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Abstract Background Although total influenza vaccine doses available in the 2005/2006 influenza season were over 80 million, CDC received many reports of delayed and diminished vaccine shipments in October to November of 2005. To better understand the supply problems, CDC and partners surveyed several health care professional groups. Methods Surveys were sent to representative samples of influenza vaccine providers including pediatricians, internists, federally qualified health centers, visiting nurse organizations, and all 64 state and other health departments receiving federal immunization funds directly. In November and December, 2005, providers were asked questions about their experience in ordering influenza vaccine, sources where orders were placed, proportion of orders received, and referral of patients to other vaccination sites. Results The number of providers surveyed (median: 154; range: 64 – 308) and response rates (median: 62%; range: 51% – 77%) varied among groups. Less than half of the providers in most groups placed a single order that was accepted (median: 31%; range: 8% – 53%), and most placed multiple orders. Only 57% of federally qualified health centers and 60% of internists reported they received at least 40% of their orders by the middle of December; the other provider groups received a greater proportion of their orders. Most internists (80%) and federally qualified health centers (54%) reported that they had referred priority group patients to other locations to receive the influenza vaccine due to inadequate supplies. Vaccine providers who ordered only from Chiron received a lower proportion of their orders than providers that ordered from another source or ordered from multiple sources. Conclusion Most of the providers surveyed received only part of their orders by the middle of December. Disruptions in receipt of influenza vaccine during the fall of 2005 were due primarily to shortfalls in vaccine from Chiron and also due to delays and partial shipments from other distributors.

Historical Background Influenza pandemics occur when an animal influenza virus to which humans have no or limited immunity acquires the ability, through genetic reassortment or mutation, to cause sustained human-to-human [...]

In the list of potential bioterrorist agents, influenza would be classified as a category C agent (1). While previous influenza pandemics were naturally occurring events, an influenza pandemic could be [...]

Epidemic influenza, an age-old infectious disease, kills approximately 20,000 men and women in the United States every year. The emergence of influenza viruses bearing novel surface antigens in 1918 (A/H1N1), [...]

Highlights recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program in the U.S. Overview of smallpox transmission and control; Recommendations on the composition of smallpox health care teams; Prevention of contact transmission of vaccinia virus; Contraindications for use of smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program. INSET: Clinical summary of recommendations for using smallpox vaccine....

This study developed methods and determined the impact of influenza vaccination on elderly persons in 3 large health plans: Kaiser Permanente Northwest, HealthPartners, and Oxford Health Plans. Data for the 1996–1997 and 1997–1998 seasons were extracted from administrative databases. Subjects were health plan members ...65 years old. Comorbid conditions collected from the preceding year were used for risk adjustment with logistic regression. The virus-vaccine match was excellent for year 1 and fair for year 2. Both years, during peak and total periods, vaccination reduced all causes of death and hospitalization for pneumonia and influenza: hospitalizations were reduced by 19%-20% and 18%-24% for years 1 and 2, respectively, and deaths were reduced by 60%-61% and 35%-39% for the same periods. These results show that all elderly persons should be immunized annually for influenza. The methods used in this study are an efficient cost-effective way to study vaccine impact and similar questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each year, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) reviews the recommended immunization schedules for persons aged 0 through 18 years to ensure that the schedules reflect current recommendations for Food and Drug Administration-licensed vaccines. In October 2014, ACIP approved the recommended immunization schedules for persons aged 0 through 18 years for 2015, which include several changes from the 2014 immunization schedules. For 2015, the figures, footnotes, and tables are being published on the CDC immunization schedule website (http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/index.html). This provides readers electronic access to the most current version of the schedules and footnotes on the CDC website. Health care providers are advised to use figures, tables, and the combined footnotes together. Printable versions of the 2015 immunization schedules for persons aged 0 through 18 years also are available at the website in several formats, including portrait, landscape, and pocket-sized versions. Ordering instructions for laminated versions and "parent-friendly" schedules also are available at the immunization schedule website.

Annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all health care personnel (HCP). In August 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published a final rule requiring acute care hospitals that participate in its Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting Program to report HCP influenza vaccination data through the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) beginning January 1, 2013. Data reported by 4,254 acute care hospitals, covering the period October 1, 2013, through March 31, 2014, were analyzed to collect estimates of the proportion of HCP vaccinated nationally and by state for three groups: (1) employees, (2) licensed independent practitioners (LIPs), and (3) adult students/trainees and volunteers. Overall in the United States, 81.8% of hospital-based HCP were reported vaccinated, with the highest proportion (86.1%) among employees and the lowest (61.9%) among LIPs. The proportion reported vaccinated varied widely by state, with ranges of 69.0%-97.6% for employees, 33.8%-93.6% for LIPs, and 50.3%-96.3% for adult students/trainees and volunteers. Public reporting of vaccination data has been shown to increase HCP influenza vaccination coverage. These new NHSN data provide a baseline for measuring changes in future hospital-based reporting of HCP influenza vaccination.

This report updates the 2005 recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine and antiviral agents (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2005;54[No. RR-8]:1--44). The 2006 recommendations include new and updated information. Principal changes include 1) recommending vaccination of children aged 24-59 months and their household contacts and out-of-home caregivers against influenza; 2) highlighting the importance of administering 2 doses of influenza vaccine for children aged 6 months--<9 years who were previously unvaccinated; 3) advising health-care providers, those planning organized campaigns, and state and local public health agencies to a) develop plans for expanding outreach and infrastructure to vaccinate more persons than the previous year and b) develop contingency plans for the timing and prioritization of administering influenza vaccine, if the supply of vaccine is delayed and/or reduced; 4) reminding providers that they should routinely offer influenza vaccine to patients throughout the influenza season; 5) recommending that neither amantadine nor rimantadine be used for the treatment or chemoprophylaxis of influenza A in the United States until evidence of susceptibility to these antiviral medications has been re-established among circulating influenza A viruses; and 6) using the 2006-07 trivalent influenza vaccine virus strains: A/New Caledonia/20/1999 (H1N1)-like, A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2)-like, and B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like antigens. For the A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2)-like antigen, manufacturers may use the antigenically equivalent A/Hiroshima/52/2005 virus; for the B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like antigen, manufacturers may use the antigenically equivalent B/Ohio/1/2005 virus. A link to this report and other information can be accessed at http://www.cdc.gov/flu.

This report supplements the 2001 statement by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) (CDC. Vaccinia [smallpox] vaccine: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 2001. MMWR 2001;50[No. RR-10]:1-25). This supplemental report provides recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program in the United States. To facilitate preparedness and response, smallpox vaccination is recommended for persons designated by public health authorities to conduct investigation and follow-up of initial smallpox cases that might necessitate direct patient contact. ACIP recommends that each state and territory establish and maintain > or = 1 smallpox response team. ACIP and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommend that each acute-care hospital identify health-care workers who can be vaccinated and trained to provide direct medical care for the first smallpox patients requiring hospital admission and to evaluate and manage patients who are suspected as having smallpox. When feasible, the first-stage vaccination program should include previously vaccinated health-care personnel to decrease the potential for adverse events. Additionally persons administering smallpox vaccine in this pre-event vaccination program should be vaccinated. Smallpox vaccine is administered by using the multiple-puncture technique with a bifurcated needle, packaged with the vaccine and diluent. According to the product labeling, 2-3 punctures are recommended for primary vaccination and 15 punctures for revaccination. A trace of blood should appear at the vaccination site after 15-20 seconds; if no trace of blood is visible, an additional 3 insertions should be made by using the same bifurcated needle without reinserting the needle into the vaccine vial. If no evidence of vaccine take is apparent after 7 days, the person can be vaccinated again. Optimal infection-control practices and appropriate site care should prevent transmission of vaccinia virus from vaccinated health-care workers to patients. Health-care personnel providing direct patient care should keep their vaccination sites covered with gauze in combination with a semipermeable membrane dressing to absorb exudates and to provide a barrier for containment of vaccinia virus to minimize the risk of transmission; the dressing should also be covered by a layer of clothing. Dressings used to cover the site should be changed frequently to prevent accumulation of exudates and consequent maceration. The most critical measure in preventing contact transmission is consistent hand hygiene. Hospitals should designate staff to assess dressings for all vaccinated health-care workers. When feasible, staff responsible for dressing changes for smallpox health-care teams should be vaccinated, all persons handling dressings should observe contact precautions. Administrative leave is not required routinely for newly vaccinated health-care personnel unless they are physically unable to work as a result of systemic signs and symptoms of illness; have extensive skin lesions that cannot be adequately covered or if they are unable to adhere to the recommended infection-control precautions. Persons outside the patient-care setting can keep their vaccination sites covered with a porous dressing hand hygiene remains key to preventing inadvertent inoculation. FDA has recommended that recipients of smallpox vaccine be deferred from donating blood for 21 days or until the scab has separated. Contacts of vaccinees, who have inadvertently contracted vaccinia, also should be deferred from donating blood for 14 days after complete resolution of their complication. In the pre-event vaccination program, smallpox vaccination is contraindicated for persons with a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosuppression; are aged < 1 year; who have a serious allergy to any component of the vaccine; or who are pregnant or breastfeeding. ACIP does not recommend smallpox vaccination for children and adolescents aged < 18 years during the pre-event vaccination program. Pre-event vaccination also is contraindicated among persons with household contacts who have a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosuppression; or who are pregnant. For purposes of screening for contraindications for pre-event vaccination, household contacts include persons with prolonged intimate contact (e.g., sexual contacts) with the potential vaccinee and others who might have direct contact with the vaccination site. Persons with inflammatory eye disease might be at increased risk for inadvertent inoculation as a result of touching or rubbing the eye. Therefore, deferring vaccination is prudent for persons with inflammatory eye diseases requiring steroid treatment until the condition resolves and the course of therapy is complete. Eczema vaccinatum, a serious form of disseminated vaccinia infection, can occur among persons with atopic dermatitis and other dermatologic conditions. Potential vaccinees should be queried regarding the diagnosis of atopic dermatitis or eczema in themselves or any member of their household, or regarding the presence of chronic or recurrent rashes consistent with these diagnoses. Persons reporting such a rash in themselves or household members should not be vaccinated, unless a health-care provider determines that the rash is not eczema or atopic dermatitis. Before vaccination, women of childbearing age should be asked if they are pregnant or intend to become pregnant during the next 4 weeks; women who respond positively should not be vaccinated. Any woman who thinks she might be pregnant or who wants additional assurance that she is not pregnant should perform a urine pregnancy test on the day scheduled for vaccination. If a pregnant woman is inadvertently vaccinated or if she becomes pregnant within 4 weeks after smallpox vaccination, she should be counseled regarding concerns for the fetus. Vaccination during pregnancy should not ordinarily be a reason to terminate pregnancy. CDC has established a pregnancy registry to prospectively follow the outcome of such pregnancies and facilitate the investigation of any adverse pregnancy outcome among pregnant women who were inadvertently vaccinated. For enrollment in the registry, contact CDC at 404-639-8253. Smallpox vaccine should not be administered to persons with human immunodeficiency virus infection (HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as part of a pre-event program because of their increased risk for progressive vaccinia. HIV testing is recommended for persons who have any history of a risk factor for HIV infection or for anyone who is concerned that he or she might have HIV infection. HIV testing should be available in a confidential or anonymous setting, in accordance with local laws and regulations, with results communicated to the potential vaccinee before the planned date of vaccination. Smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with any inactivated vaccine. With the exception of varicella vaccine, smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with other live-virus vaccines. To avoid confusion in ascertaining which vaccine might have caused postvaccination skin lesions or other adverse events, varicella vaccine and smallpox vaccine should be administered >4 weeks apart. Health-care workers scheduled to receive an annual purified protein derivative (PPD) skin test for tuberculosis screening should not receive the skin test until >1 month after smallpox vaccination. Persons with progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and severe generalized vaccinia or inadvertent inoculation might benefit from therapy with VIG or cidofovir, although the latter has not been approved by FDA for this indication. Suspected cases of these illnesses or other severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination should be reported immediately to state health departments. VIG and cidofovir are available from CDC under Investigational New Drug protocols. Clinically severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System. Reports can be made online at https://secure.vaers.org/VaersDataEntryintro.htm, or by postage-paid form, which is available by calling 800-822-7967 (toll-free). ACIP will review these recommendations periodically as new information becomes available related to smallpox disease, smallpox vaccines, the risk of smallpox attack, smallpox vaccine adverse events, and the experience gained as recent recommendations are implemented. Revised recommendations will be developed as needed.