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This paper describes very short-term wind prediction for power generation, utilizing a case study from Tasmania, Australia. Windpower presently is the fastest growing power generation sector in the world. However, windpower is intermittent. To be able to trade efficiently, make the best use of transmission line capability, and address concerns with system frequency in a re-regulated system, accurate very short-term forecasts are essential. The research introduces a novel approach—the application of an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system to forecasting a wind time series. Over the very short-term forecast interval, both windspeed and wind direction are important parameters. To be able to be gain the most from a forecast on this time scale, the turbines must be directed toward on oncoming wind. For this reason, this paper forecasts wind vectors, rather than windspeed or power output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a multi-nodal intertemporal Cournot gaming model with transmission constraints and uses it to simulate energy-only and capacity-energy market designs in the presence of uncertainties stemming from intermittent renewable power generation. Both market paradigms are compared to a competitive benchmark in order to determine which one performs better in a concentrated market with significant penetration of wind and solar generation. As a specific example, the model is applied to the South Australian zone of the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). The simulation results for the time interval 2013–2030 show that the capacity-energy market has the potential to induce significant new capacity and push prices much closer to the competitive level in contrast to the current energy-only market design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a property rights model for electric transmission is proposed and its properties analyzed. The proposed rights, called "border flow rights," support financial hedging of transmission risk and merchant transmission expansion through associated financial rights, called "contracts for differences of differences." These financial rights allow for forward trading of both energy and transmission by a unified exchange, avoiding the bifurcation in current markets between decentralized long-term energy trading and centralized long-term transmission trading. Such long-term trading can help to support the financing of both generation and transmission assets. We consider incentive properties of such a right in the absence of lumpiness, economies of scale, and market power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]