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An essay is presented which addresses an update to the author's speech which was delivered as the Keynote Address at the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium on aggregate litigation at the Emory University School of Law on February 6, 2014. The U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are mentioned, along with the revision of a rule governing class actions in America. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 1954 civil rights case Brown v. Board of Education is examined, along with the joinder of parties.

An essay is presented that analyzes William A. Fletcher's article "The Structure of Standing" which was regarding the U.S. Supreme Court's perspective on the standing to sue, which analyzes whether a litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute. The author reflects on the U.S. Congress's power to allow standing to enforce constitutional rights.

This article discusses the writ of amparo, the concept of the protection of constitutional rights in Latin America. The author comments on the influence of the writ of amparo on judicial resolutions, judgments, and procedural law. The importance of the writ of amparo in the protection of human, constitutional, and civil rights is also examined.

This article discusses the legal concept of erga omnes, or the application of equal rights for all, in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The author comments on the role of the court in the protection of human rights for member nations and describes the influence of the court's decisions on those of the smaller national and regional courts.

This article discusses the history of the Constitution of 1993 of Peru on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. The author comments on the development of the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) and its role in the judgments and protections of the fundamental civil rights of the Peruvian population.

It is common knowledge that although the Constitution entrenches the right of everyone to access sufficient water, there are several challenges that continue to impede the full realisation of this right. Recently, environmental pollution by mining companies, a violation of the constitutional environmental right, has emerged as a major impediment to realising the constitutional right of access to sufficient water. The challenge posed by environmental pollution to the enjoyment of the right of access to sufficient water is highlighted in Federation for Sustainable Environment and Others v Minister of Water Affairs [2012] ZAGPPHC 128. The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, to comment on the judgment of the North Gauteng High Court in Federation for Sustainable Environment and Others v Minister of Water Affairs; and secondly, to comment on the litigation strategy employed by the applicants in this case. This article argues that, to promote the realisation of the right of access to sufficient water, communities and civil society organisations should also direct litigation at mining companies responsible for water pollution in order to compel them to at least refrain from violating the enjoyment of socio-economic rights, including the right of access to clean water. It is suggested that this strategy is consistent with the obligation imposed on non-state actors to at least refrain from violating socio-economic rights and the now established 'polluter-pays principle' in environmental law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the rights-related amendments in the constitution of U.S. states from 2000 to 2012, while focusing on elements of continuity and change. It draws four main conclusions about the ways state amendment processes have served as a forum for deliberating about rights in the 21st century including significant number of such ammendments during 2000-2012, constraining expansive state court ruling and expanding rights beyond federal constitutional guarantees.

The article traverses the history of judicial decisions given by the Iowa Supreme Court and connects it with the role played by the court in protecting the civil rights of the people and abolishing slavery. It mentions several cases put before the court including case of a black man from Missouri, who had been permitted to come to Iowa to work in order to purchase his freedom, a black girl Susan B. Clark who was denied admission to a public school and Coger vs. North Western Union Packet Co.

On April 11, 2011, France implemented a law that placed a ban on persons wearing any form of face coverings in public, which includes the face veil that some Muslim women wear to cover their faces.+ France implemented this law on the basis of promoting public order and secularism. However, in implementing this law many Muslim women's rights to freedom of religion have been restricted. This paper argues that France's new law banning the face veil violates the European Convention on Human Rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Supreme Court - STF, in a recent historic decision, uttered in the process of Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n° 132-RJ, confers to homoaffective partners the same juridical effects regarding stable union as to those of different gender. In search for this recongnition, the action invoked the interpretation "according to the Constitution", where it sought to show that in a sistematic vision the desired right had support. The Court gave providence based on the contextual hermeneutics, which had sustaining in a series of constitutional principles, especially in those of a person's dignity, equality and freedom. The founding value, however, which is the human, yet it is set in the wide network of discursive reasoning, appears more in a tacit manner, when the opposite was expected: that the human aspect fixed in the center and base of this argumentation. For example, it is even said that homosexuality is not an illness, nor a deviance nor an option, but a sexual orientation. And if it was it all at once, for being ill wouldn't he have a shelter, or for it being an option wouldn't he have freedom of choice? This proposal is to see a new reading of this decision, starting in the election of some excerpts of the speech (due to smallness of space), displaying, in a dialectic and deductive perspective, that in light of the human rights, the minorities, i.e. the homosexuals, can receive the analysis of their pleas from a safer filter [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents insights into the jurisprudence of African American Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court, with special focus on the ideology of equal citizenship and some illustrative judicial decisions. It informs that Marshall perceived that the Reconstruction Amendments in the U.S. Constitution transformed it into a document for equality and liberty. Marshall highlighted that the Amendments bestowed the government to ensure respect for civil rights of all persons.

The article focuses on the role of a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge in protecting the rights of citizens to participate in juries of racial politics. It discusses the role of a prosecutor in the U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky, in encouraging courts and communities to prevent racial discrimination of juror exclusion. It analyzes the protections by legal system and lack of diversity in juries in a participatory democracy.

The article discusses on the dispute right of same sex marriage and domestic partnership. It provides information that California voters are trying to add a new section in the California Family Court, to define marriage only for opposite sex couples. It reveals that this action is totally against to civil rights to gay and lesbian couples and their families. It emphasizes on constitutional guarantees and the strength, benefits of domestic partnerships. It also discusses the court case Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club prosecuted in the California Supreme Court in which Country Club get failed to extend the same rights and privileges to a same sex couple.

The article discusses the impact of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the employment discrimination litigation on the case Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes. It states that the decision has created a private enforcement on fair lending laws while uncovering the importance of class-action litigation. The efforts of the administration of President Barack Obama in enforcing civil rights laws in the consumer finance field are also emphasized.

The article explores whether inmate slip and fall cases warrant recovery for a violation of the Eighth Amendment. It concludes that the importance of providing remedies for inmates who have suffered a deprivation of constitutional rights is not to be undermined. It suggests that inmates should enjoy the right to cover for injuries sustained by slip and fall cases, but under the theory of tort law.

Roe v. Wade has received much criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. These critiques diverge divisively but for one commonality. Specifically, commentators from both the pro- and anti-choice camps have expressed concern about the absence of an express constitutional right to privacy, upon which the Supreme Court in Roe based its finding of a "fundamental" right to abortion. This lack of express constitutional provision renders the Roe decision, and its resulting reproductive rights, vulnerable. Further, pro-choice advocates find fault with the privacy basis because it yields no positive rights to funding or governmental support for accessing abortion services. When based upon a right to privacy, the right to abortion is relegated to the land of negative rights. The negative right to privacy might provide some women with reproductive choice free from government intrusion, but for other women--those with limited resources--the so-called "choice" becomes nonexistent. This article investigates whether these two shortcomings--the absence of positive rights and the lack of express constitutional language--inherent in the right to privacy might be redressed by reframing Roe in the language of property, and specifically a woman's property right in her uterus. Assuming arguendo the anti-choice tenet that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, this article sets forth an argument that the fetus is an unwanted trespasser in the woman's uterus whom the woman has a right to eject. Further, this article posits that this property-based notion of abortion might justify government funding for abortions based on a constitutional obligation to maintain a system designed to protect women's uterine property, similar to states' obligations to maintain a police force in order to protect other forms of private property, including the removal of trespassers. In short, this article provides a new basis for abortion rights that takes advantage of the long-standing traditional notions of property law and the right to exclude, as well as the public support that attaches to that right, manifested through anti-trespass systems. After establishing the propertybased argument, the article explores what might be gained, and what might be lost, by adopting such a premise for abortion rights and access. Among these considerations is whether the anti-trespass scheme might push the abortion discourse beyond the typical polarizing rhetoric surrounding both the pro-choice and anti-choice camps, thus generating space for forward movement and meaningful work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's constitutional decisions have been a mixed blessing. Some of the Court's most celebrated decisions have, in the long run, done more harm than good. Mapp v. Ohio, while it might have done a certain amount of good at the time, brought with it an automatic rule of exclusion that has grossly diverted attention from the guilt or innocence of the accused. Others, like Brown v. Board of Education and Lawrence v. Texas, were watershed moments in the development of American civil rights. But what made these decisions good or bad? My most important argument will be a negative one: it had nothing to do with the original intent of those who framed or ratified the constitutional provisions in question. The rise of originalism has brought with it an almost obsessive concern with history. Originalism seeks to substitute keenness of intellect for prudent judgment because the first is thought to be objective. The second is thought to be subjective, thereby subjecting us to the rule, not of laws, but of men. Yet the wise judge recognizes that the search for security and objectivity in history is a will-o'-the wisp. Wisdom, not historical rigor, is the touchstone of good judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The category of minority is used as argumentative reinforcement in Law for the defense of fundamental rights. It is destined to groups that were historically marginalized, and claim for public recognition of their peculiarities and the protection of rights. This category, which appeared linked to the idea of state sovereignty and nationality, now is extended to demands ignored before. The interpretation of principles related to the minority category must therefore be conceived as a need for consolidation of constitutional democratic values. This study aims to identify how the minority category is articulated in decisions of the judiciary. The source of precedents on which research is developed are those decisions of all instances of the Brazilian courts, tried and published since October 5, 1988 until July 31, 2010. The conclusion is that the use of minority category by the judges pursues the democratic ideal of law enforcement to those belonging to minority groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the age treatment of the suspect in Miranda custody, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. It also discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case J.D.B. v. North Carolina, determining the custody of a person for addressing issues involved in Miranda case. It presents information on the judgment made in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, wherein age as a factor in custody analysis were laid and constitutional rights were allowed to juveniles.

The article focuses on the collateral order doctrine, which describes the federal court exception to the rule that only final judgments can be appealed. The author argues that immediate appealability should be applied to court orders that deny the appointment of counsel in civil rights cases. It is noted that the U.S. Supreme Court declined to provide a judgment or precedent for lower courts to follow.

The article focuses on the state of Georgia’s rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims in light of the 2010 Georgia Supreme Court decisions. It reflects on the historical background of the U.S. constitutional right to effective counsel and the test for analyzing IAC claims. It discusses the merits of Georgia’s rules as compared to those which are used in most jurisdictions. It further suggests that the state should clarify its approach to the IAC timing.

This article examines the Supreme Court of Canada's cost-benefit analysis of freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. The article finds that while the Supreme Court's reasoning was ultimately flawed, its use of cost-benefit analysis may be a positive development in the freedom of religion framework. The article also looks at the Court's treatment of the freedom of conscience guarantee in relation to freedom of religion. The article suggests that this treatment may foreshadow a more uniform approach to the broader freedom of conscience and religion than was provided for in previous decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a number of traditional sentencing factors, which judges use when selecting the precise sentence within the statutory sentencing range, that infringe on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Yet courts have not engaged in traditional constitutional analysis when permitting the use of these factors. Instead, they have rejected constitutional challenges to sentencing factors on the grounds that recognizing substantive constitutional limits on sentencing considerations would be inconsistent with historical practice and would interfere with the judiciary's ability to impose a proper sentence. This Article challenges these claims. It demonstrates that these oft-repeated justifications do not warrant the judiciary's disregard of constitutional rights at sentencing. Consequently, courts should directly grapple with the Constitution in imposing sentencing, instead of disregarding it on the ground that sentencing is unique. The Article then explores some possible changes to sentencing to address the problem of courts' use of these factors at sentencing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the application of traditional corporate law principles challenging the basic assumptions on corporate entities relied by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision that corporate speech and individual speech should be treated equally. It positions the conceptualization of corporate law and corporate speech regulation along with the approach used in Citizens United Court. It outlines the historical development of corporate constitutional rights.

The article discusses the public trust doctrine related to the great lakes shores in Minnesota which offers guidance regarding the public's right to use the shores the great lakes for beach walking. It proposes a uniform legal framework for use by each great lakes state for ascertaining the scope and effect of the public trust doctrine, and the rights and duties of littoral owners and the states. It informs that the U.S. inherited the public trust doctrine from English common law because it recognized the importance of maintaining navigable waters and the underlying lands for common use. It further discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois regarding use of great lakes shores for navigation, commerce, and fishing under public trust law.

This article intends to show how Neoconstitutionalism responds to the development of a constitutional theory and practice, both of which are progressively convergent. Such development has played an important role on the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court and on the science of public law in Germany. Such development is born from the adoption of the Constitution as an order of values. Definitely, it is no other thing than a transformation occurred due to the adoption of a theory about what the Constitution is: an order of values, where the structural elements of the State obey to principles which are also found in the basis of the fundamental rights system. What is new and capital about this form of constitutionalism are the material and substantial qualities of the Constitution which make it practically omnipresent in every creative operation and application of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article examines nationality, transjudicialism, and the "war on drugs" as they have played out in extradition proceedings around the world. The judicial decisions explored here are from the Privy Council (on appeal from the English-speaking Caribbean), the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada. All of the judgments cite the same sources, engage in the same analytic process, and are under the same legal influence: a common language that talks about constitutional rights and then circles back to a starting point in international relations that augments rather than restricts state power. They also share a similar approach to the subject of drug policy and extradition law, in that all three national courts are located in states that have embraced U.S.-sponsored law enforcement while they at the same time have eschewed U.S. jurisprudence as a legal source. As the Article's title suggests, the theory presented here is that the anti- drug campaign, with its non-American legal sources harnessed in support of American policy, has produced a self-referential legal world built on a peculiar form of logic whose circularity is hard to escape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Slaughter-House Cases and it association to civil rights. It says that the structural analysis of the Supreme Court to the case provide basis for congressional power to protect citizens from any interference concerning their participation in federal political processes. It explores the case opinion of Justice Samuel Freeman Miller adding that the case was used by civil rights opponents for justice Miller has limited the implication of one clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Randy Barnett on law of equal freedom, one by Roger Clegg on the Voting Rights Act, and one by Ken Marcus on firefighters' case that linked to the Civil Rights Act and equal protection clause.

The article offers information on the merits of the constitutional tort claims based from the court decision ruled in the court case Pearson and Callahan. It states that the decision was questioned whether the merits applied to constitutional tort claims must be subjected to adjudication even they are not controlled outcomes. Moreover, it adds that the decision used in the court case had determined the remedies required for different constitutional rights and the money damages.

The article discusses the straightforward rule regarding the judicial enforcement of treaties, which was established by the Constitution of the U.S. It notes that by declaring treaties to have the force of law, the Supremacy Clause makes them enforceable in the courts as a matter of domestic constitutional law. It states that the treaties were contracts between nations which had depended on interest and honor for their efficacy. It also provides information on the subsequent decision of the court in several trials including "United States v. Percheman" and "Medellin v. Texas." It also says that the Percheman rule seeks to control the domestic legal consequences of the treaties they negotiate.

The judgments in Viking and Laval confirm the Court's previous case law on the horizontal effect of Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC, and extend the horizontal effect of Articles 43 and 49 EC to cover collective action of trade unions by way of strikes, boycotts and the like. A significant knock-on effect is an extension of Community regulatory competence to cover this same subject matter, despite the contrary indications in Article 13 7(5) EC. The judgment in Viking implies that Article 28 EC is also capable of horizontal effect, at least in cases where collective action of individuals produces regulatory effects similar to those resulting from State action. The Court's reasoning leaves room for future incremental increases in the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms in cases which involve contractual rules, in particular rules regulating employed or self employed activities. The approach to horizontal effect in Viking supports, for example, the argument that provisions of a corporate constitution could amount to a restriction on freedom of establishment, as could action taken by the board of a company to frustrate a takeover bid. Advocate General Maduro in Viking argues that the Treaty rules on freedom of movement apply directly to any private action that is capable of effectively restricting others from exercising their right of freedom of movement. The present writer suggests further considerations as being relevant to determining the extent of the horizontal reach of fundamental freedoms. Normal market behaviour on the part of one market operator should not in principle be held to amount to a restriction on the fundamental freedom of another. But discriminatory conduct by market operators, or other conduct which falls outside the range of normal market behaviour, would seem capable of falling within the horizontal effect of a fundamental freedom, at any rate where it restricts access of other market operators, or consumers, to the market, or places market operators or consumers at a disadvantage because they have exercised a fundamental freedom. Account must be taken of the aims and wording of the freedom in question, along with the policy questions of whether it would be excessively burdensome to make private operators subject to the obligation to comply with the fundamental freedom in question, and whether any consequential extension of Community regulatory competence would unreasonably limit that of the Member States. A related issue to be taken into account is the possible horizontal effect of the fundamental principle of equality, as articulated in the Mangold case. Even a restrained reading of this much criticised case would suggest that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 12 EC might have horizontal effect in circumstances falling within the scope of Community law, such as the supply of goods, services, business accommodation and housing. A similar conclusion could be reached as regards discrimination in the sale of goods, services and real property to non residents. It would not be excessively burdensome to impose on private market operators the obligation not to depart from their normal terms and conditions of sale in the case of non-nationals or non-residents, unless such departure represented normal market behaviour. A possible example of discriminatory service provision contrary to the general principle of equality is that of excessive 'roaming' charges, which have been recently regulated by Regulation (EC) No 717/2007. A key question which arises in this context is the extent to which a market operator can, or should be able to be, justify discrimination against out of state operators, or discrimination against customers solely because they have crossed a national frontier, on grounds of normal market behaviour, when market conditions are not normal, and the market is not fully competitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that deprives physician Sam Sheppard of a fair trial on charges that he had murdered his wife. According to the author, the Court placed responsibility for safeguarding the fairness of the criminal proceeding solely on the trial judge rather than on the media responsible for generating the publicity. The author also calls for guidance for judges as they attempt to balance the rights of a rapidly evolving media with those of an individual facing trial.

The article examines the Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. case wherein the court held that the plaintiffs cannot claim for Title II protection under the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 since it does not cover beauty salons where the alleged discrimination incident took place. It argues that the court's decision showed its failure to interpret Title II in a way that would promote positive social change. It proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court should reverse the court's ruling and declare beauty salons as a place of public accommodation under Title II.

The article focuses on the problems that judges face in dealing cases that involve national security and civil liberties in the U.S. According to the article, cases like these, judges find it difficult to come up with a decision because they have little experience with national security matters. Such cases, judges are relatively novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications of their decisions on national security. It is suggested that judges must be reluctant to judgements of military and executive officials because if they make mistakes they may harm not only the national security but also the long-term credibility of the judiciary itself.

The article discusses the ruling of Inter-American Court on the Moiwana case concerning human rights violations. It is reported that the Court, composed of forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial executions, and acts of torture, has diversified to include more shaded situations involving property rights, political liberties and freedom of movement. The Moiwana judgment incorporates several of the Court's distinctive approaches toward these developments and it establishes new paradigms and future directions for the Tribunal's power.

This Article contributes to the broad debate over ‘adaptive preferences’ in law, economics, and political philosophy by addressing an important ongoing controversy in tort law. Hedonic damages compensate individuals for the lost enjoyment of life that results from a tortious injury. Lawyers seeking hedonic damages in personal injury cases emphasize their clients' new status as compromised and damaged persons, and courts frequently uphold jury verdicts awarding hedonic damages to individuals who experienced disabling injuries based on a view that disability necessarily limits one's enjoyment of life. This view is consonant with a general societal understanding of disability as a tragedy and of people with disabilities as natural objects of pity. But a rich psychological literature demonstrates that disability does not inherently limit enjoyment of life to the degree that these courts suggest. Rather, people who experience disabling injuries tend to adapt to their disabilities. To be sure, the views of people with disabilities about their own quality of life are classic adaptive preferences. Accordingly, one might suggest that the legal system should disregard those views. But this Article argues that the legal system goes wrong by so devaluing the experience of people with disabilities. When courts award damages based on the (nondisabled person's) view that disability is tragic, they distract attention from the societal choices and stigmas that attach disadvantage to disability; they also make it harder for people with disabilities to make hedonic adjustments to their conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the court case Bancoult v. McNamara. In this case, the individual rights consideration in dismissing on political question grounds claims arising out of the alleged depopulation by the United States of islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory, was discussed by the Washington, D.C. Circuit court. The displacement of inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago was caused by the construction of a U.S. military base.

The article discusses the case Samson v. California. In this case, a statute that dispensed with the requirement that a police officer must have individualized suspicion before searching a parolee was upheld by the Court in the name of crime prevention. The effect was that the decision increased the opportunity for police investigators to ignore individual rights. The government license permitted in Samson allowing it to do suspicionless searches of an individual's person and home has weakened the fundamental purpose and procedural safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. In the case, the Court applied the balancing of interest test rather than the special needs which the author argues that the latter should have been done by the court.

The article talks about the civil rights of Mary Mallon (1869–1938), was an Irish cook. Topics discussed include individuals in the household had developed typhoid, and in each instance, Mallon was said to have discretely departed to seek employment elsewhere; and Mallon's known places of previous employment could no longer be investigated and not all of her tours of duty had been obtained through the Stricker employment agency.

This Article offers an account of how courts respond to social change, with a specific focus on the process by which courts "tip" from one understanding of a social group and its constitutional claims to another. Adjudication of equal protection and due process claims, in particular, requires courts to make normative judgments regarding the effect of traits such as race, sex, sexual orientation, or mental retardation on group members' status and capacity. Yet, Professor Goldberg argues, courts commonly approach decisionmaking by focusing only on the "facts" about a social group, an approach that she terms "fact-based adjudication." Professor Goldberg critiques this approach for its flawed premise that restrictions on social groups can be evaluated based on facts alone and its role in obscuring judicial involvement in selecting among competing norms. The Article also observes that because fact-based adjudication enables courts to leave norms unacknowledged, it does serve the judiciary's institutional interests by maximizing flexibility for future decisionmaking regarding restrictions on group members' rights. At the same time, however, this approach facilitates inconsistency in theory and outcome by enabling courts to variously embrace and reject traditional rationales for restricting social groups without having to justify the inconsistent treatment of group-related norms. As a possible remedy for these flaws, the Article considers the costs and benefits of greater judicial candor regarding the normative underpinning of decisions. Although Professor Goldberg ultimately advocates only a limited modification to the current fact-based adjudication regime, she concludes that our theories of judicial review will improve, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the extent they recognize the inevitable judicial involvement in making normative judgments about social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the substantive due process since the supreme court cases Washington v. Glucksberg and Lawrence v. Texas. The Lawrence Court was challenged with the decision on the cases. Application of Lawrence's approach to constitutional interpretation has received its own merits. The Glucksberg Doctrine application may lead to denial of the existence of a new constitutional right.

The author reflects on the Kerr principle from a ruling on a civil suit that yielded an unconstitutional outcome, state action and legal rights in the U.S. He argues that despite conventional wisdom, state action is about responsibility and not causation. He also asserts that the principle poses a problem about legal rights.

The article presents information on various developments related to the 2005-2006 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Due to thyroid cancer, William Rehnquist, chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, died. John G. Roberts replaced Rehnquist and gave his first verdict in a death penalty case. An overview of various rulings associated with private property rights, students' rights, environmental law, bankruptcy law, abortion, preemption, etc., is also presented. Information is also provided on the judges of the Supreme Court.

The theoretical and empirical debate over the ability of the U.S. Supreme Court to influence public opinion through its decisions is far from settled. Scholars have examined the question using a variety of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, but there is no theoretical consensus, nor are the empirical studies without methodological weaknesses. We enter this debate in an attempt to bring some clarity to the theoretical approaches, overcome some of the methodological shortcomings, and bring a yet unstudied issue area, Court decisions on gay civil rights, under scrutiny We argue that the ability of Court decisions to influence public opinion is a function of the salience of the issue, the political context, and case specific factors at the aggregate level. At the individual level these factors are also relevant, but citizen characteristics must also be taken into consideration. Our analysis of aggregate level and individual level opinion does indeed suggest that Court decisions can influence public opinion. However, the ability of Court decisions to influence public opinion is conditional. Our findings lend support to the legitimation hypothesis and the structural effects model. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explains the implications of the ruling of the California Supreme Court in Miller versus Department of Corrections that consensual sexual relationships resulting in workplace favoritism may constitute sexual harassment of other employees for plaintiffs under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It also presents information on sexual harassment claims under Title VII. It criticizes the court's reliance on the favoritism standard of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EOCC).

The article examines whether the single employer doctrine appropriately limits the small firm exemption particularly in Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and employment discrimination law modeled after Title VII. It presents an overview of the doctrine and exemption in relation to the ruling of Judge Richard Posner in the case Papa versus Katy Industries. It analyzes the critics' arguments based on their description of the origins of the doctrine and its specialized function in collective bargaining law.

Environmental "citizen suit" statutes provide incentives for citizens to bring enforcement actions by awarding successful plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees. Defendants have attempted to use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to block a successful plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees. Under Rule 68, defendants may offer to allow a judgment to be issued against them for a fixed dollar amount. Plaintiffs may either accept this judgment offer or proceed to trial. If plaintiffs proceed to trial, however, they must receive a judgment more favorable than the offer or pay the defendants' litigation costs. Defendants argue that the word "costs" as used in Rule 68 applies to attorneys' fees in addition to other litigation costs. If so, the use of Rule 68 can have a great influence on the economics of citizen suit litigation. This Note explores whether or not Rule 68 should be read to apply to attorneys' fees in citizen suits under the Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on how courts misinterpret generic evidentiary rules to exclude polygraph evidence in the United States. In 1923, the Washington D.C. Circuit Court's decision to exclude polygraph evidence case was the first in a series of decisions to exclude polygraph evidence. According to the author, courts addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence usually focus on reliability.