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Preface and Acknowledgments1.A Theoretical Framework and Objectives 2.The United States and Israel 1953-1956: Divergence Dominates 3.The United States and Israel 1957-1960: The Emergence of Strategic Convergence4.The United States and Israel 1961-1962: Convergence Dominates 5.Epilogue

As a step toward further conceptualization and differentiation of the problem of surprise attacks, this article suggests a new framework for analyzing the assumptions of decision makers. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) strategic assumptions of possibilities—the explicit and implicit assumptions held by an “observing state” about the conditions and circumstances under which the “observed state” would strike; (2) tactical assumptions of actualities—assumptions that have become realities in the eyes of the observing state, or that are on the verge of realization. Five cases of failures in intelligence estimates are discussed: (1) the Barbarossa Operation; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor; (3) the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; (4) the Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962; (5) the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.The analysis indicates that in each case, when discrepancies existed between tactical assumptions of actualities and strategic assumptions of possibilities, the latter prevailed without reassessment of the situation.

The article juxtaposes the predominant preconceptions and beliefs pertaining to Japanese military capabilities and predisposition to take risks, held by a number of U. S. decision makers on the eve of the Pacific War, with those adhered to during the last phases of that conflagration. The analysis indicates that misperceived notions contributed both to the outbreak of the War and to the manner in which it was terminated. The central lesson emerging from this study in misperception can be formulated as the need to evaluate tactical field information on its own, and to avoid interpreting such data solely in the light of a priori strategic assumptions which inevitably reflect the decision maker's images of an opponent. As the article demonstrates, U. S. policy makers on both occasions analyzed tended to discount the flow of tactical indicators which contradicted their assessments of the opponent's capabilities and propensity to take risks. Thus, as a means for improving the decision-making process, particularly during periods of acute crisis or war (when policy makers are especially susceptible to the influence of preconceived images), the article suggests that increased weight should be given to tactical indicators when these are at variance with strategic assumptions.

During the years following the Second World War, intensive research was undertaken on the subject of response to threat. Confronted with the baffling yet recurrent inability of nations to respond adequately to warnings of an impending attack, many scholars concentrated on such events as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the outbreak of the Korean War, and produced a voluminous empirical literature, as well as a considerably meagre body of theoretically oriented works. Thus alongside the plethora of works that sought explanations solely in terms of certain specific conditions operating at the time of the event analyzed, a few other inquiries attempted to integrate the case under scrutiny into a broader theoretical context in order to better elucidate the patterns by which nations cope with situations of crisis and threat.