penalties, leniency, and other aspects of law enforcement should be handled. As a result, this law can be seen as extremely important for regulating firms while maintaining consumer and producer welfare. It eventually supports economic growth and social justice. As a result, Voluntary adherence to competition law, rules, and regulations is essential since doing so would significantly lower the societal costs of enforcing the law.

In this paper, I will analyze the state aid granted in the member countries for the recovery of accommodation and food services, severely affected by the pandemic, coming to the conclusion that in Romania the measures were applied later than in other countries. Thus, through the "HoReCa Scheme", the beneficiary companies in Romania have received state aid recently, after almost 2 years of deep crisis. In the meantime, more than a third of companies have gone bankrupt. Starting from the presentation of state aid in European legislation and the need for it to support economies, I will then draw attention to the major impact of the pandemic on the HORECA sector at European level.

This article points out the benefits of free competition for the agenda of the current national government. It examines the possible role of the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce in achieving policy objectives such as economic, social, and environmental justice. It first synthesizes the pillars of the transformation blocks proposed by the government and then shows that adequate enforcement of competition policy contributes to achieving some social goals such as equitable distribution of resources, equality, promotion of an economy integrated by small and mediumsized enterprises, and improvement of the quality of life of the population. It then argues that the rigorous application of the competition regime is fundamental to maintain the direction of the country's economic agenda in the next four years and some reflections derived from the analysis are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate the impact of competition on investments in Europe's mobile communications market during the 2011 to 2021 period. There are stark and sustained differences in market outcomes between three- and four-player markets in Europe, and economic theory suggests these could be partly explained by the dynamic effects of competition on the ability and incentives to invest by market players. We find strong evidence that market concentration in Europe is below optimal levels that would maximize investments, especially in four-player markets. The dispersion of fixed costs and assets among a greater number of players can result in diseconomies of scale and a less efficient use of resources. We also find evidence that investment incentives to improve quality and innovate are lower in markets with lower concentration indices and profit margins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teece asserts that competition policy is so outdated that it now significantly degrades the ability of Big Tech firms to bring socially beneficial innovations to market. He suggests that strategic management research is essential in the struggle to update such policies. We counter that none of these assertions are accurate, let alone backed by evidence. While the larger goal of improving laws and policies through scientific research is a worthy one, the specific focus on doing so to aid a set of powerful firms that have allegedly caused—directly or indirectly—great societal damage is quite unappealing. To balance his pro-Big Tech perspective, we provide logical and theory-based arguments and evidence that indicates Big Tech has often been bad for innovation and society while their regulation has been good, and that more oversight—specifically tailored to digital platforms—would be better. We then offer three alternative paths for us, as management scholars, to take that leverage our distinctive skills and that fulfill our ethical and professional mandates, in the pursuit of improving the strategic decisions and actions that policymakers and firms take.

Data and digital platforms have simultaneously upended entrenched positions in some industries, opening-up greater and disruptive competition, while driving overall higher levels of concentration through the growing power of multi-sided digital platforms. The coexistence of rivalry and collusion – a key feature of Cowling’s monopoly capitalism – persists and takes new forms in the digital economy. Taking into account the heterogenous nature of platforms, this paper analyses the relationships between large digital platforms and the development of industrial capabilities, especially in middle-income countries and the implications for industrial and competition policies. We advance an analytical-policy framework connecting the different dimensions and sources of platform power responsible for value capture and extraction, and the different platform capability-functions responsible for value creation. Building on this recasting of Hymer’s ‘efficiency contradiction’ and Cowling theory of monopoly capitalism, we advance an integrated industrial-competition policy approach to overcome it and propose a conception of an ‘entrepreneurial-regulatory state’. Complementary industrial and competition policies are required to foster optimal rivalry, being a rivalry which rewards the development of dynamic capabilities and enables contestation by different business models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essential ingredient to net-zero-emissions policies is to regionally integrate electricity markets. But electricity cross-border trades are often assessed as inefficient. We explain this inefficiency by the presence of a dichotomous regulation: producers are highly regulated with regard to their local activities, but weakly regulated when it comes to their exports. Such a dichotomy in regulation can be generalized to every economic sector, with varying intensity. We develop a generic 2-player 2-stage game theoretical framework where producers anticipate the impact of their exports on the clearing of regulated local markets. We characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game as a function of the relative price-elasticity between markets. Overall, dichotomous regulation leads producers to over-export in order to create scarcity in their home market. Hence, despite that local markets clear efficiently, the global equilibrium is inefficient. When the two jurisdictions are relatively symmetric, the equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the first-best outcome. These results call for better coordination between regulators across different jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A third party developer designs and sells a pricing algorithm that enhances a firm's ability to tailor prices to a source of demand variation, whether high-frequency demand shocks or market segmentation. The equilibrium pricing algorithm is characterized that maximizes the third party's profit given firms' optimal adoption decisions. Outsourcing the pricing algorithm does not reduce competition but does make prices more sensitive to the demand variation, and this is shown to decrease consumer welfare and increase industry profit. This effect is larger when products are more substitutable. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privacy regulation by the European Union has had effects for websites beyond the European Union and lead to an increase in market concentration of web technology vendors We document short-run changes in websites and the web technology industry with the introduction of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We follow more than 110,000 websites and their third-party HTTP requests for 12 months before and 6 months after the GDPR became effective and show that websites substantially reduced their interactions with web technology providers. Importantly, this also holds for websites not legally bound by the GDPR. These changes are especially pronounced among less popular websites and regarding the collection of personal data. We document an increase in market concentration in web technology services after the introduction of the GDPR: Although all firms suffer losses, the largest vendor—Google—loses relatively less and significantly increases market share in important markets such as advertising and analytics. Our findings contribute to the discussion on how regulating privacy, artificial intelligence and other areas of data governance relate to data minimization, regulatory competition, and market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of studying the harmonization of industrial policy with other types of economic policy is determined, the structure of industrial policy is presented, the main directions of harmonization are noted. The external harmonization of industrial policy is analysed in detail on the example of competition policy. The main aspects of each of the policies are considered, their main differences are noted. Attention is focused on their possible mutual complementarity in order to achieve a higher positive effect from the implementation of each. The current state of harmonization in Russia is considered, in particular, the conclusion is made about the dominance of industrial policy over competition. The main problems of harmonization are highlighted, including the discrepancy between pre-set goals in industrial policy and the final results. The problem of small and medium-sized businesses in industry is identified, the factors hindering the development of subjects of these categories are formulated.

The scientific thesis aims at theoretical definition and analysis of provisions on competition policy in selected international agreements, which affects the development of fair international business. Fair competition works effectively if entrepreneurs at the market can make their business decisions independently, while there has to be a legal framework applicable to protect the rights of competitors. At the international level there are several legal instruments applicable, which have a positive effect on fair competition among competitors in the market. International agreements concluded at the level of the European Union with non-member countries contain provisions on healthy competition. Our intention is to identify those international agreements containing competition provisions that affect the behavior of entrepreneurs operating in international markets and obliged to respect competition rules, as they aim to achieve economic benefits. The European Union is undoubtedly involved in the process of global competition protection.

• This article explores how an intensified competitive environment impacts the expansion of private businesses. • Enforcing the Anti-trust law can enhance the growth of private firms. • This enhancement is mainly accomplished by reducing financial restrictions and raising the financing expenses. This study examines the impact of the Chinese antimonopoly law on the growth of private enterprises, addressing the broader economic context where fair competition is essential for fostering private sector expansion. Employing a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology and analyzing data from 2006 to 2019, this study reveals that the enforcement of the law has enhanced the growth of private firms primarily by reducing financial constraints and increasing the financing costs for highly monopolistic corporations. The results suggest that stringent enforcement of the antimonopoly law will significantly alleviate financial difficulties and stimulate the growth of private firms, thereby achieving high-quality economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived in the 1930s as a way to renew free market liberalism, neoliberal doctrines aim to institute a competitive order that would regulate the market as well as society. Yet, interpretations of how competition should be enforced have varied throughout history. The European Union, with its ordoliberal origins, tends to follow an interventionist approach while the United States, where the Chicago School has gained influence, fears that inadequate public interventions may diminish global efficiency. The digital revolution and the appearance of the Tech Giants introduces a new challenge. Faced with massive increasing returns to scale, the competition authorities initially reduced their interventionism to enjoy more market efficiency. But the emergence of digital platforms and the will to protect personal data from abusive uses pushes them now to adopt a new strategy for more interventions that goes beyond the economic and efficiency issues. This article argues that the neoliberal vision is no longer accurate to regulate the digital economy. It shows that the platform economy is not an alternative way to manage the market, but an alternative to the market itself. To face these issues, a completely new conception of public regulation is therefore needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implementation of the import substitution strategy in Russia in some cases is associated with the risk of the state supporting technologically ineffective domestic producers, whose interests are taken into account in the course of industry regulation and antitrust. The article examines the problems of using the tools of antimonopoly policy (and its relationship with industrial policy) in the context of launching single-mode optical fiber by a Russian company with limited technological production competencies in the short term. While analyzing the results of optical fiber antitrust case, the authors identify the distortion of the Russian competition policy objectives and the misuse of its tools. Methodologically, the study rests on industrial organization theory, antitrust economics and new institutional economic theory (in particular, institutional design). Data from the analytical agency CRU Monitor and customs statistics are used as the information base for quantitative (economic-statistical) analysis. The article identifies the factors that determine the dynamics of the optical fiber market: demand for optical fiber cable (product of the related market); production capacities of preforms as the main raw material for optical fiber; integration of the stages of the optical fiber production process; and investments in R&D. The Elzinga-Hogarty test was performed to delimit the geographical boundaries of the single-mode fiber market. The results shows that the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia drew false conclusions about narrow geographical boundaries within the Russian Federation. This conclusion is important in terms of complying with the procedure for analyzing the competition in commodity markets, since incorrect delimitation of the market’s geographical boundaries can lead to erroneous estimates of market concentration and the mistaken detection of a company’s market dominance as a potential competitor of a domestic manufacturer. Lobbying the interests of national manufacturers not only contradicts the principles of competition protection, but also reduces the incentives of new market players to innovate and accumulate knowledge specific to the industry, which is one of the key factors of competitiveness in the optical communication markets.

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between reverse globalization, the digital markets, and competition policy within the EU. Based on the review of contemporary literature, this paper provides an insight into the EU adaptation to the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Reverse globalization is identified through the trends in the international trade and FDI flows, while the digital markets' development is evaluated through the Number of individuals using the Internet to order goods and services and ECommerce sales. While this paper uses secondary data sources, it uniquely connects the identified reverse globalization and digital markets expansion with necessary changes in the competition policy pre and during the COVID19 pandemic. Additionally, this paper provides policymakers and business owners with relevant information and possible avenues to improve the competition policy and business strategy.

So far, the notion of food sovereignty has not claimed a place at the table of competition law. Although competition law developments in the last four decades have promoted the exclusive dominance of ef- ficiency considerations, the next few years may bring a turning point through the recognition that in the long term economic efficiency also requires social and environmental sustainability, especially in a sector like agriculture. Although family farming has always been dominant in Europe, recent trends of concentration and consolidation in the agricultural and food supply chain as well as globalisation itself have shaken European agricultural producers who face several competition-related problems. This article aims to shed light on whether the theoretical framework of EU competition law and policy are appropriate for the notion of food sovereignty to join the discourse. In order to do so, the article presents the main tenets of ordoliberalism, the prevailing school of thought in EU competition policy, in particular the findings of those ordoliberal scholars who deal with the issues of agriculture. Moreover, the article aims to theorise sovereignty in food sovereignty, in parallel with bringing it into line with ordoliberalism, in order to explore whether the concept of social market economy, one of the key concepts of ordoliberalism explicitly followed by the EU, and in particular ordoliberal competition policy to be realised within the framework of the social market economy, is suitable to take into account food sovereignty's core elements at least at a theoretical level. If it is, it may bring to the fore a viewpoint of EU competition policy which ensures appropriate protection for the agricultural sector to overcome the newly emerging anomalies faced by European agricultural producers as a consequence of globalising markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will analyze the state aid granted in the member countries for the recovery of accommodation and food services, severely affected by the pandemic, coming to the conclusion that in Romania the measures were applied later than in other countries. Thus, through the "HoReCa Scheme", the beneficiary companies in Romania have received state aid recently, after almost 2 years of deep crisis. In the meantime, more than a third of companies have gone bankrupt. Starting from the presentation of state aid in European legislation and the need for it to support economies, I will then draw attention to the major impact of the pandemic on the HORECA sector at European level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper introduces the concept of excessive pricing within the framework of the competition policy. Charging high prices by an undertaking is a natural freedom in the context of a market economy. Still, a company that detains an important market power has a special economic and social responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not distort competition or negatively affect the consumers’ welfare on that market. A company in such a position is deemed to poses a dominant position on the market. Specifically, in regard with the notion of excessive pricing, a dominant undertaking should not make use of the opportunities arising out of its special market power in such a way as to gain trading profits which it would not have benefit if there had been sufficiently competition. The paper briefly analyzes the method used when establishing dominance, as well as various forms of abuse of a dominant position on the market, finally focusing on the evaluation of excessive prices. Relevant excessive pricing cases are presented, covering 45 years of European experience, since 1975 to the present day. In regard with the evolution of the methodology for analyzing potential excessive prices by the competition authorities, the cost/tariff comparison as part of the United Brands test is a cornerstone in the European jurisprudence. The notion of ‘economic value’ is for the first time used in 1978 and criteria set in the United Brands case provide for a 2 steps approach to the assessment of excessive prices. Other ways of assessing excessive pricing are dealt with, as the European Court of Justice observed that economic theorists have not failed to think up several methods to deal with the issue. Yardstick competition and the elimination of the excessive costs from the evaluation are examples of such alternative methodologies used when analyzing excessive prices. The paper concludes with the presentation of the recent European Commission investigation into excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical sector, and proposes the idea that monopoly companies’ tariffs might be easier to evaluate in the context of excessive pricing.

The article considers the issues of competitiveness of Ukrainian products. The impact factors on the competitive advantages have been shown. The strategic imperatives in creating a comprehensive approach to competitiveness have been outlined. Studying of competitiveness determines the need of elaboration of effective, easy to use tools and methods that allow the enterprise to assess the level of competitiveness of their products on the market with the maximum degree of objectivity. The analysis of rates of the level of product competitiveness is a base of the differentiation of supply and creation of the unique set of interrelated competitive advantages attractive for consumers in the target segment. Above this, an enterprise is able to plan the improvement processes for product range more effective on the base of the specific results of research. The purpose of the article is the investigation of competitiveness of Ukrainian products on the world market under modern conditions. In the product competition policy it necessary to take into account, above all, functional purpose, reliability, durability, ease of use, aesthetic appearance, and other characteristics, i.e. the ability of the product to meet the customer needs better than products-competitors. The main condition of the market surviving is creation of product customer value that would includes all set of product features. When creating the product, manufacturer applies different strategies. Widespread competition under the influence of the international division of labour and scientific and technological progress pushes manufacturers to intensify the search for new competitive products and new markets. In solving the problem of increasing the competitiveness of products, every year the problem of selection and development of new markets is becoming increasingly important. In this regard, it is very important for the further development of the product competitiveness to try to enter it with a new market, if domestically its competitiveness has fallen sharply.

The current global crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has an even stronger negative impact on the EU economy than the previous international crisis from 2008, given that its repercussions are felt not only on the banking sector, but rather on all economic sectors. As highlighted by the international crisis of 2008, state aid policy is a flexible and effective tool for providing financial support to Member States' economic sectors. As a result, this article has as major objective to present how state aid has been used by Member States to mitigate the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis, while highlighting what are the opportunities for Romania to use this type of financial instrument in order to support the national economy. This research focuses on the analysis of state aid schemes implemented by Member States, based on the legal basis created by the New Temporary Framework on State Aid (adopted in March 2020). The research methodology is primarily based on a comparative analysis between the types of state aid granted during the 2008 crisis and the current state aid implemented by Member States to deal with the difficulties created by the COVID-19 crisis. The research methodology also uses case studies, related to the experiences of old and new Member States, aiming to highlight how the state aid policy has been used to remedy economic distortions across the EU. The results of the research have as major goal to set out recommendations for the most efficient use of state aid policy to support the economic recovery while maintaining free competition and preventing market failures.

The timeliness and importance of identifying key sources of ensuring the competitiveness of the regional system, as well as analyzing the impact of competitive policy instruments on such competitiveness, is due to a lack of interest in implementing competitive approaches at the level of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. This article discusses the interdependence and interdependence of the mechanism of competition policy, com-petitiveness and the socio-economic system of the region. The object of analysis is the socio-economic system, characterized by a combination of its constituent elements and related properties. Justification of the mechanism of state policy for the protection and development of competition in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation as one of the factors ensuring the competitiveness of the socio-economic system of the region. Based on the structural approach, the tools and methods of competition policy are presented in the form of a single mechanism of influence on the elements and properties of the socio-economic system of the region. The mechanism of the impact of competition policy on the competitiveness of the socio-economic system is presented. As the main independent parts of the mechanism of influence of the policy on the protection and development of competition at the regional level, special attention is paid to: competition, the competitive environment, competitiveness, competitive advantages, as well as competitive immunity. In relation to each of the elements represented, its essence is determined, as well as its importance for acquiring competitiveness properties by the socio-economic system. The presented mechanism of the influence of competition policy on the competitiveness of the socio-economic system can be applied both by federal executive bodies (FAS Russia, territorial bodies of the FAS Russia, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, etc.) and regional government bodies in order to activate more unclaimed sources of competitiveness . According to the results of the study, it was found that to ensure the competitiveness of the socio-economic system in the long term (gaining a system of competitive immunity), a set of conditions is needed that will help transform internal potentials into competitive advantages.

Analyzing the impact of competition policy, the effects of anti-competitive practices and the decisions of competition authorities is a constant concern. Thus, public authorities, and especially competition authorities seek to justify the use of public resources to promote competition policy. Business representatives and international bodies seek to standardize competition rules so that they do not harm business development and others. In this regard, there are several methods and techniques applied to quantify the harm caused by anti-competitive practices, the economic effects of competition policy and the intervention of competition authorities proposed by the European Commission, the OECD, competition authorities in several countries, and the academic environment. The efficient analysis and quantification of the impact of anti-competitive practices are crucial in the regulatory process, being the premise of making the right decisions. The paper presents the classification and application of assessing methods for anti-competitive practices to determine the damage caused by them.

This article informs a key aspect of the business-government interface; the evolution of competition policy and how firms adapt to it. Drawing on an extensive portfolio of inquiries, what constitutes 'the market' and the boundaries of the firm within it is described through the experience of the UK alcoholic beverages industry. In situating competition policy in its historical socio-economic context, this study traces three overlapping eras; family ownership and control, network and conglomerates organisation, and specialisation and financialisation. Issues emerge that inform wider debate, notably the nature of portfolio and network effects, a central and contested theme in contemporary competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to determine the strategic directions of forming the competition policy of Ukraine through analyzing the aspects of divergence between Ukraine and the EU in public regulation of the domestic market development. Materials and methods: historical-logical method, methods of theoretical generalization, system and historical-economic analysis, system approach, and methods of analysis and synthesis are used to substantiate the conceptual foundations of the domestic market development on the competition policy grounds. The paper substantiates that the factors of foreign economic cooperation and trade and implementation of public competition policy on goods and capital flows distribution have a decisive impact on the development of the Ukrainian domestic market in conditions of globalization and European integration. The paper proves that the competition policy is the system of optimal and innovative methods, tools, and measures initiated by authorities and implemented to develop and expand the socio-economic capacity of the domestic market of consumer goods that are equal to and better than the competition policies of other countries by quality and efficiency.