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The article examines the question of the meaning of the term for accepting inheritance in Ukraine, the calculation procedure and the consequences of omission. The six-month period established by current legislation for submitting an application for acceptance of inheritance is sufficient for the heir to take legally significant actions regarding acceptance of inheritance. According to the civil legislation of Ukraine, the heir is obliged to take active actions to accept the inheritance, in particular, to submit an application for its acceptance to a notary, if he did not live with the testator. The passive behavior of the heir indicates a lack of desire to accept the inheritance and, accordingly, a rejection of the inheritance. In the civil legislation of the Republic of Poland, one can observe the opposite approach to acceptance or rejection of inheritance. However, in practice, there are often situations of missing the deadline for accepting the inheritance, which can lead to the loss of the right to inheritance, and in turn, raises problematic issues regarding the granting of an additional deadline for accepting the inheritance. The legislation of Ukraine provides for the possibility of the court granting an additional term for accepting the inheritance under certain conditions. The heir may submit an application for acceptance of the inheritance with the written consent of other heirs who have already accepted the inheritance. Also, the court can determine an additional deadline for submitting an application, if the deadline was missed due to valid reasons. Based on the analysis of judicial practice, the reasons for missing the deadline, which were recognized by the court as valid, were considered. These are the circumstances that objectively made it impossible to submit the application in a timely manner. Circumstances related to objective, insurmountable and significant difficulties for the heir in carrying out these actions are important reasons for missing the deadline for accepting the inheritance. The resolution of the issue of granting an additional term for acceptance of the inheritance depends on the specific circumstances of the case and belongs to the discretionary powers of the court, that is, it is decided at the sole discretion of the court. With this in mind, it is impossible to predict all possible circumstances that may be considered relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the impact of the Judicial Reform of 1864 on the establishment of the legal profession in Ukraine. It is noted that as of the middle of the 19th century. the decision to modernize the judicial system on the basis of effective Western judicial models was ripe in the environment of the official authorities. Although this initiative contradicted the foundations of the imperial autocracy, the judicial reform had a significant impact on the judicial system, procedural and material law of the state. First of all, this affected the separation of judicial power from legislative executive and administrative power. It is noted that the Judicial Reform of 1864 became a necessary element of total changes in the social and political system of that time. It occupied a prominent place in the history of the judiciary and the judicial system of the state, and its indisputable achievements were the equality of citizens before the law, the transparency and competitiveness of the judiciary, the immutability of judges and their independence from administrative officials, the introduction of competition in the judiciary and the creation of a system of magistrates’ courts. It is proven that the judicial reform, in addition to important democratic changes, included the creation of the legal profession, whose role in society was constantly growing. According to the idea of the initiators of the reform, the Institute of Advocacy was organized as an independent organization. This principle was manifested in the fact that in each district of the court chamber, lawyers were united in a single organization by its general meetings and the Council. It is noted that the control and supervision of the activities of lawyers was carried out by councils elected by lawyers from among themselves. Thanks to the creation of the management system of the lawyer corporation, it was possible to ensure the autonomy and independence of the legal profession from the bureaucratic apparatus. It is noted that with the establishment of the Institute of Advocacy in the Russian Empire, the official authorities sought, at least formally, to declare the foundations of equality and competition between the parties, to modernize the theory of formal evidence and the judicial process. In this way, it was planned to revive the judicial process and make it more complete and objective. This would provide an opportunity for a comprehensive consideration of the case by the judge, a more detailed insight into its essence, which would significantly affect the objectivity of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the legal nature of the Civil Council of International Experts (PCIE) in the context of the legal status of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJU) and the peculiarities of their interaction during the selection of judges to the High Anti-Corruption Court. The use of the historical method made it possible to state that with the changes injudicial legislation in 2016, bodies of judicial governance were determined at the legislative level, which are independent in their activities and are responsible for the formation of a professional and virtuous judicial corps. The concept of autonomy (independence) of judicial governance bodies, in particular in matters of formation of the judicial corps, creates prerequisites for the analysis of the legal nature of advisory and auxiliary bodies, their direct or indirect influence on the adoption of relevant decisions. The Law of Ukraine "On the High Anti-corruption Court" introduced an auxiliary body for the purposes of selection to the said court - PCIE, the legal nature and status of which require research and the formation of approaches to solving certain scientific and practical tasks. The conducted research established that the PCIE does not fully meet the characteristics of an "advisory, auxiliary body", taking into account its influence on the decisions of the HQCJU. At the same time, PCIE is not endowed with legal personality in legal relations that arise in connection with the adoption of relevant decisions of the HQCJU and does not bear legal responsibility for the adopted decisions. The analysis of the legal nature of the PCIE made it possible to formulate the conclusion that, in the presence of the mandatory characteristic of "honesty" both in the members of the HQCJU and in the members of the PCIE, the advisory (auxiliary) function of the latter is realized exclusively through the prism of the professional experience of its members, the qualification requirement for which have experience of working in other countries for at least five years in the implementation of procedural management, support of state prosecution in court or implementation of judicial proceedings in cases related to corruption. According to the direction of the performed function, PCIE acts as an additional subject of legitimization of the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article strives to find out how monetary contestation, when brought before the courts, can generate institutional change. The goal is to show if the contestation conveyed by local currencies at a specific point can be considered as a driving force via the evolution of monetary rules. This article focuses on the case of eusko—a French local currency of Basque Country. What has become the most extended French and currently European local currency was the subject to a legal conflict between the State, through the prefecture of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques, and the City of Bayonne. By using a qualitative approach by a set of semi-structured interviews, the article analyzes, helped by the theoretical framework of John R. Commons, how the dissemination of new monetary practices could be selected by judicial and political powers, respectively. Based on empirical results, and considering the Commonsian concepts of "artificial selection" and "institutionalized compromise," I conclude that the legislation changed due to this legal conflict. This change has paved the way for other French municipalities to mobilize the terms of the agreement and aim to pay part of their public expenditure in local currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article titled "Judicial Power and Potential Unconstitutionality: A Scholastic Perspective" examines the distinction between making and applying the law, using the Supreme Court's severability doctrine as an example. The author proposes a framework for replacement doctrine based on the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Chief Justice John Marshall. The article argues that judicial law declaration is an exercise of practical reason and that the judiciary does not change the law enacted by Congress. It critiques modern severability doctrine and concludes with hope for a correction in the Supreme Court's understanding of constitutional adjudication. The text also discusses the role of judges in applying the law and contrasts two approaches: statutory disregard and statutory excision. It highlights a case, Murphy v. NCAA, where the Supreme Court used conventional severability doctrine to invalidate an entire law, leading to criticism of the doctrine. Justice Thomas argues against the severability doctrine, while Justice Ginsburg suggests a limited deletion approach. The text concludes by suggesting a shift from excision to disregard in addressing potential unconstitutionality. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article states that the subjects of special criminological prevention of criminal offenses committed by probation subjects are probation bodies, police, non-specialized subjects of prevention (legislative and judicial power, their structural bodies and institutions, various formations and public associations, owners of enterprises), as well as judicial authorities and other bodies of state control, local self-government bodies, etc. Among the main directions of special criminological prevention of criminal offenses are: counteraction to manifestations of antisocial orientation and criminogenic motivation of the convict; involvement of psychologists and specialists from other spheres of life in the process of correction and resocialization of convicts; reducing the influence of external causes and conditions for the commission of a criminal offense, etc. It is proved that the introduction of these directions is an important step towards building a qualitatively new model of probation, created not on the ideology of control and authority, but on the therapeutic and rehabilitation philosophy. It is determined that probation personnel process a large amount of information and make strategic decisions, but it is necessary to take into account numerous and competing professional, political and personal interests in providing assistance to probation subjects. Since most of the decisions made by the probation officer during the preparation of the pre-trial report are intuitive, taking into account previous experience and rarely focus on the study of criminogenic needs and taking into account the results of the study of the convict's personality, taking into account the correctional programs he has undergone. It is determined that the basis of special criminological crime prevention by the probation body should be a change in the strategy of probation from a form of supervision focused on individual preventive influence on the convict to a form that would be based on compliance with the conditions of probation, implementation of plans for special criminological prevention, support of the convict, assistance in restoring the violated rights not only to the convict, but also to the convict, but also the victim, which would provide an opportunity to determine the optimally appropriate number of supervisory meetings between the probation officer and the convict and reduce the workload of probation officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes, expands and substantiates scientific knowledge about the theoretical and practical aspects of the influence of judicial law-making on judicial reform. The legal nature of judicial law-making is characterized, taking into account modern contextual and conceptual approaches to understanding the law-making potential of the court. Judicial law-making is an important, integral and special type of law-making. The legal nature of judicial law-making is deep and multifaceted, in particular, it is a way of achieving the goal of justice and ensuring the rule of law; an important guarantee of the protection of human rights; a necessary element of implementing the rule of law in the mechanism of ensuring human rights and freedoms; a means of overcoming legislative gaps and exceptional legal problems in the course of law enforcement; a tool for supplementing the law; «insurance» agent of the legislator, etc. In the democratic countries of the world, judicial law-making has proven itself as an effective tool entrusted to the courts within the limits of their judicial activity, and they use this tool with an appropriate level of responsibility. The peculiarities and directions of influence of international and national judicial law-making on reforming the judicial system and legal reform are analyzed. The theoretical and practical value of the influence of judicial law-making on judicial and legal reforms lies in the fact that it is a conceptual basis for the qualitative transformation of the domestic judiciary, judiciary, justice and the legal system, in particular the field of judicial law. The state and trends of the introduction of judicial law-making into the national legal system of Ukraine based on the results of the last judicial reform are revealed. With each stage of judicial reform in Ukraine, the need for official recognition of judicial law-making becomes more relevant. The judicial reform of 2016 did not positively resolve this issue. Currently, the need to introduce judicial law-making is mostly recognized at the doctrinal level, but is rejected by the legislator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA), it falls to federal judges in each circuit to investigate and redress complaints about their colleagues' behavior. A controversial provision of the Act authorizes the temporary suspension of misbehaving judges from new case assignments. Judges suspended under the Act--most recently, Judge Pauline Newman in the Federal Circuit--have argued that this amounts to effectively removing them from office without impeachment, violating constitutional protections of judicial tenure and independence. No court has invalidated a suspension on this basis so far. Yet courts have reserved the question taken up here, namely whether a long-term suspension could, by its practical effect, cross the line into removal. Returning to first principles, this Comment develops and defends a bright-line rule for conceptualizing effective removal. Article III vests federal judges with the power to decide legal cases and controversies within limits set by the Constitution and Congress. Individual judges are not entitled to dockets of any particular size or scope. Yet possessing some measure of case-deciding power is a necessary condition for holding judicial office. It follows that a judge does not hold office if she does not wield any judicial power, as when a categorical prohibition on hearing cases eliminates her entire docket. When a case-suspension sanction under the JCDA even temporarily has that effect, disqualifying a judge who lacks assigned cases from further assignments, it unconstitutionally removes the judge from office. After crystallizing the concept of effective removal, the Comment attends to non-merits-related reasons that courts are unlikely to accept this challenge to the JCDA even in compelling cases; assesses the risk that the Act's case-suspension provision could be abused to effectively remove judges for improper reasons; and ultimately proposes a targeted amendment to the provision that would foreclose the possibility of effective removal and conform the Act's scheme of judicial self-discipline to the Constitution's separation of powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian authority holds that there is a critical distinction between superior and inferior courts when it comes to the legal force of judicial orders affected by jurisdictional error. It is said that such orders, when made by a superior court, have legal force unless and until set aside but that, when made by an inferior court, they lack legal force from the outset. This distinction -- recently consigned to pre-1846 history by the United Kingdom Supreme Court -- does not align with the contemporary reality of the integrated system of courts established under Ch III of the Australian Constitution. The appeals in Commonwealth v Stradford, Judge Vasta v Stradford and Queensland v Stradford present an opportunity for the High Court of Australia to set a new approach that reflects the constitutional context for Ch III court operation. Specifically, the appeals may be upheld on the basis that any purported order made by a Ch III court acting as a repository of judicial power has legal force unless and until set aside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universal vacatur, the judicial power to void a regulation, is a remedy rooted in the foundations of modern administrative law, not an artifact of judicial overreach or creative reinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Feature adds to the literature on the historical underpinnings and legal propriety of universal vacatur by mapping the development of universal vacatur from the pre-APA period through the Abbott Labs trilogy. Canvassing the work of courts, Congress, and scholars, this account underscores that universal vacatur is a legitimate part of the remedial scheme of administrative law, grounded in history and sustained by subsequent recognition. After establishing these points, the Feature connects the debate over universal vacatur to another topic of vigorous discussion in contemporary administrative law: the Roberts Court's recent fortification of the major questions doctrine. The case against universal vacatur leverages the intuition that an individual district court judge should not be able to decide issues of vast economic and political significance by vacating a rule universally absent a clear statement in the APA that the judge possesses that authority. That form of argument resembles the mechanics of the new major questions doctrine. As to their consequences, the two also align: both serve to centralize power in the Supreme Court by weakening actors of our government other than the Supreme Court. Though accepting the case against universal vacatur will certainly place curbs on lower court judges, it would also indulge, and thereby strengthen, the perilous proposition that the Supreme Court should intervene to redistribute congressional allocations of power in ways that centralize its own importance and preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Delegated power is under attack from many sides. From the beginning of the American republic, lawmakers have built institutions with the understanding that they could assign power from one individual or institution to another. This principle has been fundamental to the American system of power in many forms—delegation of legislative, executive, and judicial power—both between branches and within them. Now, this model might be about to transform beyond recognition. Our Supreme Court is feeling its power. Their antidelegation program has many facets. But two have been most prominent in the jurisprudence of the past few years: frst, delegation of Article I lawmaking power to administrative agencies and, second, delegation of Article II enforcement power to private litigants. This Article makes the case that the Court’s recent moves in these two domains are part of a unifed program. They are twin strands in a broad-based effort to limit the scope and reach of delegated authority. Scholars have long been aware of the growth of both prongs of this analysis. But the doctrine is shifting under our feet, taking on new characteristics, and gaining a new coherence that sometimes even crosses the ideological divide between liberal and conservative jurists. As it takes shape, the Court’s antidelegation jurisprudence threatens to disrupt some of the basic contours of our system of governance. A well-established regime based on delegation may be forced to bow to an idealized and likely ahistorical vision of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Stability is considered a traditional legal value, particularly in relation to the stability of the constitution. This emphasis on stability stems from the need to protect the text of the constitution from frequent and unreasonable changes. However, stability must be combined with dynamism, a task primarily shouldered by the judicial branch of power through constitutional interpretation. Notably, ideas of judicial rule-making and the notion of a living/invisible constitution are only some manifestations of such a phenomenon as informal changes to the constitution. Yet, the potential risks posed by judicial intervention and the legitimacy concerns surrounding such informal changes warrant scrutiny. What is the correlation of informal constitutional changes through interpretation with the traditional doctrine of sovereign constituent power? What should be the limit of the interpretation of the constitution so that such an interpretation is not recognised as abusive? These and other issues are the focal point of research in the article. Methods: The following methods were used to research the main approaches to informal changes to the constitution. The system-structural method was used to characterise the concept of a living and invisible constitution and varieties of informal constitutional changes and to establish the relationship between these concepts. The logical-legal method made it possible to find out the content of the positions of scientists regarding the potential violation of the boundaries of interpretation of the constitution by the courts, as well as arguments for and against the legitimacy of judicial interpretation, an assessment of informal changes in the constitution from the standpoint of modern views on the doctrine of constituent power. Additionally, the comparative method was employed to study the experience of foreign countries in terms of the characterisation of binding interpretation. Results and Conclusions: The study analyses the current state of the concept of informal changes to the constitution through judicial interpretation, its connection with the doctrine of constituent power, as well as the question of the legitimacy of such an interpretation and its limits. The primary conclusion is that judicial activity guarantees the protection of the material constitution, principles and human rights. That is, the judiciary does not allow sovereign decisions made democratically (by the people) to infringe on human rights. Thus, the text of the constitution is interpreted in a conformal way to individual rights. Questions about the role of the judiciary, the possibility of informal changes to the constitution, and judicial lawmaking as such can be an indicator for distinguishing between authoritarian/totalitarian countries and democratic ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the issues of improving the institution of disciplinary liability of judges which will guarantee avoidance of the loss of the authority of justice due to unprofessionalism or open illegality of the use of the judicial power granted to individual judges, with certain "fuses" for the possibility of extra-procedural pressure on judges. The purpose оf the article is to formulate scientifically based conclusions on the necessity of enshrining in law the elements of disciplinary offenses as legislative determination for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility, to determine the permissible level of their legislative specification and exhaustiveness, and to influence the efficiency of the judicial system. "Young" democracies in the period of their formation are characterized by the tendency to specify the grounds for dismissal of a judge in legal acts, which should objectively serve as a warning against the wide discretion of the bodies conducting disciplinary proceedings and eliminate the potential threat of its use for the purpose of putting pressure on judges in an unlawful manner. Based on the results of the study, the author identified three main components that allow a positive evaluation of the implementation of the disciplinary proceedings procedure, including the application of grounds for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility. They are: 1) the existence of normative provisions that define the guidelines at the level of law (with an acceptable degree of clarity of definition and restrictive interpretation), 2) consistent and predictable practice of their application in the activities of disciplinary authorities using discretion, which will be of institutional importance in assessing law enforcement, 3) the existence of appropriate legal protection mechanisms in the form of independent and impartial review of decisions of the disciplinary authorities, taking into account the subject matter of judicial control and the limits of admissibility for the implementation of. The legislative determination of the grounds for disciplinary liability should develop both in the direction of specifying the composition of disciplinary authorities and by eliminating conflicts and gaps in the legal norms, and disciplinary bodies should develop a clear, consistent and precise practice of their application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1984, the Supreme Court in its Chevron opinion invoked democratic values to help justify holding that courts should defer to an agency's reasonable construction of a statute that it administers. In 2022, in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court invoked democratic values to help justify the major questions doctrine (MQD), which requires clear congressional authorization for agency claims of major regulatory power. Democracy, it seems, requires deference and anti-deference for agency statutory interpretations. Or maybe not. This Article submits that the democracy talk of Chevron and West Virginia is implausible, misleading, and may have caused the law to evolve in needlessly confusing and controversial ways. Had the Court skipped its democracy talk in Chevron, the resulting opinion might have focused more cleanly on the best and most persuasive justification for deference in this context, agency expertise. This might have fostered a simpler, clearer approach to deference, free from Chevron's epicycles and less vulnerable to attack based on abstractions from separation-of-powers principles that threaten Chevron's imminent demise. Without the help of democracy talk in West Virginia, the Court would have found it more difficult to justify the MQD--and a world without this judicial power grab would be a better one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the myth of George Washington's refusal of the American crown and its implications for understanding judicial restraint. Topics include the historical inaccuracy of the Washington story, Justice Antonin Scalia's critique of common-law judicial power, and the application of Scalia's principles by Justice Evan Young in state court cases.

Among the most basic principles of our federal courts is that they are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only those powers delegated to them in Article III. In 1985 the Supreme Court inexplicably created an exception to this constitutional tenet and unilaterally declared a plenary judicial power to review the exercise of an Indian tribe’s inherent sovereign authority. This exception is unmoored from all other Supreme Court precedent outside Indian law and unjustifiably assumes the judicial power in direct contrast to the Court’s ordinarily thoughtful jurisprudence on Article III and deference to the separation of powers. This Article concludes that the Supreme Court was wrong in 1985 when it assumed a plenary judicial power over Indian affairs. The consequences are profound and suggest a reconceptualization of the entire field of Indian law. Canon-creating cases like Oliphant, Montana, and Cabazon should never have been decided because the exercise of a tribe’s inherent authority does not create a federal question conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. The inherent power of Indian tribes to criminally prosecute or civilly regulate non-Indians in Indian country should not subject them to the judicially imposed limits set by the Supreme Court because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide those cases. Until a treaty or statute creates an affirmative basis for federal court review, an Indian tribe’s inherent powers are subject to the checks and balances imposed by tribal government and no others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution's original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism's rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would employ a rule-based doctrine for gradually returning our constitutional law to the original meaning without upsetting the reliance interests that stare decisis rightly protects. While originalists, like Justice Scalia, have been extremely critical of the prospective overruling that the Warren Court used to implement its constitutional revolution, we here defend an approach to prospective overruling that would avoid these originalist criticisms. We show that prospective overruling is a legitimate form of the common law of precedent and thus encompassed by the judicial power. We also show that prospective overruling is not dictum that runs afoul of the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement. In many cases, the substantive constitutional question is so intertwined with the question of precedent that a decision on a provision's original meaning is necessary to decide the stare decisis issue. In other cases, the resolution of the substantive question should be treated as a holding, even if not strictly necessary to the result, because the question was answered using a method that appears designed to resolve the case. We then illustrate how and when prospective overruling should be applied by reference to cases involving the Commerce Clause and the nondelegation doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen the rise of the semi-authoritarian regimes within the European Union. EU law scholars are rightfully concerned that, in the absence of a meaningful response, this leads to an existential crisis for the Union, as these regimes threaten respect for the Union's foundational values. The Union did respond to what it has framed as a rule of law crisis by means of a constitutional transformation, asserting Union power to protect judicial independence within the Member States even in areas previously thought beyond the reach of Union law. This paper contends that the Union's response to the authoritarian threat is flawed for its legalist faith in law and courts. In institutional terms, it was the Court of Justice of the European Union, rather than the Union's political branches, that took the lead in this transformation. In substantive terms, the Union has transformed its constitutional framework to protect the organisational infrastructure of the judiciary, but it failed to do the same in response to various other strategies in the authoritarian playbook. By framing the authoritarian threat as, above all else, a threat to the judiciary, the Union's response contributes to the reification of political debate at Union level and risks the alienation of the European polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]