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Grounded cognition accounts of semantic representation posit that brain regions traditionally linked to perception and action play a role in grounding the semantic content of words and sentences. Sensory-motor systems are thought to support partially abstract simulations through which conceptual content is grounded. However, which details of sensory-motor experience are included in, or excluded from these simulations, is not well understood. We investigated whether sensory-motor brain regions are differentially involved depending on the speed of actions described in a sentence. We addressed this issue by examining the neural signature of relatively fast (The old lady scurried across the road) and slow (The old lady strolled across the road) action sentences. The results showed that sentences that implied fast motion modulated activity within the right posterior superior temporal sulcus and the angular and middle occipital gyri, areas associated with biological motion and action perception. Sentences that implied slow motion resulted in greater signal within the right primary motor cortex and anterior inferior parietal lobule, areas associated with action execution and planning. These results suggest that the speed of described motion influences representational content and modulates the nature of conceptual grounding. Fast motion events are represented more visually whereas motor regions play a greater role in representing conceptual content associated with slow motion.

Studies on the organization of conceptual knowledge have examined categories of concrete nouns extensively. Less is known about the neural basis of verb categories suggested by linguistic theories. We used functional MRI to examine the differences between manner verbs, which encode information about the manner of an action, versus instrument verbs, which encode information about an object as part of their meaning. Using both visual and verbal stimuli and a combination of whole brain univariate and multivariate pattern analyses, our results show that accessing conceptual representations of instrument class involves brain regions typically associated with complex action and object perception, including the anterior inferior parietal cortex and occipito-temporal cortex. On the other hand, accessing conceptual representations of the manner class involves regions that are commonly associated with the processing of visual and biological motion, in the posterior superior temporal sulcus. These findings support the idea that the semantics of manner and instrument verbs are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.

Embodied theories of language maintain that brain areas associated with perception and action are also involved in the processing and representation of word meaning. A number of studies have shown that sentences with action verbs elicit activation within sensory–motor brain regions, arguing that sentence-induced mental simulations provide a means for grounding their lexical-semantic meaning. Constructionist theories argue, however, that form–meaning correspondence is present not only at the lexical level but also at the level of constructions. We investigated whether sentence-induced motor resonance is present for syntactic constructions. We measured the BOLD signal while participants read sentences with (di)transitive (caused motion) or intransitive constructions that contained either action or abstract verbs. The results showed a distinct neuronal signature for caused motion and intransitive syntactic frames. Caused motion frames activated regions associated with reaching and grasping actions, including the left anterior intraparietal sulcus and the parietal reach region. Intransitive frames activated lateral temporal regions commonly associated with abstract word processing. The left pars orbitalis showed an interaction between the syntactic frame and verb class. These findings show that sensory–motor activation elicited by sentences entails both motor resonance evoked by single words as well as at the level of syntactic constructions.

An influential model of the neural mechanisms of creative thought suggests that creativity is manifested in the joint contributions of the Default Mode Network (DMN; a set of regions in the medial PFC, lateral and medial parietal cortex, and the medial temporal lobes) and the executive networks within the dorsolateral PFC. Several empirical reports have offered support for this model by showing that complex interactions between these brain systems account for individual differences in creative performance. The present study examined whether the engagement of these regions in idea generation is modulated by one’s eminence in a creativity-related field. Twenty (n ​= ​20) healthy eminent creators from diverse fields of expertise and a ‘smart’ comparison group of sixteen (n ​= ​16) age- and education-matched non-eminent thinkers were administered a creative generation task (an adaptation of the Alternative Uses Task) and a control perceptual task, while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The participants’ verbal responses were recorded through a noise-canceling microphone and were later coded for fluency and accuracy. Behavioral and fMRI analyses revealed commonalities between groups, but also distinct patterns of activation in default mode and executive brain regions between the eminent and the non-eminent participants during creative thinking. We interpret these findings in the context of the well-documented contributions of these regions in the generation of creative ideas as modulated, in this study, by participants’ creative eminence.

Objectives:A wealth of studies provide evidence for action simulation during language comprehension. Recent research suggests such action simulations might be sensitive to fine-grained information, such as speed. Here, we present a crucial test for action simulation of speed in language by assessing speed comprehension in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD). Based on the patients’ motor deficits, we hypothesized that the speed of motion described in language would modulate their performance in semantic tasks. Specifically, they would have more difficulty processing language about relatively fast speed than language about slow speed.Methods:We conducted a semantic similarity judgment task on fast and slow action verbs in patients with PD and age-matched healthy controls. Participants had to decide which of two verbs most closely matched a target word.Results:Compared to controls, PD patients were slower making judgments about fast action verbs, but not for judgments about slow action verbs, suggesting impairment in processing language about fast action. Moreover, this impairment was specific to verbs describing fast action performed with the hand.Conclusions:Problems moving quickly lead to difficulties comprehending language about moving quickly. This study provides evidence that speed is an important part of action representations. (JINS, 2017,23, 412–420)

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical-semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations - including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur - is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first- vs. third-person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First-person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone”, “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front-back axis, consistent with the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third-person sentences (“He threw the microphone”, “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left-right axis for third-person, but not first-person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.

Contains fulltext : 102395.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Embodied theories hold that cognitive concepts are grounded in our sensorimotor systems. Specifically, a number of behavioral and neuroimaging studies have buttressed the idea that language concepts are represented in areas involved in perception and action [Pulvermueller, F. Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 576-582, 2005; Barsalou, L. W. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-660, 1999]. Proponents of a strong embodied account argue that activity in perception/action areas is triggered automatically upon encountering a word and reflect static semantic representations. In contrast to what would be expected if lexical semantic representations are automatically triggered upon encountering a word, a number of studies failed to find motor-related activity for words with a putative action-semantic component [Raposo, A., Moss, H. E., Stamatakis, E. A., & Tyler, L. K. Modulation of motor and premotor cortices by actions, action words and action sentences. Neuropsychologia, 47, 388-396, 2009; Rueschemeyer, S.-A., Brass, M., & Friederici, A. D. Comprehending prehending: Neural correlates of processing verbs with motor stems. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 855-865, 2007]. In a recent fMRI study, Van Dam and colleagues [Van Dam, W. O., Van Dijk, M., Bekkering, H., & Rueschemeyer, S.-A. Flexibility in embodied lexical-semantic representations. Human Brain Mapping, in press] showed that the degree to which a modality-specific region contributes to a representation considerably changes as a function of context. In the current study, we presented words for which both motor and visual properties (e.g., tennis ball, boxing glove) were important in constituting the concept. Our aim was to corroborate on earlier findings of flexible and context-dependent language representations by testing whether functional integration between auditory brain regions and perception/action areas is modulated by context. Functional connectivity was investigated by means of a psychophysiological interaction analysis, in which we found that bilateral superior temporal gyrus was more strongly connected with brain regions relevant for coding action information: (1) for Action Color words vs. Abstract words, and (2) for Action Color words presented in a context that emphasized action vs. a context that emphasized color properties. 12 p.

Contains fulltext : 99328.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) The acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations plays a central role in the ability to intentionally control actions. Humans learn about actions not only through active experience, but also through observing the actions of others. In Experiment 1, we examined whether action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. To this end, participants observed how a model repeatedly pressed two buttons during an observation phase. Each of the buttonpresses led to a specific tone (action effect). In a subsequent test phase, the tones served as target stimuli to which the participants had to respond with buttonpresses. Reaction times were shorter if the stimulus–response mapping in the test phase was compatible with the action–effect association in the observation phase. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that the impact of perceived action effects on own actions was driven merely by an association of spatial features with the particular tones. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the presence of an agent is necessary to acquire novel action–effect associations through observation. Altogether, the study provides evidence for the claim that bidirectional action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. Our findings are discussed in the context of the idea that the acquisition of action–effect associations through observation is an important cognitive mechanism subserving the human ability for social learning.

concepts play a central role in human behaviour and constitute a critical component of the human conceptual system. Here, we investigate the neural basis of four types of abstract concepts, examining their similarities and differences through neuroimaging meta-analyses. We examine numerical and emotional concepts, and two higher-order abstract processes, morality judgements and theory of mind. Three main findings emerge. First, representation of abstract concepts is more widespread than is often assumed. Second, representations of different types of abstract concepts differ in important respects. Each of the domains examined here was associated with some unique areas. Third, some areas were commonly activated across domains and included inferior parietal, posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex. We interpret these regions in terms of their role in episodic recall, event representation and social–emotional processing. We suggest that different types of abstract concepts can be represented and grounded through differing contributions from event-based, interoceptive, introspective and sensory-motor representations. The results underscore the richness and diversity of abstract concepts, argue against single-mechanism accounts for representation of all types of abstract concepts and suggest mechanisms for their direct and indirect grounding. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.

Contains fulltext : 90562.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Embodied accounts of language processing suggest that sensorimotor areas, generally dedicated to perception and action, are also involved in the processing and representation of word meaning. Support for such accounts comes from studies showing that language about actions selectively modulates the execution of congruent and incongruent motor responses (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), and from functional neuroimaging studies showing that understanding action-related language recruits sensorimotor brain areas (e.g. Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermueller, 2004). In the current experiment we explored the basis of the neural motor system's involvement in representing words denoting actions. Specifically, we investigated whether the motor system's involvement is modulated by the specificity of the kinematics associated with a word. Previous research in the visual domain indicates that words denoting basic level category members lacking a specific form (e.g., bird) are less richly encoded within visual areas than words denoting subordinate level members (e.g., pelican), for which the visual form is better specified (Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997). In the present study we extend these findings to the motor domain. Modulation of the BOLD response elicited by verbs denoting a general motor program (e.g., to clean) was compared to modulation elicited by verbs denoting a more specific motor program (e.g., to wipe). Conform with our hypothesis, a region within the bilateral inferior parietal lobule, typically serving the representation of action plans and goals, was sensitive to the specificity of motor programs associated with the action verbs. These findings contribute to the growing body of research on embodied language representations by showing that the concreteness of an action-semantic feature is reflected in the neural response to action verbs.

Item does not contain fulltext According to embodied theories of language (ETLs), word meaning relies on sensorimotor brain areas, generally dedicated to acting and perceiving in the real world. More specifically, words denoting actions are postulated to make use of neural motor areas, while words denoting visual properties draw on the resources of visual brain areas. Therefore, there is a direct correspondence between word meaning and the experience a listener has had with a word's referent on the brain level. Behavioral and neuroimaging studies have provided evidence in favor of ETLs; however, recent studies have also shown that sensorimotor information is recruited in a flexible manner during language comprehension (e. g., Raposo et al. 2009; Van Dam et al., 2012), leaving open the question as to what level of language processing sensorimotor activations contribute. In this study, we investigated the time course of modality-specific contributions (i.e., the contribution of action information) as to word processing by manipulating both (a) the linguistic and (b) the action context in which target words were presented. Our results demonstrate that processes reflecting sensorimotor information play a role early in word processing (i.e., within 200 ms of word presentation), but that they are sensitive to the linguistic context in which a word is presented. In other words, when sensorimotor information is activated, it is activated quickly; however, specific words do not reliably activate a consistent sensorimotor pattern. 18 p.

According to an embodied view of language comprehension, language concepts are grounded in our perceptual systems. Evidence for the idea that concepts are grounded in areas involved in action and perception comes from both behavioral and neuroimaging studies (Glenberg [1997]: Behav Brain Sci 20:1‐55; Barsalou [1999]: Behav Brain Sci 22:577‐660; Pulvermueller [1999]: Behav Brain Sci 22:253‐336; Barsalou et al. [2003]: Trends Cogn Sci 7:84‐91). However, the results from several studies indicate that the activation of information in perception and action areas is not a purely automatic process (Raposo et al. [2009]: Neuropsychologia 47:388‐396; Rueschemeyer et al. [2007]: J Cogn Neurosci 19:855‐865). These findings suggest that embodied representations are flexible. In these studies, flexibility is characterized by the relative presence or absence of activation in our perceptual systems. However, even if the context in which a word is presented does not undermine a motor interpretation, it is possible that the degree to which a modality‐specific region contributes to a representation depends on the context in which conceptual features are retrieved. In the present study, we investigated this issue by presenting word stimuli for which both motor and visual properties (e.g., Tennis ball, Boxing glove) were important in constituting the concept. Conform with the idea that language representations are flexible and context dependent, we demonstrate that the degree to which a modality‐specific region contributes to a representation considerably changes as a function of context. Hum Brain Mapp 33:2322–2333, 2012. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The embodied view of language comprehension proposes that the meaning of words is grounded in perception and action rather than represented in abstract amodal symbols. Support for embodied theories of language processing comes from behavioural studies showing that understanding a sentence about an action can modulate congruent and incongruent physical responses, suggesting motor involvement during comprehension of sentences referring to bodily movement. Additionally, several neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that comprehending single words denoting manipulable objects elicits specific responses in the neural motor system. An interesting question that remains is whether action semantic knowledge is directly activated as motor simulations in the brain, or rather modulated by the semantic context in which action words are encountered. In the current paper we investigated the nature of conceptual representations using a go/no-go lexical decision task. Specifically, target words were either presented in a semantic context that emphasized dominant action features (features related to the functional use of an object) or non-dominant action features. The response latencies in a lexical decision task reveal that participants were faster to respond to words denoting objects for which the functional use was congruent with the prepared movement. This facilitation effect, however, was only apparent when the semantic context emphasized corresponding motor properties. These findings suggest that motor involvement during comprehension of sentences is not automatic. Rather, the results suggest that conceptual processing is a context-dependent process that incorporates motor-related knowledge in a flexible manner.

Contains fulltext : 90261.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Embodied theories of language processing suggest that this motor simulation is an automatic and necessary component of meaning representation. If this is the case, then language and action systems should be mutually dependent (i.e., motor activity should selectively modulate processing of words with an action-semantic component). In this paper, we investigate in two experiments whether evidence for mutual dependence can be found using a motor priming paradigm. Specifically, participants performed either an intentional or a passive motor task while processing words denoting manipulable and nonmanipulable objects. The performance rates (Experiment 1) and response latencies (Experiment 2) in a lexical-decision task reveal that participants performing an intentional action were positively affected in the processing of words denoting manipulable objects as compared to nonmanipulable objects. This was not the case if participants performed a secondary passive motor action (Experiment 1) or did not perform a secondary motor task (Experiment 2). The results go beyond previous research showing that language processes involve motor systems to demonstrate that the execution of motor actions has a selective effect on the semantic processing of words. We suggest that intentional actions activate specific parts of the neural motor system, which are also engaged for lexical-semantic processing of action-related words and discuss the beneficial versus inhibitory nature of this relationship. The results provide new insights into the embodiment of language and the bidirectionality of effects between language and action processing. 7 p.