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Fisheries within India have significant financial, nutritional and socio-economic development prospects. The country has a diversified natural fishery resource. Fishermen have continuously undertaken fisheries activity throughout the country over decades and fisheries co-operatives have now been developed for cumulative production and effective regulation of fishery activities. It was observed that there have been many inconsistencies, mostly in the management of fisheries co-operatives; a few were effectively handled under active supervision and government backing, whereas many co-operatives are facing various problems for their existence. Effective administration of fisherman's co-operatives is critical for increasing fishing productivity and the socio-economic growth of fishermen. Co-operatives can help fishermen develop their skills and gather information about technology, marketing, and management. Co-operatives can improve productivity, processing, storing and transportation capabilities while also meeting financial demands. As a result, co-operative organisations may contend with multinational corporations by integrating competent management abilities with co-operative power. To do this, a nationwide research project focusing on different elements of fisheries co-operatives is recommended. The need for appropriate policy implications for such sustainable management of fisheries co-operatives in accordance with current technical advancements in the sector of aquaculture, environmental degradation and global warming has been highlighted.

We present a preliminary model of the within-season behavior of a fishery regulated by a total allowable catch constraint and season closure. An individual's catch depends on where he/she deploys effort and on the effort deployment decisions of other harvesters such that catch per unit effort is greater when effort is deployed before others have contacted the stock. Individual harvesters are allowed, voluntarily, to join a profit sharing co-operative that is allocated a share of the TAC commensurate with its effort capacity. The co-op centrally allocates the effort deployment decisions of all members. Non-joiners fish independently. We find that the co-op will coordinate effort in order to: fish the maximum amount of time the stock is available, concentrate effort among its most efficient members and harvest at the closest feasible distance to port. All independent harvesters will deploy effort at the maximum feasible rate until its TAC share is filled and will deploy effort at the maximum distance that yields positive profit. Harvesters joining the co-op will be the least efficient operators in the fishery.