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Since its appearance in 2020, Brazil and Mexico have been among the most affected countries in the world by covid-19. Their respective presidents, Jair Bolsonaro and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), have played a leading role in specific policies during the pandemic. Their choices were both singular and counter- intuitive. On the health front, AMLO initially underplayed the seriousness of the situation, and the Brazilian president, Bolsonaro, defended a frankly negationist attitude, with a dramatic balance sheet, without his popularity being seriously affected. On the economic front, they have chosen policies that contradict not only each other but also their own supposed ideological stances. Bolsonaro, who is ranked on the far right, has implemented an emergency transfer program on a scale comparable to those of developed countries and the most massive the country has ever seen. Conversely, AMLO, considered a progressist, provided just a minimum policy package, maintaining his previous electoral program. By adopting a comparative approach and mobilizing a unique and diversified set of data, the objective of this paper is to explore these apparent contradictions. After having established the precise diagnosis of the policies implemented to deal with the crisis and the economic and health situation in the two countries during the 2020-2022 period, we propose an original interpretation grid of the central role played by the two presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years electricity sectors worldwide have undergone major transformations, referred to as the "energy transition". This has required energy planning to quickly adapt to provide useful inputs to the regulation activity so that a cost-effective electricity market emerges to facilitate the integration of renewables. This paper analyzes the role of system planning and regulations on two specific elements in the energy market design: the concept of firm capacity and the presence of distributed energy resources, both of which can be influenced by regulation. We assess the total cost of different regulatory mechanisms in the Brazilian and Mexican systems using optimization tools to determine optimal long-term expansion for a given regulatory framework. In particular, we quantitatively analyze the role of the current regulation in the total cost of these two electricity systems when compared to a reference "efficient" energy planning scenario that adopts standard cost-minimization principles and that is well suited to the most relevant features of the new energy transformation scenario. We show that two very common features of regulatory designs that can lead to distortions are: (i) renewables commonly having a lower "perceived cost" under the current regulations, either due to direct incentives such as tax breaks or due to indirect access to more attractive contracts or financing conditions; and (ii) requirements for reliability are often defined more conservatively than they should be, overstating the hardships imposed by renewable generation on the existing system and underestimating their potential to form portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]