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The Covid-19 virus emerged firstly in the Wuhan city of China in late 2019 and quickly spread to the rest of the world. A few months later the states and World Health Organization securitized the virus, then it has become a severely full-scale health crisis at the global level. The Covid-19 pandemic has threatened all humanity irrespective of race, nation, religion, and ethnicity except socio-economic class, and has brought widespread insecurity, risk, and uncertainty around the world. Moreover, the pandemic has been a test for cooperative relations among states in the international system. The Covid-19 pandemic is a global problem but the response against the virus has been mostly national during the pandemic. In this context, the paper aims to evaluate the pandemic conditions critically and makes a comparison between the pre-pandemic era and the pandemic era of world politics. The paper concludes that although global problems ask for global solutions, concepts such as egocentrism, nationalism, and national security have increased their importance in the international system instead of cooperation and global solidarity during the pandemic.

The endless struggle between two seemingly incompatible but occasionally convergent concepts, namely liberal values and national interests, has determined United States (US) foreign policy and its implementation throughout the nation’s history. Based on the neoclassical realist assumptions shored up by the methodological insights offered by the five-dimensional pre-theory of foreign policy, this article reveals a persistent dichotomy in US foreign policy through the analysis of Washington’s response to the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Throughout history, US foreign policy has had a pendular behavioral pattern, swinging across a policy spectrum ranging from moralpolitik to realpolitik. While the inherent values-interests dilemma lies at the root of the inveterate oscillation of US foreign policy, the interplay of international stimulus and societal factors stands out as the principal source of its ambivalence, if not inconsistency, in the face of the upheavals that swept across the Middle East.

Since the Soviet Union's (USSR) collapse, Russia's domestic and foreign policies have changed. With the loss of "superpower" status, Russians struggled to define their "national identity," which influenced the country's new foreign policy. This struggle affected Russia's ties with its sovereign neighbours, the former Soviet states termed the "Near Abroad" (blizhnee zarubezhe). The struggle specifically led to a series of territorial, leadership, economic, diaspora, and military conflicts with some countries in the Near-Abroad. The question of the legitimacy of territories and borders in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Trans-Dniester area (Moldova), and Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk areas of Ukraine is largely a result of the struggle. This paper discusses the factors affecting Russian domestic and foreign policy towards the Near-Abroad nations, which have influenced Russia's behaviour in contemporary international politics. Firstly, this essay analysed Russia's identity crisis and foreign strategy. The effect of Marxism-Leninism on Soviet foreign policy and the new Russian State was also discussed. This paper also analysed Vladimir Putin's pragmatic strategy in the Near-Abroad, focusing on Ukraine. This paper submits that Russia's determination to see the Near-Abroad states as largely within its sphere of influence and geopolitical interests hinders the establishment of equal ties with these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of my interest is to present the most important determinants of relations between the Russian Federation and Israel. The main purpose of this paper is to describe the current state of affairs in mutual contacts and their importance for international security. In addition, it will be important to try to answer the question of whether Russia will continue to play an important role as an economic and political partner of Israel in the near future, in the face of the gradual containment of the Syrian conflict. At the beginning, I intend to refer to the history of relations of both countries, dating back to the time of the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the breaking of diplomatic relations after the Six-Day War in June 1967. In the following part of the discussion, I present the relations of both entities immediately after the collapse of the Soviet empire and coming to power of Vladimir Putin, who from the beginning of his term in office has sought to significantly improve contacts with Israel. Then, I raise the problem of Moscow-Tel Aviv contacts after Benjamin Netanyahu took over as prime minister again and after the Arab Spring, which implied the conflict in Syria, during which Russia and Israel established cooperation. It will also be important to trace the attitude of the authorities in Tel Aviv to the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine. I would also like to refer to the relationship of both entities on the historical and cultural level, as well as on the economic and military level. In the summary, I highlight future perspectives and try to determine whether the current relations of both countries will intensify in the face of the end of war in Syria, and whether we can observe a close alliance of both countries now and in the future, or a limited partnership, determined by the need to implement real policy in the world.

Contemporary European Union (EU) and China relations are marked by a simultaneously beneficial, conflictual and competitive partnership. This is aptly evident in the cyber technology realm. This paper contends that the European Union’s gestaltian approach towards China can be understood with the aid of three theoretical positions: (1) an institutional perspective; (2) as a values-based actor; and, (3) a realpolitik dimension. The arguments advanced in the paper, ultimately imply that the EU’s approach towards China can provide various EU domestic and global actors’ space to exploit contradictions, notably when it comes to cyber technology diplomacy. This has the attendant effect of fostering future fissures in the EU’s overall engagement with China.

Copyright of Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad is the property of Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The endless struggle between two seemingly incompatible but occasionally convergent concepts, namely liberal values and national interests, has determined United States (US) foreign policy and its implementation throughout the nation's history. Based on the neoclassical realist assumptions shored up by the methodological insights offered by the five-dimensional pre-theory of foreign policy, this article reveals a persistent dichotomy in US foreign policy through the analysis of Washington's response to the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Throughout history, US foreign policy has had a pendular behavioral pattern, swinging across a policy spectrum ranging from moralpolitik to realpolitik. While the inherent values-interests dilemma lies at the root of the inveterate oscillation of US foreign policy, the interplay of international stimulus and societal factors stands out as the principal source of its ambivalence, if not inconsistency, in the face of the upheavals that swept across the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(1), 387-401 | European Forum Insight of 25 April 2020 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Requests for assistance from certain EU Member States and replies received. - II.1. Italy. - II.2. Spain and France. - III. Available assistance mechanisms and their use in the COVID-19 crisis. - III.1. Ad hoc Assistance. - III.2. The NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. - III.3. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism. - IV. Lessons learned and further research paths. - IV.1. The lack of public information and the need for transparency of European public action. - IV.2. Realpolitik and the civil-protection autonomy of the Union. - IV.3. The gap between EU citizens' expectations and the Union's competences. | (Abstract) It is of course too early to draw conclusions about the European Union's response to the COVID-19 crisis in its Member States while we are still in the midst of the health crisis. On the other hand, it is already possible to correct the widely shared first impression that European solidarity had been shattered. The available public data systematized in Section II and the analyses in Section III show that European solidarity has been expressed in two ways: First, bilaterally between EU Member States; second, collectively under the recent impetus of the European Commission. To help explain this impression of the absence of a Union, Section IV proposes three paths that should be the subject of further research: public information and the policy of transparency of European public action, the Union's emergency-reaction autonomy in the face of third countries' Realpolitik strategies, and the gap between the expectations of the Union's citizens and its actual competences.

The present paper aims to analyse the Machiavellian power strategy that Prince Hal, the new King Henry V, develops in Henry V in order to construct a legitimate self-image. We shall argue that Hal manages to become, by means of an extremely calculated technology of self-representation, the successful Machiavellian producer of his own hero-image.

Este artigo destaca duas leituras influenciadas pelo texto Politik, do historiador Alemão Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896). A primeira é encontrada na publicação “L’Allemagne au-dessus de tout: la mentalité allemande et la guerre”, da autoria de Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) em 1915. Já a segunda leitura aparece no livro Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations, assinado por Raymond Aron (1905-1983) em 1962. O artigo se volta para os principais pontos de Treitschke, destacados nas abordagens de Durkheim e Aron, e tem como objetivo analisar em que medida as diferenças das visões durkheimianas e aronianas respondem satisfatoriamente à perspectiva de Treitschke. Como leitores peculiares, Durkheim e o Aron da Guerra Fria oferecem duas chaves importantes, uma vez que o poder político, suas configurações e possibilidades, também emergem como pontos de discussão bibliográfica e reflexões sobre os riscos, acertos e imposturas intelectuais, diante da diplomacia, relações internacionais e sociologia.

On 14 April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced that, starting on 1 May (2021), US troops will withdraw from Afghanistan, ending 20 years of war on Taliban terrorism. At a first glance, the Americans' decision seems to be a hasty withdrawal from a very costly war of attrition. On closer inspection, however, the events in Afghanistan seem to part of a realpolitik strategy, which seeks to reset the geopolitical game in Eurasia and beyond. So, what could be the potential geopolitical impact of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan? How could the regional game be reset after August 2021? This article, written immediately after the "fall" of Kabul on 15 August 2021, and the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, proposes three scenarios for regional geopolitical dynamics and their global implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is about Turkish-Russian relationshps in the context of Syrian conflict. It is known that, this conflict has aggravated due to the coinciding reasons, even led to the emergence of the challenging crisis between the sides. Simultaneously, the chain of events has demonstrated that both states, Turkey and Russia, are forced to cooperate stem from the logic of Realpolitik. The article is devoted to the analysis of the essense of this cooperation.

Copyright of Historia i Polityka is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Boa parte dos desafios do direito internacional atual dizem respeito a sua localização epistemológica. Decisões na Corte Internacional de Justiça são carregadas, até pela própria natureza da Corte, de conflituosidade entre estados, falhando por vezes na efetividade das decisões da Corte. Critica-se, ainda, o direito criminal internacional por não ter eficácia em algumas situações como o mandado de prisão contra Omar al Bashir, que continuou exercendo a Presidência do Sudão até abril de 2019 (mesmo tendo contra si mandado de prisão do Tribunal Penal Internacional – TPI), e o tratamento da Corte para a situação do Afeganistão (perante o TPI). Na realidade, deve-se avaliar se esta suposta ineficiência do tribunal seria resultado de problemas jurídicos ou políticos. Há limites operacionais para o direito internacional e para o direito criminal internacional que estão além da esfera jurídica, em desafios jamais enfrentados por operadores do direito em outras áreas, em especial porque o TPI não opera a partir de uma estrutura estatal nacional, mas depende da boa vontade de estados. The main focus of this article os to check the limits of applicability of international criminal law regarding to political obstacles. The key question is related to verifying how much international criminal law could become a mere instrument of some states’ realpolitik. Even if international law is marked by a strong idealism, it still seems far from their central objective. The article has two essential aspects of development: on the first the structural epistemology of international criminal law and realpolitik are studied, while on the second part the focus is on a series of case studies to check how does international law finds balance between two seemingly antagonic points, normativity and politics. The studied cases are Nicaragua v. USA, as a base for comparison with international criminal law, the Omar al Bashir case , related to the cooperation (or the lack thereof) between state parties of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court and the situation in Afghanistan, before the ICC, still developping.

Artykuł jest poświęcony zjawisku krytyki społecznej (teoretyczne poszukiwania możliwego do osiągnięcia porządku społecznego) jako potencjału do zbiorowego działania w różnych społecznych kontekstach. Autorzy analizują wpływ krytyki społecznej na zmianę używanego języka i zachowań członków społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Podkreślają, że Realpolitik (czyli polityka oparta na kalkulacji siły i interesów określonych podmiotów społecznych) wydaje się już nie sprawdzać, jeśli chodzi o zapewnienie dalszego trwałego i pokojowego rozwoju ludzkości. Zauważają ponadto, że interesującą alternatywą dla Realpolitik jest krytyka społeczna, gdyż wskazuje ona kierunki i odsłania możliwości urzeczywistnienia w ramach porządku społecznego określonych wartości. Zaprezentowane w artykule procesy społeczne są analizowane w kontekście ukraińskiej tzw. rewolucji godności. Autorzy zwracają uwagę, że wydarzenia, jakie dokonały się na Ukrainie na przełomie 2013 i 2014 r. były zbiorową manifestacją w nadziei na nowy, zmieniony porządek społeczny w kraju. Rewolucja godności przyczyniła się do zmiany używanego języka, symboliki państwowości oraz zachowań społeczeństwa ukraińskiego.

The diplomat, jurist and historian, James Bryce (1838-1922), the “Byron” of Armenia, as one Armenian text referred to him, was the greatest advocate for the Armenian cause in Britain for over four decades. Although Bryce attempted to influence British policy from the late 1870s, he only enjoyed partial success. Following the massacre of Sasun (1894), a certain change occurred when Bryce’s unceasing pleading for the Armenian communities received greater support in Britain. During the 1894-1896 period, maybe for the first time since the “Bulgarian Horrors” of 1876, there were calls in Britain for substantial action against the Sublime Porte due to its ill-treatment of the minorities living under its rule. Relying on vast archival material, this essay explores Bryce’s view of the internal British political, diplomatic and public spheres in the years preceding the massacres and especially between 1894 and 1896. During these three years, Bryce adopted a different course of action and began to turn his efforts to the American public in the hope that American intervention would be more effective than the ongoing, futile European actions.

In her new memoir, The Education of an Idealist, Samantha Power reflects on her eight years in the Obama administration. Although she claims that the experience did little to change her views, there is a considerable disjuncture between her point of view in her award-winning earlier book "A Problem from Hell," in which she criticizes U.S. officials for not doing the right thing, and her point of view in The Education of an Idealist, in which she defends indifference of U.S. officials under somewhat similar circumstances during the Obama years. The author of Problem could not have written Education, and the author of Education could not have written Problem. What does this tell us about the possibility for ethics in foreign policy? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have always been tensions within the EU's external development policy between ethical and self-interested approaches and also between universalist and realpolitik policies. The EU's structural economic power and global neoliberal dominance have allowed these tensions to be subsumed within its external policies. A range of factors has contributed to the rise of illiberalism globally, leading to heightened geoeconomic rivalry while complex changes in global development governance facilitate the use of aid as an instrument of political and economic self-interest. The EU has reacted to this by re-framing its political approach and policies in an effort to rebalance values and interests. A new realism entered EU discourse and there is evidence of this being applied in specific instruments and policies analysed here. Blended finance instruments are 'dual use' in that they can be used for more flexible development policies but also to support EU businesses more directly. The proposal to combine nearly all of the previous aid and cooperation instruments into one single legal instrument will also give the EU unprecedented flexibility to use aid funds for various political purposes. These changes are part of a more complex iterative process in the case of the EU than for other international actors. Interests and values are being reconfigured rather than jettisoned in a 'realist turn'. However, they still represent a significant adjustment for the EU in terms of aid priorities and modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taboos are a universal feature of social systems. Even the most avowedly open-minded organizations place tacit constraints on what can be said and even thought. Business leaders ignore these constraints at their peril.This article examines the role of the sacred, profane, and taboo in society, and links these phenomena to the psychology of moral outrage. In public debates, taboos are rarely as absolute as first assumed and can often be reframed as tragic choices. Leaders must perform a delicate balancing act if they are to prevent taboos from blinding managers to either threats or opportunities. On the one hand, leaders who let their intellectual curiosity get the better of them risk paying a steep career price. On the other, leaders who bury their heads in the sand risk even worse consequences. Navigating this dilemma brings into sharp tension the policy prescriptions of advocates of authentic leadership (who see honesty as a trump virtue) and proponents of Realpolitik (who see organizational hypocrisy and obfuscation as unfortunate but unavoidable tactics necessary in an imperfect world.) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expansion of NATO has certainly been a very controversial issue that still sees the world divided into supporters and opponents. Various reasons have been brought forward to justify why the NATO enlargement decision was taken, inter alia the securitisation and stabilisation of Europe, the democratisation of the countries formerly under the Soviet yoke or the enhancement of the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion. Although all such propositions might be valid, this article wants to analyse if indeed, as often claimed, the US decision to enlarge NATO responded first and foremost to realpolitik considerations, and namely if it is true that enlargement addressed specific US’s domestic political concerns that had their expression also in foreign policy initiatives, and more specifically if President Clinton used NATO enlargement to enhance his chances of re-election. The study conducted demonstrates that it was indeed so and that President Clinton could have not possibly followed a different policy. Without the firm US commitment to expand NATO, the enlargement of the Alliance would have probably never taken place.

This paper investigates whether there was an opportunity cost for two African states (Chad and Malawi) in recognising the Republic of China (ROC) as the ‘One China’ over the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the period between 2001 and their respective year of switching, which in turn could explain the direction of the switches. In this paper, opportunity cost was operationalised as relative economic loss (as measured through export volumes to either China) incurred that could have otherwise been avoided or compensated for by recognising the PRC over the ROC. In the timeframe studied, after two years for Chad and after one year for Malawi, both countries saw exponentially increased export volumes to the PRC once they affected a switch in recognition from the ROC, since recognising the PRC is concomitant with entering politically‐enhanced bilateral economic relations at the behest of the economically stronger PRC. This indeed indicates an opportunity cost, and pursuit of realpolitik by the African countries studied who have switched back‐and‐forth between the two Chinas based on the prospective gains to be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionally, customary international law is developed through the actions and beliefs of nations. International treaties are interpreted, in part, by assessing how the parties to the treaty behave. This Article observes that these forms of uncodified international law--custom and subsequent treaty practice--are also developed through a nation's reactions, or failures to react, to acts and beliefs that can be attributed to it. I call this "attributed lawmaking.". Consider the new commercial space race. Innovators like SpaceX and Blue Origin seek a permissive legal environment. A Cold-War-era treaty does not seem adequately to address contemporary plans for space. The treaty does, however, attribute private sector activity to nations. The theory of attributed lawmaking suggests that the attribution renders the activity of private actors in space relevant to the development of binding international legal rules. As a doctrinal matter, private activity that is attributed to the state becomes "state practice" for the purpose of treaty interpretation or customary international law formation. Moreover, as a matter of realpolitik, private actors standing in the shoes of the state can force states into a reactive posture, easing the commercially preferred rules into law through the power of inertia and changes to the status quo. Attributed lawmaking is not a new phenomenon but it may have increasing significance at a time when multilateral lawmaking is at an ebb, lines between public and private entities are blurring, and the question of attribution becomes both more complex and more urgent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Se analiza la recepción del concepto de lo político de Schmitt en el realismo político de Hinkelammert. Al relacionar ambas propuestas, el planteamiento de Schmitt debe reformularse en buena medida. El concepto de lo político de Schmitt tiene dos partes: identificar al enemigo y enfrentarlo. La primera, en el realismo político de Hinkelammert, es aceptada de manera parcial; la segunda es rechazada por completo. Schmitt señala a las instituciones como el enemigo, en tanto que Hinkelammert indica que las instituciones absolutizadas son el enemigo. Ambos autores coinciden –relativamente- en quién es el enemigo, y señalan la necesidad de procesos instituyentes constantes para mantener el orden social. En la forma de operar estos procesos imperan las divergencias.

The paper analyzes the reception of the political concept of Schmitt in the political realism of Hinkelammert. In relating both proposals, Schmitt's approach must be reformulated in great extent. The political concept of Schmitt has two parts: identifying the enemy and confronting him. The first, in the political realism of Hinkelammert, is accepted in a partial way, the second is completely rejected. Schmitt points institutions as the enemy, Hinkelammert indicates that absolutized institutions are the enemy. Both authors coincide –relatively– who the enemy is, also point out the need for constant institutional processes to maintain social order. Divergences prevail in the form of operating these processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Realpolitik, the pursuit of vital state interests in a dangerous world that constrains state behavior, is at the heart of realist theory. All realists assume either that states engage in such behavior or, at the very least, are highly incentivized to do so by the structure of the international system. Classical realists remind us, however, that Realpolitik presupposes rational thinking, which should not be taken for granted. Some leaders act more rationally than others because they think more rationally than others. Research in cognitive psychology provides a strong foundation for classical realist claims that Realpolitik requires a commitment to objectivity and deliberation, a particular psychology that few leaders exhibit. A case study of Otto von Bismarck's role in German reunification demonstrates that rationality is the exception, rather than the norm. Even though Prussia was under enormous structural constraints that should have incentivized Realpolitik, the man who would become the Iron Chancellor was isolated because of his foreign policy views. Bismarck consistently disagreed with conservative patrons and allies at home, disagreements that can be reduced largely to his higher degree of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article historicizes the German ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 in the context of post-World War II politics of migration and asylum in the country, focusing particularly on the reactions to the ‘crisis’ of 1992. That time, government reacted to more than 400,000 refugees from the Balkan wars with severe restrictions of the right to asylum, framed also within the ‘Dublin Regulation’ of the European Union. It is argued that German politics of immigration was mostly a kind of Realpolitik that subordinated humanitarian considerations to closed-border politics geared at keeping migrants out. Summer 2015, however, saw elements of humanitarianism in German refugee politics, understood, following Didier Fassin, as the introduction of moral sentiments into politics. This ‘humanitarianism’ was mostly accredited to Chancellor Angela Merkel. Yet the commitment of thousands of members of the German public ensured the sustainability of a ‘welcome culture’ intended to accommodate refugees, government politics quickly reverted to new restrictions that keep immigrants for many months or even years in a limbo of waiting. While to some extent government’s humanitarian discourse continues it becomes apparent that humanitarian politics is often a cover up for ulterior political motives. It is concluded that marking the events of 2015 as a refugee crisis enables in the first place the legitimization of politics of restriction like the externalization of EU borders into North African countries.

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine began in 1998 with the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Afterwards, in 2003 Ukraine joined the European Neighbourhood Policy and in 2004 EU was already the major trade partner with Ukraine, bigger than Russia. Anticipating the approach of former soviet republics towards Euro Atlantic structures and the foreseen loss of influence in its near abroad, Putin’s Russia launched in 2011 the Eurasian Economic Union, an economic bloc formed by some of the Russia’s former satellite States - Belarus and Kazakhstan – and through a carrot and stick policy tried to attract also Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in order to thwart the Chinese economic development and to impose itself in the regional and global markets. In November 2013, during the 3rd EU’s Eastern Partnership Summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania, Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovych surprised the world refusing to sign the Commercial Agreement with EU, turning back to a EU possible integration. On the other hand, Russia offered to reduce the natural gas rates plus a fifteen billion dollars loan, throwing Ukraine in a quasi civil war, and leaving EU and Russia on opposite sides. Considering this situation what to expect from Ukraine? To continue being a Russian satellite or head towards the Euro Atlantic geopolitical space? This paper intents to analyse the actual situation in Ukraine following Barry Buzan’s approach of multidimensional security, focusing on the different postures assumed by each one of the actors - EU and Russia - which have been between complementarity and division. The scope of the analysis is to contribute to the academic debate about security dynamics between EU, Russia and Ukraine during the post-USSR period, arguing that in the geopolitical dispute for the post-soviet space where Ukraine is integrated, the Russian Realpolitik prevails the EU soft power.

Abrams’ spectacularly distended infantilising manipulation of the saga embeds a form of cognitive resonance with a state of perpetual war and a politically thanatising mythos fitted out as a politically containing moment within what cultural commentators are referring to as “post-9/11 American cinema”, a form of cinema reacting to a cultural trauma and that normalises a hegemonic political reactivity in a perceived ‘clash of civilizations’ in “the social embodied” in an age marked by what Terry Eagleton describes as “holy terror”. As cultural philosopher Douglas Kellner argues, movies of apocalyptic or catastrophe cinema can “be read as allegories of the disintegration of social life and civil society, and the emergence of a Darwinian nightmare where the struggle for survival occurs in a Hobbesian world where life is nasty, brutish, and short.” The contention is that if George Lucas developed Star Wars to struggle with, among other things, an America that had elected Richard Nixon and engaged in the culturally traumatic Vietnam War, Abrams and his co-writer Lawrence Kazdan have relocated the franchise in a context marked as “post 9/11 cinema”. It is unclear quite how The Force Awakens could offer a distinctively interrogatory function for conceiving political subjectivity in the contemporary fractured and self-assertive space of global geopolitics, expressing, as it does, the classificatory coding that figures innocent selfhood in a conflictual relation with the evil terrorist other. Abrams’ movie, accordingly, is ill equipped to refuse to naturalise the innocence of the politically regulative messianic monomyth of the exceptionalist nation that instils a sensitivity conducive to violence against the foreigner when it is perceived to be under threat. It is, in other words, ill-equipped to resist being captured by the Girardian framing of myth within an identification of “sacred violence”. Consequently, The Force Awakens provides a resource for the critic’s reflections on the cultural difficulties of learning about our learning, of the disciplining of desire through monomythic intensification, and of sustaining reaction to cultural trauma through the hostility of sacrificial disposal of the other that requires the instrumentalised rationality of the self-secure national subject.

On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled in favour of the Philippines in 14 of its 15 submissions against China's expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. The PCA declared that China's claims - defined by the nine-dash line - violate international law. The arbitral tribunal also asserted that Chinese reclamation and construction projects in the land features of the disputed waters infringe on Philippines' territorial rights. The ruling likewise found China guilty of destroying the maritime environment by building artificial islands and illegally preventing Filipinos from fishing and conducting oil exploration activities in the area. The PCA award to the Philippines illustrates the efficient and impartial dispute resolution mechanism of the UNCLOS as well as the short-term triumph of the Philippines' lawfare over China's realpolitik approach in the dispute. Unfortunately, the Duterte Administration has shelved the PCA ruling saying that enforcing it has a minimal chance of success. Instead, he has adopted an appeasement policy in exchange for China's goodwill and economic largess. The article concludes that the Duterte Administration's course of action lends credence to former State Councilor Dai Bingguo's statement that the PCA award to the Philippines is nothing more than a "piece of trash paper". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]