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People only exert cognitive effort if they think the benefits outweigh the costs. Here, the authors show that people assess these benefits by considering expected rewards and how much their effort matters for obtaining those rewards, and then integrating these to determine how much effort to exert.

In public debate, Twitter (now X) is often said to cause detrimental effects on users and society. Here we address this research question by querying 252 participants from a representative sample of U.S. Twitter users 5 times per day over 7 days (6,218 observations). Results revealed that Twitter use is related to decreases in well-being, and increases in political polarization, outrage, and sense of belonging over the course of the following 30 minutes. Effect sizes were comparable to the effect of social interactions on well-being. These effects remained consistent even when accounting for demographic and personality traits. Different inferred uses of Twitter were linked to different outcomes: passive usage was associated with lower well-being, social usage with a higher sense of belonging, and information-seeking usage with increased outrage and most effects were driven by within-person changes., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

People tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort, and findings from recent behavioral studies suggest that effort allocation is in part determined by the opportunity cost of slothful responding-operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time. When the average rate of reward is high, individuals make more errors in cognitive control tasks, presumably owing to a withdrawal of costly cognitive processing. An open question remains whether the presumed modulations of cognitively effortful control processes are observable at the neural level. Here, we measured EEG while participants completed the Simon task, a well-known response conflict task, while the experienced average reward rate fluctuated across trials. We examined neural activity associated with the opportunity cost of time by applying generalized eigendecomposition, a hypothesis-driven source separation technique, to identify a midfrontal component associated with the average reward rate. Fluctuations in average reward rate modulated not only component amplitude but also, most importantly, component theta power (4-8 Hz). Higher average reward rate was associated with reduced theta power, suggesting that the opportunity of time modulates effort allocation. These neural results provide evidence for the idea that people strategically modulate the amount of cognitive effort they exert based on the opportunity cost of time., (© 2022 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

Effort is aversive and often avoided, even when earning benefits for oneself. Yet, people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work shows people avoid physical effort for strangers relative to themselves, but invest more physical effort for charity. Here, we find that people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is a personally meaningful charity. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants (N = 51; 150 choices) were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity than themselves. In Study 2, participants (N = 47; 225 choices) were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred cognitive exertion that benefited themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike prior physical effort findings, cognitive effort discounted the subjective value of rewards linearly. Exploratory machine learning analyses suggest that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf, opening up new avenues for future research., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Self-regulation has been studied across levels of analysis; however, little attention has been paid to the extent to which self-report, neural, and behavioral indices predict goal pursuit in real-life. We use a mixed-method approach (N = 201) to triangulate evidence among established measures of different aspects of self-regulation to predict both the process of goal pursuit using experience sampling, as well as longer-term goal progress at 1, 3, and 6-month follow-ups. While self-reported trait self-control predicts goal attainment months later, we observe a null relationship between longitudinal goal attainment and ERPs associated with performance-monitoring and reactivity to positive/rewarding stimuli. Despite evidence that these ERPs are reliable and trait-like, and despite theorizing that suggests otherwise, our findings suggest that these ERPs are not meaningfully associated with everyday goal attainment. These findings challenge the ecological validity of brain measures thought to assess aspects of self-regulation., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

While the importance of social affect and cognition is indisputable throughout the adult lifespan, findings of how empathy and prosociality develop and interact across adulthood are mixed and real-life data are scarce. Research using ecological momentary assessment recently demonstrated that adults commonly experience empathy in daily life. Furthermore, experiencing empathy was linked to higher prosocial behavior and subjective well-being. However, to date, it is not clear whether there are adult age differences in daily empathy and daily prosociality and whether age moderates the relationship between empathy and prosociality across adulthood. Here we analyzed experience-sampling data collected from participants across the adult lifespan to study age effects on empathy, prosocial behavior, and well-being under real-life circumstances. Linear and quadratic age effects were found for the experience of empathy, with increased empathy across the three younger age groups (18 to 45 years) and a slight decrease in the oldest group (55 years and older). Neither prosocial behavior nor well-being showed significant age-related differences. We discuss these findings with respect to (partially discrepant) results derived from lab-based and traditional survey studies. We conclude that studies linking in-lab experiments with real-life experience-sampling may be a promising venue for future lifespan studies., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

People generally prefer easier over more difficult mental tasks. Using two different adaptations of a demand selection task, we show that interest can influence this effect, such that participants choose options with a higher cognitive workload. Interest was also associated with lower feelings of fatigue. In two studies, participants ( N = 63 and N = 158) repeatedly made a choice between completing a difficult or easy math problem. Results show that liking math predicts choosing more difficult (vs. easy) math problems (even after controlling for perceived math skill). Two additional studies used the Academic Diligence Task (Galla et al., 2014), where high school students ( N = 447 and N = 884) could toggle between a math task and playing a video game/watching videos. In these studies, we again find that math interest relates to greater proportion of time spent on the math problems. Three of these four studies also examined perceived fatigue, finding that interest relates to lower fatigue. An internal meta-analysis of the four studies finds a small but robust effect of interest on both the willingness to exert greater effort and the experience of less fatigue (despite engaging in more effort)., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2021 Milyavskaya, Galla, Inzlicht and Duckworth.)

The amount of mental effort we invest in a task is influenced by the reward we can expect if we perform that task well. However, some of the rewards that have the greatest potential for driving these efforts are partly determined by factors beyond one's control. In such cases, effort has more limited efficacy for obtaining rewards. According to the Expected Value of Control theory, people integrate information about the expected reward and efficacy of task performance to determine the expected value of control, and then adjust their control allocation (i.e., mental effort) accordingly. Here we test this theory's key behavioral and neural predictions. We show that participants invest more cognitive control when this control is more rewarding and more efficacious, and that these incentive components separately modulate EEG signatures of incentive evaluation and proactive control allocation. Our findings support the prediction that people combine expectations of reward and efficacy to determine how much effort to invest.

Self-control is often believed to operate as if it were a finite, domain-general resource. However, recent attempts to demonstrate this under transparent conditions have failed to yield positive results. In the current study, we monitor two groups of students (N1 = 8,867, N2 = 8,754) over separate 17-week intervals with 24-hour coverage, as they engage in voluntary learning and self-testing using an online program. We use daily behavior to assess whether time-of-day effects support domain-general theories of self-control. Additionally, we assess whether mental fatigue emerges within task during prolonged persistent effort. Results reveal within-task fatigue emerges within an hour on-task. However, there is a negligible effect on ability throughout the day. Additionally, time-of-day has no detrimental effect on motivation; rather there is a strong tendency to increase learning time at night. Results are consistent with theories indicating people lose motivation within a specific task, but at odds with theories that argue for a domain-general self-control resource.

Rituals are found in all types of performance domains, from high-stakes athletics and military to the daily morning preparations of the working family. Yet despite their ubiquity and widespread importance for humans, we know very little of ritual's causal basis and how (if at all) they facilitate goal-directed performance. Here, in a fully pre-registered pre/post experimental design, we examine a candidate proximal mechanism, the error-related negativity (ERN), in testing the prediction that ritual modulates neural performance-monitoring. Participants completed an arbitrary ritual-novel actions repeated at home over one week-followed by an executive function task in the lab during electroencephalographic (EEG) recording. Results revealed that relative to pre rounds, participants showed a reduced ERN in the post rounds, after completing the ritual in the lab. Despite a muted ERN, there was no evidence that the reduction in neural monitoring led to performance deficit (nor a performance improvement). Generally, the findings are consistent with the longstanding view that ritual buffers against uncertainty and anxiety. Our results indicate that ritual guides goal-directed performance by regulating the brain's response to personal failure., Competing Interests: The authors declare there are no competing interests.

Much of human learning happens in the social world. A person's social identity-the groups to which they belong, the people with whom they identify-is a powerful cue that can affect our goal-directed behaviors, often implicitly. In the present experiment, we explored the underlying neural mechanisms driving these processes, testing hypotheses derived from social identity theory. In a within-subjects design, participants underwent a minimal group manipulation where they were randomly assigned to an arbitrary ingroup. In two blocks of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a task for money while being observed by an ingroup member and outgroup member separately. Results revealed that being observed by an ingroup or outgroup member led to divergent patterns of neural activity associated with feedback monitoring, namely the feedback-related negativity (FRN). Receiving feedback in the presence of an ingroup member produced a typical FRN signal, but the FRN was dampened while receiving feedback in the presence of an outgroup member. Further, this differentiated neural pattern was exaggerated in people who reported greater intergroup bias. Together, the mere presence of a person can alter how the brain adaptively monitors feedback, impairing the reinforcement learning signal when the person observing is an outgroup member., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Acetaminophen has recently been recognized as having impacts that extend into the affective domain. In particular, double blind placebo controlled trials have revealed that acetaminophen reduces the magnitude of reactivity to social rejection, frustration, dissonance and to both negatively and positively valenced attitude objects. Given this diversity of consequences, it has been proposed that the psychological effects of acetaminophen may reflect a widespread blunting of evaluative processing. We tested this hypothesis using event-related potentials (ERPs). Sixty-two participants received acetaminophen or a placebo in a double-blind protocol and completed the Go/NoGo task. Participants' ERPs were observed following errors on the Go/NoGo task, in particular the error-related negativity (ERN; measured at FCz) and error-related positivity (Pe; measured at Pz and CPz). Results show that acetaminophen inhibits the Pe, but not the ERN, and the magnitude of an individual's Pe correlates positively with omission errors, partially mediating the effects of acetaminophen on the error rate. These results suggest that recently documented affective blunting caused by acetaminophen may best be described as an inhibition of evaluative processing. They also contribute to the growing work suggesting that the Pe is more strongly associated with conscious awareness of errors relative to the ERN., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Self-control is considered broadly important for many domains of life. One of its unfortunate features, however, is that it tends to wane over time, with little agreement about why this is the case. Recently, there has been a push to address this problem by looking to the literature in exercise physiology, specifically the work on the central governor model of physical fatigue. Trying to explain how and why mental performance wanes over time, the central governor model suggests that exertion is throttled by some central nervous system mechanism that receives information about energetic bodily needs and motivational drives to regulate exertion and, ultimately, to prevent homeostatic breakdown, chiefly energy depletion. While we admire the spirit of integration and the attempt to shed light on an important topic in psychology, our concern is that the central governor model is very controversial in exercise physiology, with increasing calls to abandon it altogether, making it a poor fit for psychology. Our concerns are threefold. First, while we agree that preservation of bodily homeostasis makes for an elegant ultimate account, the fact that such important homeostatic concerns can be regularly overturned with even slight incentives (e.g., a smile) renders the ultimate account impotent and points to other ultimate functions for fatigue. Second, despite the central governor being thought to take as input information about the metabolic needs of the body, there is no credible evidence that mental effort actually consumes inordinate amounts of energy that are not already circulating in the brain. Third, recent modifications of the model make the central governor appear like an all-knowing homunculus and unfalsifiable in principle, thus contributing very little to our understanding of why people tend to disengage from effortful tasks over time. We note that the latest models in exercise physiology have actually borrowed concepts and models from psychology to understand physical performance.

It has recently been suggested that gratitude can benefit self-regulation by reducing impulsivity during economic decision making. We tested if comparable benefits of gratitude are observed for neural performance monitoring and conflict-driven self-control. In a pre-post design, 61 participants were randomly assigned to either a gratitude or happiness condition, and then performed a pre-induction flanker task. Subsequently, participants recalled an autobiographical event where they had felt grateful or happy, followed by a post-induction flanker task. Despite closely following existing protocols, participants in the gratitude condition did not report elevated gratefulness compared to the happy group. In regard to self-control, we found no association between gratitude--operationalized by experimental condition or as a continuous predictor--and any control metric, including flanker interference, post-error adjustments, or neural monitoring (the error-related negativity, ERN). Thus, while gratitude might increase economic patience, such benefits may not generalize to conflict-driven control processes.

Several prominent theories spanning clinical, social and developmental psychology suggest that people are motivated to see the world as a sensible orderly place. These theories presuppose that randomness is aversive because it is associated with unpredictability. If this is the case, thinking that the world is random should lead to increased anxiety and heightened monitoring of one's actions and their consequences. Here, we conduct experimental tests of both of these ideas. Participants read one of three passages: (i) comprehensible order, (ii) incomprehensible order and (iii) randomness. In Study 1, we examined the effects of these passages on self-reported anxiety. In Study 2, we examined the effects of the same manipulation on the error-related negativity (ERN), an event-related brain potential associated with performance monitoring. We found that messages about randomness increased self-reported anxiety and ERN amplitude relative to comprehensible order, whereas incomprehensible order had intermediate effects. These results lend support to the theoretically important idea that randomness is unsettling because it implies that the world is unpredictable., (© The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

In religions where God is portrayed as both loving and wrathful, religious beliefs may be a source of fear as well as comfort. Here, we consider if God's love may be more effective, relative to God's wrath, for soothing distress, but less effective for helping control behavior. Specifically, we assess whether contemplating God's love reduces our ability to detect and emotionally react to conflict between one's behavior and overarching religious standards. We do so within a neurophysiological framework, by observing the effects of exposure to concepts of God's love vs punishment on the error-related negativity (ERN)--a neural signal originating in the anterior cingulate cortex that is associated with performance monitoring and affective responses to errors. Participants included 123 students at Brigham Young University, who completed a Go/No-Go task where they made 'religious' errors (i.e. ostensibly exhibited pro-alcohol tendencies). Reflecting on God's love caused dampened ERNs and worse performance on the Go/No-Go task. Thinking about God's punishment did not affect performance or ERNs. Results suggest that one possible reason religiosity is generally linked to positive well-being may be because of a decreased affective response to errors that occurs when God's love is prominent in the minds of believers., (© The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Neural processes that support individual differences in attachment security and affect regulation are currently unclear. Using electroencephalography, we examined whether securely attached individuals, compared with insecure individuals, would show a muted neural response to experimentally manipulated distress. Participants completed a reaction time task that elicits error commission and the error-related negativity (ERN)-a neural signal sensitive to error-related distress-both before and after a distressing insecurity threat. Despite similar pre-threat levels, secure participants showed a stable ERN, whereas insecure participants showed a post-threat increase in ERN amplitude. These results suggest a neural mechanism that allows securely attached people to regulate distress., (© The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

It is widely held that negative emotions such as threat, anxiety, and disgust represent the core psychological factors that enhance conservative political beliefs. We put forward an alternative hypothesis: that conservatism is fundamentally motivated by arousal, and that, in this context, the effect of negative emotion is due to engaging intensely arousing states. Here we show that study participants agreed more with right but not left-wing political speeches after being exposed to positive as well as negative emotion-inducing film-clips. No such effect emerged for neutral-content videos. A follow-up study replicated and extended this effect. These results are consistent with the idea that emotional arousal, in general, and not negative valence, specifically, may underlie political conservatism.

Considerable research has disclosed how cognitive reappraisals and the modulation of emotional responses promote successful emotion regulation. Less research has examined how the early processing of emotion-relevant stimuli may create divergent emotional response consequences. Mindfulness--a receptive, non-evaluative form of attention--is theorized to foster emotion regulation, and the present study examined whether individual differences in mindfulness would modulate neural responses associated with the early processing of affective stimuli. Focus was on the late positive potential (LPP) of the event-related brain potential to visual stimuli varying in emotional valence and arousal. This study first found, replicating past research, that high arousal images, particularly of an unpleasant type, elicited larger LPP responses. Second, the study found that more mindful individuals showed lower LPP responses to high arousal unpleasant images, even after controlling for trait attentional control. Conversely, two traits contrasting with mindfulness--neuroticism and negative affectivity--were associated with higher LPP responses to high arousal unpleasant images. Finally, mindfulness was also associated with lower LPP responses to motivationally salient pleasant images (erotica). These findings suggest that mindfulness modulates neural responses in an early phase of affective processing, and contribute to understanding how this quality of attention may promote healthy emotional functioning.

Previous studies have documented the positive effects of mindfulness meditation on executive control. What has been lacking, however, is an understanding of the mechanism underlying this effect. Some theorists have described mindfulness as embodying two facets-present moment awareness and emotional acceptance. Here, we examine how the effect of meditation practice on executive control manifests in the brain, suggesting that emotional acceptance and performance monitoring play important roles. We investigated the effect of meditation practice on executive control and measured the neural correlates of performance monitoring, specifically, the error-related negativity (ERN), a neurophysiological response that occurs within 100 ms of error commission. Meditators and controls completed a Stroop task, during which we recorded ERN amplitudes with electroencephalography. Meditators showed greater executive control (i.e. fewer errors), a higher ERN and more emotional acceptance than controls. Finally, mediation pathway models further revealed that meditation practice relates to greater executive control and that this effect can be accounted for by heightened emotional acceptance, and to a lesser extent, increased brain-based performance monitoring.

Empathy facilitates prosocial behavior and social understanding. Here, however, we suggest that the most basic mechanism of empathy--the intuitive sharing of other's emotional and motivational states--is limited to those we like. Measuring electroencephalographic (EEG) alpha oscillations as people observed ingroup vs outgroup members, we found that participants showed similar activation patterns when feeling sad as when they observed ingroup members feeling sad. In contrast, participants did not show these same activation patterns when observing outgroup members and even less so the more they were prejudiced. These findings provide evidence from brain activity for an ingroup bias in empathy: empathy may be restricted to close others and, without active effort, may not extend to outgroups, potentially making them likely targets for prejudice and discrimination.

Although prejudice-reduction policies and interventions abound, is it possible that some of them result in the precise opposite of their intended effect--an increase in prejudice? We examined this question by exploring the impact of motivation-based prejudice-reduction interventions and assessing whether certain popular practices might in fact increase prejudice. In two experiments, participants received detailed information on, or were primed with, the goal of prejudice reduction; the information and primes either encouraged autonomous motivation to regulate prejudice or emphasized the societal requirement to control prejudice. Ironically, motivating people to reduce prejudice by emphasizing external control produced more explicit and implicit prejudice than did not intervening at all. Conversely, participants in whom autonomous motivation to regulate prejudice was induced displayed less explicit and implicit prejudice compared with no-treatment control participants. We outline strategies for effectively reducing prejudice and discuss the detrimental consequences of enforcing antiprejudice standards.

We all have models of the world, and when these models fit with what goes on around us we have a sense of meaning. Unfortunately, we are often faced with situations that violate, or threaten, our models, and when this happens we attempt to resolve these inconsistencies to restore a sense of meaning. It is well documented that we often try to reduce threats in indirect ways-ways that, at first glance, seem to reduce the negative feelings without actually solving the problem. This article explores the possibility that threats can be interpreted in different ways depending on the person and context, and suggests that because of this, different threat reduction approaches can be adaptive in different situations. Specifically, it presents the hypothesis that concrete construal of threats should result in compensation efforts that are relatively direct, whereas abstract construals should expand the possibilities for compensation to include indirect strategies. It describes the existing evidence, where evidence is lacking, and potentially fruitful avenues of future exploration., (© Association for Psychological Science 2011.)

Can people accurately predict how they will act in a moral dilemma? Our research suggests that in some situations, they cannot, and that emotions play a pivotal role in this dissociation between behavior and forecasting. In the current experiment, individuals in a moral action condition cheated significantly less on a math task than participants in a forecasting condition predicted they themselves would cheat. Furthermore, we found that participants in the action condition displayed significantly more physiological arousal, as measured by preejection period, skin conductance response (SCR), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and that the underestimation effect was mediated by SCR and RSA together. This research suggests that the affective arousal present during real-life moral dilemmas may not be fully engaged during moral forecasting, and that this may account for the moral forecasting errors that individuals make. This research has the potential to inform past work in the field of moral psychology, which has largely ignored actual behavior.

The world is a vast and complex place that can sometimes generate feelings of uncertainty and distress for its inhabitants. Although religion is associated with a sense of meaning and order, it remains unclear whether religious belief can actually cause people to feel less anxiety and distress. To test the anxiolytic power of religion, we conducted two experiments focusing on the error-related negativity (ERN)-a neural signal that arises from the anterior cingulate cortex and is associated with defensive responses to errors. The results indicate that for believers, conscious and nonconscious religious primes cause a decrease in ERN amplitude. In contrast, priming nonbelievers with religious concepts causes an increase in ERN amplitude. Overall, examining basic neurophysiological processes reveals the power of religion to act as a buffer against anxious reactions to self-generated, generic errors-but only for individuals who believe.

Many people derive peace of mind and purpose in life from their belief in God. For others, however, religion provides unsatisfying answers. Are there brain differences between believers and nonbelievers? Here we show that religious conviction is marked by reduced reactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a cortical system that is involved in the experience of anxiety and is important for self-regulation. In two studies, we recorded electroencephalographic neural reactivity in the ACC as participants completed a Stroop task. Results showed that stronger religious zeal and greater belief in God were associated with less firing of the ACC in response to error and with commission of fewer errors. These correlations remained strong even after we controlled for personality and cognitive ability. These results suggest that religious conviction provides a framework for understanding and acting within one's environment, thereby acting as a buffer against anxiety and minimizing the experience of error.

Individuals differ in the extent to which they respond negatively to uncertainty. Although some individuals feel little discomfort when facing the unknown, those high in neuroticism find it aversive. We examined neurophysiological responses to uncertainty using an event-related potential framework. Participants completed a time-estimation task while their neural activity was recorded via electroencephalography. The feedback-related negativity (FRN), an evoked potential that peaks approximately 250 ms after the receipt of feedback information, was examined under conditions of positive, negative, and uncertain feedback. The magnitude of these responses was then analyzed in relation to individual differences in neuroticism. As expected, a larger FRN was observed after negative feedback than after positive feedback for all participants. For individuals who scored highly on trait neuroticism, however, uncertain feedback produced a larger neural response than did negative feedback. These results are discussed in terms of affective responses to uncertainty among neurotic individuals.

Past research shows that self-control is limited and becomes depleted after initial exertions. This study examined the neural processes underlying self-control failure by testing whether controlled, effortful behavior impairs subsequent attempts at control by depleting the neural system associated with conflict monitoring. Subjects either watched an emotional movie normally or tried to suppress their emotions while watching the movie; they then completed an ostensibly unrelated Stroop task while electroencephalographic activity was recorded. The error-related negativity (ERN)--a waveform associated with activity in the anterior cingulate--was measured to determine whether prior regulatory exertion constrained the conflict-monitoring system. Compared with subjects in the control condition, those who suppressed their emotions performed worse on the Stroop task, and this deficit was mediated by weaker ERN signals. These results offer a neural account for the self-regulatory-strength model and demonstrate the utility of the social neuroscience approach.

This research examined whether stigma diminishes people's ability to control their behaviors. Because coping with stigma requires self-regulation, and self-regulation is a limited-capacity resource, we predicted that individuals belonging to stigmatized groups are less able to regulate their own behavior when they become conscious of their stigmatizing status or enter threatening environments. Study 1 uncovered a correlation between stigma sensitivity and self-regulation; the more Black college students were sensitive to prejudice, the less self-control they reported having. By experimentally activating stigma, Studies 2 and 3 provided causal evidence for stigma's ego-depleting qualities: When their stigma was activated, stigmatized participants (Black students and females) showed impaired self-control in two very different domains (attentional and physical self-regulation). These results suggest that (a) stigma is ego depleting and (b) coping with it can weaken the ability to control and regulate one's behaviors in domains unrelated to the stigma.

This research examined whether stereotype vulnerability-the tendency to expect, perceive, and be influenced by negative stereotypes about one's social category-is associated with uncertainty about one's academic self-knowledge in two important ways. We predicted that stereotype-vulnerable African American students would (a) know less about how much they know than less vulnerable students do and (b) have unstable academic efficacy. In Study 1, Black and White participants took a verbal test and indicated the probability that each of their answers was correct. As expected, stereotype-vulnerable Black participants were more miscalibrated than other participants. In Study 2, participants completed measures of self-efficacy twice daily for 8 days. Also as expected, the academic efficacy of stereotype-vulnerable Blacks fluctuated more-and more extremely-than that of other participants. The results suggest that, in addition to undermining intellectual performance, stigma interferes with academic self-knowledge.

Does placing females in environments in which they have contact with males cause deficits in their problem-solving performance? Is a situational cue, such as gender composition, sufficient for creating a threatening intellectual environment for females--an environment that elicits performance-impinging stereotypes? Two studies explored these questions. Participants completed a difficult math or verbal test in 3-person groups, each of which included 2 additional people of the same sex as the participant (same-sex condition) or of the opposite sex (minority condition). Female participants in the minority condition experienced performance deficits in the math test only, whereas males performed equally well on the math test in the two conditions. Further investigation showed that females' deficits were proportional to the number of males in their group. Even females who were placed in a mixed-sex majority condition (2 females and 1 male) experienced moderate but significant deficits. Findings are discussed in relation to theories of distinctiveness, stereotype threat, and tokenism.