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The reliability of each component in a system plays a crucial role, as any malfunction can significantly reduce the system's overall lifespan. Optimizing the arrangement and sequence of heterogeneous components with varying lifespans is essential for enhancing system stability. This paper addresses the redundancy allocation problem (RAP) by determining the optimal number of components in each subsystem, considering their sequence, and optimizing multiple criteria such as reliability, cost uncertainty, and weight. A novel approach is introduced, incorporating a switching mechanism that accommodates both correct and defective switches. To assess reliability benefits, Markov chains are employed, while cost uncertainty is evaluated using the Monte-Carlo method with risk criteria such as percentile and mean-variance. The problem is solved using a modified genetic algorithm, and the proposed method is benchmarked against alternative approaches in similar scenarios. The results demonstrate a significant improvement in the Model Performance Index (MPI), with the best RAPMC solution under a mixed strategy achieving an MPI of 0.98625, indicating superior model efficiency compared to previous studies. Sensitivity analysis reveals that lower percentiles in the cost evaluations correlate with reduced objective function values and mean-variance, confirming the model's robustness in managing redundancy allocation to optimize reliability and control cost uncertainties effectively.

Focusing on the extreme points of the solution sets of matrix two-person games, we propose the notions of characteristic sets and characteristic numbers. The characteristic sets (resp., the characteristic numbers) are the sets (resp., the numbers) of the extreme points of the solution set of the game and the optimal solution sets of the players. These concepts allow us to measure the complexity of the game. The larger the characteristic numbers, the more complex the game is. Among other things, we obtain upper bounds for the characteristic numbers and give a novel geometric construction. By the construction, we get useful descriptions of the optimal strategy set of each player of a game given by any nonsingular square matrix. Namely, the investigation of the geometry the just-mentioned sets reduces to computing or studying certain simpler sets. We also formulate several open problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrialization and increased energy use are leading to a greater influence of environmental and climate challenges on human existence and progress. China's emissions in 2023 totaled 12.6 gigatons, representing 35% of global emissions, establishing it as the top carbon emitter globally. Combined with China's industrial structure, it is essential to investigate carbon reduction in the building sector due to its significant contribution to carbon emissions. This study introduces a third-party organization into the relationship between stakeholders, based on traditional government regulation. It constructs a three-party dynamic evolution model involving the government, environmental protection organization, and construction enterprise. The study analyzes the evolution process of the three-party strategy selection using evolutionary game theory. We analyze the elements influencing decision-making for the three parties through simulation analysis and provide appropriate recommendations. The study's findings indicate that low-carbon construction in China's construction sector is an intricate system involving several stakeholders, each guided by their own interests when determining their behavioral methods. Government penalties and financial subsidies can influence construction enterprises to adopt low-carbon production practices to some degree, but excessive rewards and punishments may not support system stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the problem of securing a guaranteed victory for our side in the course of military operations, when the dynamic power of the enemy is known. The problem of the set of weapons for a guaranteed victory is solved. A method is given for calculating the set of weapons and equipment that guarantees victory without regard to information on the set of weapons and equipment of the opposing side for any set. The method of composing and solving matrix games in game theory is used. The problem is modeled as a matrix game with mixed strategies, and the existence of its solution (saddle point) is shown in this setting. To obtain a numerical solution of the problem, the matrix game is reduced to the linear programming problem.

Industrialization and increased energy use are leading to a greater influence of environmental and climate challenges on human existence and progress. China’s emissions in 2023 totaled 12.6 gigatons, representing 35% of global emissions, establishing it as the top carbon emitter globally. Combined with China’s industrial structure, it is essential to investigate carbon reduction in the building sector due to its significant contribution to carbon emissions. This study introduces a third-party organization into the relationship between stakeholders, based on traditional government regulation. It constructs a three-party dynamic evolution model involving the government, environmental protection organization, and construction enterprise. The study analyzes the evolution process of the three-party strategy selection using evolutionary game theory. We analyze the elements influencing decision-making for the three parties through simulation analysis and provide appropriate recommendations. The study’s findings indicate that low-carbon construction in China’s construction sector is an intricate system involving several stakeholders, each guided by their own interests when determining their behavioral methods. Government penalties and financial subsidies can influence construction enterprises to adopt low-carbon production practices to some degree, but excessive rewards and punishments may not support system stability.

For a discrete-time superreplication problem, a guaranteed deterministic formulation is considered: the problem is to ensure the cheapest coverage of the contingent claim on an option under all scenarios that are set using a priori defined compacts depending on the price history. Price increments at each moment of time must lie in the corresponding compact sets. We consider a market with trading constraints and no transaction costs. The statement of the problem is game-theoretic in nature and leads directly to the Bellman–Isaacs equations. In this article, we introduce a mixed extension of the "market" pure strategies. Several results concerning game equilibrium are obtained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a guaranteed deterministic problem setting of discrete-time superreplication: the aim of hedging of a contingent claim is to ensure the coverage of possible payout under the option contract for all admissible scenarios. These scenarios are given by means of a priori given compact sets that depend on the prehistory of prices: the increments of the price at each moment of time must lie in the corresponding compact sets. The absence of transaction costs is assumed. The game-theoretic interpretation implies that the corresponding Bellman–Isaacs equations hold both for pure and mixed strategies. In the present paper, we propose a two-step method for solving the Bellman equation arising in the case of a (game) equilibrium. In particular, the most unfavorable strategies of the "market" can be found in the class of distributions concentrated at most at points, where is the number of risky assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the common approaches for improving the reliability of a specific system is to use parallel redundant components in subsystems. This approach, which is known as the redundancy allocation problem (RAP), includes the simultaneous selection of the component type and its level for each subsystem in order to maximize the system reliability.Traditionally, there are two redundancy strategies, namely active and standby, for the redundant components. Recently, a new powerful strategy called mixed strategy has been developed. It has been proved that the mixed strategy has a better performance when compared to both previous strategies. The main issue in utilizing the mixed strategy is its complicated formulation and sophisticated calculations, leading to a time-consuming procedure for solving the problems. Hence, in this paper, a new formulation based on the recursive approach is introduced to ease the calculation of the mixed strategy. In the new formulation, the complex double integral calculations are removed and the calculation times is reduced. The proposed recursive formulation provides a general statement for the mixed strategy formula which is not changed by altering the number of components in each subsystem. This flexibility and stability in the formula can be very important, especially for large scale cases. In order to evaluate the new approach and to compare its performances with the previous formulation, a benchmark problem with 14 subsystems is considered and the results of the two formulation are compared with each other.

The redundancy allocation problem (RAP) is an intriguing area in the field of reliability optimization to which a lot of research has been devoted in recent years. In this paper, a bi-objective model is developed for RAP with a heterogeneous backup scheme and a mixed redundancy strategy. Elimination of the lower bound estimation and the exact calculation of the reliability of the mixed strategy forms one of the most striking features of the proposed model. Investigating the optimal sequence of components in each subsystem, the study modifies a non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA-II), as a powerful multi-objective evolutionary one, to solve the proposed bi-objective model. Two numerical examples will then be used to verify the efficiency of the model in achieving enhanced system reliability. Finally, the results of Pareto optimal set are used to demonstrate that the assumptions made enable the proposed model to improve system reliability by offering various structures while simultaneously considering system limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of human cooperation is an important issue concerning social science. A deep understanding of human bounded rationality is a prerequisite for promoting collective cooperation and solving social dilemmas. Here we construct an asymmetric micro-dynamic based on bounded rationality from a micro perspective by combining behavioral economics and cognitive psychology with evolutionary game theory. Asynchronously updated Monte Carlo simulations were conducted where individuals were located on a square lattice to play a voluntary public goods game. The results showed that "free riding" behaviors can be effectively suppressed in most situations. The cooperation level can be obviously enhanced in a population comprising easily satisfied cooperators and greedy defectors. Moreover, essential conditions for the stability of the system are further discussed at the microscopic level, and altruistic behavior can be explained that an individual with lower expectations for or underestimation of a single game is more likely to cooperate. We argue that, compared to traditional approaches, the integration of interdisciplinary ideas should be taken more seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the foundations for the development of optimal randomization in mixed strategy games. We consider a population of children and adolescents (7 to 16 years old) and study in the laboratory their behavior in a nonzero sum, hide‐and‐seek game with a unique interior mixed strategy equilibrium where each location has a known but different value. The vast majority of participants favor the high‐value location not only as seekers (as predicted by theory) but also as hiders (in contradiction with theory). The behavior is extremely similar across all ages, and also similar to that of the college students control adult group. We also study the use of cheap talk (potentially deceptive) messages in this game. Hiders are excessively truthful in the messages they send while seekers have a slight tendency to (correctly) believe hiders. In general, however, messages have a small impact on outcomes. The results point to a powerful (erroneous) heuristic thinking in two‐person randomization settings that does not get corrected, even partially, with age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Price promotions and countercyclical pricing are driven by consumer search. This explanation is tested using a dynamic, structural, and seasonal inventory model. Previous studies have found that increases in price promotions lead decreases in the average price of seasonal goods in high-demand seasons, countering basic supply and demand predictions. I explain this phenomenon by proposing that price-sensitive consumers are less likely to search in low-demand periods, changing consumer composition and decreasing aggregate price elasticity. Simultaneously, consumer searches allow the firm to use price promotions to attract price-sensitive consumers while maintaining high average prices. I test this and other explanations using a seasonal dynamic structural inventory model where consumers make decisions on whether to search, which reveals price promotions and allows consumers to purchase. I find that price-sensitive consumers make up 14.9% of searching consumers in the low-demand season versus 29% in the high-demand season, resulting in increased price elasticity. The results suggest that consumer composition is changing due to the different search incentives of different segments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

4G is now deployed all over the world, but requirements are about to change rapidly face to the exponential growth on devices number, local service applications and spectrum scarce. To deal with that, 5G networks integrated Device To Device (D2D) communication as a key technology in its evolving architecture. From 3GPP Rel-12 to Rel-16, D2D succeeded to improve network capacity by enhancing spectrum reuse, data rates and reducing end-to-end latency. However, despite all these advantages, it implies new challenges in 5G system design as interference, spectrum and energy consumption. As a contribution, we propose in this paper a joint spectrum and energy efficient resource allocation algorithm for D2D communications. This approach maximizes the total spectrum efficiency and reduces UEs power consumption. Contrarily to most of previous studies on resource allocation problems considering only centralized and pure strategies approaches, we propose a distributed algorithm based on new mathematical game theory model as an interpretation of mixed strategy non cooperative game. We extend our previous research, by focusing on power consumption issue. Our proposed solution enhances joint SE/EE tradeoff by minimizing interferences and power consumption via a smart RB allocation. This new approach allows users to adopt more accurate strategies and maximize their utilities according to the random network behavior.

This research studies a resource pool-choice dilemma, in which a group of resource seekers independently choose between a larger pool containing more resources and a smaller pool containing fewer resources, knowing that the resources in each pool will be divided equally among its choosers, so that the more (fewer) people choose a certain pool, the fewer (more) resources each of them will get. This setting corresponds to many real-world situations, ranging from students choosing majors as a function of job opportunities to entrepreneurs choosing markets as a function of customer bases. Ten studies reveal a systematic undershooting bias: fewer people choose the larger pool relative to both the normative equilibrium benchmark and chance (random choice), thus advantaging those who choose the larger pool and disadvantaging those who choose the smaller pool. We present evidence showing that the undershooting bias is driven by bounded rationality in strategic thinking and discuss the relationship between our paradigm and other coordination games. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and alsoreverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibriumparticipation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.

Problem definition: We consider a buyer sourcing from multiple competing suppliers who exert cost-reduction efforts before procurement contracts are awarded. Academic/practical relevance: The supply chain is subject to the classic hold-up problem—as the lack of a contract commitment hinders suppliers' incentives to make investment upfront—complicated with supplier competition. Methodology: With deterministic cost-reduction outcomes, suppliers will not exert any effort if this effort is observable, and a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist if the effort is unobservable. We analyze the mixed-strategy equilibrium with unobservable supplier effort, in which suppliers randomize their efforts and the buyer designs an optimal procurement mechanism. Results: We show that the optimal procurement mechanism can be implemented by a conventional single-price reverse auction with a random reserve price. The mixed strategy of supplier effort generates endogenous information asymmetry on supplier costs that provides suppliers with information rent, which sustains their efforts. The endogenous information asymmetry improves effort efficiency (by inducing positive supplier effort), yet introduces trade inefficiency (by causing the possible failure of trade between the parties). Although increasing supplier competition (measured by the number of suppliers) hurts the effort efficiency, it improves trade efficiency. As a result, the buyer is always better off introducing supplier competition by including more than one supplier in the supply base. However, the desired supply base size (number of suppliers) depends on the product revenue: For high-margin goods, the optimal size is achieved with two suppliers, whereas for low-margin goods, a larger supply base is better for the buyer. We show that the result based on deterministic cost reduction can be established as a limit of the case when uncertainty in cost reduction exists and shrinks to null. Managerial implications: Our study helps to understand the impact of supplier competition when supply-chain parties deliberately make their actions unpredictable to avoid being held up. The findings provide managerial guidance on procurement auction and supply base designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to analyze the application of game theory in international trade. Given the fact that countries differ with each other in terms of their production capabilities, natural resource endowments, levels of technological innovation and so forth, game theory can be used as one of the tools in resource allocation. Theoretic games models assume that players in international trade are rational actors who make rational decisions something that is contrary to the reality. Typically, actors in the international trade are comprised of self-interested individuals whose decisions are not necessarily based on rationality. This article argues that even though game theoretic models cannot sufficiently provide answers to all economic problems, its applications are essential in resolving complex issues in bargaining, resource allocation and strategic decisionmaking in international trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a general stochastic game analysis of a network scenario consisting of a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative players (i.e., users) under incomplete game information. Users access a shared channel using the Slotted ALOHA mechanism combined with ZigZag Decoding (SAZD). Cooperative players seek to optimize the global utility of the system (e.g., throughput, delay, loss rate) regardless of their individual interests, whereas non-cooperative players act selfishly and optimize their own benefits irrespective of the impact of this behavior on others and on the entire network system. The game equilibrium is characterized by the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium, where the former is adopted by cooperative players and the latter is the equilibrium strategy of non-cooperative players. We undertake a comparative study across two game scenarios with different levels of cooperation and selfishness. Our results generally show that the information possessed by a player can determine the outcome. Furthermore, our findings show that the network performance is strongly influenced by selfish behavior, which can lead to a significant disruption of the entire system. Finally, we show a possible scenario in which the network could greatly benefit from this selfish behavior thanks to the ZigZag scheme.

B2C is a commercial retail model of e-commerce for selling products and services directly to consumers. To solve the credit risk issues in B2C e-commerce, in this paper, a credit risk game mechanism is proposed based on game theory and logical Petri nets theory. First, by combining logical Petri nets with game theory, a theoretical modeling method called the logical game Petri nets is proposed. To characterize the utility that each body gained during the competition processes using the least square method, utility functions that describe the relationships between enterprises in different business modes are derived; next, a logical game Petri net model to specify the interactions among different bodies in the enterprise competition module is constructed. To analyze the behavior of the competition module, a reachable marking graph for this logical game Petri net model is established. According to this reachable graph, a utility matrix is subsequently designed to obtain the maximum expected utility for the bodies; finally, through analysis of the logical game Petri nets model for the enterprise competition module, the local optimal utility, as well as the global optimal utility of the individuals and groups, can be guaranteed.

We define the mixed strategy form of the characteristic function of the biform games and build the Shapley allocation function (SAF) on each mixed strategy profile in the second stage of the biform games. SAF provides a more detailed and accurate picture of the fairness of the strategic contribution and reflects the degree of the players’ further choices of strategies. SAF can guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium in the first stage of the non-cooperative games. The existence and uniqueness of SAF on each mixed strategy profile overcome the defect that the core may be an empty set and provide a fair allocation method when the core element is not unique. Moreover, SAF can be used as an important reference or substitute for the core with the confidence index.

In mixed strategy games, the ability to randomize decisions is a critical strategic necessity, yet studies show that such rational behavior is sometimes elusive. This paper examines mixed strategy play in a natural setting, by looking at a pitcher's decision to throw the ball to home plate or to throw it to first base in a pickoff play. In the absence of significant pressure, we find that pitchers can effectively randomize their sequence of choices to remain unpredictable, as mixed strategy Nash equilibriums require. However, in the face of pressure, some pitchers are less able to randomize their choices. Our paper is the first empirical study in the English language literature to find that decision makers are unable to randomize their strategic decisions when they face an increased cognitive load due to pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

Using penalty kicks in collegiate soccer matches, we test whether kickers choose where to place shots, and whether goalies choose where to dive in a way that is consistent with optimal mixed strategy play. The previous literature, studying professional soccer players, provides evidence of mixed strategy play in penalty kick scenarios. These results contrast with the evidence obtained in a lab, studying subjects who only play a game a few times and have insignificant monetary payoffs. These lab results find no evidence of mixed strategy play. The contrast between the results obtained from these very different environments makes it unclear which result generalizes to other settings. By studying college athletes, we analyze the middle ground, which is where most strategic decisions will be made. We find that college players employ optimal strategic play in some respects, but not in other respects.

In the exchange of micropayment protocol, the cost of ensuring fairness by TTP is higher than the value of protocol, in this case the rational exchange protocol is a appropriate choice. Exchange protocol was modeled by extensive mixed strategy game and the entropy function was introduced to discuss the fairness in the process of exchange. In addition, the rational fairness was formally defined by using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under the principle of the fairness in the process, and on the basis of this model to construct a new rational exchange protolcol. The protocol’s accountability and rational fairness were proved, the results show that the proposed protocol can achieve mixed stratrgy Nash equilibrium. Without the participation of the trusted third party, the protocol can achieve rational fairness and optimize the penalty values, it is beautifully adapted to the real environment.

Abstract This paper examines the subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames. We present a method that finds all the equilibrium payoffs without public correlation in 2 × 2 games. The method makes it possible to solve and analyse the set of equilibria in more detail. This is the first time that the mixed-strategy payoff set is solved in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that the players can obtain higher payoffs in mixed strategies, there are more Pareto efficient outcomes, and the set of equilibria can be dramatically larger. We show that the equilibrium payoffs can be efficiently computed by finding certain extreme points of the set. This result relies on the classification of games, the monotonicity properties of the problem and splitting the sets into X-Y convex parts. We also introduce set-valued games, where the players' payoffs are chosen from given sets, and show that these games can be solved with the same methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A penalty kicker's problem in football has been modelled. The study took into consideration different directions in which the ball can be struck and goalkeepers' success at defending shots. The strategic form of the game that can be used to predict how the kicker should optimally randomise his strategies has been modelled as a non-linear game-theoretic problem from a professional kicker's viewpoint. The equilibrium of the game (i.e., the pair of mutually optimal mixed strategies) was obtained from the game-theoretic problem by reducing it to a linear programming problem and the two-phase simplex method was adopted to solve this problem. The optimal solution to the game indicates that the kicker never chooses to kick the ball off target, to the goalpost or to the crossbar, but rather chooses to kick the ball in the opposite direction to the one where the goalkeeper is most likely to successfully defend from past history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in 2 × 2 games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The production of two or more distinct fruit types by an individual, i.e. heterocarpy, is considered as a mixed dispersal strategy in which a proportion of the offspring is able to colonize new sites, whilst others remain near the maternal location. Here, we aimed to explore the effects of achene morphology (winged vs. unwinged achenes) and achene size –measured here as achene mass– on post-dispersal life-history traits (probability and time of seedling emergence) in three heterocarpic Anacyclus species (Anthemideae, Asteraceae). Morphology, size and germination performance were studied in achenes from six populations of Anacyclus clavatus (Desf.) Pers., A. homogamos (Maire) Humphries, and A. valentinus L. Our results show that achene morphology and size were related to their position within the capitulum, such that outer, winged achenes were significantly heavier than the inner, unwinged ones. Additionally, winged achenes germinated faster than unwinged ones. This pattern may be related to the sequential achene time of release displayed by these species. Finally, our findings cast doubt on the role of wings as structures that favor dispersal by wind in these three species of Anacyclus.

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.

In the present paper, different clustering techniques were applied to detect significant patterns describing single-household water consumption in a residential neighborhood of the City of Naples, basing on hourly time series aggregated at the monthly scale. Comparisons among results were performed by means of a selection of Clustering Validity Indices, that were adjusted to overcome a bias caused by sparsely populated clusters. The most performant cluster solution proved to be the one resulting from the application of a mixed strategy, namely a Self-Organized Map followed by K-means performed on first level cluster centroids.

Duopoly game theory is applied to the wood industrial markets (sawnwood and pulpwood markets) in the North of Iran. The Nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. The probability that the Nash equilibrium will be reached is almost zero. The dynamical properties of sawnwood and pulpwood prices derived via the duopoly game model are found also in the real empirical price series.

In this paper, the interaction of a MIMO radar and a jammer is modeled as a two person zeros sum game. Minimum mean square error (MMSE) is used as the utility function where the radar and the jammer can change their power allocation strategy so that the MMSE is optimized for the two players respectively. Matrix game is used under the assumption that the strategy sets for the two players have finite numbers of elements. Iteration-Brown algorithm is applied to solve the matrix game and mixed power allocation strategies are obtained. Simulation results prove the effectiveness of the method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to review literature on classical game theory applications in libraries and enable librarians to identify which games may be played in response to various decision-making situations especially in uncertain settings. Also this review paper provides approaches that are helpful for library cooperation. This study is mainly based on works of Hayes (2003), of various game theoretical concepts and applications of those in the library setting and explores the value of game theory concepts in helping libraries deal with management issues and library cooperation which is not widely practiced among libraries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Microsaccades are smallamplitude (typically <1°), ballistic eye movements that occur when attempting to fixate gaze. Initially thought to be generated randomly, it has recently been established that microsaccades are influenced by sensory stimuli, attentional processes, and certain cognitive states. Whether decision processes influence microsaccades, however, is unknown. Here, we adapted two classic economic tasks to examine whether microsaccades reflect evolving saccade decisions. Volitional saccade choices of monkey and human subjects provided a measure of the subjective value of targets. Importantly, analyses occurred during a period of complete darkness to minimize the known influence of sensory and attentional processes on microsaccades. As the time of saccadic choice approached, microsaccade direction became the following: 1) biased toward targets as a function of their subjective value and 2) predictive of upcoming, voluntary choice. Our results indicate that microsaccade direction is influenced by and is a reliable tell of evolving saccade decisions. Our results are consistent with dynamic decision processes within the midbrain superior colliculus; that is, microsaccade direction is influenced by the transition of activity toward caudal saccade regions associated with high saccade value and/or future saccade choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a two player game between a base runner and a pitcher in Major League Baseball. To make testable predictions, we exploit the fact that generally left-handed pitchers are more proficient at pick-off throws to first base than their right-handed counterparts. We find evidence in support of mixed strategy play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]