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Copyright of Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian & Latin American Economic History is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article reports on the conference "Die nationalsozialistische Okkupationspresse in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion, 1941-1944" (The National Socialist Press in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union), held at the University of Heidelberg from November 5-8, 2010. Papers discussed various aspects of press politics and propaganda in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe, including their institutional organization, content, reception, and audience, as well as biographical questions.

Copyright of Historia, Antropologia y Fuentes Orales is the property of Asociacion de Revistas Culturales de Espana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Sociología Histórica is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Reconstructing the complex supplier network of the famous JU 88 air armament programme, this article shows that outsourcing activities increased considerably in wartime Germany. The resulting inter-firm division of labour did not lead only to a quite effective protection of the German aircraft production against Allied air raids but also contributed to enormous labour productivity growth in most stages of the production process. Even though aircraft production was prohibited in post-war Germany, this supplier network survived and became the backbone of the most spectacular symbol of West Germany's economic rebirth: the automobile industry. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article covers three aspects of the Holocaust that are commonly misrepresented or ignored. First, an endlessly repeated piece of misinformation, is the description of the Holocaust as a project to kill the Jews of Europe. Most ignore the evidence that all Jews on earth were to be killed, that some outside Europe were killed, and that there were preparations for the killing of Jews in the Middle East. The second is the German expectation of winning the war, and that certain policies in implementing the Holocaust can only be understood in the context of an expectation of easier completion after victory. The third aspect is the absence from most accounts of the personal interests of those doing the killing in promotions, medals, loot, etc. in the early years and in safety from dangerous assignment to fighting at the front in the later years of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm-level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning-by-doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines efforts by the British Special Operations Executive in 1944 in gaining support from anti-Soviet Cossacks and Russian prisoners of war (POW) by offering repatriation to Russia. Aim of subverting the Russians who were fighting for the Germans in Western Europe; Events that led to the Russians being made POW by the Germans; Interaction between Russian and British officers concerning the POW.