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This paper examines how international education (IE), as an important tool of public diplomacy (PD) and soft power (SP), faces unique challenges as issues of national security (NS) become more prominent in this era of new geopolitics. It presents a model to understand the relationship between PD, SP and NS and then applies this model to a comparative study. The contrasting histories, approaches and perspectives of IE as it operates as a component of foreign policy and at the nexus of PD, SP and NS in both the U.S. and Canada are analysed. The paper concludes with three challenges faced by IE in the contemporary context: first, the diminishing role of the university as a distinct and valued non-state actor; second, the weakening of foreign policy as an outward looking, distinctly international investment; and third, the problem with choosing isolation over engagement as a strategy.

This paper focuses on the recent political spars between Canada and Saudi Arabia as well as China and their impact on Canadian universities. It asks three questions: (1) What key issues did Canada's political strains with Saudi Arabia and China raise for Canadian universities' international education (IE) initiatives and what issues were absent? (2) What do these key issues suggest about Canada's approaches to IE in an era of new geopolitics? and (3) What implications can be drawn from these cases about Canadian university-government relations in the context of new geopolitics? Given the powerful role media plays in education policy, a systematic study was conducted across three main media sources to identify 74 articles and news releases between August 2018 and November 2019. Three dominant themes are identified and analyzed, each vividly illustrating the close ties between global politics, government foreign policy and IE within Canadian Universities. On the one hand, the narratives speak to concerns about IE as a risk to national security and, on the other, as a vehicle for Canada's economic prosperity. However, what the media has not achieved is a broader discussion on how Canada needs to revisit its IE objectives and approaches in light of broader geopolitical shifts. Using the theoretical framework of soft power, the paper speaks to the limitations and short-sightedness of Canada's approach to IE as soft power in this era of new geopolitics and concludes with three recommendations for Canada.

As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American forces in many wars. Canada's Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Canadian government’s foreign and security policy responses to Russian disinformation in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It asks whether, how, and why the government has securitised the “crisis of Russian disinformation.” The paper first briefly reviews literature on the Copenhagen’s School’s “securitisation” theory and how it has been used to explain responses to other crises. It then adopts the framework to contextualise the Canadian federal government’s official rhetoric, and then to categorise government policies and actions. The sources consulted include government actors’ reports and stated intentions and policies from 2022 to 2024. Adopting a securitisation framework reveals that Russian disinformation has been rhetorically securitised by government actors as an existential threat to national security and democratic integrity which requires urgent action. Within a context of cascading risks, the government has taken a range of distinct yet reinforcing policies and actions, some more comprehensive than others. The paper argues that together this “pervasive rhetorical securitisation” and “ad hoc practical securitisation” comprise the Canadian government’s ongoing process of partial securitisation. This process is legitimising different methods of governance: security and warfare communications (to address threats to national defence and security), democratic resilience (to address threats to democracy), and, most controversially, blocking and sanctioning (to signal discontent to the Russian regime). The analysis further reveals that each approach has different benefits and limits. The paper concludes that the securitisation process is incomplete compared to the government's rhetoric, with no over-arching organisation or strategy. It outlines implications for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little research has examined public diplomacy as a comparative education issue, particularly regarding social-psychological, economic and political fears or personal and national insecurities. This paper discusses American public diplomacy as a mostly Cold War strategy adapted to post-9/11 national security interests, fears and desires. It further explores differences, similarities, and debates in Canadian media, policy documents and academia, in response to American political, economic and military pressures or demands for a "North American" (i.e. joint American-Canadian) security approach. From a critical pedagogy perspective the paper argues that modern public diplomacy has been a dubious, pseudo-educational, fear-mongering concept nurtured by academics, politicians and military leaders as part of an American foreign policy, military security and propaganda strategy. The paper further shows that post-9/11 Canada, problematically, adapted its own public diplomacy policies to serve American interests. Further research is needed to examine more closely public diplomacy's impacts on Canadian education. (Contains 1 note.)

This paper reviews the legislative history and application of the Criminal Code's definition of terrorist activity to trace how the "motive clause" reinforces systemic racism within Canada's criminal justice system. By outlining this process, this paper argues that the motive clause contributes to a dynamic that racializes terror offences as a specific type of criminal offence committed by racialized individuals--marking terrorism as a unique social characteristic of racialized communities. This occurs mainly due to the legislative requirement to prosecute the ideas of accused persons, which, in practice, has increased the likelihood of courts admitting otherwise prejudicial evidence against the accused and the problematic ways in which expert evidence has (or has not) been used in terrorism trials. Although discrimination may not be an inevitable or intended outcome of the drafted legislation, it creates a framework that encourages discriminatory prosecutorial strategies, facilitates bias in the admission and treatment of some evidence, and potentially contributes to the exclusive use of the provisions against racialized communities specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper addresses the use of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and the International Emergencies Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), in the US trade policy of the presidency of Donald Trump, towards its North American partners. From a political economy approach and from addressing case studies, the article argues that these laws have been transformed from tools to deal with rival countries, to resources of power to obtain concessions from Canada and Mexico both in the commercial and commercial sphere. in other areas of your relationship. Specifically, for Section 232, the case of steel and aluminum tariffs against Canada and Mexico is addressed. In the case of the IEEPA, reference is made to the tariff threats filed by the United States against Mexico in 2019. Based on this, the article identifies the ways in which the United States authorities have reinterpreted the provisions of the laws to use them as resources that assert their market power in regional negotiations. At the end, the article explains in a general way, a strategic course available for Canada and Mexico, to counteract the contemporary use that the United States has made of its national security laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our survey reveals that Chinese-origin faculty in Canadian universities used to work in the frontiers of collaborating with China, leveraging their cultural and linguistic competencies, as well as personal networks. Now, they are caught in geopolitical conflicts and even become victims of implicit or explicit racial profiling, as a result of policies that link research collaboration with China to national security concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Graduate Journal of Sociology & Criminology / Revue Canadienne des Études Supérieures en Sociologie et Criminologie is the property of Paladin Academic Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

National security policy in cyberspace presents a unique security challenge. Operations under the current mandate of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) may incidentally capture Canadian information and thereby affect Canadian privacy interests. This raises serious concerns that this regime does not comply with sections 8 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, legislative reform under Bill C-59 implements external accountability measures in a manner that satisfies Charter requirements. Finally, Bill C-59 makes significant changes to CSE's mandate, namely the addition of an "active" cyber mandate. These changes raise concerns that the expansion of CSE's offensive capabilities, without careful oversight, may enable CSE to conduct cyber operations that do not comply with Canada's international legal obligations and are not authorized by Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper begins with Foucault's definition of the 'carceral' as an incorporation of "institutions of supervision or constraint, of discreet surveillance and insistent coercion" (1995, 299) to examine how the invocation of the War Measures Act during World War II translated into virtual incarceration for Japanese Canadians. Using newspaper articles from a one-year period, I apply this definition to Japanese Canadians sent to Alberta and Manitoba as part of the government sponsored Sugar Beet Programme. This program offers a unique perspective, as it was framed as a 'self-support' program, thus implying a greater range of freedoms. However, despite illusions of freedom, I argue that what made these sites carceral was a combination of state, media and civic mediations. Moving beyond the carceral institution to interrogate less formal spaces of carcerality, this paper strives to build on Foucault's definition through the inclusion of broader, less bounded and less definitive spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns that counter-terrorism laws and practices are directly and indirectly causing human rights violations have mounted. Much of the international focus has been on the United States. This paper highlights, however, that it is a debate with a truly global dimension. The author examines particular concerns that Canadian law enforcement and security agencies may have been complicit in the imprisonment and torture abroad of Canadian citizens who were of interest in the context of national security investigations. The cases are situated in the wider debate about torture that has emerged worldwide in recent years, and argues that any move to create exceptions to the absolute prohibition of torture, enshrined in numerous international treaties, would lead to both injustice and insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In any jurisdiction, national security legislation is not developed or enacted in a vacuum and, as such, interdisciplinary analyses of this legislation are both necessary and useful. As such, this article illustrates that the United Kingdom, Canada and Hong Kong's counter-terrorism policymaking has been influenced by their domestic legal and political structures and cultures, including their: respective legal systems; the relative stability of government and political institutions; mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny and oversight; and experiences with terrorism. Through this interdisciplinary and comparative lens, this article analyzes contemporary developments in these countries, such as terrorist attacks on the Canadian Parliament and the Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong, in order to discuss the human rights implications of the legislation that has been (or will be) enacted in the aftermath of these events, and to call attention to problematic aspects of Canada and the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism policy-making. The example of Hong Kong, a jurisdiction that deals with national security exclusively through ordinary criminal law, is utilized to further emphasize these problematic aspects. The article concludes that terrorism can be best dealt with through existing criminal law, rather than national security legislation that is often hastily enacted, lacking in oversight, overly politicized, and problematic from a human rights standpoint. The article further concludes that these human rights implications are exacerbated in Canada due to a glaring lack of parliamentary oversight, and recommends mechanisms for review of counter-terrorism activities as a matter of urgency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the interwar period, the Royal Canadian Air Force reoriented itself from an exclusively civil to a military service. In doing so, it assumed primary responsibility for Canada’s direct home defence, put in place a command and administrative air defence structure spanning Canada, and gained coequal status with the other services. Moreover, by 1939 the air force had on hand a cadre of technically trained staff officers prepared to take over the many higher appointments created by the expansion required to meet the demands of the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Parliament of Canada has traditionally deferred to the government on matters relating to national security although parliamentarians have, on occasion, vied for the task of being actively involved in holding the government to account on these matters. In 1991, parliament conducted a five-year review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act where the Solicitor General of Canada and his officials presented classified summaries to parliamentarians to assist them in their review of the effectiveness of the legislation. In 2004, a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians was proposed in Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy. The Speaker's ruling on the provision of documents of April 27, 2010 also dealt with this issue. This paper examines a number of issues and concerns that have arisen in the past on this issue, and it examines parliamentary review of national security matters in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. It concludes that there are no reasonable barriers to the involvement of parliamentarians in reviewing matters of national security in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether Islamic terrorism has seen a marked increase in Canada since the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks in New York City. It discusses the effect of the September 2001 terrorism to the Canadians and policymakers moving forward. The author argues that an analysis of terrorist incidents in Canada after the September 11 incident reveals a disturbing trend and also provides a clear indication of several areas which need to be investigated and addressed to mitigate this threat moving forward. It offers an overview of the six high profile terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

In this paper, the author examines the role of international law on the development of Canada's security certificate regime. On the one hand, international law has had a perceptible impact on judicial reasoning, contributing to judges' increased willingness to recognize the rights of non-citizens named in certificates and to envision better ways of balancing national security and human rights. On the other hand, the judiciary's attitudes towards international law as non-binding sources of insight akin to foreign law has reinforced disparities in levels of rights afforded by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and those afforded by international human rights. Viewed skeptically, one might argue that the judiciary's selective result-oriented use of international law and foreign law helped it spread a veneer of legality over an otherwise unaltered and discriminatory certificate regime. Reviewing Charkaoui I and II in international context, the author suggests an alternative account. He suggests that the judiciary's use of international law and foreign law, although highly ambiguous and ambivalent, both was principled and has progressively brought named persons' Charter rights more closely in step with their international human rights. Although the current balance between national security and human rights is imperfect, the way in which aspects of Canada's certificate regime have been improved suggests that international law is a valuable resource for protecting the rights of non-citizens in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Besieged by insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and gripped by mounting pressure to enhance security and public safety at home, officials in Washington and Ottawa are now confronted with a serious homeland security dilemma: the greater the financial costs, public sacrifice and political capital invested in security, the higher the public's expectations and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the more significant the public's sense of insecurity after each failure, and, paradoxically, the higher the pressure on governments and citizens to sacrifice even more to achieve perfect security. The paradox of security dilemmas at the international level (Jervis, 1976, 1978) explains why perfectly rational decisions to enhance power actually diminish security by promoting unstable spirals in competitive defence spending--a common account of escalating military budgets throughout much of the Cold War. The homeland security dilemma represents the post-9/l I equivalent for domestic politics in the war on terrorism. The paper's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need, not because enhancing security makes terrorism more likely (although the incentive for terrorists to attack may increase as extremists feel duty bound to demonstrate their ongoing relevance), but because enormous investments in security inevitably raise public expectations and amplify public out-rage after subsequent failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Bar Review is the property of Canadian Bar Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses Canadian politician Gerald Gratton McGeer's advocacy for the construction of naval and air bases in British Columbia and Alaska during World War II as a means to launch attacks against Japan. McGeer's belief that Canada should support the U.S. in its actions against Japanese armed forces in the North Pacific Ocean is detailed, as are his various communications with Canadian Prime Minister W.L.M. King and Cabinet War Committee (CWC). Focus is given to the way McGeer's advocacy forced the seemingly indifferent Canadian federal government to pay attention to the security of British Columbia as well as his promotion of economic development in western Canada. His conversations with Frederic Delano, U.S. Chief of the National Resources Planning Board, are also outlined.

While Canadians have been called an "unmilitary people," Canada has played a significant role in many wars, from South Africa to Korea, and has been able to mobilize its resources to meet the demands of war. This paper concentrates entirely on the mobilization of military personnel: the process of moving armed forces from peacetime to wartime levels. Its analysis centers on the internal and external factors that influence force requirements and availability and on the means of filling the inevitable gaps between peacetime and wartime needs. Canada's mobilization policies are currently emerging from a period of neglect and must resolve the traditional tendencies of an unmilitary people with the demands of modern conventional war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada's alliance relationships, NATO and NORAD, constitute nearly the sum total of Canadian defense policy. In addition to providing national security through collective Western defense, these alliances have been viewed in Canada as affording Ottawa a seat at the table, where important issues of international security and U.S.-Soviet relations are discussed. While enjoying this access, Canada has, nonetheless, been concerned about the overwhelming U.S. influence over its defense policy. For the Canadian military, the problem has been obtaining adequate funding for the Allied commitments made by the government. The 1987 White Paper on defense promised sufficient resources, but recent budget cuts have cast serious doubt on Canada's future role in its alliances and on Ottawa's ability to make use of its seat in Allied councils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four of the men convicted as part of the Toronto 18 prosecution were subject to citizenship revocation on grounds of terrorism. One of the four was born in Canada, and the other three immigrated to Canada and acquired citizenship through naturalization. I situate the politics of the four men's citizenship revocation in legal and comparative context. Contemporary citizenship revocation policies, especially those invoked in the name of national security, serve both instrumental and symbolic goals. I argue that the citizenship revocation scheme enacted in Canada resonated primarily in the register of symbolic politics and lacked virtually any instrumental value related to national security. Its deployment against four of the Toronto 18 was always, and only, a calculated electoral tactic. I conclude by recounting the case of U.K.-Canadian Jack Letts in order to illustrate how citizenship revocation not only infringes fundamental human rights but is dysfunctional from the vantage point of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strengthening of EU-Canada relations in the last years has revealed mutual interests in several policy fields. In times of increasingly tense relations with the US and weakening multilateralism, deepened and broadened bilateral cooperation is of particular importance for both, Canada and the EU. In order to better understand mutual interests and similar challenges, this article explores cooperation in the two different policy fields of foreign and security policy and climate change policy. This analysis of the current situation in international security and climate change policy points out key areas in which closer EU-Canada cooperation could be brought to bear fruits not only for their bilateral relationship but also the alliance for multilateralism in the short run and for years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As of November 2017, 60 known foreign terrorist fighters have been permitted to return and live in Canada without criminal consequence. The reason for this, according to the Minister of Public Safety, is the problem of using information collected for intelligence purposes as evidence in criminal proceedings. Often referred to as the “intelligence to evidence” (I2E) dilemma, this challenge has plagued Canada’s terrorism prosecutions since the Air India bombing in 1985. Yet, not all countries struggle to bring terrorists to justice. Canada’s prosecution statistics pale in comparison to the United Kingdom. In a democracy committed to upholding the rule of law and respecting human rights, prosecuting terrorists is the strongest and most transparent deterrent to this threat. This article argues that as the threat of terrorism grows both domestically and abroad, Canada must learn from the UK’s experience and reform the rules of evidence to ensure that criminal charges are pursued. This article will outline and compare the relevant Canadian and UK rules of evidence and assess their practical implications for national security prosecutions in light of primary research conducted in London in the fall of 2017. It concludes with a series of legislative and organizational reforms to improve the efficiency of Canadian terrorism trials. As of November 2017, 60 known foreign terrorist fighters have been permitted to return and live in Canada without criminal consequence. The reason for this, according to the Minister of Public Safety, is the problem of using information collected for intelligence purposes as evidence in criminal proceedings. Often referred to as the “intelligence to evidence” (I2E) dilemma, this challenge has plagued Canada’s terrorism prosecutions since the Air India bombing in 1985. Yet, not all countries struggle to bring terrorists to justice. Canada’s prosecution statistics pale in comparison to the United Kingdom. In a democracy committed to upholding the rule of law and respecting human rights, prosecuting terrorists is the strongest and most transparent deterrent to this threat. This article argues that as the threat of terrorism grows both domestically and abroad, Canada must learn from the UK’s experience and reform the rules of evidence to ensure that criminal charges are pursued. This article will outline and compare the relevant Canadian and UK rules of evidence and assess their practical implications for national security prosecutions in light of primary research conducted in London in the fall of 2017. It concludes with a series of legislative and organizational reforms to improve the efficiency of Canadian terrorism trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif 's ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary seeks to excavate Captain Latif 's fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically analyzes the Court's claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In Canada, funding, administration, and delivery of health services-including those targeting people who use drugs-are primarily the responsibility of the provinces and territories. Access to harm reduction services varies across jurisdictions, possibly reflecting differences in provincial and territorial policy commitments. We examined the quality of current provincial and territorial harm reduction policies in Canada, relative to how well official documents reflect internationally recognized principles and attributes of a harm reduction approach. Methods: We employed an iterative search and screening process to generate a corpus of 54 provincial and territorial harm reduction policy documents that were current to the end of 2015. Documents were content-analyzed using a deductive coding framework comprised of 17 indicators that assessed the quality of policies relative to how well they described key population and program aspects of a harm reduction approach. Results: Only two jurisdictions had current provincial-level, stand-alone harm reduction policies; all other documents were focused on either substance use, addiction and/or mental health, or sexually transmitted and/or blood-borne infections. Policies rarely named specific harm reduction interventions and more frequently referred to generic harm reduction programs or services. Only one document met all 17 indicators. Very few documents acknowledged that stigma and discrimination are issues faced by people who use drugs, that not all substance use is problematic, or that people who use drugs are legitimate participants in policymaking. A minority of documents recognized that abstaining from substance use is not required to receive services. Just over a quarter addressed the risk of drug overdose, and even fewer acknowledged the need to apply harm reduction approaches to an array of drugs and modes of use. Conclusions: Current provincial and territorial policies offer few robust characterizations of harm reduction or go beyond rhetorical or generic support for the approach. By endorsing harm reduction in name, but not in substance, provincial and territorial policies may communicate to diverse stakeholders a general lack of support for key aspects of the approach, potentially challenging efforts to expand harm reduction services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the fine balance that needs to be made between maintaining national security and freedom of expression in Canada and talks about the need for the Liberal Government to relook aspects of the problematic elements of Bill C-51 and section 83.221 of the Criminal Code.

The article focuses on the developments in the Canadian intelligence community after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. It notes that the country's intelligence community gained substantial new resources and revised mandate, as well as the modification of institutional structures to focus on new threats and improve coordination, after the terrorist attacks. It states that the mobilization of resources to prevent a direct attack on Canadian citizens or Canadian infrastructure became the immediate priority of the government. The country's Department of National Defense was also increased to meet new military commitments and expanded its intelligence gathering.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

The article focuses on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada. It explores how and why is that NATO has managed to retain considerable significance to the Canadian security and defense policy a ten years after the September 11, 2011 terrorists attacks. It highlights the pessimism about NATO's future prospects expressed by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. It notes that Canada was more engaged with NATO than it had been since the start of the early 1950s, an engagement that correspond closely with liberal foreign policy doctrine.

The article reports on the Canadian government's refusal to allow BHP Billiton Ltd.'s proposed acquisition of Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. It mentions that the decision marks second rejection of a proposed transaction outside the culture sector 25 year history of Investment Canada Act (ICA). It investigates the reasons including national security and amendments to the ICA taken into consideration by the government in refusing the acquisition.

The article provides an overview of the mission, tasks and challenges of the Canada Command (Canada COM) and reserves in Canada. Its mission is to deliver a comprehensive, integrated and networked force to prevent and defeat threat and aggression aimed at Canada and North America. Its task include defence, security and the provision of services. Also, the role of the reserve force is providing augmentation, sustainment and support to forces that are deployed and provide a base for expansion and mobilization.

Game theoretical analysis can be useful in contexts such as securities regulation, where multiple decision makers (i.e., securities regulatory authorities or commissions) act unilaterally but can also potentially reap benefits from cooperation. We deploy several models in seeking to render more transparent the strategies and pay-offs that motivate jurisdictions to support or resist the introduction of a national securities regulator in Canada. Our analysis suggests that consensus has not been reached regarding a national regulator not only because of a lack of cooperation but also because of a lack of coordination. Indeed, it seems plausible both that provinces recognize the benefit of adopting a common standardized regulatory model and that the source of disagreement surrounds the precise regulatory content of that common standardized model. This essay explores the implications of this insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First - ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second - instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff - while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third - drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth - overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic - alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth - creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Desafíos is the property of Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Lester Crawford, acting commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, is worried that the importation of cheap pharmaceuticals could expose people in The U.S. to attack from bioterrorists. In an interview with the journal Associated Press, he raised the potential contamination of imported drugs as a threat to national security. In practice, the imports come mainly from Canada, where drugs are subject to government price controls. They are increasingly sanctioned by state governments in the United States, where citizens are tiring of paying inflated prices for medicines.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Sociology is the property of Canadian Journal of Sociology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Focuses on the strategic assessment of the military power in Canada. Reference to the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1818 between Canada and the U.S.; Percentage of the Gross National Product allocated for the defense sector in Canada; Dependence of Canada's political, economic, and military power on the U.S.

A content analysis of material generated by the 1994–1995 foreign policy review process in Canada was conducted in an effort to understand how culture came to be officially constituted as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy. The analysis showed significant differences among actors in terms of modes of legitimization of cultural diplomacy. State agents, by refusing to consider culture as a referent object in a broadened notion of security and by assimilating it into a system of civic values, resisted pressures from academics and groups that favored introducing societal conceptions of culture as relevant for the making o f foreign policy. The result is nevertheless a new, albeit defensive and still ambiguous, form of implication of foreign policy in the cultural mission of the state in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]