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In this paper, we examine the arguments presented by John Mearsheimer in his work on the Ukrainian crisis. Guided by the principles of neorealism, Mearsheimer fundamentally portrays Russia as a declining power forced to defend itself due to Washington’s reckless policies. Policies driven by liberal ideals rather than the principles of realpolitik led to NATO’s expansion into parts of Europe that constitute Russia’s sphere of interest, ultimately resulting in the conflict in Ukraine. While we agree with certain aspects of Mearsheimer’s work, we believe that specific deficiencies create a misleading picture of Russia and its policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis focuses on aspects of Russian history in these areas and the development of its strategic culture. Based on these foundations, we come to understand that Russian strategic culture is deeply rooted in its historical experience and largely adheres to principles of offensive strategy. Its policy in Ukraine, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, represents a historical continuity of Russian military activity, which is not a reaction to Washington’s policy but rather a part of a broader strategic culture and the way Moscow formulates foreign policy and perceives the international environment.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 marks a security policy paradigm shift akin to ‘9/11’ for Europe. For the international community of security experts, the invasion represents an anomaly for their rational choice analysis. Their ‘logic of consequence’ must be replaced by the alternative ‘logic of appropriateness’. Hence, the author of this paper employs a broad approach to strategic culture stressing Kremlin regime security as Putin’s operational code. Under this approach, interventionism characterizes the Russian ‘way of war’ as does sheer brutality. The decision to invade Ukraine resulted from Putin’s personal hubris and idiosyncrasies as much as groupthink within the Russian security elite. Putin’s calculus behind invading Ukraine is reconstructed as geopolitical and geo-economic imperialism, along with domestic concerns for pacifying Russia. The first year of war exposed a dysfunctional Russian strategic culture - a collapsing Blitzkrieg effort and a failure to prevail in the subsequent battle for Donbas. The Russian conduct of war reiterated the signature Russian strategic culture of massive destruction and unpunished war crimes. Putin often doubles down and escalates, as seen in the partial mobilization on 21st September 2022. The winter of 2022–2023 brought both systematic Russian attacks on critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure and fierce battles in Vuhledar, Soledar and Bakhmut in which Russia used meatgrinder tactics. The Russian military performance improved during the second year of the war due to the construction of massive fortifications along the frontline. Putin’s strategy has thus turned in favour of a long war of attrition seeking to outlast the combined effect of successive Western upgrading of the weapons supplied to Ukraine and the stamina of the Ukrainians themselves. The Ukrainian counteroffensive shows Ukraine to have the initiative, but progress is painfully slow. This reflects the fact that the war is a war of attrition between two different militaries supported by two dissimilar coalitions of productive power and high-tech innovative capacity.

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Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on strategic culture as an analytical tool that provides a deeper understanding of a state’s behavior and its strategic choice to use force, whether for aggression or self-defense, using Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine as a case study. While strategic culture is generally resistant to change, we identified shifts in Ukraine’s strategic culture in response to external shocks in 2014 and 2022. This was based on an analysis of military-political behavior patterns, components, and manifestations of strategic culture, as reflected in state strategies on national security and defense, as well as in other relevant documents and texts. We argue that Russia’s aggressive military-political behavior, shaped by Soviet-imperial revanchist sentiments, has become an existential threat to Ukraine. This study contributes to a better understanding of why some conflict resolution measures and strategies have proven ineffective in addressing the ongoing Russian war.

Despite the growing emphasis on integrating collaborative problem-solving (CPS) into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of this educational approach remains a challenge. This study aims to identify effective strategic and behavioral factors in course design and assess how these factors contribute to students' learning performance. This study collected data from 106 students enrolled in seventh-grade science classes by using a mixed-method approach. First, the t-test results indicate that students' learning performance was improved through CPS-based STEM learning. A path analysis shows that CPS awareness and several behavioral factors had direct effects, while several strategic factors had indirect effects on the improvement of learning performance. Finally, a dialog analysis indicates that students' integrative use of CPS skills, especially task regulation skills used along with other skills, helped improve learning performance. This study not only bridges the gap in understanding the effectiveness of CPS in STEM education but also provides specific suggestions for improving instructional design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research of the ideological foundations of Scythianism and Eurasianism underlines the conceptual affinity between these two movements, as well as their cause-and-effect relationship. These phenomena are embedded within the particular historical and social context. They are part of Russian socio-political thought during the pivotal years of the Great War and the October Revolution, and represent a medium through which we can reconstruct the prevailing "spirit of the time." Nevertheless, the focal point of this study is oriented towards the future, not the past. This is due to the fact that the ideas emanating from these movements hold a greater contemporary relevance than they did a century ago. We conclude that both Scythianism and Eurasianism are not just part of history, but rather far-reaching visions being realized before our eyes. From a contemporary perspective, the Scythians are pioneers of a "creative era" whose intuition and elan vital set Russia on a new civilizational trajectory. Their significance becomes particularly pronounced on the threshold of tectonic international changes and apocalyptic forecasts that can no longer be remedied through "political reforms", but solely through systemic changes. Similar to the period before the First World War, an avantgarde strategic culture emerges as a suitable solution, especially taking into account the dispersion of global power in the collective West.

Classic theory of civil-military relations was mostly limited to empirical-descriptive studies, while theoretical starting point of such studies was rudimentary. The end of the Cold War brought about new challenges and questions, causing the need for theoretic grounds and expansion of research agenda of civil-military relations. Consequently, the subject of this paper encompasses the overview of the evolution of the theoretical framework and research agenda of civil-military relations, starting from the classical theory towards theoretical paradigms of the constructivists. The primary objective of the paper is to establish theoretical grounds of civil-military relations on the principles of Constructivism and strategic culture, as a fruitful analytical framework for the study of those relations as a dependent variable. In this paper, the method used is the overview of academic literature to achieve a systematic insight into relevant theoretical positions of the author which thematise strategic culture and civil-military relations on the principles of Constructivism. Two basic perspectives of strategic culture study have been singled out that determine the way of shaping those relations as a dependent variable. In concrete terms, civil-military relations can be analysed as a product of unique ideational elements of national culture, tradition and history of a nation, and as a product of discursive practices of political and military elites. Overall, the study of strategic culture enables overcoming anachronistic perspective of civil-military relations, offering and innovative theoretical and analytical framework that enables opening research agenda for new questions and subjects.

The primary objective of the article is to evaluate the significance of status and allied reputation within Denmark’s strategic culture. Amongst Danish international relations scholars, there is a well-established notion that one of the key motivations for the use of military force in Danish foreign policy was the aspiration to cultivate special relations with the United States and achieve the status of a privileged ally. This status would confirm guarantees for Denmark’s national security, provide the country with an opportunity for distinctive influence in decision-making and agenda-setting in NATO, the EU, and transatlantic cooperation. A qualitative content analysis of the 2017—2018, 2019—2020 and 2022 Danish foreign policy strategies was carried out to determine the effect of such expert perceptions on the texts of the guiding foreign policy documents. The analysis highlighted and confirmed the ‘super Atlanticism’ tendencies in Denmark’s contemporary strategic culture, revealing its close ties with the Danish perception of the US as the safeguard for the liberal world order and associated multilateral institutions. Denmark’s value-driven militarised foreign political activism in the post-Cold War era is thus not only pragmatic but also ideological as it seeks to promote liberal values, democracy and human rights under American leadership. The article concludes that factoring in status and reputation in strategic culture studies may complement the explanations of security community formation, alliance strategies and the dynamics behind relations within different types of alliances.

The article examines the strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with the focus on the dominance of military elites in the political life of this state. The author’s goal is to analyze the factors that led to the rise of the army in the specific political and security environment of Pakistan. The generalship has done more than merely determine the main directions of the security policy and make principled decisions of a strategic nature; it has fully controlled all aspects of Pakistani society. This has been the case not only during military coups and direct military rule, but also when civilian governments were in power. Crucial decisions have been made only with the consent of or even as initiated by the army leadership. Moreover, from the very beginning of its independence, Pakistan has been nurturing its own version of the "army + Islam" formula, in which one component complemented and upheld the other. This "duet" was deeply rooted in the very emergence of Pakistani identity as a Muslim state of South Asia, i.e., a state established on a religious basis. After highlighting the preceding historical factors of the formation of such a specific culture, the study then explores its manifestations in the contemporary state through examples illustrating the influence of military leaders on the internal development and international behavior of the country. The author argues that for the 75 years of its independence, the Pakistani army has been a guarantor of social stability, which has brought it significant support from the population. On the other hand, the generalship has been repeatedly criticized for inhibiting the development of democratic institutions in the country and active interference in domestic policies and the life of the population. The author places a special emphasis on investigating the strategic behavior of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the context of the development of Ukrainian-Pakistani relations. The army has the power to influence bilateral cooperation and Pakistan’s official neutral position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war by adjusting this attitude.

The article demonstrates that the Danish Armed Forces based its decision to establish the Joint Arctic Command in 2012 on a desire to rationalise and cut defence spending in general rather than in an attempt to strengthen Denmark’s military posture in the Artic. We make this argument by employing the concept of strategic culture to make sense of these decisions and to provide an understanding of the overall strategic logic behind Denmark’s military presence. Based on eight interviews with key informants involved in the establishment of the new joint command, supplemented with published and other written sources, we argue that cost-cutting arguments weighed heavier than strategic rationales during the process leading up to the creation of the Joint Arctic Command. Using strategic culture as our analytical framework allows us to provide an alternative explanation to that usually found in the literature, in which the establishment of JACO is held to be an index of a stronger Arctic focus in Danish foreign and security policy. This analysis prompts further consideration of what we can expect from the Danish Armed Forces in the years to come.

Copyright of Hispania: Revista Española de Historia is the property of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article demonstrates that the Danish Armed Forces based its decision to establish the Joint Arctic Command in 2012 on a desire to rationalise and cut defence spending in general rather than in an attempt to strengthen Denmark's military posture in the Artic. We make this argument by employing the concept of strategic culture to make sense of these decisions and to provide an understanding of the overall strategic logic behind Denmark's military presence. Based on eight interviews with key informants involved in the establishment of the new joint command, supplemented with published and other written sources, we argue that cost-cutting arguments weighed heavier than strategic rationales during the process leading up to the creation of the Joint Arctic Command. Using strategic culture as our analytical framework allows us to provide an alternative explanation to that usually found in the literature, in which the establishment of JACO is held to be an index of a stronger Arctic focus in Danish foreign and security policy. This analysis prompts further consideration of what we can expect from the Danish Armed Forces in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to reveal the intention of “strategic culture”, which has a significant cognitive potential for studying the political course of the main players in the modern world. In modern-day Russia, the study of this phenomenon is characterized by inconsistency and ambiguity, which has disorienting consequences and makes it difficult to use the concept to identify political phenomena and processes. The situation is further complicated by the lack of clarity about what a political strategy is. The article gives the author’s vision of the strategy and reveals how the strategic culture is determined by the historical past of the nation, including its military experience. Therefore, the concept of “strategic culture” refers to the dependence of the subject’s political behavior on their perception of security. This perception is determined by the historical experience of the use of military force and the attitude towards it. Therefore, in practice, strategic culture is expressed in preferences when choosing ways and means of the subject’s response to changes in the environment.The comprehension of a specific strategic culture is complicated by the fact that, while existing and being insufficiently studied and explained, it can be perceived as an irrational phenomenon. Understanding the strategic culture requires the perception of value meanings, symbols, and motives of political players. It leads to increased requirements for the choice of methodology and research methods. The study of strategic culture and related phenomena involves the complex use of applied and specific methods. Among them, discourse analysis and content analysis, cross-cultural, semantic and semiotic analysis, study of documents, analysis of performance results should be singled out.

This article deals with the problem of assessing and interpreting expansionist elements in Poland’s international political behaviour. The problem is approached using the concept of the strategic culture of states, which covers beliefs, perceptions, and the language states use to describe their own and other countries’ actions. The study examines what expansionist types of strategic culture have developed in Poland, how relevant they are in the current political landscape, and describes their differences and similarities. To this end, the intellectual origins of foreign policy ideas prevalent in Poland (Rzeczpospolita) are traced, and the challenges of the external environment are correlated with the way they have been perceived in the course of Poland’s historical development. Two historically contingent expansionist types of strategic culture were identified. Firstly, as a medium-sized state that has faced military defeats, the Polish state has hardly embraced ideas bearing on the ‘besieged fortress’ concept. Secondly, the very culture of limited power politics has assumed some unique characteristics in the country: greater readiness to take risks and fascination with power actions. This state of affairs is largely a result of the contours of the regional project having been drawn for the neighbouring states mostly based on the negative type of consolidation (against the Muslims and later the Bolsheviks) and therefore never reaching a sufficient level of detail.

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. Bibliography Entry Fatima Sherazi, Anees. 2023. "Role of Maritime Strategy in Russian Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Black Sea." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 115-124.

This paper examines the strategic cultures of India and Pakistan, their development through time, and their relative effects on South Asia’s strategic stability. It explains the distinctive components that make up each nation’s strategic culture, influenced by historical events, political processes, national identities, and geopolitical circumstances, via in-depth research. The research highlights essential contrasts in the strategic cultures of Pakistan and India and attributes these differences to the divergence in their distinct national trajectories and political evolutions. The historical non-alignment, democratic ethos, economic objectives, and geopolitical factors are used to examine the Indian strategic culture. The paper also considers how these different strategic cultures affect the intricate connection between these nuclear-armed neighbors by building on this basis. It broadens the discussion to consider how Pakistani and Indian strategic cultures may affect South Asia’s regional stability. The research highlights strategic cultures’ crucial role in determining regional dynamics and interstate interactions.

Copyright of Socioloski Pregled is the property of Srpsko Sociolosko Drustvo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In September 2021, Australia, the US, and the United Kingdom entered into a new trilateral security pact, AUKUS. Central to AUKUS is Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, scheduled to begin delivery in the 2030s. AUKUS was announced by Australia's previous conservative government, but it has also won the strong support of the new Labor government. The rationale behind AUKUS emphasizes growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and the advantages of joint capabilities and interoperability in the context of China's growing assertiveness in the region. This article examines AUKUS through the lens of China's rise and the contradictory economic and security imperatives that the agreement poses for Australia. We argue that AUKUS is the latest expression of Australia's strategic culture, which is premised on a fear of abandonment and a conviction that Australia's core security interests can only be guaranteed by the support of the US. Yet this position harbours risks that are not widely acknowledged. These include risks to Australia's sovereignty and other risks arising from the uncertainties of the US position in Asia and the volatility of US domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past two decades, the Turkish government has been seeking strategic autonomy in international relations by trying different foreign policy styles. Throughout that time, Turkey strongly prioritized its own interests in relations with other regional and global powers, and pursued a multilateral and balanced policy, seeing it as a window for more opportunities to maneuver in foreign policy. Part of Turkey's approach to strategic autonomy relied on hedging, even if it resulted in the emergence of asymmetric relations with others. For example, Turkey developed not always economically and politically symmetric relations with Russia that had strong implications for the Middle East, South Caucasus, Black Sea region and Central Asia. On 24 February 2022, after Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, Turkey did not join in with Western sanctions against Russia, and instead attempted to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow. This decision was not spontaneous, as it was premised on years of building and strengthening bilateral ties with Russia, despite some devastating incidents between the two. This article is an inquiry into the search for strategic autonomy in Turkey's foreign policy with a focus on its relations with Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text brings to the fore an exploratory research. On one hand, the article sets out to explore the emergence of potential strategic subcultures in China. On the other hand, the article tries to frontload two different research approaches on the strategic (sub)cultures of a given state, namely, an inside-out way of investigation and an outside-in one. Even if it relies on an exploratory research, the text is not a descriptive one. It rests on a minimal research design, that is, research questions, literature review, and empirical data. The explanatory paradigm that this text employs is neoclassical realism, a meta-theory that has emerged at the intersection of realism with constructivism. According to this paradigm, a series of subsistemic factors, among which lies also the dominant strategic subculture, may account for a certain autonomy of a given state’s political elites when faced with regional or international pressures. The main concept that this text puts forward is that of dominant strategic subculture, which emerges as an outgrowth of elite competition in a certain state.

The paper theoretically investigates the phenomena of ontological security and collective identity through the prism of strategic culture, with an empirical elaboration of the case study of Kosovo and Metohija. The authors supplement the realistic understanding of security with a social-constructivist perspective, emphasizing the influence of values, ideas, perceptions and culture in general in the shaping of collective identity, which is closely related to the subjective sense of security. The main hypothesis is that the solidity of the collective identity survives regardless of external pressures and reshaping tendencies because its survival is perceived as an inseparable essence of ontological security. The authors conclude that the strength of collective identity in certain situations overcomes the problems of collapsed institutions and the absence of actors who advocate the basic values of that identity. Kosovo and Metohija is more than a material part of the territory, strongly building the foundations of collective identity. An individual who feels a sense of belonging to such a collective identity will almost instinctively reject any solution which affects that identity, so he will perceive an attack on those values, no matter how intense, as a feeling of personal insecurity.

Throughout history, Serbs and Albanians have had periods of coexistence and cooperation, but more often than not there have been periods of conflicts, wih the long-standing one regarding the control over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Nevertheless, almost half a century since the appearance of the concept, there have been no significant efforts to define basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture, which are evident shortcomings of Serbian strategic studies. This paper has the aim to initiate a process of systematic study of the abovementioned research problem, with the aim to objectively and rationally obtain basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture by applying almost all scientific methods, especially hypothetico-deductive method. The paper's main hypothesis states as follows: basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture are predominantly "mercantile" approach towards diplomacy with strong support from diaspora, by which they seek to support persistent aspirations for the control over the territory with the majority of Albanian population, whereby they do not hesitate to use political violence, while the military force is engaged exclusively with previously provided support from great powers. Basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture point to the necessity to reevaluate our strategic approach towards Albanians.

The article deals with the «total defense» concept considering it to be part of Sweden’s strategic culture and provides an overview of how this concept defines Sweden’s approach towards the defense cooperation within the EU. «Total defence» remains staple in the Swedish defence planning and the perception of risks to national security, but has not yet received sufficient attention from Russian researchers. The announced restoration of the effective total defense system potentially comparable to that of the period of bipolar confrontation is associated with significant difficulties due to the gradual reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War and the decentralization of the national crisis preparedness structures which was initiated in the early 2000s. The total defense itself also reveals tensions between the demands for consolidation and centralized decision-making and the liberal, open nature of the Swedish society and national economy, as well as the principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and similarity that underline the present Swedish emergency response system. The total defense, is, therefore, regarded as an attempt at creating an effective crisis preparedness system that would function successfully in a democratic society, both under the conditions of peace and potential armed conflict, without the need to declare an emergency and endow individual bodies or a selected group of individuals with exclusive powers. The Swedish strategic culture, therefore, stipulates that it is important not only to resolve a crisis effectively, but also to do so in a way which would not endanger the regular functioning of political institutions and the rule of law. Within the EU Sweden has earned credit for developing civilian or non-military elements of crisis management, while «more hardware» defense cooperation within PESCO and the European Defense Fund is defined by the pragmatic economic interests of Swedish defense companies rather than by strategic considerations. The Swedish Experience with «total defence» will continue to face the same dilemma – the need to rebuild a robust and self-reliant national defence while preserving the liberal principles in politics as well as in economy.

Strategic success is usually associated with having deliberate intentions, prior stated goals and a comprehensively formulated plan for effective execution. This way of thinking is driven by a means-ends logic and underpinned by the cognitivist assumption that conscious thought and consequential reasoning drive effective action: such privileging of thought over action is endemic in strategic theorizing. Our purpose in this paper is to demonstrate the plausibility of other, precognitive logics of strategic action and 'intention' as alternative explanatory bases for strategic success. We identify three such logics and their associated forms of intentionality. A 'logic of practices' views collectively shared habitus rather than conscious cognition/deliberate intention as the basis of effective strategic action. A 'logic of situation' emphasizes how situational momentum, tendencies and affordances themselves contain pre-cognitive 'in-tensional' impulses that actively elicit appropriate strategic responses. Finally, a 'logic of potential' associated with what Friedrich Nietzsche termed 'will to power'. It is with this fourth logic, we suggest, that strategic intention becomes most effective. In will to power, strategy entails the relentless expanding of degrees of freedom from environmental constraints without presuming cognitive separation from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how non-expansionist types of strategic culture emerged and gradually developed in Poland. The study aims to identify the features of non-expansionist types of Polish strategic culture for a more objective analysis of the country's modern foreign and security policy. The article begins by describing the emergence and use of the concept of strategic culture, offering a typology of strategic cultures based on the work of the 'cultural realist' Alastair Johnston. Then it employs a qualitative method of process tracing to outline the sequence of events and the ideological constructs that led to the emergence or degradation of the corresponding types of strategic culture. The strategic culture of neutrality, exposed to external influences and revised republicanism ideas, is shown to have laid the foundation for a strategic culture of political fortification (or an outpost) in Poland. This strategic culture has its origins in the idea of the ethical superiority of the Polish state, although the details of this superiority may differ dramatically in specific situations. At the same time, none of the types of the accommodation culture has yet emerged in Poland, albeit accommodation seems to be a promising lead for the further development of the country’s strategic culture.

Until today, the European Union (EU) has associated its foreign policy with normative power, which is the main instrument of soſt power. However, the crisis of global governance has affected the global strategy of the EU. The article explores the most pressing of these changes. The research was based on official publications made by various European think tanks and individual analysts. The EU has an effective mechanism for interaction between think tanks and political leaders. As a result, the European analytics can justify various concepts and approaches that later acquire legislative forms. Also, the scientific analytics makes it possible to test the decisions being made. The article focuses on the following EU issues: new strategic culture; geopolitics and normative power in strategic documents; strategic autonomy; differentiation and fragmentation as policy tools; the end of unanimity in making responsible decisions; the concept of pragmatic federalism; military development; the so-called Strategic Compass; the Russian military special operation and the concept of world order, etc.

Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to concern about the implications for Arctic governance and stability. The Arctic Council has been temporarily suspended and the security tension between Russia and the seven other Western Arctic states has intensified. A more isolated Russia under Western sanctions leans even more towards the East, where China, especially, figures as an attractive strategic partner. In this article, we set out to examine the prospects for Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic. We introduce a social constructivist perspective highlighting how strategic culture may serve as a lens through which to analyse developments in states’ strategies – specifically their ends, ways and means. Applying our culturally applicable ends-ways-means (EWM) model, we show how Russian and Chinese strategic cultures set distinct limits to their strategic cooperation in the Arctic. The two states’ identity-driven urge to secure and display their great power position will increasingly collide. It is therefore our prediction that Russia and China will eventually act in ways that will gradually come to undermine their strategic cooperation in the region.

Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to concern about the implications for Arctic governance and stability. The Arctic Council has been temporarily suspended and the security tension between Russia and the seven other Western Arctic states has intensified. A more isolated Russia under Western sanctions leans even more towards the East, where China, especially, figures as an attractive strategic partner. In this article, we set out to examine the prospects for Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic. We introduce a social constructivist perspective highlighting how strategic culture may serve as a lens through which to analyse developments in states' strategies – specifically their ends, ways and means. Applying our culturally applicable ends-ways-means (EWM) model, we show how Russian and Chinese strategic cultures set distinct limits to their strategic cooperation in the Arctic. The two states' identity-driven urge to secure and display their great power position will increasingly collide. It is therefore our prediction that Russia and China will eventually act in ways that will gradually come to undermine their strategic cooperation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s strategic involvement in the African region is multi-faceted as it seeks to bolster economic, political, and security ties. Chinese security and political engagement with African countries are driven by its interest in stimulating its economic rise. This research is qualitative and exploratory in nature and utilizes the concept of strategic culture to analyze the motivations behind Beijing’s interests and behavior in the African continent. Confucian-Mencian and Parabellum form two major strands of Chinese Strategic Culture, making it a unique Cult of Defense. Three important case studies have been analyzed through the prism of the country’s strategic culture, i.e. Chinese economic engagement with one of its largest trading partners― South Africa―, Chinese political engagement in the conflicts of Sudan and South Sudan, and lastly, its security engagement in Djibouti where it established its first foreign military base. Chinese three-dimensional engagements in Africa have had both positive and negative implications for the region. This research concludes that Chinese strategic culture is not static and likely to adapt itself in accordance with the opportunities available for Beijing and its goals in Africa.

War as a political and social phenomenon is one of the central subjects in political science and international studies. This is one issue where theory and practice are intertwined most closely and updated most frequently since each new military conflict discovers new facets of war and peace for researchers, military and policy-making circles. This theme nests a number of related disciplines and subtopics some of which have become especially relevant amidst growing interstate rivalry on a global scale and in certain regions of the world. What do “containment” and “escalation” mean today? To what extent is a state’s foreign policy strategy determined by its “strategic culture”? How relevant are the ideas of the great military thinkers of the past to modern and future wars? At the center of all these stories is the issue of the evolution of means of armed struggle: how they are changing and what humanity can come to as a result of the “arrogance of force” of some states. To discuss these and other matters, Comparative Politics Russia sat down with Dr. Kokoshin, one of Russia’s leading experts in the field of military-political, socio-economic and technological aspects of international and national security.

Growing complexity of the modern world order calls for the search for strategic stability in order to prevent a new global military clash. In view of recent political events, Russia and China have strengthened their cooperation, creating a strategic stability dyad in contrast to the United States and other Western countries. However, the strategic stability of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China is not fully beneficial for Russia due to the peculiarity of the Chinese strategic culture, which is cinocentric. The absence of Russian strategic culture eliminates the equality of the two countries and pushes Russia to submit and mimic China. The author offers her vision of balancing the two forces. The first is the legal basis, which is to update the bilateral agreement between Russia and China with an effort to strengthen the positions and advantages of the Russian side. The second is the development of Russian strategic thinking and, as a result, the emergence of national strategic culture that will contribute to the formation of an adequate foreign policy course of the Russian Federation in the new world stability.

Strategic culture involves diplomatic ties, geopolitical orientation and political ideology involving the military. India’s strategic culture orientates pro-nationalist policies, emphasizing the business progression of a specific class, discriminating in exercising minority rights, and imbalancing diplomatic ties with neighbouring states for regional hegemony. Indian leadership, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Narendra Modi, has kept regional dominance as a primary Indian strategic objective. More importantly, the Indian strategic community has carefully maintained narrative linking insurgencies with its neighbours, especially Pakistan. A cross-sectional analysis of Indian political doctrines explains how internal security challenges of India are shaping its strategic culture and stance towards Pakistan. It includes contextualizing the concept of strategic culture and modelling Indian strategic culture to the scope of research. The impact of Indian strategic culture on Pakistan is multi-dimensional, ranging from combat capabilities to international presence at international forums like the UN and FATF. The research proposes policy options and action points for Pakistan. The paper establishes three fundamental aspects. First, the Indian strategic thoughts are rooted in Kautilyian discourse. Second, linking Pakistan with insurgencies in India. Third, with the rise of Hindutva through the BJP with a conducive geostrategic environment, India has resorted to an offensive-defensive strategy towards Pakistan. With these interpretations, the research paves the way for identifying policy options for Pakistan while considering Pakistan’s national interests. Bibliography Entry Malik, Tassawar Aziz, and Sehrish Qayyum. 2022. "Indian Political Doctrines: Understanding Internal Security Dynamics of India Impacting Pakistan." Margalla Papers 26 (1): 18-33.

Geography, culture and history play a central role in shaping a nation's perceptions, biases and images of adversaries. The combination of these factors constitutes strategic culture. Strategic communities tend to adopt diverse approaches to interpreting, analysing and reacting to a given situation. They may incline to pick peculiar strategic choices, such as using force or relying on external alliances, while not opting for a range of others. Decisions and choices are affected by patterns of thinking that evolved over the years. Strategic culture has evolved and generated significant discussion on theoretical frameworks and potential applications in a regional and international security context. Pakistan-India strategic equation is a complex phenomenon, fraught with hostility and mistrust, impregnated with conventional and non-conventional hazards. India views Pakistan as a stumbling block in realising her power ambition, while Pakistan considers India an existential threat. The article analyses the effect of strategic culture on inter-state relations with emphasis on Pakistan-India relations. Unique historical events, geography, the influence of dominant strategic strata and perception biases shape respective strategic cultures. It further analyses strategic culture based on Hofstede's Model, besides pondering upon symbols and philosophical influences. Bibliography Entry Ali, Shehzad. 2022. "Strategic Culture and Inter-State Relations: A Case of Pakistan and India." Margalla Papers 26 (1): 121-131.

Throughout the entire 20th century, the Serbian strategic culture was "torn" by various discontinuities, from the state system, through foreign policy and ideological, to strategic and doctrinal orientation, and it can be said that discontinuity is almost its only constant. Nevertheless, the existence of military cliques can be considered to be one of the constants of the Serbian strategic culture. They followed the Serbian Army and influenced the political life of the Kingdom of Serbia. The dynastic coup of May 1903 can be taken as an example of their actions. After that, younger conspirators established the so-called Black Hand, whose leader was Colonel Apis, who was shot after the Thessaloniki process in 1917. The interwar period was marked by the action of the so-called White Hand, under the leadership of General Petar Živković, which was active until the assassination of King Alexander Karađorđević in Marseilles in 1934. The Second Yugoslavia even had a formalized "military clique" represented in the League of Communists, which was an integral part of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at federal level, together with the republican leagues. Thus, the influence of the party on the military organization was secured, and the influence of the army in the society was also "secured" by its representation in the party forum at federal level. Consequently, the Serbian political elite welcomed the dissolution of the SFRY with perhaps the only constant in its strategic culture, and that is the reliance on the military in resolving political crises, which can be vividly presented by the statement of Slobodan Milosević: "We do not know how to work, but we know how to fight".

Since 2011, while the principles of foreign policy "independent, active, and non-aligned" under the respective governments under the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy have remained the same, the foreign policy approaches – including the concept of non-alignment – of the two leaders of these governments have been quite different. This article describes the survival and foreign policy of the small country of Myanmar beyond the great power lens, arguing that the impact of strategic culture on the two governments since 2011 has differed because of the different levels of legitimacy enjoyed by the two leaders. The cornerstones of Myanmar's strategic culture are (1) that it shall never tolerate foreign interference, (2) that it shall always pursue self-reliance in its diplomacy, and (3) that the very nature of Myanmar is to be independent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heightened political tensions and advances in technological development have prompted Scandinavian countries to increase investment in military research and capability development. The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of why actors sharing similar strategic cultures implement new technology for military purposes differently. The research is founded on a cognitive-psychological perspective comparing two cases of innovation processes: Swedish nuclear weapons development during the Cold War and developments in Swedish cyber defence during the first decades of the 21st century. The main finding is that military innovation is better explained through a consideration of shared mental models of new technology than it is through a consideration of strategic cultures. The analysis shows there are implications for capability development. First, military innovation processes are only initiated if and when new technology appears militarily relevant to an actor; thus, the ability to correctly assess the military relevance of technology at an early stage is crucial. Second, the forming of shared mental models can both contribute to and counteract military innovation and, thus, decision-makers need to be aware both that mental models can be shared and that confirmation bias affects actors on a collective level. Third, it is likely that military innovation processes benefit from mental models being challenged and from diverging mental models being made evident. Consequently, it is good practice, also from this study’s perspective, to diversify and welcome different views on the use of new technology. Further studies are solicited in order to develop practical guidelines.

Global and regional energy markets are increasingly influenced by policies aimed at climate change mitigation, with possible grave implications for major producers and exporters of fossil fuels – including Russia, which is planning further increases. This article examines the evolution of Russian official thinking on the role of climate change as a strategic factor in policymaking as expressed in key documents on security and in strategic statements made by Presidents Putin and Medvedev (2000–2020). The set of strategic statements examined in this article show surprisingly little attention to this important matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]