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When firms evaluate their service system design choices, there is typically more uncertainty surrounding the value that a particular auxiliary service provides than there is on the cost of providing that service. To help inform this decision, we propose an approach where we compare the relative value of the segment of passengers who use an auxiliary service to the relative value of the segment that does not use it. We demonstrate this approach for a typical auxiliary service common to the airline industry. In 2008, most US airlines implemented checked baggage fee policies to decrease their costs by reducing the number of customer service agents needed in the check-in and baggage handling processes. The success of this change has led to a current debate at many of these airlines on whether to make further staffing cuts in these areas, essentially making it even less attractive for passengers to check their baggage. Our proposed methodology helps answer whether passengers who continue to check bags in today's baggage-fee era are more or less valuable than passengers who do not check bags. We explore this question empirically by examining, through a stated preference survey, if a history of checking or not checking bags can be used to segment passengers based on how their itinerary choices are influenced by common airline service attributes (on-time performance, itinerary time, number of connections, airfare, and schedule delay). Contrary to the opinions of some top airline executives, we find that the passengers who continue to check bags at airlines that charge baggage fees are generally less sensitive to differences in three of these important service attributes and are less likely to switch airlines when a competing airline improves its offerings along these dimensions. Thus, airlines that charge for checked bags should consider improving the customer experience for their bag-checking passengers, as they represent a potentially more valuable segment class to the airline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Historically, peaked schedules have been used with hub-and-spoke networks to maximize passenger connection opportunities. Although peaked schedules can generate more attractive connecting itineraries and revenue for an airline, they are costly to operate because additional manpower and equipment resources are needed to serve the peak periods. Several airlines experimented with depeaking their hubs as a way to reduce costs and improve operations in the 2000s. Prior studies have quantified operational improvements and cost savings associated with depeaking; however, none have quantified revenue impacts. We use difference-in-differences methods to quantify revenue and operational impacts associated with depeaking for five U.S. hubs. Results show that depeaking tends to improve operations, but may negatively impact revenue per available seat mile (RASM). In some cases, revenue losses exceed reported cost savings. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: There has been an increase in the number of involuntary denied airline passenger boardings in the US. A denied boarding is influenced by multiple factors other than compensation amounts, including the accuracy, magnitude, and variability associated with no-show forecasts, load factors, and carriers’ day of departure operating policies. We describe how these and other factors influence denied boardings, why they differ across US carriers, and why carriers have strong internal incentives to reduce denied boardings. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]