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This study examined the relationship between social anxiety (SA) and the generation of upward counterfactual thoughts (U-CFT; ―if only...‖ thoughts imagining better outcomes to past events). U-CFT has been associated with negative affect and with social anxiety in past research (e.g., Kocovski et al., 2005). Participants (n= 89) were randomly assigned to generate U-CFT in response to a controllable or uncontrollable social-evaluative scenario. When comparing those with extreme SA scores, those higher in SA generated a greater number of upward as compared with downward CFTs. A significant positive correlation between SA and U-CFT was found when examining subsets of the sample (i.e., those in the controllable scenario, students). Potential mediators between SA and CFT were examined. Postevent Processing emerged as the only significant mediator (among students only). There was no evidence of maladaptive CFT (i.e., in response to the uncontrollable scenario only) within subsets or the sample as a whole.

Research suggests that those experiencing Social Anxiety (SA) symptoms are more likely to engage in repetitive thought (RT), including upward counterfactual thinking (U-CFT). Findings indicate that these cognitive patterns may lead to deleterious thoughts and emotions, particularly when U-CFT focuses on non-repeatable, uncontrollable situations and negative self-appraisals. The present dissertation consisted of two complementary studies. Study 1 attempted to 1) validate new measures of state and trait U-CFT, 2) examine the relationship between U-CFT and established measures of RT and mood, and 3) explore the relationship between SA symptoms and counterfactual thinking within a student population. Results indicated that the U-CFT-S (trait measure of U-CFT) and the Counterfactual Likelihood scales (state measure of U-CFT) evidenced sound psychometrics in terms of internal consistency, factor structure, and relationships with related questionnaires. Factor analyses revealed that the Maladaptive U-CFT-S scale clustered with negative mood, rumination, and learned helplessness, while the Adaptive U-CFT subscale clustered with measures of positive mood and self-efficacy. Finally, symptoms of SA correlated positively with state and trait U-CFT generation. Study 2 1) compared patterns of U-CFT and emotions such as guilt and self-blame between a diagnosed Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) group and a Healthy Control (HC) group 2) determined if disorder-specific content impacts U-CFT generation, and 3) piloted a brief, CBT-based, video intervention targeting maladaptive U-CFT. Results indicated that the SAD group evidenced higher amounts of U-CFT in response to the socially-based scenarios than the HC group and in response to social than non-social scenarios. The SAD group evidenced higher levels of unhelpful emotions (e.g., guilt) both pre- and post-CFT generation than HC participants. Finally, the CBT intervention was generally unsuccessful at reducing maladaptive U-CFT, but was more likely to be effective among SAD than HC participants. Implications of this dissertation include: 1) the benefit of including state- and trait-based measures of U-CFT in future research, 2) the importance of conceptualizing U-CFT as a multifaceted construct, 3) addressing that those with SAD are engaging in maladaptive U-CFT and experiencing consequent guilt and self-blame, and 4) the direction of creating more comprehensive, brief interventions aimed at targeting maladaptive U-CFT.

Although a recent update on the functional theory of counterfactual thinking suggests that counterfactuals are important for behavior regulation, there is some evidence that counterfactuals may not be functional for everyone. Two studies found differences between maladaptive and high personal standards perfectionism in the functionality of counterfactuals and variables relevant to behavior regulation. Maladaptive but not personal standards perfectionism predicted making more upward counterfactuals after recalling a negative event and was linked to a variety of negative markers of achievement. Maladaptive perfectionism was associated with making controllable, subtractive, and less specific counterfactuals. High personal standards perfectionism moderated the effects of maladaptive perfectionism on counterfactual controllability. Generating counterfactuals increased motivation for personal standards perfectionists relative to a noncounterfactual control group but had no effect on motivation for maladaptive perfectionists. The findings suggest a continuum of counterfactual functionality for perfectionists and highlight the importance of considering counterfactual specificity and structure.