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To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.2006.00425.x Byline: L. Alan Winters (1) Author Affiliation: (1)The World Bank Article History: September 2006

We analyse the likely trade effects of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which defines the post-Brexit trading environment between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). We apply a computable general equilibrium model and focus on trade in value added rather than just the gross values of exports and imports. We describe the TCA and estimate its effects on the costs of conducting UK–EU trade, including various non-tariff barriers in both goods and services. We suggest that the TCA will reduce UK trade significantly: total exports by around 7 per cent and imports by around 14 per cent. In terms of value added (i.e. incomes generated), textiles and vehicles, both of which trade extensively with the EU, suffer heavily, as do services which trade significantly with the EU, face large increases in trade barriers, and experience declining demand from other sectors as those sectors' exports fall. Such inter-industry linkages spread the losses from Brexit widely through the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A survey of policies aimed at curtailing emissions of greenhouse gases is made by analyzing quantitative studies of the abatement costs of such policies. Through the analysis made, which concentrated on the modeling approaches and choices of key parameters of the quantitative studies, a conceptual framework that identifies the major determinants of the macroeconomic costs of abating greenhouse gases is formed. The studies show that each 20% abatement below business-as-usual emissions may cost around 1% of gross world product.

This paper surveys the arguments that the creation of the EC has increased world protectionism relative to what it would otherwise have been. Models of tariff bargaining between trade blocks suggest some increase, because the optimum tariff is higher for larger blocks, but this is not inevitable. Models of EC decision-taking suggest an increase because of the restaurant-bill problem and the tendency of committees towards universalism. The evidence is not enough, however, to be certain that a protectionist effect exists.

Previous literature has concentrated on the rent transfer accruing to exporting countries when a voluntary export restraint (VER) is binding. This paper studies the efficiency and distributional effects arising when VERs force factors out of industries in which they are most productive. A theoretical model of the industry under the VER is developed to establish qualitative conditions under which a VER will result in: Spillovers of exports to unrestricted markets; industry contraction; and loss in national welfare. Key parameters of demand and supply are estimated for leather footwear exports from Taiwan subject to the U.S. Orderly Marketing Agreement, and their implications explored in a calibrated simulation exercise. The results make a strong indictment of VERs. For most plausible parameter values, VERs distort exports, reduce industry size and cause overall economic losses, especially if the affected industry is large.