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Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the case law of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo and explains how this court protects the rule of law, as a fundamental constitutional principle and as a human right. The example of Kosovo is intriguing because of the peculiar historical, political and legal backdrop against which the Constitution was drafted, and the constitutional adjudication that has taken place. Methodologically, this analysis is based on a review of the landmark cases when the Constitutional Court of Kosovo reasoned its decisions with reference to the specific constitutional provisions that enshrine the principle of the rule of law. The paper highlights that the Constitutional Court of Kosovo refers to the rule of law as a general normative framework for adjudicating cases of abstract constitutional review, as well as for deciding cases submitted by individuals – mostly in conjunction with the right to a fair and impartial trial. By scrutinizing the cases of Kosovo, this analysis highlights the role of constitutional courts in ensuring that general constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, are justiciable and have practical effect for human rights of individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of a corporation to exercise constitutional protections has been rife with uncertainty and change since the conception of corporate rights came into existence. The history and rapid development of the corporation, combined with the misapplied and misunderstood “corporate personhood” theory, have resulted in an almost unintelligible hodgepodge of corporate constitutional applications. Similarly, the concept of the right to bear arms has equally been muddled and applied very differently at varying times and locations since before the establishment of the Second Amendment. This Article attempts to clarify how an alternative to the “corporate personhood” theory, namely the “purpose” theory is increasingly relied on by the Supreme Court to more consistently and transparently extend or restrict constitutional rights. Purpose analysis provides a sound legal basis to conclude that the Second Amendment should also be applied to corporations. In recent years, the Supreme Court has dramatically increased the rights of corporations. Simultaneously the Court has also significantly augmented the right of Americans to possess and publicly carry a vast array of firearms. However, the Court has never said whether this right is one possessed by corporations. Nevertheless, the reasoning in many cases generally dealing with corporate rights and gun rights, including the Court’s most recent Second Amendment case, point to the answer that corporations are entitled to the right to bear arms. While there is an understandable amount of antipathy on the part of many scholars to expanding Second Amendment rights in the manner that the 2022 Supreme Court decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen did, a corporate right to bear armsdoes not reflect the same risks discussed in Bruen. Currently, there is a split in whether lower courts have held in favor of corporations (or other collectives) having Second Amendment rights, and this disagreement could and should eventually come before the Supreme Court. Whether one agrees with the outcome of Bruen or not, purpose analysis, which entails judicial examination of the purpose behind particular constitutional provisions to determine their boundaries, dictates that corporations should have Second Amendment rights. Indeed, corporations’ interests in these rights are rooted in and further the key purposes of the Second Amendment: self-defense, protection of third parties, and defense of property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the aim is to demonstrate how the judgment BVerfGE 65, 1 (Volkszählungsurteil), carried out by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1983, influenced the development of an autonomous fundamental right of personal data protection in the Brazilian legal system. A bibliographical and documentary research was carried out, using the inductive-confirmable approach method, with a study, first, of the context and need for the development of a right to the protection of personal data. Then the foundations of the historical precedent judged by the German Constitutional Court in 1983 are stated to, finally, demonstrate how such foundations served as the basis for the construction of legislation and jurisprudence for the protection of personal data in Brazil. It is concluded that, in a context of information society, data processing is an unavoidable event, so that recognition for a right to protection of personal data reveals to be essential for the protection of human beings in their dignity and personality, something that encounters safe direction in the decision handed down by the Brazilian Federal Constitutional Court, inspired by the decision of the German Constitutional Court, which contributes as a paradigm for the interpretation and application of this right so discussed nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article analyzes the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of article 387 of the Criminal Procedure Code in Chile, which establishes restrictions on the right to appeal in cases of final judgments. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court on this issue is reviewed, highlighting the recent changes in the jurisprudence of the latter court. The importance of an ordinary and effective appeal, accessible and allowing a comprehensive examination of the appealed decision, is discussed. The Constitutional Court has declared the inapplicability due to unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of article 387 in several judgments, arguing that it restricts the right to defense and violates the right to a fair trial. It is suggested to modify this rule to comply with constitutional and human rights standards. [Extracted from the article]

The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution transformed the Constitutional Court from a specialist in constitutional matters to a generalist appellate court. Following this amendment, the Court has demonstrated ample willingness to accept its newfound role as the super appellate court in all areas of South Africa's law, and the limits supposedly imposed on the Court's jurisdiction by Section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution have developed and evolved through a jurisprudence riddled with inconsistencies. This article briefly illustrates these inconsistencies in support of its main claim, which is that it is problematic that the Court acts as a generalist court of appeal over decisions of specialised courts, especially when those decisions require engagement with complex factual assessments that fall outside the realm of the Court's expertise. To demonstrate this, the Court's jurisprudence and experience is compared in the specialised areas of labour law and competition law. This exercise indicates that in areas where the Court possesses expertise similar to what is statutorily envisaged for the relevant specialist courts, such as labour law, it has contributed positive developments that have given content to constitutional rights. On the other hand, the Court's jurisprudence in competition law is a disturbing indication of the shortcomings of the present system in terms of which the Court, without acknowledging its limited competition expertise, has overturned expert factual and economic findings of the competition courts. In the process, this has created uncertainty and undermined the legislative intent of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. This conundrum needs to be remedied through deliberate interventions to enhance the Court's competition expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines approaches to the interaction of decisions of the Court of the European Union (CJEU) and international obligations in the field of human rights with the constitutional identity of states. Attention is focused on the concepts of "national identity" and "constitutional identity", their relationship, and the introduction of the concept of "national identity" into the European legal order after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Attention is drawn to the fact that the primary law of the EU does not contain the concept of "constitutional identity", but this term is widely used in the decisions of the constitutional courts of several EU member states. In these decisions, the constitutional courts raised the issue of the protection of the constitution and constitutionality in the EU member state given the harmonization of legislation and/ or ultra vires decisions. The article notes that the concept of constitutional identity is broad, it covers the historical, political, cultural, and legal identity of the state, as well as the connection of national law with the international and autonomous legal order of the EU. The idea of constitutional identity is dynamic and constantly evolving due to the continuous development of the states themselves. The analysis of various approaches to this interaction based on the German Federal Constitutional Court, Hungarian Constitutional Court, and Italian Constitutional Court was carried out. It is noted that the interaction of CJEU rulings with constitutional identities is based on the principle of primacy of the EU law, and international human rights obligations are based on the conventional feature of the "obligation of uniform interpretation" and universal standards while ignoring the constitutional tradition of the states. It means that CJEU judgments have a higher legal force than national court judgments, while international human rights obligations should become precedents for subsequent national court judgments, not lowering the national standards of human rights protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ius et Praxis (07172877) is the property of Universidad de Talca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu is the property of Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Pravni Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bucerius Law Journal is the property of Bucerius Law School e.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Daniels v Scribante (hereafter the Daniels case) the Constitutional Court had to decide whether: (a) the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) afforded Ms Daniels the right to make improvements to her dwelling; (b) if consent from the person in charge, Mr Scribante, was a requirement for Ms Daniels to make such improvements; and (c) if consent was not a requirement, if Ms Daniels could effect improvements to the total disregard of Mr Scribante. The judgment in Daniels is important not only because it paved the way for Ms Daniels to effect improvements on her existing dwelling without the consent of Mr Scribante, but also because it showed that under section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) on the application of the Bill of Rights Mr Scribante owed a positive obligation to Ms Daniels to ensure that she lived in conditions that afforded her human dignity. In Daniels the Constitutional Court indicated that private landowners were enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution through ESTA to accommodate ESTA occupiers on their land. According to the Constitutional Court in Daniels, the nature of the obligation imposed by section 25(6) of the Constitution was both negative and positive, and in this particular case it rested on Mr Scribante. Against this background, this case note provides at the outset the salient facts and judgment of the Daniels case. This is followed by an analysis aimed at critiquing the judgment in Daniels pertaining to what is expected of private landowners in the new constitutional dispensation. It is concluded that more may be required from the private landowner – a positive duty – to ensure that ESTA occupiers enjoy fundamental rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo is the property of Universidad de San Buenaventura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research article examines various proposals generated from the philosophy of law and from legal theory, around the requirement of rationality, not only in the regulation of law, but also in the adoption of judicial decisions, showing different perspectives: On one hand, which defends a logicist type of rationality, and, on the other, the one that advocates a non-logicist or argumentative rationality paradigm, under the premise that the law is fundamentally praxis. It also demonstrates how the absence of control of discretionary decisions, issued by the constitutional courts, to solve difficult cases, including those related to fundamental rights, and the objections raised to the proportionality test, merit the structuring criteria of rationality that contribute to mitigate the risks of arbitrariness and to guarantee a balance between material justice, human dignity, and legal security and stability. This research, concerning the criteria of rationality in the application of law, is of a juridical nature, and it has been developed from a qualitative approach through the bibliographic review of theoretical categories supported by authors versed in the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper author explores the legal dimensions of the autonomy of the legislature in the context of the current pandemic. The paper is situated in Croatian constitutional theory and is written against the background of two developments. The first one is a decision of the Constitutional Court of Croatia that authorized the Croatian parliament to avoid a more demanding procedure for adopting the restrictions of fundamental rights enacted in the pandemic. The second development is the use of ballot initiatives to force the parliament to adhere to this procedure. Using the concept of constitutional silences as a tool, I bring these two developments together to explore what are the spaces for unwritten political rules left by the Croatian Constitution and how does the ballot initiative challenge them. I do this to argue that ballot initiatives should not be considered unconstitutional when they do not attempt to override legitimate constitutional silences of parliamentary representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008, Ecuador recognized the Constitutional Rights of Nature in a global first. This recognition implies a major shift in the human-nature relationship, from one between a subject with agency (humans) and an exploitable object (nature), to a more equilibrated relationship. However, the lack of a standard legal framework has left room for subjective interpretations and variable implementation. The recent widespread concessioning of pristine ecosystems to mining industries has set up an unprecedented conflict and test of these rights. Currently, a landmark case involving Los Cedros Protected Forest and mining companies has reached the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. If Ecuador's highest Court rules in favor of Los Cedros and the Rights of Nature, it would set a legal precedent with enormous impact on biological conservation. Such a policy shift offers a novel conservation strategy, through citizen oversight and action. A ruling against Los Cedros and the Rights of Nature, while a major setback for biodiversity conservation, would be taken in stride by the active social movement supporting these goals, with the case likely moving into international courts. Meanwhile, extractive activities would continue and expand, with known consequences for biodiversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Interface - Comunicação, Saúde, Educação is the property of Fundacao UNI and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea is the property of Teoria Juridica Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Prolegómenos Derechos y Valores is the property of Prolegomenos Derechos y Valores and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the relationship between sports justice and state justice. It focuses on the judgment of the Constitutional Court no 160 of 2019, which declared that Art 2 para 1, letter b) and para 2 of decreto legge 19 August 2003, no 220 on sports justice was not unlawful. Art 2 does not allow an appeal to the state judge for disputes concerning technical and disciplinary sports sanctions; the state judge can only decide on compensation for damages. In this decision the monist and pluralist theories of the legal system are highlighted; through their analysis we want to reach the conclusion of the necessary unity of the legal system, as also the technical and disciplinary provisions of the sports legal order can damage the fundamental rights of the person, and thus determine a protection request before the state judge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Legal Records / Pravni Zapisi is the property of Union University Law School, Belgrade and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista CES Derecho is the property of Universidad CES and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In late 2018, the South African Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Law Society of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa, which had been referred to it by the North Gauteng High Court. The matter concerned the constitutionality of former president Jacob Zuma's support for and signing of the infamous 2014 Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit protocol, which has deprived the people of the SADC region from recourse to the SADC Tribunal. In short, the Constitutional Court confirmed both the finding that the signing of the protocol was unconstitutional, and the order for the president's signature to be removed, exactly as the high court had ruled. While welcoming the judgment, this contribution explores whether the ruling offers credible hope to SADC citizens and represents an important milestone for South Africa and the region. Or is it a token victory for constitutional democracy and the rule of law? A discussion of the judgment, supplemented by references to other case law and literature, leads to two conclusions: Firstly, it is evident that the South African constitutional scheme is extensive in reach, and the Constitution is central in the interpretation of treaty and customary international law. While the majority judgment ironically deviates from this, instead focusing more on the dictates of international law, the minority judgment clearly locates the grounds for reviewing the former president's conduct in his failure to respect the rights in our Constitution. Secondly, the order to un-sign the protocol could be seen as an opportunity for South Africa to recommit to justice, the rule of law, human rights and the key values of democracy. The South African president did eventually withdraw South Africa's signature from the protocol but the question remains whether the judgment and the un-signing of the protocol are token victories for maintaining the rule of law, particularly fostering access to justice in a regional court for ordinary citizens, in South Africa and the sub-Saharan region. It is one thing to un-sign a contentious protocol that divested the region's people of an avenue of access to justice; it is another to repair the damage that was caused by the events discussed later which effectively dismantled the SADC tribunal; something about which the political elite has remained silent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the recent Weiss/PSPP decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court, attempting to contextualise these decisions within previous conflicts between these two courts. The FCC's case law is studied through the perspective of three different types of reviews it developed: fundamental rights review, ultra vires review and constitutional identity review. Then, a detailed analysis of the Weiss and PSPP cases is given in order to understand the repercussions of the first case in which the FCC officially exercised its proclaimed competences and declared the CJEU and ECB's decisions as ultra vires, undermining fundamental principles of the EU legal order. This act could potentially lead to significant changes in current mechanisms of resolving disputes between the highest courts of the EU and national legal orders. Finally, the future of judicial conflicts is discussed through the analysis of the Weiler/Sarmiento model and the system (or lack of system) of resolving the conflicts currently in place. The paper concludes by highlighting that the Weiss/PSPP decisions could very well be those that finally stimulate a long-needed solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica Piélagus is the property of Universidad Surcolombiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Catalana de Dret Públic is the property of Revista Catalana de Dret Public and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The intelligibility of initiative proposals is of utmost importance in case of direct democratic decisions. This study sums up the tools by means of which voters are informed about referendum issues in countries or states with well developed direct democratic traditions, like Switzerland, Oregon and California. A special attention is paid to ballot pamphlets and requirements regarding the wording of the proposal. The second part of the study focuses on Hungary. Ballot pamphlets are not in use here, the practice of the authorities is centred on the "requirement of the unambiguity of the question". Based on an analysis of the resolutions of the National Election Committee, the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Curia (Supreme Court) of Hungary, the authors demonstrate that the requirement of unambiguity has become an obligation of initiators which is very difficult to comply with. The study finally recommends possible solutions in order to make the tool of bottom-up initiative a more practicable instrument of direct democracy in Hungary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica Piélagus is the property of Universidad Surcolombiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The need to protect has deep roots in the history of law. Paradoxically, the more humanity has endeavored to legislate, the abuse and the lack of real support from those responsible for ensuring security and peace have increased. That is how society felt that, besides the internal regulation of privacy, it had to appeal to international organisations whose purpose was to persuade states that they alone could be able to resist any abusive interference in the individual's privacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established in 1948 that no man would be the object of arbitrary interference in his private life, as long as there is legal protection against these intrusions1. Article The Right to Privacy written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, appeared in the Harvard Law Review, volume IV, issue 5 of December 15, 1890, is considered to be one of the most influential essays in the history of American law2, and the right to private life is defined by the authors as the right to be left alone or the right to loneliness3. The social evolution and the transformations of law have gradually led to an increasing distance between the initial desideratum - that of loneliness - and the real need to ensure a safety and protection environment for each individual. Even if at the theoretical level any individual has the right to be left alone, in reality this right is not necessarily illusory, but rather impossible to be respected in the way we would probably want each one of us. Complex threats, from wars, civil movements, terrorism, to cyber attacks, and the need for strong nations to dominate, have transformed the right to private life into a promising slogan whenever interest calls for it, or, worse, have reduced to noticeable dimensions invoking the need for overprotection of the individual by the state. But what are governments doing in the name of protecting their own citizens? They violate private life, but they do it under the protection of the law, they do not respect fundamental rights, but their action appears justified, they restrict liberties and even suppress any intimacy in the name of the protection of the general good. What does ultimately mean private life and how much should the state be interested in protecting it? Of course, the notion itself is all-encompassing, with unspeakable valences and hidden ramifications throughout our existence. We have a private life from the moment we are born, but others are responsible for it, private is the home with all its dependencies, private information about the state of health, or personal data, at work we have the right to intimacy, even a detainee has the right to ensure and respect his private life in designated spaces and the list can continue. By making a parallel between private life in the American model and the way it is protected in European law, a fundamental difference emerges. If in American law individual autonomy is the expression of absolutism, being the core of the existence of social rights, Europeans did not think this notion as an independent, stand alone, supreme relation to the other rights recognized by the individual but as an important, but not exclusive component or outside any limitations or restrictions. In European law, the balance between the protection of the general interest and the need to guarantee, within reasonable limits, respect for the right to privacy was maintained. Although Romania signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the constitutional right to privacy did not find a distinct regulation either in the 1848 constitution or in 1952 or in 1965. At present, the Romanian Constitution protects and regulates the right to private life and the authorities have the obligation to respect it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to the criticism that the "second wave" of socioeconomic rights judgments by the South African Constitutional Court unduly defers socio-economic dispute resolution to "outside" democratic structures. Given that socio-economic rights are strategically asserted through a range of political channels, from voting to participation in institutional processes and political protest, the article argues that the Court's socio-economic rights pronouncements must similarly be understood in a broader jurisprudential context, including the Court's treatment of elections, protest and structured political participation. This context reveals a Court preoccupied with ensuring that everyday governance and dispute resolution institutions and mechanisms exist, function and are strengthened, while simultaneously being accountable to citizens and responsive to their rights and concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the history of the Constitution of 1993 of Peru on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. The author comments on the development of the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) and its role in the judgments and protections of the fundamental civil rights of the Peruvian population.

The Federal Supreme Court - STF, in a recent historic decision, uttered in the process of Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n° 132-RJ, confers to homoaffective partners the same juridical effects regarding stable union as to those of different gender. In search for this recongnition, the action invoked the interpretation "according to the Constitution", where it sought to show that in a sistematic vision the desired right had support. The Court gave providence based on the contextual hermeneutics, which had sustaining in a series of constitutional principles, especially in those of a person's dignity, equality and freedom. The founding value, however, which is the human, yet it is set in the wide network of discursive reasoning, appears more in a tacit manner, when the opposite was expected: that the human aspect fixed in the center and base of this argumentation. For example, it is even said that homosexuality is not an illness, nor a deviance nor an option, but a sexual orientation. And if it was it all at once, for being ill wouldn't he have a shelter, or for it being an option wouldn't he have freedom of choice? This proposal is to see a new reading of this decision, starting in the election of some excerpts of the speech (due to smallness of space), displaying, in a dialectic and deductive perspective, that in light of the human rights, the minorities, i.e. the homosexuals, can receive the analysis of their pleas from a safer filter [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the application of traditional corporate law principles challenging the basic assumptions on corporate entities relied by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision that corporate speech and individual speech should be treated equally. It positions the conceptualization of corporate law and corporate speech regulation along with the approach used in Citizens United Court. It outlines the historical development of corporate constitutional rights.

Copyright of Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departamento de Derecho Penal y Criminologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The authors discuss the impact of the Constitutional Court decisions, in its role as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, on the other branches of government, particularly the government itself and the Congress, especially when its sentences are about the meaning and scope of fundamental rights, such as the right to life of the unborn. Besides, they sustain that the precedents that this kind of sentences stand, can't be ignored neither by the Constitutional Court itself nor by the government entities in their future decisions, insofar the fundamental rights are an unbridgeable barrier for the colegislative branches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the rulings of the Supreme Court regarding the case "Lau v. Nichols." on behalf of 2,856 Chinese-speaking students in San Francisco school Lau was charged for racial discrimination. The violation of Lau was based on the interpretation of the Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, which barred school practices that have the effect of excluding children from the educational process based on language, where language is a proxy for race, ethnicity, or national origin. The Supreme Court undercut Lau's suppositions that Title IV covers both intentional discrimination and disparate impact.

Presents updates on case law and administrative decisions concerning nuclear activities in Europe as of December 2004. Judgment of the Appeal Court of Limoges in France regarding the dumping of nuclear waste by Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires; Ruling of ther Slovak Constitutional Court on Greenpeace claim of breach of their constitutional rights; Decision of Sweden's Environmental Court on permits for Studsvik Nuclear AB and Svafo AB.