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We examine the role of universities in knowledge production and industrial change using historical evidence. Political shocks led to a profound pro-science shift in German universities around 1800. To study the consequences, we construct novel microdata. We find that invention and manufacturing developed similarly in cities closer to and farther from universities in the 1700s and shifted towards universities and accelerated in the early 1800s. The shift in manufacturing was strongest in new and high knowledge industries. After 1800, the adoption of mechanized technology and the number and share of firms winning international awards for innovation were higher near universities.

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which addressed strains in the asset-backed securities market, was an unusual crisis facility because it provided loans to a wide range of nonbank financial institutions. Using new, detailed loan-level data, we study whether institutional differences across nonbanks affected nonbanks' support for key program goals-stabilizing markets quickly, winding down the program when conditions normalized, providing liquidity to a wide range of assets, and internalizing credit risk rather than shifting it to the government. As the program terms were the same for all TALF borrowers, our study can examine the role of institutional constraints.

Regulation and capital constraints may force banks and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) to sell deteriorating loans, potentially hampering renegotiation and amplifying the initial negative shock to the borrower. We show that banks and CLOs sell downgraded loans to mutual funds and hedge funds. The reallocation of loan shares favors the syndicate's concentration, increasing lenders' incentives to renegotiate. However, syndicates remain less concentrated when potential buyers experience financial constraints and subsequently loans are less likely to be amended and more likely to be downgraded even further. Our findings indicate that existing regulations may amplify shocks to credit quality during periods of generalized distress in the financial system.

We show that credit supply effects and associated real effects of monetary policy depend on the size of nonbank presence in the respective lending market. Nonbank presence also alters how monetary policy affects the distribution of risk. For identification, we use exhaustive loan-level data since the 1990s and Gertler-Karadi (2015) monetary policy shocks. First, different from the literature showing that low monetary policy rates increase credit supply and risk-taking by banks, we find that higher monetary policy rates shifts credit supply for corporates, mortgages, and consumers shifts from regulated banks to less regulated, more fragile nonbanks. Moreover, this shift is more pronounced for ex-ante riskier borrowers. Second, nonbanks reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy at the loan-level. However, this reduction varies substantially across lending markets. Total credit and real effects are largely neutralized in consumer loans and the associated consumption, but not in corporate loans and investment.

We show that U.S. dollar movements affect syndicated loan terms for U.S. borrowers, even for those without trade exposure. We identify the effect of dollar movements using spread and loan amount adjustments during the syndication process. Using this high-frequency, within loan variation, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the dollar index increases spreads by up to 15 basis points and reduces loan amounts and underpricing by up to 2 percent and 7 basis points, respectively. These effects are concentrated in dollar appreciations. Our results suggest that global factors reflected in the dollar determine U.S. borrowing costs.

Updated February 27, 2020 We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis. (updated Feb. 27, 2020) We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation has important spillovers: during the 2008 crisis, loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility. Peydró acknowledges financial support from both the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness Feder EU (project ECO2015-68136-P) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).