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This open access book presents novel theoretical, empirical and experimental work exploring the nature of mental representations that support natural language production and understanding, and other manifestations of cognition. One fundamental question raised in the text is whether requisite knowledge structures can be adequately modeled by means of a uniform representational format, and if so, what exactly is its nature. Frames are a key topic covered which have had a strong impact on the exploration of knowledge representations in artificial intelligence, psychology and linguistics; cascades are a novel development in frame theory. Other key subject areas explored are: concepts and categorization, the experimental investigation of mental representation, as well as cognitive analysis in semantics. This book is of interest to students, researchers, and professionals working on cognition in the fields of linguistics, philosophy, and psychology.

Fictive motion, i.e., the figurative stative use of verbs of motion, has attracted much attention in cognitive linguistics as a paradigm case for how basic dynamic concepts are exploited figuratively in concept formation (Langacker 1986; Matsumoto 1996; Talmy 2000; Matlock 2004a, b inter alia). In this paper, we present a case study of the fictive motion reading of the German movement verb steigen ‘climb, rise’ and explore how it can be related to the various dynamic readings of the verb. In our account of steigen, which builds on Gamerschlag, Geuder & Petersen’s (2014) analysis of the dynamic readings of the verb, we contrast the different readings in terms of frames, i.e., recursive attribute-value structures in the sense of Barsalou (1992) and Petersen (2007/2015).

In order to help to explain cognition, cognitive structures are assumed to be present in the mind/brain. While the empirical investigation of such structures is the task of cognitive psychology, the other cognitive science disciplines like linguistics, philosophy and artificial intelligence have an important role in suggesting hypotheses. Researchers in these disciplines increasingly test such hypotheses by empirical means themselves. In philosophy, the traditional way of referring to such structures is via concepts, i.e. those mental entities by which we conceive reality and with the help of which we reason and plan. Linguists traditionally refer to the cognitive structures as meanings—at least those linguists with a mentalistic concept of meaning do who do not think of meaning as extra-mental entities.