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Deciphering nonhuman communication – particularly nonhuman vocal communication – has been a longstanding human quest. We are, for example, fascinated by the songs of birds and whales, the grunts of apes, the barks of dogs, and the croaks of frogs; we wonder about their potential meaning and their relationship to human language. Do these utterances express little more than emotional states, or do they convey actual bits and bytes of concrete information? Humans’ numerous attempts to decipher nonhuman systems have, however, progressed slowly. We still wonder why only a small number of species are capable of vocal learning, a trait that, because it allows for innovation and adaptation, would seem to be a prerequisite for most language-like abilities. Humans have also attempted to teach nonhumans elements of our system, using both vocal and nonvocal systems. The rationale for such training is that the extent of success in instilling symbolic reference provides some evidence for, at the very least, the cognitive underpinnings of parallels between human and nonhuman communication systems. However, separating acquisition of reference from simple object-label association is not a simple matter, as reference begins with such associations, and the point at which true reference emerges is not always obvious. I begin by discussing these points and questions, predominantly from the viewpoint of someone studying avian abilities. I end by examining the question posed by Premack: do nonhumans that have achieved some level of symbolic reference then process information differently from those that have not? I suggest the answer is likely “yes,” giving examples from my research on Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus).

Understanding the perspectives of others is a critical skill. Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential ability for social competence and communication, and it is necessary for understanding behaviors that differ from our own (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Although all individuals possess a ToM to varying degrees, bilinguals are especially adept to perspective-taking. Research has reported that bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks (e.g., Goetz, 2003; Rubio-Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012). However, the mechanisms underlying this effect are unclear. Studying individual differences in ToM performance between bilinguals and monolinguals can help explain these mechanisms. Yet this promising area of research faces an important challenge: the lack of psychometric research on ToM measurement. Recent research suggests that tests that measure the ToM construct might not be as reliable as previously thought (Warnell & Redcay, 2019). This hinders the interpretation of experimental and correlational findings and puts into question the validity of the ToM construct. This dissertation addresses these two questions empirically to improve our understanding of what constitutes ToM. Study 1 examines the structure of ToM, crystallized intelligence (Gc), and fluid intelligence (Gf) to understand (a) whether ToM constitutes a construct separate from other cognitive abilities and (b) to explore whether tasks of ToM present adequate construct validity. For this, three confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted. The results demonstrated that a model with three latent factors (ToM, Gf and Gc) did not adequately fit the data and was not significantly different from a model with only two latent factors (ToM-Gf and Gc). In addition, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) showed that two of the ToM tasks loaded onto a Gf factor whereas one of the tasks loaded onto a third factor by itself. Finally, an exploratory network analysis (NMA) was conducted to observe relationships among the tasks. The results showed that the ToM tasks were no more related to each other than to some tasks of Gf and Gc, and that ToM tasks did not form a consistent cluster. Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that ToM tasks are likely not measuring a monolithic ToM construct. Study 2 examines individual differences in metalinguistic awareness, executive function, and bilingualism as predictors of ToM. The results showed that all variables significantly predicted ToM, but bilingualism was not a significant moderator of ToM. Overall, the findings suggest that in this sample there was no difference in the processes used to predict ToM based on being bilingual or monolingual. Implications for measurement and individual differences in ToM are discussed.

As robots move from the factory and into the daily lives of men, women, and children around the world, it is becoming increasingly clear that the skills they will require are vastly different from the majority of skills with which they were programmed in the 20th century. In fact, it would appear that many of these skills will center on the challenge of interacting with humans, rather than with machine parts or other robots. To this end, modern-day roboticists are actively studying the problem of human-robot interaction – how best to create robots that can interact with humans, usually in a social setting. Among the many problems of human robot interaction, one of the most interesting is the problem of intent recognition: the problem of predicting the intentions of a person, usually just by observing that person. If we understand intentions to be non-observable goal-directed mental activities, then we may (quite understandably) view the intent recognition problem for robots as one of reading peoples’ minds. As grandiose as this claim may sound, we believe that this understanding of intent recognition is quite reasonable; it is this interpretation that we seek to justify in the following pages. Every day, humans observe one another and on the basis of their observations “read people’s minds,” correctly inferring the intentions of others. Moreover, this ability is regarded not as remarkable, but as entirely ordinary and effortless. If we hope to build robots that are similarly capable of successfully interacting with people in a social setting, we must endow our robots with an ability to understand humans' intentions. In this paper, we review the intent recognition problem, and provide as an example a system we have been developing to recognize human intentions. Our approach is ultimately based on psychological and neuroscientific evidence for a theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), which suggests that the ease with which humans recognize the intentions of others is the result of an innate mechanism for representing, interpreting, and predicting other's actions. The mechanism relies on taking the perspective of others (Gopnick & Moore, 1994), which allows humans to correctly infer intentions. Although this process is innate to humans, it does not take place in a vacuum. Intuitively, it would seem that our understanding of others' intentions depend heavily on the contexts in which we find ourselves and those we observe. This intuition is supported by Source: Human-Robot Interaction, Book edited by: Daisuke Chugo, ISBN 978-953-307-051-3, pp. 288, February 2010, INTECH, Croatia, downloaded from SCIYO.COM

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with the aid of token training can achieve analogical reasoning, or the ability to understand relations-between-relations (e.g., Premack, 1976; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). However, extraordinarily few numbers of old- and new-world monkeys have demonstrated this ability in variants of relational matching to sample tasks. Moreover, the rarity of replications leaves open the question of whether the results are normative for other captive colonies of the same species. In experiment one we attempted to replicate whether old world rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) might demonstrate the same level of proficiency on a spatial above/below relational matching task as reported for old world baboons (Papio papio). None of the rhesus monkeys attained above chance performances over 10,000 training trials. In experiment two we attempted to replicate results demonstrating that new-world capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) match above/below relations. The capuchin monkeys performed above chance only in the absence of 'Clever Hans' controls for cuing of the correct choice by the experimenters. These failures to replicate previously reported results demonstrate that some, but definitely not all monkeys can judge the equivalence of abstract 'relations between relations' and warrant further investigations into the behavioral and cognitive characteristics that underlie these similarities and differences within population and between individuals of different primate species.

When training and working a substance detection canine, a trained final response should be performed immediately upon recognition of odor (Generally, a 1-3 s window is preferred within our detection practices). Typical canine training places much emphasis on planning and setting up training scenarios to achieve specific objectives but not much consideration is given to how to end a training session. When the canine fails to maintain criteria, trainers are left trying to determine the cause of poor performance. One consideration often overlooked is a phenomenon called End of Session Cueing that may exist in detection training whereby a previously trained canine no longer responds to odor because it has taken on aversive association. This may be due to several factors associated with motivation. The sequence of events at the end of a session can be as equally important to maintain motivation for the task of scent detection in future sessions. This paper will identify and examine multiple factors associated with "End of Session Cues" in working dogs, how they may be responsible for poor final response performance and discuss potential strategies to address them.

This paper includes a detailed description of a familiarization protocol, which is used as an integral component of a larger research protocol to collect electroencephalography (EEG) data and Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). At present, the systems available for the collection of high-quality EEG/ERP data make significant demands on children with developmental disabilities, such as those with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Children with ASD may have difficulty adapting to novel situations, tolerating uncomfortable sensory stimuli, and sitting quietly. This familiarization protocol uses Evidence-Based Practices (EBPs) to increase research participants' knowledge and understanding of the specific activities and steps of the research protocol. The tools in this familiarization protocol are a social narrative, a visual schedule, the Premack principle, role-playing, and modeling. The goal of this familiarization protocol is to increase understanding and agency and to potentially reduce anxiety for child participants, resulting in a greater likelihood of the successful completion of the research protocol for the collection of EEG/ERP data.

The disequilibrium approach to reinforcement and punishment, derived from the probability-differential hypothesis and response deprivation hypothesis, provides a number of potentially useful mathematical models for practitioners. The disequilibrium approach and its accompanying models have proven effective in the prediction and control of behavior, yet they have not been fully espoused and integrated into clinical practice. The purpose of this tutorial is to detail the disequilibrium approach and adapt its mathematical models for use as a tool in applied settings. The disequilibrium models specify how to arrange contingencies and predict the effects of those contingencies. We aggregate these models, and provide them as a single tool, in the form of a Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet that calculates the direction and magnitude of behavior change based on baseline measures and a practitioner's choice of intervention parameters. How practitioners take baseline measures and select intervention parameters in accordance with disequilibrium models is explicated. The proposed tool can be accessed and downloaded for use at https://osf.io/knf7x/.

Play develops skill across all developmental domains in early childhood: cognitive/academic, communication/language, social-emotional, physical, and adaptive. Children with ASD often refrain from engaging in any type of play, or they may prefer play that is highly repetitious, sensory-based and of a ?cause/effect? type. Encouraging a child with ASD to engage in novel types of play can be challenging, especially if the child has limited play skills in his repertoire. However, it is critically important that we discover ways to increase play skills of children with ASD. This article will discuss strategies for teaching and encouraging novel play for children with ASD. Strategies to consider are visual supports, such as video modeling, or social narratives, and reinforcement-based strategies: the Premack Principle or utilizing an existing area of interest.

Parcela da literatura operante sustenta expressiva produção de conhecimentos sobre resolução de problemas, resposta de observação e relações de contingência entre respostas com diferentes probabilidades de ocorrência (Princípio de Premack). O presente trabalho investigou possíveis convergências entre uma análise descritiva do comportamento ordinal e tal parcela da literatura operante. Análises conceituais e metodológicas de material bibliográfico salientaram a relevância da sequência de eventos funcionalmente relacionados na caracterização da produção de conhecimentos sobre resolução de problema, sobre resposta de observação e sobre o Princípio de Premack viabilizando aproximações entre programas de pesquisas sobre repertórios comportamentais complexos, bem como expansões em estratégias de investigação sobre responder ordinal.

Two of Timberlake's major contributions, amongst numerous other good notes, are Behavior Regulation Theory (BRT), and Behavior Systems Theory (BST). BRT was a refinement of the Premack Principle. What both got right was that reinforcers are responses, not stimuli. For BRT, they were responses that were occurring below the rate at which they otherwise would given free access to them. BST was a larger ethological framework for our science of behavior. We have always needed it, as it opens an important window on our field. With that window closed, it is easy to stumble over a half-dozen anomalies in the dark, ones that we say humph to, scratch our heads, and then move on. When illuminated by BST, however, such anomalies become keys to a deeper understanding of our subject. This paper reviews numerous anomalies that make sense within the joint framework of BST and BRT, and Dickinson's Dual-Process theory of learned behavior. No longer anomalous in that context, all that is now left to do is test the validity and productivity of this general framework for those many strange cases.

— The ability to flexibly predict others’ behaviorshas been ascribed to a theory of mind (ToM) system. Mostresearch has focused on formal conceptual definitions ofsuch a system, and the question of whom to credit with aToM. In this article, I suggest shifting perspective fromformal definitions to a usage-based approach. Thisapproach views action within human interaction as cen-tral to the emergence and continuous development of theability to flexibly predict others’ behaviors. Addressing thecurrent debate about whether infants have a ToM, I illus-trate how infants use flexible action expectations tointeract with others appropriately. I also discuss the con-tinuous development of ToM and its natural structure froma usage-based perspective. KEYWORDS— action prediction; usage-based theory; falsebelief; prelinguistic communication THEORY OF MIND: WHAT FOR? Theory of mind (ToM) is a cognitive system that “can be used tomake predictions about the behavior of others” (Premack WRakoczy, 2012). Other mental-state concepts, like intentions,desire, and knowledge, are considered precursors to a full, rep-resentational ToM (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004), but these stillfollow the logic of formal conceptual definitions of ToM.One problem with formal conceptual approaches is that thepostulated definitions of ToM and their empirical operationaliza-tions influence each other. The validity of the widely used stan-dard false belief tests has been questioned because additionaltask demands like language and executive skills conceal con-ceptual understanding (Bloom & German, 2000). When remov-ing these demands, apparently even 1-year-olds understandfalse belief (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). For other research-ers, however, the very conceptual definitions require some of theremoved demands, such as language to entail hypothetical —notonly practical—belief scenarios (Perner, 2010), executive skillsto enable flexibility in perspective shifting (e.g., Moses, Carlson,& Sabbagh, 2005), or other general reasoning skills to get frompremises to conclusions. This results in the ambiguous use ofthe term ToM (Rakoczy, 2012) and leads to auxiliary termslike infant ToM and the postulation of separate ToM systems(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).A second problem is that formal approaches bewitch us to con-ceptualize ToM as a stage-like all-or-nothing affair, obscuring

International audience; Reasoning by analogy is one of the most complex and highly adaptive cognitive processes in abstract thinking. For humans, analogical reasoning entails the judgment and conceptual mapping of relations-between-relations and is facilitated by language (Gentner in Cogn Sci 7:155-170, 1983; Premack in Thought without language, Oxford University Press, New York, 1986). Recent evidence, however, shows that monkeys like ``language-trained'' apes exhibit similar capacity to match relations-between-relations (Fagot and Thompson in Psychol Sci 22:1304-1309, 2011; Flemming et al. in J Exp Psychol: Anim Behav Process 37:353-360, 2011; Truppa et al. in Plos One 6(8):e23809, 2011). Whether this behavior is driven by the abstraction of categorical relations or alternatively by direct perception of variability (entropy) is crucial to the debate as to whether nonhuman animals are capable of analogical reasoning. In the current study, we presented baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens) with a computerized same/different relational-matching task that in principle could be solved by either strategy. Both baboons and humans produced markedly similar patterns of responding. Both species responded different when the perceptual variability of a stimulus array fell exactly between or even closer to that of a same display. Overall, these results demonstrate that categorical abstraction trumped perceptual properties and, like humans, Old World monkeys can solve the analogical matching task by judging the categorical abstract equivalence of same/different relations-between-relations.

Research concerning animal cognition explores the abilities and capacity of animals to perceive, think and conceive. As an extension of this, researchers have tried to ascertain the concept of animal minds. The field has been a matter of great debate as it has brought into question the uniqueness of the human mind. This dissertation will review the various areas of research that have contributed to our understanding of animal minds, with a specific focus on non-human primates. The term ‘theory of mind’ was originally proposed by Premack and Woodruff in 1978. The ability entails a recognition and understanding of another’s mental states. Recently, this term has included the cognition of seeing. Throughout this article, the important distinction between theory of mind capabilities and complex behavioural analysis is emphasized. It is important to consider how various primates represent entities in their environment, including their own image. In particular reference to this latter point, self-recognition could act as a first step towards understanding others. With this ability, other individuals may then be understood and manipulated through deception, imitation and teaching. In addition to deception, pretend play and external representation are proposed as another dimension of understanding false representations. Decisions about the evolutionary point at which theory of mind may have developed will depend on interpretations of the evidence for these abilities in non-human primates and whether indeed theory of mind is underlying them. Since the conception of the term ‘theory of mind’, the issue may have evolved beyond whether or not there is theory of mind in non-human primates to a more sophisticated appreciation that the concept of mind has many facets and some of these may exist in non-human primates while others may not.

Identity matching-to-sample consists of matching a sample stimulus to the corresponding identical comparison stimulus from an array of comparison stimuli (Brown, Brown, & Poulson, 1995). For example, if a learner were presented with an array of stimuli such as a block, car, and spoon (the comparison stimuli), then handed a spoon (the sample stimulus), and told to match, the learner should then place that spoon next to the comparison spoon. After the learner has acquired the ability to match all of the three objects, the experimenter could assess whether he or she had also acquired generalized matching-to-sample by using three different objects, such as a plate, sock, and cup to determine if the learner could match the given sample stimulus with the correct comparison stimulus. If the learner is able to correctly match the novel stimuli, then he or she has acquired a generalized identity matching-to-sample repertoire (Brown, et al., 1995). Identity matching-to-sample has been demonstrated with various animal species such as pigeons (Cummings & Berryman, 1961; Cummings, Berryman, & Cohen, 1965; Wright, Cook, Rivera, Sands, & Delius, 1988), California sea lions (Pack, Herman, & Roitblat, 1991), bottle nosed dolphins (Herman & Gordon, 1974; Herman, Honvancik, Gory, Bradshaw, 1989), infant chimpanzees (Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988), and macaque monkeys (Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh, 1989; as cited by Brown et al., 1995). Not only did all of the aforementioned experimenters intend to determine whether or not the various species of animals could acquire an identical matching-to-sample repertoire, but also, would a generalized repertoire develop as well. Cumming and Berryman (1961) were unable to get generalized matching with pigeons; however, Cumming, Berryman, and Cohen (1965) got low levels of generalized matching with their pigeons, and Wright, Cook, Rivera, Sands, and Delius (1988) got high levels of generalized matching with their pigeons (as cited by Brown et al., 1995). Dolphins demonstrated generalized matching (Herman & Gordon, 1974; Herman et al., 1989), as did infant chimpanzees (Oden et al., 1988; as cited by Brown et al., 1995). Following identity matching-to-sample training, California sea lions demonstrated some generalization (Pack et al. 1991) and it is unclear if macaque monkeys acquired a generalized matching repertoire (Washburn et al., 1989; as cited by Brown et al., 1995). Children under five years of age can acquire identity matching-to-sample, but no attempt seems to have been made to assess generalization (Dixon & Dixon, 1978; Lutzer, 1987; Daehler, Lonardo, & Bukatko, 1979; as cited by Brown, et al., 1995). If a skill is going to be targeted for acquisition, it should be taught not only to mastery, but the generalization of that skill needs to be targeted as well. However, Brown, Brown, and Poulson (1995) demonstrated that three typically developing children were able to acquire generalized identity matching-to-sample. While many manuals recommend training matching-to-sample to young children with developmental disabilities (Lovaas, 1981; Taylor, & McDonough, 1996), we have not found any literature actually showing that traditional matching-to-sample can be achieved by young children with developmental disabilities. And although, Saunders and Sherman (1986) taught matching-to-sample to three developmentally delayed teenagers; and all three children demonstrated generalized matching repertoire (as cited by Brown et al., 1995) there is still a need to demonstrate not only matching-to-sample, but also generalized matching in young children with developmental delays. And while generalized matching is an interesting theoretical issue, presumably it is also of considerable practical importance, as the children will have little opportunity to use their matching skills with the specific stimulus used in training. The acquisition of an identity matching repertoire will be of little value to the child if that child has not acquired a generalized matching repertoire, so that he or she can use that skill in a variety of educational and practical contexts where the matching task involves novel, untrained stimuli. …

Introduction: Behavior Analysis, Language and Stimulus Equivalence According to behaviour analysis, human language is verbal behaviour, emerging from the social contingencies operating in the verbal community. This perspective on cognitive functioning constitutes a very different approach to human language than that found in mainstream cognitive psychology and in many conceptualisations of language pathology. The conventional approach to the study of language has tended to focus on the symbolic nature of words. Language-able humans are said to be able to "manipulate symbols" (Clark, 1994), or to use words to "refer" to objects, events, or relations (Premack, 1976). For the behaviour analyst, however, concepts such as "refer" and "symbol manipulation" remain undefined and therefore are not deemed useful in explaining human language. For behaviour analysis the "meaning" of a word is established through the contingencies that control the emission of the word as an instance of verbal behaviour (Skinner, 1957). For example, the arbitrary vocal stimulus "dinner" has meaning only to the extent that it occasions appropriate behaviour (appropriate being defined by the social contingencies). Originally, behavioural researchers assumed that the meaning of a word was established in much the same way, as are stimulus control processes in nonhuman species. In essence, this conceptualisation of symbolic meaning defined symbols as discriminative stimuli. However, both non-behavioural and behavioural psychologists have questioned whether it is possible to accommodate the sheer flexibility of symbolic relations using the principle of discriminative control (cf. Hayes & Hayes, 1989). For instance, it has often been asked how an explanatory framework, which focuses on a history of previous reinforcement, can account for the fact that language-able humans respond appropriately to sentences that they have never previously heard (Chomsky, 1959). This is precisely the crucial question that a growing number of behavioural researchers have focused on in recent years. Specifically, the investigation of the phenomenon termed "stimulus equivalence" has allowed behaviour analysts to explore the behavioural processes whereby stimuli come to control behaviour in new ways in the absence of explicit reinforcement (see Sidman, 1994, for an extensive review). Stimulus equivalence has normally been studied using the matching-to-sample (MTS) procedure. When a subject is taught a series of related conditional discriminations, using the MTS format, the stimuli that enter into these discriminations become related to each other in new ways, without explicit teaching and/or reinforcement. For example, a subject might be taught, given a novel visual sample A1, to select the form B1, from an array containing B1, B2 and B3 (these visual forms are often abstract shapes or nonsense syllables that bear no formal relationship to each other). At the same time, the subject may also be trained, given the sample A1, to select another visual form C1, from an array containing C1, C2 and C3. Without additional training or explicit reinforcement, the subject may derive other relations among the stimuli; therefore the stimuli are said to be members of an equivalence class, and they show the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. Reflexivity is inferred from generalised identity matching (e.g. without any training, given A1 as a sample, the subject picks A1 and not A2 or A3 from an array). Symmetry: If the subject is trained, given A1 to pick B1, then the functional reversibility of this trained relation emerges without any direct reinforcement (given B1, pick A1). Transitivity: If a subject is trained 'given A1 pick B1' and 'given B1 pick C1', the relation 'given A1, pick C1' emerges without any training or reinforcement. The phenomenon of stimulus equivalence appears to be readily observed in the human species, whereas great difficulty has been encountered in attempting to demonstrate the effect in non-humans (e. …

Among long-standing issues in animal cognition is which (nonhuman) animal species have the cognitive ability to learn abstract concepts (e.g., Premack, 1978). The hallmark of abstract concepts is that they transcend specific features of the training stimuli because they are based upon relationships (i.e., relational learning). In a seminal paper that was instrumental in the modern resurgence of animal cognition, David Premack said “…unlike the primate, the behavior of the pigeon is predominantly controlled by absolute rather than relational factors…” (1978, p. 432). Premack’s claim that item-specific learning (i.e., absolute factors) by pigeons has been the accepted explanation for why pigeons, at that time, had failed to learn abstract concepts (e.g., Cumming, Berryman, & Cohen, 1965; Farthing & Opuda, 1974; Santi 1978). Nevertheless, evidence began to emerge that if a large number of training stimuli (e.g., 152 color cartoons) were used, pigeons actually could learn a matching-to-sample (MTS) abstract concept (Wright, Cook, Rivera, Sands, & Delius, 1988). A somewhat more advantageous procedure than MTS for testing abstract-concept learning is the same/different procedure because the matching and non-matching stimuli are presented on separate trials. Details of currently used S/D procedures used to test pigeon abstract-concept learning vary widely including the numbers of stimuli used in training and testing (e.g., Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Cook, Kelly, & Katz, 2003; Santiago & Wright, 1984; Wasserman, Hugart, & Kirkpatrick-Steger, 1995; Young & Wasserman, 1997). In consideration of the evidence that some species only accurately transfer their performance to novel stimuli following training with a substantial number of training stimuli, we have regularly made the number of training stimuli a parameter in our experiments. In a series of experiments with rhesus monkeys, capuchin monkeys, and pigeons, we began training with a small set of 8 stimuli and then progressively expanded (doubled) the training set followed by transfer tests with novel stimuli (Katz & Wright, 2006; Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; Wright, Rivera, Katz, & Bachevalier, 2003). This regime allowed us to assess whether or not the degree of concept learning would depend on the number of training exemplars and whether or not transfer would eventually reach the level of baseline performance with the training stimuli. We anticipated that large numbers of training stimuli might be necessary to achieve a level of transfer equivalent to baseline performance, and therefore used picture stimuli. We selected pictures so that the training and testing pictures would be distinctive from one another and the transfer stimuli were only tested once, by definition of their being novel. In these experiments when the training set was expanded sufficiently (256 items for pigeons, 128 for monkeys), transfer became equivalent to baseline performance which remained above 80% correct. We termed this full abstract-concept learning because the baseline performance sets an upper limit. This result was the first time that pigeons had shown full concept learning in an S/D task, but pigeons required more training exemplars (i.e., stimulus pairs of same or different) than rhesus or capuchin monkeys. We characterized this species difference as a quantitative difference in contrast to the ability to fully learn the S/D abstract concept which we characterized as a qualitative similarity. The purpose of the experiments of this article was to explore whether or not training pigeons with somewhat larger initial sets of stimuli might produce better transfer than those trained initially with an 8-item set in the prior study. Training with the smaller 8-item set might produce carryover effects that would interfere with generalized relational learning which would in turn be necessary for good performance with the large training sets. To this end, we trained different groups of pigeons with larger initial training sets and compared their transfer to groups trained initially with smaller training sets. Such comparisons, of course, would depend upon pigeons being able to learn the S/D task with large training sets. With these considerations, the first group of pigeons was trained on an intermediate set size of 32 pictures.

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.

College students (N = 151) completed three in-class mathematics assignments that varied with respect to the order of short, medium, and long multiplication problems, including a short-to-long order, a long-to-short order, and a random order. Problem order within assignments did not significantly affect work accuracy, completion time, or assignment preference. However, participants rated (1) the assignment with random order as less difficult than the other two assignments and (2) the assignment with long-to-short order as requiring less time than the other two assignments. Participants were likely to choose a related homework assignment viewed as less effortful, less difficult, or less time consuming. Several concepts (e.g., matching law, behavioral momentum, and Premack reinforcement principle) were used in interpreting the results. Keywords: problem order, mathematics, homework, matching law, behavioral momentum, Premack reinforcement principle. ********** Academic assignments and tests often involve a series of tasks or problems that can be ordered in a variety of ways. A typical pattern is to begin the assignment with the less demanding tasks (briefer, easier) and proceed to the more demanding. A less common order is to begin with the more demanding tasks and proceed to the less demanding. A third order is to randomize task order with respect to difficulty. Because order of tasks within an assignment could affect performance on the assignment, time to complete the assignment, and favorability rating of the assignment, one would expect a plethora of research dealing with the effect of task order on student performance and preference of task order. However, an examination of research on assignment performance and assignment preference reveals few studies that deal specifically with the effects of task order within assignments. Research in this area has focused mainly on exams rather than assignments. Studies of multiple-choice exams have demonstrated mixed effects of item order on performance accuracy. Balch (1989) found that sequential exams (in which the test material was presented in the same order that material was presented in texts or lectures) produced higher scores than randomized or chapter-sequenced exams. In contrast, Neely, Springston, and McCann (1994) reported no differences in accuracy between sequential and randomized questions on undergraduate psychology exams. Similarly, Perlini, Lind, and Zumbo (1998) found no influence of easy-to-hard, hard-to-easy, or random item order on psychology exam performance. Studies of difficulty ratings of exams with different task orders have also produced mixed results. Laffitte (1984) found no differences in perceived difficulty of exams organized as easy-to-hard by chapter, easy-to-hard across chapters, randomly within chapters, and randomly across chapters. In contrast, Olson and Barickowski (1976) reported that hard-to-easy tests were viewed as easier than easy-to-hard, with no differences in accuracy of answers. Whether these research findings on item order with psychology exams can be generalized to assignments that involve skill building in a variety of academic domains remains an issue for further investigation. Research regarding the effects of choosing assignment sequence has been done mainly with children and adults with special needs (e.g., autism, mental retardation) and has typically dealt with the scheduling of assignments rather that the order of tasks within assignments. For example, Kern, Mantegna, Vorndran, Bailin, and Hilt (2001) found that students having intellectual and behavioral problems improved both in task engagement and appropriate conduct when allowed to schedule the sequence of required tasks. Similarly, Seybert, Dunlap, and Ferro (1996) reported that giving high school students with severe mental retardation the opportunity to schedule their tasks increased task engagement and task productivity. …

Some evolutionary cognitive and developmental psychologists propose that the human mind consists of domain-specific modules. These are characterized as self-contained “mini-computers” that process information of a certain kind. Although, according to my reading, much of the extant human brain research does not necessarily support the module view (Greenwald, 1997), still module theories continue to occupy center stage in cognitive developmental and comparative psychology. One would think that neuroscience, as a study of the behavior beneath the skin, would simply replace cognitive psychology. But, perhaps I missed the value of the psychological construct. In their book, the Premacks set out to provide a synthesis of evidence from various fields in order to identify what they characterize as “original intelligence.” Their synthesis is derived from their reading of findings in comparative psychology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology and other “life sciences.” All of the evidence and theory from psychology from which they draw their evidence comes from the cognitive perspective including their own contributions to that research. For them, original intelligence includes certain phylogenetic and ontogenetic contributions that they identify as expectancies, capabilities that are present or not present in certain species including humans. These capabilities include inherited expectancies, derived from natural selection; and expectancies derived from experience and its interaction with inherited expectancies. Infants have inherited expectancies not only about how physical bodies “act,” but also about psychological and biological objects, about language, number, spatial navigation, and music. Indeed, infants have inherited expectancies in all the domains into which human problem solving can be divided. These expectancies are an integral part of the infant's modules. (p. 17)

Introduction Complex language is one of the unique repertoires of the human species. Others include teaching and certain "types of imitation" (Premack, 2004), although these too may be pre-or co-requisites for certain functional uses of language. Over the last 40 years linguists have proposed theories and provided evidence related to their interpretation of the structure of language (Chomsky, 1959; Chomsky & Place, 2000, MacCorquodale, 1970; Pinker, 1999). Neuroscientists have identified neurological correlates associated with some aspects of language (Deacon, 1979, Holden, 2004). Behavior analysts have focused on the source of and controlling variables for the function of language as behavior per se (Catania, Mathews, & Shimoff, 1990; Greer & Ross, 2005; Michael, 1984; Skinner, 1957). More recently, scholars have come to view human language as a product of evolution; "Linguists and neuroscientists armed with new types of data are moving beyond the non-evolutionary paradigm once suggested by Noam Chomsky and tackling the origins of speech head-on." (Culotta & Brooks-Hanson, 2004, p. 1315). The current work focuses on the evolution of both the non-oral motor and oral components of speech (Deacon, 1997; Holden, 2004), although some arguments are characterized necessarily more by theory than data. Despite the evidence that primates and pigeons can be taught certa in features of verbal behavior (D. Premack & A. Premack; 2003; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1978; Epstein, Lanza, & Skinner, 1980), the speaker-as-own listener capability makes complex verbal behavior possible and may represent what is most unique about human verbal functions (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2001; Lodhi & Greer, 1989; Horne & Lowe, 1996). Some suggest that oral communication evolved from clicking sounds to sounds of phonemes, and cite the extant clicking languages as evidence (Pennisi, 2004). It is likely that sign language and gesture predated both vocal forms; but it is the evolution of the spoken and auditory components of language that are seen as critical to the evolution of language. Some of these include changes in the anatomy of the jaw--Homo sapiens have more flexible jaw than did Neanderthals. Also, the location of the larynx relative to the trachea is different for Homo sapiens, and this anatomical feature made it possible for the humans to emit a wider range of speech sounds (Deacon, 1997). The combination of these anatomical changes, together with the identification of separate, but proximate, sites in the brain for speaking, listening, and imitation seem to be critical parts of what made spoken language possible (Deacon, 1997). The presence of these anatomical and physiological properties made it possible for the evolution of verbal functions through the process of cultural selection (Catania, 2001). The functional effects of speech sounds were acquired by the consequences provided within verbal communities. This latter focus is what constitutes the subject matter of verbal behavior. The new foci on language, as an evolved anatomical and physiological capacity, do not necessarily suggest the existence of a universal grammar; nor, in fact, does it eliminate the possibility of an evolved universal grammar, as some argue (Pinker, 1999). Some of the linguistic neuropsychological searches for an evolved universal grammar now follow the PET and MRI trails and focus on identifying blood flow associated with the speech and hearing centers in the brain (Holden, 2004). Interesting and as important as this work may be, little, if any, is devoted to the function of language as behavior per se. Nor is it concerned with the biological or cultural evolution of verbal function in our species or in the lifespan of the individual, although anthropological linguists point to functions as the initial source. Only the research associated with Skinner's (1957) theory of verbal behavior as behavior per se, and expansions of the theory by contemporary behavior analysts, provide the means for analyzing how cultural selection gave rise to the function of language (Greer, 2002; Greer & Ross, in press; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2000; Lowe, Horne, Harris, & Randle, 2002). …

We suspect that people have an everyday theory of mind because they explain and frequently talk about the behaviour of others and themselves in terms of beliefs and desires. Having a theory of mind means that we believe that other people have minds like ours and that we understand the behaviour of these others in terms of the contents of their minds: their knowledge, beliefs and desires. But how can we demonstrate experimentally that people are using their theory of mind to predict the behaviour of others. This problem is particularly acute in the case of animals or young human children when they do not have language. Dennett (1978) discussing Premack & Woodruff's (1978) seminal paper ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’, suggested that the use of false beliefs to explain behaviour would provide convincing evidence. When their belief is true (i.e. corresponds to the actual state of the world) we can explain peoples' behaviour on the basis of the state of the world without needing to know about their beliefs. This ambiguity does not arise when the belief is false. The first experiment to use this approach was published by Wimmer & Perner (1983). They showed that at around 4 years of age a child knows that Maxi will look for his chocolates where Maxi believes them to be, even though the child knows that this belief is false because he has seen Maxi's mother moving the chocolates. In the English-speaking world the task involving Maxi and the chocolates has become the Sally-Anne task (see this issue, Lee et al. 2004).

We used response-restriction (RR) assessments to identify the preferences of 7 individuals with mental retardation for a variety of vocational and leisure activities. We subsequently increased their engagement in nonpreferred activities using several procedures: response restriction per se versus a Premack-type contingency (Study 1), supplemental reinforcement for engagement in target activities (Study 2), and noncontingent pairing of reinforcers with nonpreferred activities (Study 3). Results indicated that preferences are not immutable and can be altered through a variety of relatively benign interventions and that the results of RR assessments may be helpful in determining which types of procedures may be most effective on an individual basis.

Since my first immersion in the medical environment in 1975, I have had the opportunity to participate in and develop a number of different environments of care and types of services for children, adolescents, and their families. I am reminded that the famous philosopher Yogi Berra once said “You can observe a lot just by watching.” I continue to be impressed by the unique and ever-changing benefits to children’s health brought about by pediatric psychologists. I want to thank my colleagues for bestowing on me the opportunity to reflect on my personal experiences and the growth of our field. When I arrived at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) to begin my undergraduate education, it was my career goal to become a physicist. However, my path changed very quickly. I was lucky to have had the opportunity to study with a number of outstanding psychologists. I can remember my first course in learning theory taught by David Premack, PHD, of Premack Principle fame. Simply put, the Premack Principle states that a more-preferred activity can be used to reinforce a less-preferred activity (Premack, 1959). Even though his original work was done with monkeys, its application to humans was apparent. In another of my classes, we watched the film “Behavior Modification: Teaching Language to Psychotic Children” (Lovaas, 1969). In essence, Dr Ivar Lovaas had applied his own learning research, the Premack Principle, and other findings from the basic research literature to develop a method to teach mute or echolalic autistic children how to speak and use language!

Behavior is a sequence of actions. Premackian conditioning occurs when one of those actions permits an animal to engage in more biologically potent positive responses—reinforcement—or forces them to engage in less positive (or negative) responses —punishment. Signals of the transition from one class of actions to another focus the instrumental responses in the first class and inform the contingent responses in the second class. The signals may be innate (USs) or learned (sign-learning); excitatory (leading to more positive actions) or inhibitory (leading to less positive actions). The potency of an action has phylogenetic origins, but may be conditioned by proximity to more potent responses, such as consummation of a reinforcer. With practice instrumental responses may take on increased strength, and in some cases become motivationally autonomous—become habits. Stimuli or responses that signal the availability of more positive actions may become incentive motivators that animals will approach. Discriminative stimuli do not have intrinsic value as reinforcers, but only the value derived from the responses that they release. These forces bend an animal’s trajectory through its stimulus-action-time context into a path that leads more directly to positive actions. The association of actions (conditioned responses, operants, and observing responses) with actions of different potency (ultimately unconditioned responses or consummatory behavior) is the primary association in Premackian conditioning. All other types of conditioning may be interpreted as instances of such Premackian conditioning.

Author(s): Weiss, Stanley J.; Rosales-Ruiz, Jesus | Abstract: The Keynote Speaker at Winter Conference on Animal Learning and Behavior (WCALB) 2014 was Dr. Bjorn Brembs whose address was titled, Pavlovian and Skinnerian Processes Are Genetically Separable. The essence of the address, that describes the research on which Dr. Brembs based this conclusion, is described below. Articles in this issue representing the related Focus Session include: The Many Faces of Pavlovian Conditioning by Dr. Jozefowiez, Pavlov + Skinner = Premack by Dr. Killeen, Evocation of Behavioral Change by the Reinforcer is the Critical Event in Both the Classical and Operant Procedures by Dr. Donahoe, On Choice and the Law of Effect by Dr. Staddon, Response-Outcome versus Outcome-Response Associations in Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer: Effects of Instrumental Training Context by Gilroy, Everett and Delamater, and The Instrumentally-Derived Incentive-Motivational Function by Dr. Weiss. As a whole, they attempt to increase our contact with, and get at the essence of, what is actually happening with these operant and classical contingencies in the laboratory and nature. The Research Seminar Session revealed the current tendency for explanations of behavior to be reduced to physiology, neuroscience, and genetics. However, anti-reductionists saw shortcomings in this approach. They recommended an interconnected holistic approach which shifts the focus away from the structure of discrete behaviors and toward examining the environment in which the behavior occurs and the consequences produced. The distinction between structural and functional analysis points to a difficulty of integrating facts about behavior with other levels of analysis that requires our attention.

In D. Premack's thought-provoking Perspective on language and intelligence (“Is language the key to human intelligence?” 16 Jan., p. 318), I was a bit taken aback by the first sentence, in which he writes that humans have invented four systems of symbols. Written language and arabic numerals are

What factors make humans unique? Spoken language? Recursion? In his Perspective, Premack uses a recent study showing that tamarin monkeys can acquire nonrecursive but not recursive grammar ( Fitch et al.) as a springboard to discuss various aspects of human uniqueness.

This paper describes response deprivation as an establishing operation. In this context, we review the concept of establishing operation, in particular, its reinforcer-establishing and evocative effects; we place response deprivation in the literature on the reinforcing effects of behavioral activity, wherein response deprivation subsumes the Premack principle; we describe the reinforcer-altering and evocative effects of response deprivation; and we address a methodological concern about the evocative effect. In closing, we discuss some conceptual and empirical implications of the foregoing analyses.

This study applied Premack's (1959, 1965) model of reinforcement to improving quality performance of service employees. Premack stated that for any pair of activities, the more probable or valued one will reinforce the less probable or less valued one. Quality performance was operationally defined and measured in the study by an observational instrument developed from a large-scale employee survey. Employees of a fast food restaurant chain in a medium-sized, midwest metropolitan area identified the most important quality performance dimensions for each workstation in the restaurant, and observers were trained to record those categories of performance with 90 percent interrater reliability. Performance of eight randomly selected employees at one of the restaurant locations was directly observed during a 7-week period. Five of the employees experienced an intervention derived from the Premack reinforcement model; if the quality of their performance exceeded baseline at a targeted workstation, they earned access to work time on their favorite station. A multiple baseline design across the five individuals was employed to assess the impact of this intervention; three employees who did not experience the intervention served as a control for maturation. The results provide beginning support for the use of reinforcement procedures derived from Premack's model in improving quality performance of service employees.

Describes the application of Organizational Behaviour Modification (OBMod), and in particular the Premack Principle, to improving the performance of a number of professional electrical engineers. The design and implementation of the behavioural change scheme was undertaken by the engineers′ manager who received approximately one day′s training in the theory and practice of OBMod. Analysis of the behaviour of the engineers revealed that, while they had the ability and resources required to undertake their jobs effectively, their efforts were not resulting in the desired performance. Analysis using the Premack Principle revealed that much of their efforts were being directed towards necessary, but not essential, aspects of their jobs. A scheme of reinforcement was devised for each engineer, involving regular feedback and praise from the manager. Results over a period of one year showed the section moving from the bottom to the top of comparable sections within the organization. Individual improvements in output ranged from 31 to 270 per cent while that for the section as a whole rose by 73 per cent.

Establishing appropriate relations between the basic and applied areas of behavior analysis has been of long and persistent interest to me (e.g., Friman & Poling, 1996; Poling, Picker, Grossett, Hall-Johnson, & Holbrook, 1981; Porritt, Van Wagner, & Poling, 2009). Therefore, I read with enthusiasm the collection of articles on progressive-ratio (PR) schedules that appeared in the Summer 2008 issue the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA). For nearly 50 years, since they were first described by Hodos (1961), such schedules have been used in basic research published in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior and elsewhere to measure what is commonly termed the strength, potency, or effectiveness of scheduled reinforcers. (The three terms appear to be synonymous, and hereafter I will use only potency.) The essential logic, reflected in all of the JABA articles, is that there is a direct relation between how hard an organism will work for access to an object or activity, as indexed by the largest ratio completed under a PR schedule (the breaking point), and the potency of the reinforcer. It is important to recognize that reinforcer potency is a hypothetical construct, and prominent behavior analysts have argued consistently and compellingly that hypothetical constructs play no useful role in a science of behavior (e.g., Michael, 2004; Skinner, 1938). Unlike, for example, reinforcer delay or magnitude, reinforcer potency is not measured directly, but is instead inferred on the basis of how the scheduled event interacts with ongoing behavior. PR breaking strength is one measure of this interaction, but many others are tenable, including amount of time spent interacting with a reinforcer (think Premack principle), rate of responding engendered by a reinforcer, preference for a reinforcer (think matching equation), demand (in the behavioral economics sense) for a reinforcer, and resistance to disruption of behavior maintained by a reinforcer (behavioral momentum). Although I will not attempt to review the relevant literature, basic and applied studies (including those published in the JABA collection on PR schedules) make it clear that these measures are not necessarily equivalent. As an example, consider cocaine. Acute administrations of the drug reduce self-reported craving for food in humans as well as food intake in humans and nonhumans alike, but they increase PR breaking points at low to moderate doses (Jones, LeSage, Sundby, & Poling, 1995; Sizemore, Cannon, Smith, & Dworkin, 2003; Thompson, 1977). Does the drug increase the reinforcing potency of food and act as an establishing operation (EO), as suggested by PR breaking points, or decrease it and act as an abolishing operation (AO), as suggested by craving and consumption? As a second example, consider methylphenidate. A PR study with rats indicated that the drug increases breaking points for food reinforcers, suggesting that the drug is an EO (Poncelet, Chermat, Soubrie, & Simon, 1983). This suggestion is inconsistent with results of an experiment by Northup, Fusilier, Swanson, Roane, and Borrero (1997), who studied young people diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. These researchers systematically reinforced appropriate responses (completed math problems) with coupons (conditioned reinforcers) that could be exchanged for particular back-up reinforcers. Each time a reinforcer was earned, seven different coupons, each exchangeable for a different reinforcer, were available in a reinforcer selection arrangement. In general, coupons exchangeable for food were selected more often when placebo was given than when methylphenidate was administered, and coupons exchangeable for activities were selected more often in the latter condition than in the former. These findings suggest that the drug acted as an EO for social activities and as an AO for food. Of course, the effects of drugs on PR responding and other aspects of behavior may reflect a mechanism other than altered reinforcer effectiveness, but the point is clear: PR schedules do not provide an uncontaminated index of the effects of drugs or other independent variables on reinforcer potency. As the examples of cocaine and methylphenidate illustrate, the apparent potency of a reinforcer may depend on the general procedure used to measure it. In addition to the general strategy used to quantify behavior, the specifics of a given procedure also can influence reinforcer potency. Roane (2008) indicated that this appears to be the case with PR schedules, but there are many uninvestigated areas for future research, including (a) how initial schedule value and step size influence findings in applied settings, (b) how response topographies influence results, and (c) whether behavioral economics analyses can be applied profitably to PR findings. In fact, he comments that “almost any previous study that has examined variables that alter the effectiveness of positive reinforcement could be replicated [in applied settings] using PR schedules” (p. 159). One can easily envision several lifetimes of research in this vein, especially when comparisons across all of the procedures available for measuring reinforcer potency, as well as within PR schedule variants, are considered and negative reinforcers are added to the mix. Whether such research would yield much of applied benefit is debatable. My prediction is that it would not. In applied research—at least, when applied is defined as proposed in Baer, Wolf, and Risley's (1968) seminal article—the potency of a scheduled reinforcer is important primarily with respect to whether or not that reinforcer can be arranged to improve a socially significant target behavior. How it affects behavior in other circumstances, even in the population of concern (e.g., children with autism), is of value only if (a) this information is easily obtained, so there is little cost for people with special needs; and (b) this information allows applied behavior analysts to predict the clinical utility of the scheduled reinforcer. PR schedules are not an especially quick way to scale reinforcer potency. In addition, exposure to long ratios (as when the breaking point is approached) is known to be aversive (e.g., Dardano, 1973). Therefore, members of protected populations should not be exposed to them unless there are clear offsetting benefits. To date, no such benefits have been demonstrated, and no compelling arguments for their existence have been provided.

Wallace, Tylor, Wundt, Johannesson, and others have proposed that human language had its basis in hand and arm gestures. The Gardners' work with the chimpanzee Washoe, Premack's study of the chimpanzee Sarah, and continuing experiments along these lines indicate that neural restructuring would not have been necessary for the protohominid acquisition of a simple propositional gesture or sign language which did not involve cross-modal transfer at a high level from the visual to the auditory channel or vice versa. Evidence from primate studies, early tool-using, the continuing functions of gesture in human communication, lateral dominance in its relation to speech and tool manipulation, and other sources is presented to support a model of glottogenesis. It is argued that a preexisting gestural language system would have provided an easier pathway to vocal language than a direct outgrowth of the "emotional" use of vocalization characteristic of nonhuman primates.

Ever since Premack & Woodruff's classic article^1^, which introduced the term "theory of mind", researchers have claimed that strategic deception is the most natural behavioural consequence of understanding false belief. Here we challenge that claim, and provide evidence for the first time that the earliest manifestation of false belief understanding in human development is found in young children's emerging pro-social behaviours. In a modified false belief task, children were asked either to choose one protagonist they should help to find the object (the pro-social context), or to choose one they need to deceive so that none of the protagonists can find the object (the competitive context). The results show that the pro-social motive, but not the competitive motive, boosts early false belief understanding. This is most clearly contrasted with findings that apes, our closest living relatives, are capable of intentionally manipulating others by concealing information only under competitive motives, not under cooperative alternatives. Thus, the current findings are the strongest to date that sophisticated understanding of others' belief in humans has its unique origin, separate from the primate origin at some point in recent evolution, when cooperative and communicative motives played an essential role for their survival.

Premack and Woodruff (1978) have proposed the term "Theory of Mind" (ToM) to refer to one's ability to infer the beliefs, intentions and thoughts of others in order to explain and predict their behavior. Understanding how ToM operates has been the subject of debate for more than twenty years in cognitive psychology, but has only recently been studied in behavior analysis. Although the concepts of ToM do not lend themselves readily to a functional interpretation, some behavioral researchers working under the rubric of Relational Frame Theory (RFT) have attempted to develop a behavioral interpretation of the types of repertoires that constitute a ToM (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004a). Relational Frame Theory is a modern behavioranalytic approach to the study of human language and cognition. At its core, this approach embraces the simple idea that language and cognition involve a number of limited but powerful behavioral processes, that allow individuals to relate stimuli or events in the world in new and untrained ways (as in generative language). A range of behavioral patterns emerge as a result of these relations between stimuli and these patterns are referred to as relational frames (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). The simplest form of such relating can be referred to as coordination framing. An example of this type of framing might go as follows: a child could learn that the written word "DOG" is the same as the spoken word "DOG" according to the non-physical characteristics of these two stimuli while their physical form is very different. According to RFT, it is the uniquely human ability to learn to relate objects and events not based on their physical form but on external cues that allows for the generativity of human language. Among the different ways in which two stimuli can be related, Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, and Dymond (2001; see also Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004) have underlined the role of a specific class of relational responding termed deictic framing, which is assumed to underpin perspective-taking and, thus to be critically important with respect to the ability to infer the mental states of others. The three deictic frames involved in the acquisition of perspective-taking skills are the frames of I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN, corresponding to interpersonal, spatial, and temporal dimensions, respectively. According to this view, perspective-taking skills emerge through a history of responding to questions such as > or >. Many phrases during daily discourse include these relational frames, even if substituted words such as the names of places, people and time are frequently used instead of the actual terms of I and YOU, HERE and THERE and NOW and THEN. Following the RFT approach to ToM, McHugh et al. (2004a) have proposed an RFT interpretation of the developmental levels of ToM described by Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin (1999). That is, the authors suggested that levels from simple visual perspective-taking to the understanding of false-beliefs involve the ability to respond in accordance with deictic relational frames. Consider the following example of a well known false-belief task (Gopnick & Astington, 1988), in which a participant is asked what is inside a closed candy box. After responding, the candy box is opened and the participant discovers that the candy box did not contain candy but actually contained pencils. Then s/he is asked >. The RFT view of this task is that a correct response coming from the participant is underpinned by relational frames as follows: >. In order to study this interpretation, McHugh et al. …

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Introducción. El objetivo del artículo es realizar una revisión bibliográfica y responder a la pregunta ¿existen programas de intervención probados para desarrollar la cognición social en personas con trastornos del espectro autista (TEA)? Se define autismo según Kanner, Asperguer y Wing, este último que formuló la tríada sintomática del autismo. La Teoría de la mente (ToM), que es la capacidad para atribuir estados mentales a otras personas, distintos a los propios, da explicación a los 3 síntomas de Wing. Aportes desde la ToM. Se revisan distintos autores que aportaron en la investigación empírica de la ToM desde Premack y Woodruf (1978) que ocupan el concepto por primera vez, hasta Baron-Cohen (2001) que ha centrado sus investigaciones en estudios de la ToM en niños con autismo. Tratamientos propuestos para desarrollar la cognición social en personas con TEA. Se revisan 5 estudios que proponen diversas intervenciones para desarrollar la ToM en niños con TEA, el último realizado por Stichter y colaboradores el año 2012. Discusión. Se analiza la escasez de estudios con pequeñas poblaciones, lo que dificulta extrapolar los resultados. Se destaca la necesidad de realizar evaluaciones en contextos reales, profundizar los estudios de programas sistematizados que consideren grupo control, muestras representativas y seguimientos prolongados para evaluar la generalización de los aprendizajes. Finalmente se exponen aportes potenciales de la terapia ocupacional a los estudios y programas de tratamiento.

Results from several studies have suggested that the opportunity to engage in stereotypic behavior may function as reinforcement for alternative, more socially desirable behaviors. However, the procedural components of this intervention include several distinct operations whose effects have not been analyzed separately. While measuring the occurrence of stereotypy and an alternative behavior (manipulation of leisure materials), we exposed 3 participants to three or four components of a "stereotypy as reinforcement" contingency: (a) continuous access to materials, (b) prompts to manipulate materials, (c) restricted access to stereotypy (i.e., response blocking), and (d) access to stereotypy contingent on manipulating the materials. Continuous access to materials and prompting (a and b) produced negligible results. Restriction of stereotypy (c) produced a large increase in the alternative behavior of 2 participants, suggesting that response restriction per se may occasion alternative behavior. However, contingent access to stereotypy (d) was necessary to increase the 3rd participant's object manipulation; this finding provided some support for the use of stereotypy as reinforcement for alternative behavior. Finally, when transfer of the effects of intervention was assessed during periods in which active intervention components were withdrawn, the alternative behavior was maintained for 1 participant.

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.

Of course, words aren’t magic. Neither are sextants, compasses, maps, slide rules and all the other paraphenelia which have accreted around the basic biological brains of homo sapiens. In the case of these other tools and props, however, it is transparently clear that they function so as to either carry out or to facilitate computational operations important to various human projects. The slide rule transforms complex mathematical problems (ones that would baffle or tax the unaided subject) into simple tasks of perceptual recognition. The map provides geographical information in a format well-suited to aid complex planning and strategic military operations. The compass gathers and displays a kind of information that (most) unaided human subjects do not seem to command. These various tools and props thus act to generate information, or to store it, or to transform it, or some combination of the three. In so doing, they impact our individual and collective problemsolving capacities in much the same dramatic ways as various software packages impact the performance of a simple pc.

Some philosophers have laid down rather severe strictures on whether there can be thought without language. Wittgenstein asserted that ‘the limits of language…mean the limits of my world’ (1922, §5.62). Davidson (1984, p. 157) has argued that ‘a creature cannot have thoughts unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another’. Dummett (1978, p. 458) has interpreted some pronouncements as meaning that ‘the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological processes of thinking and…the only proper method of analysing thought consists in the analysis of language’. And there is also the position that thought has its own language that might exist even prior to or in the absence of natural language. But here I am going to concentrate on what might be possible in the absence of natural language. I do not know what it would mean to consider thinking in the absence of its own intrinsic language, a language of thought, if the two always co-exist.

The concept "theory of mind", first proposed by Premack and Woodruff (1978), has drastically changed our view of the mind. In the first half of this paper, the concept's history and recent developments were reviewed. Included were studies of non-human primates, normal children, and autistic children, in addition to some philosophical discussions. The "false belief" paradigm has been successful in understanding children older than 4 years and in characterizing children with high-functioning autism. But with the paradigm alone, it is difficult to explain the "mind" of most non-human primates, younger children, and a large part of autistic children. In the second half, a theoretical discussion was made to understand early developments of mind. The theory theory and competing theories of modularity, simulation, and intersubjectivity were compared concerning the observability of mind (of self and others), the basic mechanisms for understanding the mind, the indispensability of theorizing the mind, and the need for metarepresentation in pretend plays.

Original Intelligence Unlocking the Mystery of Who We Are. David Premack and Ann Premack. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003. 287 pp. $24.95, £18.99, C$34.95. ISBN 0-07-138142-2. The authors present a theory of mind developed through their critical appraisal of findings from cognitive and comparative psychology and primatology, and they discuss its implications for understanding animal intelligence and educating children.

The ketogenic diet, a treatment for intractable epilepsy, is rarely initiated because it requires strict compliance with a diet that is perceived to be unpalatable. In a case study of a 15-year-old girl with uncontrolled epilepsy, we used a stimulus-choice procedure to assess relative preferences of 33 foods from the diet and to develop two treatments based on Premack's principle. The results of a multielement analysis showed that both treatments increased dietary compliance. Compliance was maintained with generalization of treatment across settings, and was associated with a 40% reduction in seizures.

First-grade children engaged in seatwork behaviors under reinforcement schedules established according to the Premack Principle and the Response Deprivation Hypothesis. Across two experiments, schedules were presented to the children in a counter-balanced fashion which fulfilled the conditions of one, both, or neither of the hypotheses. Duration of on-task math and coloring in Experiment 1 and on-task math and reading in Experiment 2 were the dependent variables. A modified ABA-type withdrawal design, including a condition to control for the noncontingent effects of a schedule, indicated an increase of on-task instrumental responding only in those schedules where the condition of response deprivation was present but not where it was absent, regardless of the probability differential between the instrumental and contingent responses. These results were consistent with laboratory findings supporting the necessity of response deprivation for producing the reinforcement effect in single response, instrumental schedules. However, the results of the control procedure were equivocal so the contribution of the contingent relationship between the responses to the increases in instrumental behavior could not be determined. Nevertheless, these results provided tentative support for the Response Deprivation Hypothesis as a new approach to establishing reinforcement schedules while indicating the need for further research in this area. The possible advantages of this technique for applied use were identified and discussed.

In the last ten years, entirely new experiments have been undertaken in the field of animal communication. The works of Allen and Beatrice Gardner with the chimpanzee Washoe and David and Ann Premack with Sarah should have held the attention of linguists and semiologists more than they have up to now. It is from this standpoint that they are examined here.

In his now classic paper of 1959, David Premack reinterpreted the positive reinforcement effect as follows: "Reinforcement results when an R of a lower independent rate coincides, within temporal limits, with the stimuli governing the occurrence of an R of a higher independent rate [p. 219]" (italics original). Among other implications of this reinterpretation is the following which has direct applicability to educational problems: of two behaviors performed by an individual, the more preferred (operationally defined as the one with the higher independent frequency of occurrence) can reinforce the less preferred, but not vice versa. Premack demonstrated this effect, now often referred to as the Premack Principle, on several species (e.g., Premack, 1959, 1962, 1965, 1971). In his study on humans (Premack, 1959) each of the 33 first graders was exposed to a candy dispenser and a pinball machine and told that he could play with either or both games as much as he liked. This first exposure to the games established' 'empirical independent rates (as measures of preference) for the two behaviors. The second trial provided a test of the principle by establishing the following contingency relationships. Half the Ss found that the availability of their preferred behavior (either manipulating the pinball machine or eating candy) was not contingent upon performance of their nonpreferred behavior (eating or manipulating, respectively). This was ac

A failure to support Premack’s assertion that a rate reduction in the reinforcing response of a reinforcement contingency, relative to the precontingency baseline rate of that response, is necessary for the occurrence of reinforcement, is reported. The implications of this finding for reinforcement theory are discussed, and it is proposed that reinforcement contingencies have potential importance for evaluating animal intelligence.

Human preferences for various fixed-ratio schedules were compared with a fixed-interval 30-sec schedule in 56 male and female subjects. Using counter points as reinforcers and a preference paradigm permitting interspecies comparisons, three experiments yielded data suggesting that schedule preferences reflect sensitivities to time-dependent and responsedependent variables, rate of reinforcement parameters, and the total number of responses emitted by the organism, in that order of importance. The importance of this technology for tests of Premack’s reinforcement principle and ascertainment of the positive or negative valence of reinforcement schedules is briefly discussed.