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Since the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic, the Australian Government has been ambiguous in the way it has communicated the aid budget. On some occasions, it has sought to downplay increases in aid spending, while at other times it has sought to downplay cuts to aid spending. We draw on interviews with federal parliamentarians and key informants to understand these dynamics, in the context of obtaining their views on changes to Australia's post‐COVID‐19 aid policy. We find evidence that a new political consensus is forming around Australian aid. While this 'cautious consensus' countenances aid spending increases, motivated in part by humanitarian concerns but especially by anxiety about increasing Chinese influence in the region, these priorities are tempered by considerable concern about public backlash at a time of significant economic challenges for Australian citizens. Based on this evidence, we define the contours of an emerging 'cautious consensus' by showing how it will differ from the earlier 'golden consensus' era of Australian aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that while the US alliance remains at the forefront of Australian security policy, the deepening of ties between the United States and Australia has the potential to complicate Australia's relations with its Southeast asian neighbours. Moreover, the manner in which the Howard government has attempted to manage this shift in policy has only exacerbated the problem. Australian pronouncements of support for the US policy of pre-emption, the perceived preference of the Australian Prime Minister to take on the role of ‘Deputy Sheriff’, and the unwieldy approach taken by the Australian government in policy announcements pertaining to maritime and security policy have caused unnecessary tension and mistrust between Australia and some Southeast asian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]