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We revisit the notion of vicarious causation in Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in order to first show that Harman has articulated two iterations of his account that are in tension with one another; one is found in his earlier paper “On Vicarious Causation,” while the other is contained in his later writings following the publication of Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. This involves a critical assessment of his developing theory of metaphor in a way that encourages sympathetic revision in the service of improving his non-correlationist view of intra-objective relations.

Working in the framework of object-oriented ontology, Graham Harman claims that science strictly adheres to literal language as opposed to metaphorical language. In this article, I argue that such a distinction between literal and metaphorical language cannot be made cleanly in the context of contemporary physics. First, I identify aspects of scientific practice that point to non-literalism, which include non-linguistic elements of scientific discourse, the problem of interpretation of mathematical formulations of some theories, and the acceptance of incompatible theories that describe the same object. Second, I outline an argument that at least some theories in physics constitute complex metaphors based on Harman’s own definition.

Immanuel Kant is often conveyed as a Platonic or Newtonian thinker of the temporal, expressing time as an absolute and continuous repository wherein all objects occur. However, employing themes from his aesthetic writings, what happens when Kantian “sublime” time is reoriented towards a more discontinuous temporal register? This essay employs just such a reading, while also utilising Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), as a methodological device for rethinking both Kantian and object time as neither solely continuous nor discontinuous, but somewhere inbetween these two determinations, in what I term their “ontological ambience.” By doing so I offer a critique of both Kantian orthodoxy and Harmanian OOO, via a comparative analysis of (1) how Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger thematise Kantian temporality, and (2) how Harman develops their subsequent ideas about time. This schema provides post-Kantian philosophy with a provisional model for thinking posthuman time in new and productive ways: as ambient temporalities.

Graham Harman writes that the “basic dualism in the world lies…between things in their intimate reality and things as confronted by other things.” However, dualism implies irreconcilable difference; what Harman points to is better expressed as a dyad, where the two components imply one another and interact. This article shows that systems theory has long asserted the fundamental character of Harman’s dyad, expressing it as the union of internal structure and external function, which correspond exactly to what Levi Bryant, characterizing Harman’s views, refers to as the intra-ontic and the inter-ontic, respectively. After interpreting Harman’s dyad in terms of the ontology of systems theory, the article illustrates his dyad with a variety of examples, including conceptions about truth, ethics, value, and intelligence. The structure–function dyad is a spatial conception of a system as an object. It is usefully augmented with a temporal dimension, expressed in a third component or with an additional orthogonal dyad. Adding a temporal dyad to the structure–function dyad joins the idea of an event and/or process to the idea of an object.

Speculative Realism, New Realism or Postcontinental Realism is an eclectic current that comes to overcome the aporias and insufficiencies of continental philosophy from a perspective that could be attributed to the same problems as the idealist and constructivist perspective of continental philosophers. For the development of philosophy, it is important to engage in conversation with the authors of this movement. This article presents an approach to the successes and insufficiencies of the ontologies of two current authors such as Markus Gabriel and Graham Harman. The strengths and weaknesses of Markus Gabriel's neutral realism and Object-Oriented Ontology are presented, in this order. In the last section, by way of conclusions, the common points of the ontologies are pointed out and the idea of event is provided as a line of research that overcomes the aporias that emerge from the contrast between idealism and realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to explore the impact of Object-Oriented Ontology (O.O.O) within the realm of pedagogy, critically examining its departure from humanistic and traditional paradigms. Simultaneously, it presents an alternative perspective on education that decenters the human as an inevitable ground. In a contrasting move, attention is directed towards Bruno Latour and Graham Harman, elucidating key facets of their ideas. This shift also signifies a departure from the conventional realm of “critical pedagogy”, as championed by Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire. However, it is crucial to acknowledge and appreciate the contributions and significance of Freire’s work. This essay adopts a left-wing stance, with no intention of launching moral attacks on Paulo Freire, as is sometimes witnessed when reactionaries and conservatives enter the academic arena. Criticisms within these pages focus on the content of Freire’s writings, tracing the trajectory from his seminal work, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, published in 1968, to his final piece, “Pedagogy of Autonomy” written in 1996. The aim is not to exhaust all arguments put forth by Freire but to engage with select ideas, since his oeuvre is extremely complex and full of different layers. It is essential to clarify that the critique presented here does not target the character of Paulo Freire but rather delves into some of the theoretical references behind the scenes, particularly the anthropocentrism associated with his ideas. Consequently, this essay emerges as an interdisciplinary endeavor, a conjunction between philosophy and social theory. What doors will this discussion open? What new field of possibilities awaits us? I invite you to dive into this debate, exploring the potential for an Object-Oriented Pedagogy (O.O.P) on the horizon.

The article aims to explore the ways in which scholars from Poland and Ukraine engage with Graham Harman’s philosophical work1 . The introductory part briefly describes Harman’s ontology and demonstrates the link connecting Harman with Polish and Ukrainian intellectual environments. Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) states that objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality and cannot be reduced either to what they are made of or to what they do, that is, either to their constituents or to their effects. The connection with Poland and Ukraine goes back to the theory of objects suggested by the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski, whom Harman names among the predecessors of his ontology and who influenced both Polish and Ukrainian intellectual milieus. The next part of the article examines the history of the reception, identifying its key events and publications. The reception in Poland proves to be much more substantial than in Ukraine. A common tendency is determined: a conflation of Harman’s OOO and speculative realism by mistakenly ascribing the features of the former to the latter (broader concept), which suggests that speculative realism is being received through the lens of Harman’s project. The next part establishes the key discursive points that are used to map Harman’s ideas within the contemporary philosophical landscape. They can be summarised by the terms antianthropocentrism and antireductionism. The final part analyses the strategies for applying Harman’s theory showing that it can become the lens for interpretation and direct our attention to nonhumans and the hidden, inexplicable dimension of things or provide an ontological grounding for semi-literary and literary discourses. The methodology of this application, though, needs further development and clarification. Overall, in Poland, two of Harman’s books and two articles have been translated, and at least two books, one Ph.D. dissertation, and around two dozen articles discuss or apply his ideas. Apart from philosophy, his OOO is used for discussing literature, video games, films, humanities in general, education, management processes, antique studies, and ecocriticism. In Ukraine, one of Harman’s articles has been translated, and around ten articles and one collective monography engage with his philosophical project. Some of the Ukrainian works also apply Harman’s OOO in contexts that are not strictly philosophical, namely, in literary criticism, urban studies, film studies, and humanities in general. This paper can be of use to researchers studying OOO and its reception in different countries. In addition, it can help Ukrainian and Polish scholars who want to discuss or use OOO to familiarize themselves with the previous reception in their countries, thus facilitating domestic philosophical interaction.

The present paper compares the author’s original proposal called ecorhythmology with contemporary ecophilosophies. After briefly outlining the background and results of more than two decades of research, it examines the seminal theses of Object Oriented Ontology (Graham Harman), Action Network Theory (Bruno Latour) and the concept of being ecological (Timothy Morton) from an ecorhythmological perspective. Taking stock of interesting similarities and correspondences, this analysis also raises new questions, to which the author proposes different solutions. The paper presents two critiques of the reductionism of string theory and compares Harman’s theory of metaphor with the concept of art based on gestural resonance. Further investigations connect Latour’s redistribution of agency to the intersubjective relationship between the human and non-human, and relate hybridity to proximity. In the second part of the paper, Morton’s different temporalities are juxtaposed with rhythmic dimensions, and finally, the article makes a difference between the casual, political and ethical approaches to the phenomenon of tuning. The stakes are always learning and relearning what kind of contact making can lead to greater peace in difficult human – non-human coexistence.

Abstract Tim Ingold, while extending the radical undertaking of vitalism, with its Nietzschean matrix, puts the decentering undertaken by this philosophical tradition on a more solid foundation, opening up a new space of interobjective relations. Instead of an epistemic plunge into human categories, the goal is to move towards a broader ontological space, including other sites of meaning, such as chairs, spirits, animals, baskets, and many others. Unlike more classical anthropology, with its well-delimited Anthropos as an inevitable transcendental horizon, Ingold suggests a world where humans are not protagonists, but rather provisional negotiators within a large mesh of subjectless experiences. The model proposed in this essay distances itself from the plane of (neo)-Kantian speculation, converting its contours into something less orthodox by making room for a possible Object-Oriented Anthropology (O.O.A).

Graham Harman, an American contemporary philosopher, is the founder of object-oriented ontology (OOO). In his 2016 book, Immaterialism, he offeres a theoretical framework for studying social phenomena using OOO. According to this theory, the traditional distinction between subject and object is eliminated in favor of a more realistic vision, in which everything from human beings to animals and arti- ficial entities are 'objects' as far as they have similar stages of living: birth, maturity, decadence, and death. We tried to examine this theoretical framework in film studies by taking the film Dance with Me!, (2019, Persian: "Jahan, ba man beraghs!") as a study case. The methodology of this article is a description-analysis based on observations and library resources. In this paper, we try to sketch out how the film's protagonist, Jahan, as an object in his last stage of living, undergoes! actions and reactions to other objects (characters, animals, properties, etc.) to make sense of his life as a symbiosis.Immaterialism provides a framework to analyze things as they are, as well as their effects on other things. Unlike other theoretical frameworks used in film studies, such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, OOO's main goal is that the critic does not need to find events, accidents, or actions in the films to apply prior knowledge to them. In other words, while other methodologies try to confirm their own limits by abstracting them from the narrative, immaterialism lets audiences see what is deliberately conveyed in the narrative, even if it does not contribute to or amount to the level of dialectical progress of the narration. Dance with Me!, unlike "art movies" that are produced for global or western audiences, is a film that targets local cinemagoers in Iran. Its director, Soroush Sehat (1965), has a long experience in scriptwriting, direction, and acting in Iranian TV and cinema. In this paper, we take the characters as objects that interact in order to create momentum in the narration. Jahan (a Persian name meaning 'world', dropped out of the film's English name), is regarded as a thing at its last stage of life that has some important interactions with other things, from his family and friends to his domestic animals and properties. But, as its name suggests, the film is not simply a biographical drama about someone dying but instead it is trying to portray an improvised cinematic dance. Dormant objects, which according to immaterialism are things present before any interaction with other things, are considered in this paper to have great importance. Instead of trying to prove something or confirm some psychoanalytic realities, here we simply try to address dormant things that may have or not have obvious effects on the plot or the protagonist's consciousness but make a difference, provoke curiosity, and provide a spot in which metaphor becomes possible. So, while we care about what happens and how the narration goes on, we also have an eye on what remains dormant and escapes from the normative restrictions of cinematic narration in Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tim Ingold, while extending the radical undertaking of vitalism, with its Nietzschean matrix, puts the decentering undertaken by this philosophical tradition on a more solid foundation, opening up a new space of interobjective relations. Instead of an epistemic plunge into human categories, the goal is to move towards a broader ontological space, including other sites of meaning, such as chairs, spirits, animals, baskets, and many others. Unlike more classical anthropology, with its well-delimited Anthropos as an inevitable transcendental horizon, Ingold suggests a world where humans are not protagonists, but rather provisional negotiators within a large mesh of subjectless experiences. The model proposed in this essay distances itself from the plane of (neo)-Kantian speculation, converting its contours into something less orthodox by making room for a possible Object-Oriented Anthropology (O.O.A). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology (OOO). It explores the tensions in Harman's quadripartite notion of the object and how aesthetics provides an indirect mode of access to the object. This principally comes by way of metaphor and theatricality, the rift and transposition of the sensual from the real. A good illustration of these concepts can be found in Sofia Coppola's film Lost in Translation. Reading Lost in Translation through OOO, we can see the theory enacted, and understand how the of the spectator interacts with the film, the reader with theory. Through this aesthetic prism we can approach the both the object of the film and the theory even in the face of their very retreat. All objects, films, theories, and even this article, become lost in translation. Everything, in any relation, is condemned to mediation. Nevertheless, there are still remain intimations of the real to be had both beyond and through the sensual and literal. This article is an attempt to explore this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.).

Desde inicios del siglo xx la filosofía parecía haber despachado la legitimidad del realismo, llamando a la descripción del mundo dentro de los límites de nuestra subjetividad. El agotamiento y los problemas de esta premisa filosófica han sido finalmente enunciados y señalados por el realismo especulativo. En el presente artículo mostramos de qué manera tres de sus representantes más reconocidos, Meillassoux, Harman y Gabriel, llevan a cabo esta tarea. Pero para evitar una posición ingenua, este realismo se expresa de forma especulativa, es decir, a partir de argumentos lógicos, matemáticos y abstractos que no carecen de problemas. Después de una breve exposición de sus filosofías, presentamos problemas centrales en ellas que se derivan de una falta de reflexión sobre los recursos lógicos y matemáticos que emplean explícita o implícitamente. Mostramos que la constante en todos ellos consiste tanto en un desconocimiento de las paradojas de autorreferencia que ponen en juego, como en la falta de una teoría de relaciones reales que explique las relaciones sujeto-objeto y objeto-objeto. Concluimos con una breve referencia a Fréredic Nef para mostrar qué puntos debería considerar una teoría general de relaciones.

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In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article constitutes an extended review essay of Thomas Lemke’s book Foucault and the Government of Things: Foucault and the New Materialisms published by New York University Press in 2021. A shorter version of this article was published as a book review in Social Forces (http://doi.org/10.1093/soac037, 22nd April 2022). This longer extended version is being published here with the permission of Oxford University Press, who publish Social Forces. In performing this review, the article seeks to outline and assess Lemke’s thesis to incorporate Foucault as a part of the new materialist approach to the social and physical sciences. As my own work has located Foucault as a materialist since the 1990s, I relate Lemke’s endeavour to my own and conclude that my approach has distinct advantages that his lacks. At the same time, however, his account presents some novel and insightful dimensions which can profitably be added to mine, strengthening the case for Foucault’s materialism overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article constitutes an extended review essay of Thomas Lemke’s book Foucault and the Government of Things: Foucault and the New Materialisms published by New York University Press in 2021. A shorter version of this article was published as a book review in Social Forces (http://doi.org/10.1093/soac037, 22nd April 2022). This longer extended version is being published here with the permission of Oxford University Press, who publish Social Forces. In performing this review, the article seeks to outline and assess Lemke’s thesis to incorporate Foucault as a part of the new materialist approach to the social and physical sciences. As my own work has located Foucault as a materialist since the 1990s, I relate Lemke’s endeavour to my own and conclude that my approach has distinct advantages that his lacks. At the same time, however, his account presents some novel and insightful dimensions which can profitably be added to mine, strengthening the case for Foucault’s materialism overall.

The conceptualization of the notion of subjectivity within the Anthropocene finds in Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanism one of its most explicit and profuse modulations. This essay argues that Braidotti’s model powerfully accounts for the Anthropocene’s subjectivity by conceiving the “self” as a transversal multiplicity and its relationality to the “others” and the “world” as non-hierarchized by nature–culture distinctions; however, by being ontologically grounded on a neo-Spinozistic monism, Braidotti’s model blurs the notions of finitude, agency, and change, obscuring the possibility of critical dissent while decreasing the overall theory’s consistency. An alternative ontological model capitalizing on these elements can be found in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and its notion of withdrawal. By associating OOO’s non-onto-taxonomical pluralism with Braidotti’s posthuman subjectivity, this essay aims at ontologically discretizing the latter in order to overcome these limitations. Grounded on this association and invoking a narrative imaginary propelled by the Greek terms xenos (guest-friend) and xenia (hospitality), the article paves the way for a form of subjectivity deviating from Braidotti’s ecological model and defined as xenological, arguing that, within the context of the Anthropocene, it constitutes an adequate alternative to Braidotti’s subjectivity.

This article mounts a defense of my and Slavoj Žižek’s co-edited anthology, Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism, against the two main criticisms of it made throughout Graham Harman’s article “The Battle of Objects and Subjects”: (1) that we and our fellow contributors are guilty of gross overgeneralization when we classify thinkers from various schools of thought – among them New Materialism, object-oriented ontology, speculative realism, and actor–network theory – under the broad rubric of the “new materialisms”; and (2) that despite our pretensions to the mantle of materialism, our Lacano-Hegelian position is actually a full-blown idealism. In responding to and attempting to refute these criticisms, I make the case that our Lacano-Hegelian model of dialectical materialism is an “extimate materialism.”

This is a largely theoretical essay that, in conversation with Graham Harman’s energetic view of objects and Ben Lerner’s idiosyncratic theory of poetry, articulates the basic tenets of a “flat aesthetics” and then moves on to tease out this aesthetics’ ramifications in terms of form, reading thereof, and politics. When the object’s ontological dignity is acknowledged, as flat ontology does, and further, when literature too is dealt with as an object whose “intransitive” objecthood is recognized, literary form, Moraru argues, no longer reflects an elsewhere, a beyond, or other transcendent place, meaning, or design. Instead, this form deflects clarifying light “prismatically,” illuminating other objects, the bigger ensembles into which they are arranged, as well as the potential for new arrangements and worlds. Drawing from Lerner’s Hatred of Poetry, the article’s closing segment explains how this potentiality is already embedded in form qua object and sprouts dialectically from the limits within which literary forms inherently coalesce.

Josiah Royce is remembered mainly as an absolute idealist. Through his confrontation with "Bradley's regress", this paper will show that he was actually trying to combine a bold form of monism with a pluralism of real, discrete individuals. His commitment to the actual infinite is used both to turn Bradley's regress into the generative mechanism of individuality within the Absolute, and to abolish the ontological difference between the Absolute itself and the individuals it contains. The "flat absolutism" resulting from this operation will be compared to the contemporary "flat ontologies" of Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, whose pluralism and commitment to "external" relations are shown to be just some of the ways in which a robust sense of individuality can be defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artículo busca traer a nuestro presente en marcha y a nuestra filosofía presente la pregunta de Arthur S. Eddington: ¿qué es una mesa? Usaremos la distinción sellarsiana entre imagen científica e imagen manifiesta (entre ciencia y mundo de la vida) para ver si se puede conseguir una reconciliación en clave ontológica. Para tal objetivo, traeremos a la discusión los planteamientos de Graham Harman, filósofo contemporáneo englobado dentro del realismo especulativo, cuya ontología pide una vuelta a los objetos mismos, alejándose de la clásica distinción entre sujeto y objeto. Nuestra principal aportación en este artículo es la de juzgar la pertinencia de lo que hemos denominado la solución tercerposicionista de Harman para dar una respuesta novedosa al problema de Sellars.

Dark theology as a theoretical approach emerged during debates on human rights and inclusion in Orthodox theology. It is realized at the junction of such disciplines as ecclesiology, political theology, philosophy, and social theory. It is based on the tools of object-oriented ontology (OOO), one of the branches of the philosophy of speculative realism. The author proposes a theoretical framework by which we can talk about God and supernatural entities as real objects included in public discourses through the collective imagination. The article discovers the basic theoretical (ontological, epistemological, and aesthetic) principles of dark theology as they apply to ecclesiology and political theology. Additionally, it discusses the existence of church dark actors who do not come within the field of vision of the theological mind (ecclesiology) illuminating ecclesial space. The author concludes by proposing a concept of reassembling the Church based on Bruno Latour's notion of the 'collective'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The empirical-transcendental debate in philosophy of technology, as debates go, took a turn toward the counterposing of the two perspectives, 'empirical'-pragmatic-pragmatist versus 'transcendental'-critical. Postphenomenology aligns itself with the former standpoint, and it is in this spirit that commentators have criticized it for its too-instrumentalist stance and lack of overarching, i.e., transcendental orientation. But the positions may have become too starkly delineated in order for the debate to reach any breakthrough: a seemingly unbridgeable gap yawns between the stances of 'technology with a small "t"' and 'Technology with a capital "T."' Is there any way to reorient the debate? In this paper I propose to do so by considering whether there would be some way of arriving from one end of the spectrum to the other—crossing the gap. Exploring the purported wasteland in between "technology" and "Technology" by way of object-oriented ontology (OOO)—Harman, Morton—we can find it actually filled with countless gaps, adhering to every thing. Following the radical insights of OOO, we'd have to attest to a 'thing-transcendentality.' The 'gap,' then, that seemed so threatening and all-encompassing, becomes smeared out, levelled down to a multiplicity of perspectives. And this casts the debate, with its purported strict tension between 'empirical' and 'transcendental' positions, in fresh terms, opening up new ways for studying how the two interrelate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aesthetic theory of Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) revolves around the concept of allure, a nonliteral experience of an object’s displacement from its qualities that draws attention to a deeper reality. But applying allure to aesthetic interpretation is hampered in two ways. First, OOO necessarily moves between the constrained viewpoint of experience and a more global perspective. Yet mixing these “inside” and “outside” views can risk ambiguity. Second, the phenomenological difference between the parts and qualities of an object must be clarified before Harman’s model of wholes and parts can be incorporated into OOO aesthetics. Addressing these two ambiguities will make it possible to further develop OOO’s resources for aesthetic commentary. For instance, one conclusion is that allure itself has two varieties: a tension between the object and its qualities (“allusion”) and a tension between the whole and its parts (“collusion”). These options parallel Harman’s twofold critique of reductionism. Another conclusion is that the literal needs an explanation within the framework of OOO insofar as it is a genuine feature of experience.

The ontological abyss that separates real objects from sensual objects is one of the central principles of Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), which has its most explicit and profuse modulation in Timothy Morton’s notion of rift. This article argues that, despite succeeding in explaining the radical difference that inhabits every object, Morton’s rift fails to explain the object’s unification, rendering the overall theory inconsistent. An alternative approach that accounts simultaneously for disjunction and conjunction between essences and appearances can be found in Eugenio Trías’s philosophy of the limit, a term widely ignored in OOO despite its deeply non-relational conception of the reality of things. The article further argues that the reinterpretation of Trías’s twofold liminal approach in light of OOO successfully addresses the inconsistencies found in Morton’s rift, paving the way for a theory of limits within Harman’s ontological framework.

The primary aim of this essay was to elucidate the unique philosophical concept of “the non-interpretive”, which Masaya Chiba, one of the most prominent philosophers in East Asia, formulated mainly by bridging the theories of Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who have generally been reckoned as two of the most pivotal proponents in the contemporary philosophical movement dubbed Speculative Realism. In order to achieve the aim, the first part clarified the chief arguments and doctrines of Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism and Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy. Thereupon, the second and main part investigated how Chiba invented the concept, what it precisely meant, and what insights it could offer for us. The concluding section summarized the chief arguments of this paper and sketched a worldview which we could adopt in order to survive the turbulent epoch of alternative facts and post-truth.

Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology has employed a variant of occasionalist causation since 2002, with sensual objects acting as the mediators of causation between real objects. While the mechanism for living beings creating sensual objects is clear, how nonliving objects generate sensual objects is not. This essay sets out an interpretation of occasionalism where the mediating agency of nonliving contact is the virtual particles of nominally empty space. Since living, conscious, real objects need to hold sensual objects as sub-components, but nonliving objects do not, this leads to an explanation of why consciousness, in Object-Oriented Ontology, might be described as doubly withdrawn: a sensual sub-component of a withdrawn real object.

Object-oriented ontology (OOO) is a philosophy that asks us to step outside the human-centric view of the world to recognize that objects have realities of their own. Although we cannot directly access a thing-in-itself, we can still come to know something about it through an indirect access that Graham Harman suggests is provided by aesthetics, specifically the metaphor. In the metaphor, we step into the place of the object-in-itself (that withdraws) and experience a taste of its reality. This main purpose of this article is to show that the visual arts—specifically Haim Steinbach’s art works—offer a different way to know objects. Steinbach “arranges” found objects on shelves; this emphasis on “arrangement” raises questions about the nature of the space between objects. I argue that it is this space between objects (rather than the indirect contact with objects) that grants us some access to the thing-in-itself. By relating the spaces between objects to silence, I show that it is in these spaces that objects speak. In other words, the theatricality of the metaphor Harman privileges for understanding the object only exists in a silence that emerges from the spaces between objects.

One of the main criticisms of object-oriented ontology in its current formulation by Graham Harman is that it includes a notion of time that, upon closer inspection, renders the overall theory inconsistent. I argue that while this is indeed the case, Harman’s notion of time can be modified in a way that leaves the framework of object-oriented ontology intact. More specifically, Harman’s theory of time as a single surface tension between sensual objects and their qualities should be expanded into a theory of time as a twofold of related yet irreducible temporalities. Such a theory can already be found in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense. I argue that much of the latter theory is already tacitly presupposed in Harman’s ontology, and show that the proposed modification successfully addresses the most salient criticisms that have been voiced at Harman’s notion of time.

This article begins by addressing a critique of my book Immaterialism by the archaeologists Þóra Pétursdóttirr and Bjørnar Olsen in their 2018 article “Theory Adrift.” As they see it, I restrict myself in Immaterialism to available historical documentation on the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and they wonder how my account might have changed if I had discussed more typical archaeological examples instead: wrecked and sunken ships, released ballast, deserted harbors, distributed goods, and derelict fortresses. In response, I argue that my account was not therefore non-archaeological, since ruins are the topic of archaeology only by accident: the real subject of the discipline is what Marshall McLuhan describes as “cold media,” in the sense that they are low in information. McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cold media is shown to be surprisingly analogous to Aristotle’s difference between continua and discrete substances, and some consequences are drawn from this analogy.

Philosophical critiques are prone to relapse into a sort of entrenchment in which the basic elements of a philosophy are kept from exposure, so that instead of advancing, philosophy easily becomes compartmentalized into specific trends. This article thus seeks the conditions of a non-entrenched, open-field philosophical critique in general and, in particular, of an open-field critique of Harman’s OOO (object-oriented ontology). For that purpose, the idea of precariousness is introduced, which is then confronted with some ideas concerning philosophical critique and practice, in particular those of François Laruelle. Since we can find in Harman’s OOO an outline of what we call here an open-field critique, the field of combat against Harman will be the one concerning the idea of an open field itself.

This essay looks to re-evaluate sculptor Richard Serra’s famous claim that “to remove the work is to destroy it.” Using OOO, and particularly Graham Harman’s interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s tool analysis, in order to analyze the now famous moment when Tilted Arc was de-installed from Federal Plaza, Manhattan in 1989, this paper argues that the work was not in fact destroyed but rather that its ontological autonomy was even more absolutely revealed in that moment as such. Although it is the case that art objects and sites are prone to discursive co-construction and evaluation, it is this analysis’ claim that they both are possessive of a deep, substantive form also, a form resistant to appropriation. Tilted Arc therefore revealed something even more insidious and dangerous to those who opposed it than the power of art to speak back to its surroundings. Rather, it uncovered the substantive objecthood of the site itself.

This paper intends to reexamine the idiosyncratic thoughts of Nicholaus Cusanus (Nicholas of Cusa), a fifteenth-century German theologian-cum-philosopher who has generally been considered to be just a transitional figure to the succeeding, modern thinkers. The chief argument of this essay is that his conception of God as both immanent and transcendent has a number of interesting parallels with contemporary, de-anthropocentric philosophies, especially with Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO), and in fact can be regarded as a prescient harbinger to OOO in that Nicholas evidently urges one to assume a more liberal worldview while simultaneously equipping his own theory with a logic intelligible to others. In the closing section, the author of this paper poses a few proposals drawn from the investigation both to the discipline of philosophy and to the general public.

The genesis of socio-humanitarian and sociological knowledge, namely: understanding and studying the phenomenon of human life, its biological, vital, informational and social aspects has been revealed. The regularity of the transformation of anthropocentrism under the influence of the development of science and technology, the emergence of the concept of post-humanism has been substantiated. The examples of man-made disasters, the use of weapons of mass destruction, as social facts, that had a significant impact on the development of mankind, have been adduced. The conditions for the emergence of object-oriented sociology and the sociology of things have been shown, some scientific approaches have been disclosed within the framework of this concept of Graham Harman, Brun Latour and his followers. Separately, the methodological approaches of the actor-network theory have been disclosed, the main one has been highlighted. Separately, the methodological foundations of cognition of the world of things have been described within the framework of object-oriented sociology, related to the rejection of opposing pairs of the concepts “society and nature”, “truth is non-truth”, “structure and process” and others. The connection of this theory with the sociology of translation has been shown. The characteristic of the problems of development of the scientific and methodological base of digital sociology in the context of changing the content of social relations “man – machine” on the example of the information and communication network Internet has been given. Among them, have been allocated the problems of delegation to digital technologies, more and more powers in solving complex socio-technical problems, the global centralization of digital resources management, the emergence of virtual actors of social interaction. The author reduces specific examples of the use of actor-network theory to interpret the processes and phenomena of interaction between users of Internet resources with individual components of the Internet. Separately, promising areas of research in this area, related to the phenomena of the Internet of things and neuronet, have been highlighted.

In this paper I will be focusing on the introduction to Hilan Bensusan's latest work Indexicalism: The Metaphysics of Paradox and will be picking out some passages to look over and analyse through a contemporary Hegelian lens. This will be entitled Part 2. However, in Part 1 I will briefly share with you what appears in my aforementioned upcoming book (Object Oriented Dialectics: Hegel, Heidegger, Harman) as two paradoxical accounts of exteriority and how this relates (or contrasts) to Bensusans own understanding of exteriority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I model the version of Wilfrid Sellars' Myth of the Given argument that John McDowell presents in Mind and World along the lines of one of Graham Priest's inclosure paradoxes, with McDowell's "spinning of the wheels" worry being a worry about denial of Transcendence and his "exculpation not justification" worry being a worry about denial of Closure. This exercise reveals much, importantly: (1) McDowell's conceptualism does not in fact, resolve the paradox, and (2) on the other hand, with insights from Graham Harman, Hilan Bensusan, and the Rinzai tradition of Zen Buddhism, a non-conceptualist, indexicalist, epistemology can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a largely theoretical essay that, in conversation with Graham Harman's energetic view of objects and Ben Lerner' idiosyncratic theory of poetry, articulates the basic tenets of a "flat aesthetics" and then moves on to tease out this aesthetics' ramifications in terms of form, reading thereof, and politics. When the object's ontological dignity is acknowledged, as flat ontology does, and further, when literature too is dealt with as an object whose "intransitive" objecthood is recognized, literary form, Moraru argues, no longer reflects an elsewhere, a beyond, or other transcendent place, meaning, or design. Instead, this form deflects clarifying light "prismatically," illuminating other objects, the bigger ensembles into which they are arranged, as well as the potential for new arrangements and worlds. Drawing from Lerner's Hatred of Poetry, the article's closing segment explains how this potentiality is already embedded in form qua object and sprouts dialectically from the limits within which literary forms inherently coalesce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay calls for an independent theory of features in object-oriented philosophy. Theories of features are in general motivated by at least two interconnected demands: 1) to explain why objects have the characteristics they have, 2) to explain how regular divisions in those characteristics can be intuited. While a theory of universal properties may be the most internally consistent means of addressing these demands, an object-oriented metaphysics needs to address them without a concept of shared features. This means that regular divisions of invariant features and our intuitions of them cannot be explained by the repetition of self-same characteristics or natural laws. They can instead be explained by the immanent repetition of similar features. However, this requires a new, radically aesthetic understanding of what it means to be similar in the first place, one in which similarity is an emergent process rather than a state of affairs existing between resembling particulars.

This paper presents a juxtaposition of the understanding of objects in Jean-Luc Nancy’s postdeconstructive realism and Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology, particularly with reference to their respective notions of touch. Nancy incorporates a tension between the phenomenological accounts of touch and embodiment given by Merleau-Ponty, who focuses on the relationality of the flesh, and Levinas, who focuses more on non-relational alterity. Furthermore, Nancy does not accept the anthropocentric assumptions whereby phenomenology accounts for objects insofar as they correlate to human existence. Following the deconstruction of sovereign humanity, Nancy approaches what Derrida calls “post-deconstructive realism,” accounting for touch with regard to the relationality and alterity of all objects, human and nonhuman. However, abjuring the metaphysical interiority posited by panpsychists, Nancy admits that his philosophy cannot account for the discrete, atomistic differences between beings. Graham Harman agrees with much of Nancy’s philosophy, but he criticizes Nancy on this point, offering a corrective supplement in the form of his object-oriented ontology, which avoids panpsychism while nonetheless accounting for the discrete differences between objects.

In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social theory theorizes them as inert, resilient entities with a private reality that exceeds their components and actions. Harman’s theory focuses on what social entities are qua objects, and consequently says little about their specificity as social objects. A more complete social theory would also outline how human existence is to be understood in relation to a social world comprised of discrete and inert entities, as opposed to, for example, far more continuous material fields or networks of associations. We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation. We first outline Harman’s and Sartre’s respective ontologies of social objects, and then discuss how their many complementarities make the latter a suitable extension of the former.

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