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This paper extends the World Bank's Long-Term Growth Model (LTGM) with the addition of a natural resource sector to analyze how long-run growth evolves in resource-rich countries and the growth impacts of price shocks and resource discoveries. In the LTGM-Natural Resource Extension (LTGM-NR), commodity price shocks affect long-term economic growth through physical investment rates. As a large share of resource income typically accrues to the government, the size of the boost to investment in a price boom depends on the government’s fiscal rule. Fiscal rules that prioritize public investment, like a Hartwick Rule, generally lead to the largest increases in long-term growth. However, structural surplus rules, which save commodity revenues, can also boost growth if they free up savings for private investment. The response of growth to discoveries of natural resources is similar to the response to price shocks, although discoveries also produce a direct effect on real GDP, in addition to an indirect effect through investment. The LTGM¬-NR also captures the effect of other (non-resource) growth fundamentals in resource-rich economies, and it is better suited to general growth analysis in these countries than the standard LTGM. However, the LTGM-NR is a supply-side model, and so does not capture the short-run effects of price and discovery shocks that operate through aggregate demand.

The Long-Term Growth Model (LTGM) and its extensions are a suite of models and spreadsheet-based toolkits for analyzing future growth paths in developing countries, based on the Solow-Swan growth model. This volume, The Long-Term Growth Model: Fundamentals, Extensions, and Applications, is a collection of ten chapters that summarize the development of the LTGM over the last decade, and how it has been applied in practice. The volume starts with a description of the Standard LTGM, the simplest and easiest-to-use component of the LTGM suite. It then outlines several extensions to the basic model in important areas such as the implications of growth for poverty (built into the Standard LTGM), the effects of public capital, the determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, and how growth drivers differ in natural resource rich economies. The final part of the book covers six case studies which apply the LTGM in a diverse range of countries: Malaysia, South Korea, Bangladesh, Syria, Egypt, and Sri Lanka. Although growth performances, constraints, and opportunities vary across country contexts, the LTGM framework outlined in this volume, analyzing future growth in terms of TFP, human capital, physical capital, and labor, is universally relevant. The chapters in the volume typically find that popular investment-led growth strategies are unsustainable in the long-run (including those growth strategies relying solely on high rates of public investment). This is mostly due to a declining marginal productivity of capital, though financing high investment rates without high savings rates is also a practical concern. Instead, they find that the most important driver of sustainable rapid long-run growth is productivity (TFP) growth.

Is there a trade-off between raising growth and reducing inequality and poverty? This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the complex links between growth, inequality, and poverty, with causation going in both directions. The evidence suggests that growth can be effective in reducing poverty, but its impact on inequality is ambiguous and depends on the underlying sources of growth. The impact of poverty and inequality on growth is likewise ambiguous, as several channels mediate the relationship. But most plausible mechanisms suggest that poverty and inequality reduce growth, at least in the long run. Policies play a role in shaping these relationships and those designed to improve equality of opportunity can simultaneously improve inclusiveness and growth.

The COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic crisis combines the worst characteristics of previous crises. It features a simultaneous supply and demand shock; domestic, regional, and global scope; a projected long duration; and a high degree of uncertainty. What can be expected for recovery from the pandemic crisis across the world? This brief first assesses the projections of economic activity in 2020 and 2021 and the domestic and international conditions that will constrain and drive a possible recovery. It then discusses the potential shapes of the recovery (or lack thereof) for specific country conditions. Finally, it explores the need to balance short-term and long-term concerns, arguing in favor of policies that focus on sustained recovery, rather than quick but debt-fueled and short-lived gains. Drawing on the lessons from past crises, the brief concludes that sustained economic recovery is possible only when the underlying causes are addressed and the foundations of growth are protected. For the pandemic crisis, this implies mitigating the spread of the disease to manageable levels while keeping the economy sufficiently active. In the short term, economic policy should focus on preventing further poverty, averting unnecessary business closures, and avoiding lasting damage to human capital and productivity. In the long term, policy reform should address the structural vulnerabilities that the pandemic crisis has exposed. This includes reforms to expand labor and business formalization; to improve the coverage and adequacy of social protection; to extend financial inclusion to elderly, rural, and poor people; to promote digital transformation across society; and, most basically, to improve access to and quality of public health care.

This paper discusses and illustrates the analytical foundations of international comparisons (or benchmarking) for assessing a country's potential for improvement along various dimensions of social and economic development. By providing a methodology for international benchmarking, discussing various alternatives and choices, and presenting a cross-country illustration, the paper can help practitioners be less arbitrary and more systematic in their approach to international comparisons, as well as more realistic in their expectations for a country's improvement. The paper presents the stochastic frontier approach and applies it to estimate feasible frontiers or benchmarks for each variable, country, and year. It then interprets a country's (one-sided) departure from the benchmark as inefficiency or potential for improvement. This contrasts with the literature that compares countries by looking at raw variables or indicators, without considering that countries differ in structural endowments that constrain the maximum performance that a country could achieve in a policy-relevant horizon. The Stochastic Frontier approach also improves upon the literature that uses regression residuals to measure performance. Regression residuals are hard to interpret as inefficiency, because they are mixed with noise and take positive and negative values. As an illustration, the paper uses a panel of 142 countries with yearly data for 2005-14 and considers a set of 10 development indicators. It finds that the potential for improvement does not follow a simple relationship with economic development, with some lower-income countries being closer to their own feasible frontier than more advanced countries are.

This paper addresses three questions: 1) what would have been the growth and income trajectory of Syria in the absence of war; 2) given the war, what explains the reduction in economic growth in terms physical capital, labor force, human capital, and productivity; and 3) what potential growth scenarios for Syria there could be in the aftermath of war. Estimates of the impact of conflict point to negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth of -12 percent on average over 2011-18, resulting in a GDP contraction to about one-third of the 2010 level. In post-conflict simulation scenarios, the growth drivers are affected by the assumed levels of reconstruction assistance, repatriation of refugees, and productivity improvements associated with three plausible political settlement outcomes: a baseline (Sochi-plus) moderate scenario, an optimistic (robust political settlement) scenario, and a pessimistic (de facto balance of power) scenario. Respectively for these scenarios, GDP per capita average growth in the next two decades is projected to be 6.1, 8.2, or 3.1 percent, assuming that a final and stable resolution of the conflict is achieved.

This is the background paper for the productivity extension of the World Bank’s Long-Term Growth Model (LTGM). Based on an extensive literature review, the paper identifies the main determinants of economic productivity as innovation, education, market efficiency, infrastructure, and institutions. Based on underlying proxies, the paper constructs indexes representing each of the main categories of productivity determinants and, combining them through principal component analysis, obtains an overall determinant index. This is done for every year in the three decades spanning 1985–2015 and for more than 100 countries. In parallel, the paper presents a measure of total factor productivity (TFP), largely obtained from the Penn World Table, and assesses the pattern of productivity growth across regions and income groups over the same sample. The paper then examines the relationship between the measures of TFP and its determinants. The variance of productivity growth is decomposed into the share explained by each of its main determinants, and the relationship between productivity growth and the overall determinant index is identified. The variance decomposition results show that the highest contributor among the determinants to the variance in TFP growth is market efficiency for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and education for developing countries in the most recent decade. The regression results indicate that, controlling for country- and time-specific effects, TFP growth has a positive and significant relationship with the proposed TFP determinant index and a negative relationship with initial TFP. This relationship is then used to provide a set of simulations on the potential path of TFP growth if certain improvements on TFP determinants are achieved. The paper presents and discusses some of these simulations for groups of countries by geographic region and income level. An accompanying Excel-based toolkit, linked to the LTGM, provides a larger set of simulations and scenario analysis at the country level for the next few decades.

The reallocation of resources from low- to high-productivity firms can generate large aggregate productivity gains. The paper uses data from the Malaysian manufacturing census to measure the country's hypothetical productivity gains when moving toward the level of within-sector allocative efficiency in the United States to be between 13 and 36 percent. Across three census periods in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (the most recent available), the productivity gaps appear to have somewhat widened. This suggests that the "catching-up" process remains a challenge and a potential opportunity, particularly if total factor productivity is expected to be the dominant source of future economic growth. The simulations, based on different magnitudes of the realization of hypothetical productivity gains, show that Malaysia's gross domestic product growth can potentially increase by 0.4 to 1.3 percentage points per year over five years. The analysis accounts only for resource misallocation within sectors. There may be other, possibly large, resource misallocation across sectors. If so, closing those gaps could boost total factor productivity and gross domestic product growth even further.

"Informality" is a term used to describe the collection of firms, workers, and activities that operate outside the legal and regulatory systems. It is widespread in the majority of developing countries--in a typical developing economy, the informal sector produces about 35 percent of gross domestic product and employs 70 percent of the labor force. This paper studies informality in the context of economic development by presenting a model and projections that link informality, regulations, migration, and economic growth. This analytical framework highlights the trade-offs between formality and informality, the relationship between the different types of informality, and the connection between them and the forces of labor, capital, and productivity growth. The paper models the behavior of the informal sector based on the following fundamental asymmetry: formal firms confront higher labor costs while informal firms face higher capital costs and lower productivity. Using mandated minimum wages as the policy-induced distortion, the model first studies the static allocation of formal and informal capital and labor in a modern economy. Second, it opens the possibility of labor migration from a rudimentary economy with an ample supply of labor (rural areas or less advanced neighboring countries). Third, the model analyzes the dynamic behavior of the formal and informal sectors, considering how they affect and are affected by economic growth and labor migration. Then, the paper presents projections for the size of labor informality, in the modern and rudimentary economies, in the next two decades for a large group of countries representing all regions of the world. The projections are based on the calibration and simulation of the model and serve to discuss its usefulness and limitations.

This paper contributes to the economic analysis of illicit activities and money laundering. First, it presents a theoretical model of long-run growth that explicitly considers illicit workers, activities, and income, alongside a licit private sector and a functioning government. Second, it generates estimates of the size of illicit income and provides simulated and econometric estimates of the volume of laundered assets in the Colombian economy. In the model, the licit sector operates in a perfectly competitive environment and produces a licit good through a standard neoclassical production function. The illicit sector operates in an imperfectly competitive environment and is composed of two different activities: The first activity produces an illicit good that nonetheless is valuable in the market (for example illicit drugs); the second does not add value to the economy but only redistributes wealth (for example robbery, kidnapping, and fraud). The paper provides a series of comparative statics exercises to assess the effects of changes in government efficiency, licit sector productivity, and illicit drug prices. From the model, the analysis derives a set of estimable macroeconometric equations to measure the size of laundered assets in the Colombian economy in the period 1985 to 2013. The paper assembles a data set whose key components are estimates of illicit income from drug trafficking and common crime. Illicit incomes increased drastically until 2001, reaching a peak of nearly 12 percent of gross domestic product and then decreasing to less than 2 percent by 2013. The decline overlaps not only in a period of high economic growth, but also after the implementation of Plan Colombia. The data set is used to estimate the volume of laundered assets in the economy by applying the Kalman filter for the estimation of unobserved dynamic variables onto the derived macroeconometric equations from the model. The findings show that the volume of laundered assets increased from about 8 percent of gross domestic product in the mid-1980s to a peak of 14 percent by 2002, and declined to 8 percent in 2013.

This article uses cross-country data to estimate the potential effect of drastic reductions in the price of cocaine on the share of the population that consumes this drug. In order to identify movements along the cocaine consumption/demand function, this article instruments for cocaine prices with variables that affect the supply of cocaine. Liberalization of drug policies would produce an increase in the prevalence of cocaine consumption. However, the quantitative evidence presented here suggests that, even if substantial, this increase would not amount to epidemic cocaine use.

This paper analyzes to what extent, and under what conditions, an increase in household wealth affects the use of child labor in poor households. It develops a simple theoretical model, which uses child labor, training, and schooling to maximize household income over time, subject to resource constraints. Then, it conducts an empirical analysis using randomized trial data, which were collected for the evaluation of the 2006 Nicaragua conditional cash transfer program. This social program transfers wealth to poor families in rural areas, conditional on children's school attendance and health check-ups. In addition, for one third of the beneficiaries, there is a further wealth transfer to start a non-agricultural business. The paper finds that the conditional cash transfer program affected the volume and quality of child labor, reducing it in the aggregate and steering it towards skill-forming activities. Specifically, the program appears to have reduced the use of child labor for household chores and farm work, while increasing it for the non-traditional, skill-forming activities related to commerce and retail. Moreover, the paper finds that the source behind the increase in skill-forming child labor is not the basic component, which provides a transfer for paying for schooling and health services, but it's the business-grant component, which provides a household grant for the creation of a micro business or a new economic activity.

Is informal employment a safety net or a growth engine? To address this question, this paper studies the trends and cycles of informal employment. It first presents a theoretical model of long- and short-run behavior of informal labor. Then it analyzes these relationships empirically, using the share of self-employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment. In the long run, informality is larger when labor productivity is lower, government services weaker, and business flexibility less prevalent. In the short run, informal employment behaves counter-cyclically, indicating that it acts primarily as a safety net. The degree of counter-cyclicality, however, varies inversely with the size of informal labor itself.

This paper explores how developmental and regulatory impediments to resource reallocation limit the ability of developing countries to adopt new technologies. An efficient economy innovates quickly; but when the economy is unable to redeploy resources away from inefficient uses, technological adoption becomes sluggish and growth is reduced. The authors build a model of heterogeneous firms and idiosyncratic shocks, where aggregate long-run growth occurs through the adoption of new technologies, which in turn requires firm destruction and rebirth. After calibrating the model to leading and developing economies, the authors analyze its dynamics in order to clarify the mechanism based on firm renewal. The analysis uses the steady-state characteristics of the model to provide an explanation for long-run output gaps between the United States and a large sample of developing countries. For the median less-developed country in the sample, the model accounts for more than 50 percent of the income gap with respect to the United States, with 60 percent of the simulated gap being explained by developmental and regulatory barriers taken individually, and 40 percent by their interaction. Thus, the benefits from market reforms are largely diminished if developmental and regulatory distortions to firm dynamics are not jointly addressed.

In the past half a century, Egypt has experienced remarkable progress in the provision of infrastructure in all areas, including transportation, telecommunication, power generation, and water and sanitation. Judging from an international perspective, Egypt has achieved an infrastructure status that closely corresponds to what could be expected given its national income level. The present infrastructure status is the result of decades of purposeful investment. In the past 15 years, however, a worrisome trend has emerged: Infrastructure investment has suffered a substantial decline, which may be at odds with the country’s goals of raising economic growth. Improving infrastructure in Egypt would require a combination of larger infrastructure expenditures and more efficient investment. The analysis provided in this paper suggests that an increase in infrastructure expenditures from 5 to 6 percent of gross domestic product would raise the annual per capita growth rate of gross domestic product by about 0.5 percentage points in a decade’s time and 1 percentage point by the third decade. If the increase in infrastructure investment did not imply a heavier government burden (for instance, by cutting down on inefficient expenditures), the corresponding increase in growth of per capita gross domestic product would be substantially larger, in fact twice as large by the end of the first decade. This highlights the importance of considering renewed infrastructure investment in the larger context of public sector reform.

This paper contributes to explain the cross-country heterogeneity of the poverty response to changes in economic growth. It does so by focusing on the structure of output growth itself. The paper presents a two-sector theoretical model that clarifies the mechanism through which the sectoral composition of growth and associated labor intensity can affect workers' wages and, thus, poverty alleviation. Then, it presents cross-country empirical evidence that analyzes, first, the differential poverty-reducing impact of sectoral growth at various levels of disaggregation, and, second, the role of unskilled labor intensity in such differential impact. The paper finds evidence that not only the size of economic growth but also its composition matters for poverty alleviation, with the largest contributions from unskilled labor-intensive sectors (agriculture, construction, and manufacturing). The results are robust to the influence of outliers, endogeneity concerns, alternative explanations, and various poverty measures.

This paper studies the causes and consequences of informality and applies the analysis to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It starts with a discussion on the definition and measures of informality, as well as on the reasons why widespread informality should be of great concern. The paper analyzes informality's main determinants, arguing that informality is not single-caused but results from the combination of poor public services, a burdensome regulatory regime, and weak monitoring and enforcement capacity by the state. This combination is especially explosive when the country suffers from low educational achievement and features demographic pressures and primary production structures. Using cross-country regression analysis, the paper evaluates the empirical relevance of each determinant of informality. It then applies the estimated relationships to most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to assess the country-specific relevance of each proposed mechanism.

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

This paper studies how initial conditions affect the outcome of reform using the case of trade liberalization as an example. The paper illustrates empirically and theoretically the seemingly paradoxical case of larger impact of reform when initial conditions are poorer.

Macroeconomic Volatility and Welfare in Developing Countries: An Introduction Norman V. Loayza, Romain Ranciere, Luis Serven, ` and Jaume Ventura Macroeconomic volatility, both a source and a reflection of underdevelopment, is a fundamental concern for developing countries. This article provides a brief overview of the recent literature on macroeconomic volatility in developing countries, highlighting its causes, consequences, and possible remedies. to reduce domestic policy-induced macroeconomic volatility by controlling the level and variability of fiscal expenditures, by keeping inflation low and stable, and by avoiding price rigidity (including that of the exchange rate), which eventually leads to drastic adjustments. The ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies is crucial, and it depends largely on the ability of the authorities to reduce public indebtedness to internationally acceptable levels, establish a record of saving in good times to provide for bad times, and develop credibility that forestalls perceptions of wasteful spending and default risk. Governments can reduce financial fragilities and deepen financial markets by eliminating implicit insurance schemes (such as fixed exchange rate regimes) and credit restrictions that distort the valuation of financial assets and liabilities. Following Ehrlich Becker's (1972) classic "comprehensive insurance" framework, three possible options can be identified: Self-protection (reducing the exposure to risk through, for instance, limited trade and financial openness). Primiceri and van Rens (2006*) explore the source of this increase by examining the consumption behavior of a large panel of individuals, finding that their behavior is consistent with an increase in the persistence of individual income shocks. Loayza and Raddatz (2007*) analyze how financial openness and trade openness, as well as product-market flexibility, factor-market flexibility, and domestic financial development, influence the impact of terms of trade shocks on output. To obtain their measure of policy volatility, the authors construct a measure of exogenous policy decisions unrelated to the state of the economy and take the standard deviation of this measure as a proxy for policy volatility. Even so, the literature and the lessons from the Barcelona conference reviewed here can provide some elements of sensible policy recommendations and identify areas where research is especially needed.

This paper studies the trends and cycles of informal employment. It first presents a theoretical model where the size of informal employment is determined by the relative costs and benefits of informality and the distribution of workers'skills. In the long run, informal employment varies with the trends in these variables, and in the short run it reacts to accommodate transient shocks and to close the gap that separates it from its trend level. The paper then uses an error-correction framework to examine empirically informality's long- and short-run relationships. For this purpose, it uses country-level data at annual frequency for a sample of industrial and developing countries, with the share of self-employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment. The paper finds that, in the long run, informality is larger in countries that have lower GDP per capita and impose more costs to formal firms in the form of more rigid business regulations, less valuable police and judicial services, and weaker monitoring of informality. In the short run, informal employment is found to be counter-cyclical for the majority of countries, with the degree of counter-cyclicality being lower in countries with larger informal employment and better police and judicial services. Moreover, informal employment follows a stable, trend-reverting process. These results are robust to changes in the sample and to the influence of outliers, even when only developing countries are considered in the analysis.

This paper studies the effects of regulation on economic growth and the relative size of the informal sector in a large sample of industrial and developing countries. Along with firm dynamics, informality is an important channel through which regulation affects macroeconomic performance and economic growth in particular. The paper concludes that a heavier regulatory burden -- particularly in product and labor markets -- reduces growth and induces informality. These effects are, however, mitigated as the overall institutional framework improves.

Regulation is purportedly enacted to serve specific social purposes. In reality, however, it follows a more complex political economy process, where legitimate social goals are mixed with the objectives of particular interest groups. Whatever its justification and objectives, regulation can have potentially significant macroeconomic consequences, by helping or hampering the dynamics of economic restructuring and resource reallocation that underlie the growth process. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the macroeconomic impact of regulation. It first characterizes the stylized facts on regulation across the world, using a set of newly constructed, comprehensive indicators of regulation in a large number of countries in the 1990s. Using these indicators, the paper studies the effects of regulation on economic growth and macroeconomic volatility employing cross-country regression analysis. In particular, the paper considers whether the effects of regulation are affected by the country's level of institutional development. Finally, the analysis controls for the likely endogeneity of regulation with respect to macroeconomic performance. The paper concludes that a heavier regulatory burden reduces growth and increases volatility, although these effects are smaller the higher the quality of the overall institutional framework.

This paper presents policy- and outcome-based ways of measuring the progress of market-oriented reforms in both traditional areas of first-generation reform and the areas of institutional reform that have been emphasized lately. These policy areas are the domestic financial system; international financial markets; international trade; the labor market; the tax system; public infrastructure and public firms; the legal and regulatory framework; and governance. For each of them, first, we discuss the general principles underlying market-oriented reform; second, we present various indicators of the policy stance in the area in question; and third, we present various outcome indicators of the policy stance.

The informal economy, which evades labor regulations, provides employment for much of the labor force in developing countries. The author explores how labor regulations and imperfections in informal capital markets affect income inequality and the speed of industrialization. Empirical evidence shows that labor costs are higher in the formal sector, and that the cost of capital is higher in the informal sector (in part because many informal activities are illegal, so contracts are unenforceable). The author develops a theoretical model based on such factor-cost asymmetry. He applies it to an urban economy with and without ample supplies of labor from the rural sector. The dynamic analysis considers rural-urban migration and optimal capital accumulation. He finds the following. First, labor regulations that mandate workers'compensation above its market-dictated level induce the formation of an informal sector and thus the dispersion of wages across homogeneous workers. And labor regulations slow capital accumulation and retard the process of rural-urban migration. Second, when capital allocation to informal producers becomes more efficient, the informal sector expands relative to the formal sector, the gap between formal and informal wages narrows, and rural-urban migration speeds up. Finally, policies with an urban bias hasten rural-urban migration, inducing an expansion of the informal labor force relative to the total labor force. Post-World War II experience in informal economies in Latin America motivates and in some respects supports the theoretical findings, says the author.

Large informal sectors are an important characteristic of developing countries. The authors build a dynamic model in which the informal sector exists when overregulation (high tax rates and high cost for entering the formal sector) is coupled with an inefficient and corrupt system of compliance control. They consider a production technology in which public services are essential and subject to congestion. The public services are financed by taxes collected from the formal sector. Informal producers evade taxes and, because of their illegal status, can use only some public services, cannot use capital or insurance markets, and are subject to stochastic penalties. The authors find that the relative size of the informal sector is negatively related to the severity of the penalties and positively related to tax rates and the extent of informal use of public services. They also find that economies with larger informal sectors have lower capital return and growth rates because the contribution of public services to productivity decreases with informality. They argue that self-interested bureaucracies create an economic environment that makes informality attractive or simply unavoidable because they profit from the presence of the informal sector.