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We revisit the idea that colonized countries that were more (less) economically advanced in 1500 became poorer (richer, respectively) by the late 20th century. Using data on place of origin of today's country populations and the urbanization and population density measures used by Acemoglu et al. (2002) as indicators of level of development in 1500, we confirm a reversal of fortune for territories but find persistence of fortune for people and their descendants. The results are equally strong or stronger for three alternative measures of early development, namely years since transition to agriculture, state history, and the Comin et al. (2010) year 1500 technology index. They are also robust to changing end years, to inclusion of non-colonized countries or exclusion of "neo-Europas" and city states, and to the addition of various controls.

Over the past decade, research explaining cross country income differences has increasingly pointed to the dominant role of total factor productivity (TFP) gaps as opposed to factor accumulation. Nevertheless, it is a widely held belief that a country's ability to absorb and implement technologies is tied to its human capital. In this paper, we implement this idea in a novel specification and explore its quantitative implications within a development accounting framework. In our model, intermediate goods production takes place over a range of industries, and human capital ratios in a country influence industry specific productivities asymmetrically. As a result, in human capital abundant countries, production is concentrated around industries with high TFP, while in low human capital countries, production is concentrated around industries with low TFP. Development accounting exercises for a range of parameter values suggest that this human capital-technology complementarity may account for eighteen to twenty five percent of differences in GDP per worker which is higher than the combined direct contribution of factors of production.

We study the effect of capital controls on the level of investment in human capital and the resulting growth path of an economy. The economy consists of two groups of agents based on the ownership of factors of production. One type of agents – called workers – own human capital and bequeath education to their offsprings. The other group of agents – called capitalists – own and bequeath physical capital. The workers have the political power to tax capital income. The capitalists, based on the tax rate imposed by the workers and the capital control regime in place, decide to invest part or all of their capital abroad. We characterize the optimal tax behavior of the workers. We find that higher capital controls are beneficial for investment in education whenever there is capital flight in a steady state equilibrium. However, higher capital controls are shown to have no effect on the tax rate on capital income imposed by workers: rather, they act as a disincentive for capital flight by lowering the return from foreign investment. We show that lowering capital controls can lead to higher growth only when there is no capital flight in the steady state. Importantly, to prevent capital flight in the long run, human capital accumulation must not show decreasing returns with respect to education and the economy must be sufficiently developed.

Early states like China, India, Italy and Greece have been experiencing more rapid economic growth in recent decades than have later-comers to agriculture and statehood like New Guinea, the Congo, and Uruguay. We show that more rapid growth by early starters has been the norm in economic history, and that the “reversal of fortune” associated with European overseas expansion from about 1500 to 1960 was an exception. We demonstrate that the colonial era reversal was in the process of being reversed in recent decades, and that this second reversal is in line with longer-term trends dating back to the first agricultural revolution.

This paper argues that a significant part of measured TFP differences across countries is attributable not to technological factors that affect the entire economy neutrally, but rather, to variations in the structural composition of economies. In particular, the allocation of scarce inputs between agriculture and non-agriculture seems to be important. We provide a theory which links the institutional framework to the long-run composition of the economy, and thereby to measured TFP and income per worker. A decomposition analysis suggests that between 30 and 50 percent of the international variation in TFP can be attributed to the composition of output. Estimation exercises suggest that recent findings of a conducive effect from institutions, and to some extent, geography, on long-run prosperity and TFP, may be thus explained.