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The demise of collective bargaining has allowed firms to flex their 'monopsony power' and squeeze wages 'MASTERS ARE always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform [...]

CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. MARKET POWER AS A DIMENSION OF LIABILITY A. Liability Function B. Evidence C. Separability D. Generalization III. CHANNELS OF RELEVANCE A. Decision-Theoretic Formulation B. Market Power [...], Market power is the most important determinant of liability in competition law cases throughout the world. Yet fundamental questions on the relevance of market power are underanalyzed, if examined at all: When and why should we inquire into market power? How much should we require? Should market power be viewed as one thing, regardless of the practice under scrutiny and independent of the pertinent anticompetitive and procompetitive explanations for its use? Does each component of market power have the same probative force? Or even influence optimal liability determinations in the same direction? This Article's ground-up investigation of market power finds that the answers often differ from what is generally believed and sometimes are surprising--notably, higher levels of certain market power measures or particular market power components sometimes disfavor liability. This gulf between conventional wisdom and correct understanding suggests the need to redirect research agendas, agency guidance, and competition law doctrine.

The authors study the roles of asset contractibility, market power, and rate of return differentials in dynamic insurance when the contracting parties have limited commitment. They define, characterize, and compute [...]

The imf adds to a chorus of concern about falling levels of competition PHYSICISTS' QUEST for a 'theory of everything' is well-known. The equivalent in economics is the hunt for [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 438 II The Market Definition/Market Share Paradigm 443 A. Preliminaries 443 B. Analysis 447 1. Dominant Firm, Homogeneous Good, Small Rivals 448 [...], Competition law is dominated by the market definition / market share paradigm, under which a relevant market is defined and pertinent market shares therein are examined in order to make inferences about market power. This Article advances the immodest claim that the market definition process is incoherent as a matter of basic economic principles and hence should be abandoned entirely. This conclusion rests on four arguments. First, meaningful inferences of market power in redefined markets cannot be made. Second, the paradigm relies on an unarticulated notion of a standard reference market whose necessity and prior omission signal a serious gap. Third and most important, determining what market definition is best is impossible without first formulating a best estimate of market power, rendering further analysis pointless and possibly leading to erroneous outcomes. Finally, the need to define markets engenders a mistaken focus on cross-elasticities of demand for particular substitutes rather than on the market elasticity of demand, which further reduces the quality of resulting market power inferences. Although the inquiry is conceptual, brief remarks on legal doctrine suggest that creating conformity may not be unduly difficult.

A realistic empirical model and a less aggregated data set is used to formally assess competitive buying and selling behavior in the Australian grains and oilseeds industries. It was seen that flour and cereal food product manufacturers exert market power when they purchase wheat, barely, oats and triticale.

Byline: GRAYDON CARTER America the Angry It could fairly be said that during the past decade America went from being an essentially optimistic nation to being an essentially pessimistic one, [...]