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This special issue sheds light on the shift from consensus over democracy and liberal values to increased dissensus. With a focus on Central and Eastern Europe, it explores the nature and the origi...

In recent years, government officials in Hungary, Poland and Austria have contested the authority of the EU in areas linked to core state powers, such as democracy and the rule of law and migrations. Analyzing the discursive strategies displayed by conservative and/or right-wing governments in these countries, the article shows how the old conflict line over sovereignty that has traditionally shaped the integration process–supranational vs domestic sovereignty–is being complemented by a new discourse which consists in disparaging EU ‘interference’ in the very name of European values and a common European identity, defined in opposition to multiculturalism and political liberalism. Pioneered by Viktor Orban, this discourse has been circulating among other Central European heads of government and incumbent parties’ officials in the wake of the refugee ‘crisis’, which opened up a discursive opportunity structure for its diffusion., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In the post-Maastricht era, member states of the European Union (EU) have proved increasingly reluctant to transfer further competences to the supranational level and are willing to safeguard their sovereignty. Though the responses to the contemporary multiple crises–related to economic and monetary policy, borders and migrations, or democracy and the rule of law–have brought about conflicts over values and sovereignty losses surrounding the legal, economic and political legitimacy of the EU. Against this backdrop, we argue that beyond the traditional contentious (re)distribution of competences between nation-states (national sovereignty) and the EU (and its embryonic forms of supranational sovereignty), new conflicts of sovereignty involve two other key types of sovereignty belonging to the democratic tradition, namely parliamentary sovereignty and popular sovereignty. This introductory article proposes a common analytical framework in order to investigate conflicts in their multi-dimensionality., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The aim of this article is to understand why the EU opted to conclude the ‘EU–Turkey refugee deal’ in March 2016 in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, despite the fact that the agreement deeply contradicts fundamental EU values and norms. The article seeks to explain the outcome—the conclusion of the EU–Turkey refugee deal—by analysing not only the ability of EU institutions to shape decisions, but also their motivations, ideas and preferences in justifying the EU’s actions in responding to the refugee challenge. It is argued that the deal results from ideational and power struggles between supranational (the European Parliament and the European Commission) and intergovernmental institutions (the European Council and the Council of the European Union). It is demonstrated that while the former put forward normative arguments, the latter invoked security as a main concern to avoid internal divisions between Member States. This article also reveals that such ideational and power struggles have consequences for the EU’s identity. Theoretically, the article builds on the new intergovernmentalist claims and on the normative/civilian power literature. Empirically, it explores the usage of normative justifications by EU institutions and points to inter-institutional tensions in framing the EU’s response to the refugee challenge., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

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This article examines the Romanian rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union during the first half of 2019 as a two-level game. It shows how, despite heightened political tensions at the domestic and European level, the Romanian rotating presidency managed to fulfil its main functions. It is argued that the preparation and the conduct of the rotating presidency is not only a two-level game, but also one in which diplomats and civil servants play a central role. Their centrality in the process neutralises domestic political factors such as Eurosceptic governmental attitudes, the lack of political vision or credibility., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

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La crise de la zone euro a induit une redéfinition profonde de la gouvernanceéconomique de l’Union européenne afin de renforcer les règles du Pacte de stabilité etde croissance (PSC). L’article analyse comment ces idées, initialement conçues pourrenforcer la gouvernance économique, ont également eu des effets sur la politique decohésion et ont façonné l’adoption du règlement 1303/2013 sur les fonds structurelset d’investissements européens (fonds ESI). En examinant les rapports de force entrele Parlement, la Commission et le Conseil, l’article montre comment la conditionnalités’est imposée comme idée dominante entre 2010 et 2013 et comment, après 2013,les mécanismes de sanction imposés pendant la crise divisent les institutions entre lespartisans de l’application stricte des règles et ceux favorables à une plus grande flexibilitédans leur mise en oeuvre., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In the original publication of the article, the production team updated wrong journal name in some references. Those references with correct journal name are given below

In recent years IPE and EU studies scholars have examined how actors in international organisations and EU institutions shape policy ideas. This article explores the professional structure of economists affiliated to two Brussels-based think tanks, Bruegel and CEPS, who, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, sought to contribute to the production of policy solutions to douse the flames of the crisis and put forward long term recommendations for the EMU’s stability. Through the analysis of more than 300 CVs and by drawing on network and sequence analysis, the article shows that in their search for solutions, Brussels-based think tanks bring together economists from different EU member states, whose authority draws on academic qualifications, experience, and seniority. They are ‘multiple insiders’ connected to a wide range of institutions and professional networks, who move back and forth between professional and organisational networks and serve as bridges between revisionist, orthodox, and mixed economic ideas., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013 on structural funds, arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of the euro area had spill-over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase of the crisis (2010–2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of suspending structural funds in case of non-compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on Member States’ compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how, after the entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a greater number of actors has been calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. To explain the disruption between t1 and t2, the article examines the change in the power relations between and within institutions and the change in ideas., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The eurozone crisis has spectacularly increased the European Union’s (EU’s) institutional demand for expert knowledge. While the crisis has challenged the legitimacy of the EU in many ways, it has in contrast amplified the visibility and the role of Brussels-based think tanks as laboratories of ideas that think ahead about eurozone governance and policies. Drawing on the analysis of more than 450 expert reports produced by two leading Brusselsbased think tanks, over 300 CVs and biographical notes as well interviews, this article explores when, how and why Brussels-based think tanks expand their networks in times of crisis. While the article leaves aside the question of their ideational impact upon agenda-setting and the policy formulation process leading to the new European economic governance, it shows how think tanks adapt to crises and how they seek to have a voice in thinking about the future of the EU’s economic governance.

Recent developments in Hungarian constitutional and judicial politics have given impetus to question not only the outcomes of democratisation and Europeanisation, but also the efficacy of the European Union’s compliance mechanisms. In 2010, Hungary, one of the forerunners in building democracy made the headlines with Fidesz’s attempts at adopting a new Constitution and implementing cardinal laws along with controversial institutional, cultural, religious, moral and socio-economic policies. This article attempts to depict the transformative power of the European Union within a sensitive policy area which touches upon States’ pouvoris régaliens: the independence of the judiciary.

This paper focuses on the functional representation in post-communist Romania, addressing the question of interest groups regulation. Taking into account the novelty of this matter in the Romanian political system, the aim of this article is to describe and understand why the question of regulating lobbying has entered the Romanian political agenda ten years after the collapse of the communism. In other words, this contribution tries to illustrate the reasons for, and the public reaction to a legislative proposal introduced in 2001 by a social-democrat Member of the Parliament (MP). By focusing on the point of view expressed by the main political and social actors involved in the subsequent political and public debate, the paper maintains that regulating lobbying has been put on the political agenda of this country in the hope of solving some dysfunctional aspects observed in the domestic process of decision-making. It argues that, in the Romanian political landscape, regulating lobbying become a multifaceted coin. For instance, when supporting the idea of regulating lobbying, the rationale of the Romanian Government was to reduce corruption, the main explanatory statement of the Social-Democrat MP was to change the modus operandi/behaviour of interest groups and to create a new profession, while among the reasons expressed by some of the social actors involved in the public debate the creation of a legal framework allowing the participation of non-state actors in the domestic process of decision-making occupied an importance place., info:eu-repo/semantics/published