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Based on U.S. cybersecurity policy, this thesis proposes effective countermeasures for the Republic of Korea (ROK) to prepare for, deter, and recover from cyber threats posed by North Korea. This study identifies the most dangerous North Korean cyber strikes facing South Korea by reviewing several cases of North Korean cyberattacks, the ROK’s countermeasures, and the severity of the damage caused by the attacks. The study builds on the writings of academics and subject matter experts as well as publicly available government policy documents, although specifics on policy are limited due to national security concerns. In addition, the study acknowledges how the cybersecurity paradigm has shifted as a result of U.S. planning, reaction to, and establishment of follow-up measures for an attack of a similar type by a cyber superpower. The strategy of deterring an opponent's operations based on the past has evolved into a strategy of preparing for enemy attacks through information sharing and preemptive defense measures, and counterattack by rapid recovery and identification of the enemy through resilience and with tracking technologies. Although the ROK is a country with well-developed information technology, its cybersecurity knowledge, systems, and technology remain weak in comparison to North Korea's abilities. Consequently, it is conceivable that the ROK can respond effectively to North Korea’s cyber threats by applying the lessons learned from the United States., Major, Republic of Korea Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

While the United States has reduced the overall number of nuclear warheads supporting U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia, North Korea has been developing additional nuclear weapons and missiles to maintain a stronger security posture against the United States. Therefore, South Korea, which is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is getting more skeptical of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear policy in regard to South Korea. Meanwhile, a well-organized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) has assured allies of the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence policy in Europe. This study demonstrates that South Korea could enhance its assurance of U.S. commitment to extended deterrence by adopting the NATO NPG as a model of a nuclear consultative body. Enhancing South Korea-U.S. nuclear policy coordination as presented in this thesis would bolster extended deterrence of North Korea's threats and enhance South Korea's assurance of U.S. extended deterrence., Captain, Republic of Korea Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Armed conflicts and insurgencies today have adopted ruthless tactics of warfare by coercively recruiting child soldiers. Child soldiers play many roles during armed conflicts, creating security concerns for peace and stability in the international community. This study explores the social, physical, and psychological impact of child soldiers on peacekeepers and communities during and after conflict. It examines the three levels of risk (low, medium, and high) related to the use of force in interactions between child soldiers and members of the military and peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the study assesses how lower-risk-level interactions can escalate to life-threatening situations. Drawing on relevant international law, literature by subject matter experts, and the author’s personal experience in peacekeeping operations, the research discusses how child soldiers shape contemporary peace support operations using Sierra Leone’s past civil war as a case that involved varieties of UN and non-UN peacekeeping efforts. Finally, the study makes recommendations to policymakers aimed to thwart efforts to recruit children and prevent further interactions between peacekeepers and children during all stages of conflict., Major, Sierra Leone Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Over the years, the National Network of Intelligence Fusion Centers, established after the 9/11 attacks, was able to evolve and adapt to new threats and challenges to security environments. Domestic violent extremism became a serious challenge to U.S. security, especially after the development of social media. The most dangerous representatives of violent domestic extremism are the far-right extremists, who have become very active in the last decade. The far-right groups successfully used social media for organization and propaganda by spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories. This thesis tries to understand the role of state and local fusion centers in the fight against violent far-right extremists. To answer that question, this thesis analyses the intelligence fusion centers’ actions concerning the Capitol insurrection by far-right extremists on January 6, 2021, and disinformation campaigns during the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. The findings are that fusion centers played an important role during the Capitol insurrection by exploiting open-source intelligence. On the other hand, fusion centers are not effective against foreign or, especially, domestic disinformation campaigns. Therefore, more federal support is needed to improve the fusion centers' capacity to help contain the spread of disinformation., Captain, Bulgarian Special Operations Forces Brigade, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The United States, China, and Russia are each competing to develop hypersonic weapons. Can this hypersonic weapon competition be classified as an arms race? Current literature regarding hypersonic weapons treats them as a manifestation of arms racing, but does not offer a comprehensive assessment of arms race dynamics in current hypersonic weapon development. This thesis uses traditional arms race theory and current strategic stability literature to analyze the hypersonic weapon competition and to highlight challenges the competition imposes. This thesis proposes a new arms racing category to classify the hypersonic weapon competition: an incipient arms race. It defines an incipient arms race, examines the importance of recognizing its incipiency, and raises potential problems for policymakers to consider. This thesis recommends that policymakers fully consider the impact that a full arms race would have on global strategic security prior to committing the required resources to offensive and defensive hypersonic weapon systems., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Reversible cyberattacks are similar to ransomware and can provide a new capability in cyber warfare. They can be effective strategically and often ethically superior. Providing incentives in an attack like returning a system to its prior state can encourage a country to comply with demands by the attacker. This research discusses the types of cyberattack that can be effectively reversed, addressing their structure and capacity for reversibility. Traditional cyberattacks and reversible cyberattacks are compared, considering strategic advantages and ethical obligations and when each would be superior. Other issues addressed are the effects of backup methods, the kinds of collateral damage that cannot be reversed, and the need for a second cyberattack to accomplish reversal., Ensign, United States Navy, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Special Feature : Issues of the Iraq War The Iraq War from the Viewpoint of International Law by Hisakazu Fujita…p.1 The Invasion of Iraq, the U.N., the Threat of U.S. Unilateralism and the Spirit of Hiroshima by Christian P. Scherrer …p.2 The Inhumanity of Depleted Uranium Weapons by Kazumi Mizumoto …p.3 Countdown in Korea by Wade L. Huntley …p.4 Publication: HPI, ed., Humanitarian crisis and international intervention : formulae for restoring peace [Jindo kiki to kokusai kainyu: Heiwa kaifuku no shohosen] …p.5 “Hiroshima” and “Lucky Dragon” by Hiroko Takahashi …p.6 HPI Research Forum Anti-Personnel Land Mines by Ian Maddocks…p.7 HPI-TAPRI Workshop …p.7 Forthcoming International Symposium : “Terror from the Sky: Indiscriminate Bombing from Hiroshima to Today”…p.8 Diary …p.8, source:http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/modules/peace_e/index.php

As cyberspace operations become further integrated into operational planning for nation-states, planners must understand the implications of perishability and obsolescence when deciding how to use cyberweapons. Obsolescence reflects the risk that a vulnerability will be patched without cyberweapon use, while perishability describes the short lifespan of a cyberweapon once it is used; one creates an incentive to use and the other an incentive to stockpile. This thesis examined operating-system vulnerabilities over four years: we quantified the duration between key events of their life cycles as well as the time to release a patch after disclosure. We performed survival analysis for longevity and post-disclosure patch time using Kaplan-Meier curves, then found that the data fit well to Weibull distributions. We also examined the effects of severity and operating system on the lengths of vulnerability life-cycle phases. Our parametric models enable planners to predict the expected survival time of a cyberweapon’s vulnerability, allowing them to determine when to use them, replenish them, and assess windows of opportunity for reuse. This reduces the need to stockpile cyberweapons and creates incentives to use them before the expected survival time. The observed wide variability in longevity values indicates that risk tolerance is important in deciding when to use a cyberweapon.

Many people are in favor of South Korea enhancing nuclear deterrence options (the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or its indigenous nuclear weapons). Since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, a majority of those surveyed in opinion polls have favored enhancing nuclear deterrence. The results of these polls have attracted the attention of domestic and foreign media as well as those in politics and academia. However, questions remain, such as what this public opinion means both implicitly and explicitly, and what factors have prevented public opinion from influencing the government’s policy-making decisions. This thesis focuses on domestic political factors rather than international factors, such as the feasibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence options. This thesis argues that public opinion in favor of enhancing nuclear deterrence options did not influence the government’s policy formation due to 1) characteristics for the public opinion in favor of enacting a new policy, and 2) the existence of alternative policies to the enhancing nuclear deterrence options., Dae-wi, Republic of Korea Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This thesis studies the influence of the United States on the Republic of Korea’s Nordpolitik and Neo-Nordpolitik policies, and the interaction between the ROK and the United States in the process of executing the two policies. The Neo-Nordpolitik policy is a foreign and unification policy currently being pursued by the Moon Jae-in government in South Korea, subsequent to the Nordpolitik policy of the Roh Tae-woo administration in the early 1990s. This thesis focuses in-depth on the practical role the United States played in the process of promoting and implementing the two policies. The research for this thesis finds that the United States treated the ROK largely with consistency and consideration over the period spanning these two policies but behaved quite differently toward the two policies themselves. The United States, directly and indirectly, took a supportive position regarding the Nordpolitik policy. On the contrary, the United States, in an indirect manner, has effectively taken a divergent position regarding the Neo-Nordpolitik policy. The thesis explains the different responses of the United States in terms of the two policies’ alignments with U.S. interests in the overall circumstances in the Northeast Asia region, which was strong in the first case but is weak in the current case., Outstanding Thesis, So-ryeong, Republic of Korea Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

North Korea has sought nuclear weapons because acquiring nuclear weapons can offset a state’s inferior power in conventional warfare. North Korea seems to expect "nuclear substitution," which is defined as a situation in which countries with nuclear capabilities enjoy a higher level of security capability than before nuclear development, while reducing the burden of conventional power construction. However, this does not appear applicable to the North. In other words, even if the North is able to acquire nuclear weapons, the burden of conventional power development is not reduced. To grasp the situation, Pakistan can anticipate the North's behavior because Pakistan has similar security situations as North Korea in several aspects. Pakistan has not reduced its conventional power construction since its nuclear armament. This suggests that nuclear substitution may be insufficient; thus, Pakistan is developing a conventional strategy in terms of “nuclear-conventional strategy interaction,” in which conventional forces play a pivotal role in implementing military strategies. This study supposes that the situation in North Korea is similar to that of Pakistan. North Korea could face a dilemma of additional costs for conventional power construction at a time when nuclear compensation is not as effective as expected. Therefore, this study focuses on why the North cannot expect nuclear substitution and which dilemmas are ahead for the North., So-ryeong, Republic of Korea Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Based on U.S. cybersecurity policy, this thesis proposes effective countermeasures for the Republic of Korea (ROK) to prepare for, deter, and recover from cyber threats posed by North Korea. This study identifies the most dangerous North Korean cyber strikes facing South Korea by reviewing several cases of North Korean cyberattacks, the ROK’s countermeasures, and the severity of the damage caused by the attacks. The study builds on the writings of academics and subject matter experts as well as publicly available government policy documents, although specifics on policy are limited due to national security concerns. In addition, the study acknowledges how the cybersecurity paradigm has shifted as a result of U.S. planning, reaction to, and establishment of follow-up measures for an attack of a similar type by a cyber superpower. The strategy of deterring an opponent's operations based on the past has evolved into a strategy of preparing for enemy attacks through information sharing and preemptive defense measures, and counterattack by rapid recovery and identification of the enemy through resilience and with tracking technologies. Although the ROK is a country with well-developed information technology, its cybersecurity knowledge, systems, and technology remain weak in comparison to North Korea's abilities. Consequently, it is conceivable that the ROK can respond effectively to North Korea’s cyber threats by applying the lessons learned from the United States.

The DPRK’s WMD programs pose increasing threats to security in the region. To better understand that challenge, this thesis investigates specifically the consequences for U.S. and ROK strategic postures arising from current DPRK efforts to develop Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSB). This SLBM/SSB effort bears directly on the ROK Navy’s current efforts to counter wider technology and capability improvements by the DPRK Navy in the undersea domain as well as broader ROK interests in adopting a more global focus for its military posture. The DPRK’s SLBM/SSB ambitions also directly impact U.S. security interests on issues including extended deterrence assurances to the ROK, regional anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and wartime operational control of military forces on the Korean Peninsula. To address its focal concern, the thesis first presents the current status of the DPRK SLBM and SSB programs. The thesis then utilizes these details to estimate DPRK intentions in pursuing these programs. On this basis, the thesis then evaluates recent and prospective ROK responses. Overall, the thesis reaches two conclusions. On the one hand, given U.S. and ROK capacities, the potential threat posed by the DPRK’s aim to deploy nuclear-capable SLBMs will be negligible. However, the DPRK leadership’s overestimation of its SLBM/SSB capabilities could fuel risky provocative behavior eroding regional stability and deepen crisis dangers., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

NPS NRP Technical Report, This project will provide an assessment of the prospects for war in the Indo-Pacific to inform the Navy strategy in this theater. The project will examine how regional actors assess the prospects for war, specifically their attitudes towards deterrence, escalation management on the use of force at sea, and the implications for possible conflict with Indo-Pacific competitors. The findings in this study will be used to assess the implications for US maritime strategy throughout the region. The study will highlight the need for the Navy to rediscover long-forgotten writings on deterrence, coercion, and strategy to analyze the dimensions of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific., N3/N5 - Plans & Strategy, This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This research applies an Indications and Warning (I&W) analytical philosophy and methodology to the problem of warning of an amphibious movement against the Island of Taiwan. It identifies the tenets and philosophy behind I&W analysis; the general issues that must be addressed to undertake effective I&W analysis related to an amphibious operation against Taiwan; the alternative warning scenarios and various indicators associated with different types of amphibious attack against Taiwan (i.e., a rough template for the conduct of I&W amphibious analysis); and the issues involved in developing an operational response to warning. The research will culminate in an effort to engage senior line officers about the crucial role played by theater commanders when it comes to utilizing I&W intelligence. Warning only works when commanders are prepared to utilize it.

This thesis examines the developing response of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) range of threats as a case study of its approach to non-traditional security issues. Over the past two decades, ASEAN-led WMD/CBRN cooperation largely emphasized rhetoric, dialogue, treaties, and confidence-building measures, which were especially notable in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Although ASEAN leaders previously expressed their support toward international cooperation, they initially limited their activities to diplomacy, which frustrated their extra-regional partners. However, ASEAN’s activities within the last few years indicate that it has become more inclined toward developing the capabilities necessary for disrupting threat WMD proliferation efforts and responding to potential WMD/CBRN incidents. In 2018, defense leaders and practitioners of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting established the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Experts, or the “ASEAN CBR Network.” The following year, the ARF heads of state planned to conduct a tabletop exercise to address WMD disarmament, non-proliferation, and capability generation. This thesis reveals that ASEAN’s approach to region-specific WMD/CBRN security challenges is changing, although this shift has been mostly from diplomacy to consultation, education, and limited exercise planning., Captain, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The defend forward cyber defense strategy is predicated on the notion of persistent engagement with adversaries in gray and red network space, to cause friction for adversaries before they can carry out malicious activity in U.S. network space. The U.S. Cyber Defense Strategy seeks to overmatch adversaries and cause friction by actively engaging adversaries outside of U.S. network space, albeit below the threshold of armed conflict. This strategy is designed to advance the security of U.S. national interests in the cyberspace domain. U.S. security strategies may have varying effects on stability in specific domains and in overall international relations. Defend forward is often criticized for being destabilizing in the cyberspace domain, and as such, security gains from defend forward are potentially outweighed by negative effects of a further destabilized domain. This thesis answers the following questions: What is the impact of defend forward on the security of U.S. interests and overall stability in the cyberspace domain? The thesis seeks to separate the effects that defend forward has on security and stability in order to understand how, and to what extent, the strategy impacts both. This ultimately enables a determination of the immediate and long-term efficacy of defend forward and the role stability has in relation to the security of U.S. interests in the cyberspace domain., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines the main security and economic drivers for Japan’s foreign policy responses to U.S.–China competition in the Indo-Pacific region through a historical lens. First, the Cold War era is reviewed to determine the effects of Japan’s post-war status under the occupation of U.S. forces and China’s rapid rise as an economic competitor in the region. Then, the last decade is reviewed to find the trajectory and consistency of Japan’s foreign policy decisions as the U.S. and China progressively competed for hegemonic influence in the region. This thesis found that, while security drivers tended to be consistent throughout these two periods, economic drivers were more diverse because of the radically different set of circumstances Japan has faced while it developed into a more autonomous country. Japan frequently reacted to perceptions of an increasingly hostile or unstable environment and to concerns of an over-dependence on the U.S., particularly during periods where the U.S. was viewed as a potentially unreliable security partner. While Japan's responses did not have a consistent set of economic drivers, there was a common trend of fear of over-dependence on the U.S. and China at different points in time., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines the past impact United Nations Command (UNC) has had on South Korean security. With South Korea’s security environment facing significant changes today, including the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the push to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC is under debate over whether it has to remain in the peninsula. This thesis seeks to analyze the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s security on a comprehensive security concept to give insight into the debate. This thesis analyzes the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s security before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the UNC’s role was changed. This thesis insists that the UNC has had different effects on the comprehensive security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea’s military and economic security but had a somewhat negative impact on political and diplomatic security. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive impact on South Korea’s military security and has played a positive role in diplomatic security. Based on these findings, this thesis proposes that South Korea should have diplomatic initiative to resolve Korean Peninsula issues. This thesis also suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for concessions in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. Finally, this thesis suggests that the UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role., Major, Republic of Korea Army, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis explores three aspects of post–Cold War Japanese security policy development. First, what significant security policy changes have occurred between 1989 and 2020? Second, what were the underlying factors that created the observed policy outcome? Third, how durable do those factors appear to be in 2020 and beyond? This thesis concludes with an assessment of Japan's probable future security policy trajectory, based upon the answers to the three foregoing questions. In seeking to answer the above questions, this thesis draws four primary conclusions. First, that Japan has maintained a consistent, but limited, security policy trajectory toward militarization over the observed period from 1989–2020. Second, that the observed trajectory is being driven by an interaction between external factors (China threat, North Korea threat, U.S. force presence, and U.S. diplomacy) and internal factors (antiwar norms, suspicion of revisionists, single-party dominance, and prime minister preferences). Third, that the factors driving Japan’s security policy trajectory toward militarization are currently durable in both vector and degree, while the factors resisting further militarization are situationally malleable. Fourth, and finally, that Japan is likely to remain on a long-term trajectory toward further militarization, in which Japanese technological and legal capability for use of force will continue to expand., http://archive.org/details/japansmodernsecu1094566595, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Providing border security has not always been a priority of nation-states in Latin America. As the wars of independence created legitimate armies, governments began using their forces for border protection to encapsulate a collective identity. The problem lies in Latin America's soft borders. Some countries unwillingly harbor the transportation of illicit drug and human traffickers, illegal logging and mineral extraction operations, poachers, and individuals willing to harm indigenous people to achieve their illegitimate objectives. Another concern is travelers fleeing failed states, as witnessed at the borders of Mexico-Guatemala, Colombia-Ecuador, and Venezuela. The 4.6 million people who have fled Venezuela have traversed into adjacent nations. This does not account for the 1.3 million migrants who have crossed illegally to bypass national entry points, in fear of rejection. A way to better manage border crossings is through smart border systems. This thesis evaluates whether smart borders alter the geopolitics of borderlands and how the most advanced use of border management influences stability or instability in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis uses an exploratory design to qualitatively evaluate evolving border environments. The data relied on for this research encompassed border crossing metrics, traffic management and mitigation, entry point vulnerabilities, the smart border technologies used, and the effectiveness of these technologies against border threats., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

North Korea has sought nuclear weapons because acquiring nuclear weapons can offset a state’s inferior power in conventional warfare. North Korea seems to expect "nuclear substitution," which is defined as a situation in which countries with nuclear capabilities enjoy a higher level of security capability than before nuclear development, while reducing the burden of conventional power construction. However, this does not appear applicable to the North. In other words, even if the North is able to acquire nuclear weapons, the burden of conventional power development is not reduced. To grasp the situation, Pakistan can anticipate the North's behavior because Pakistan has similar security situations as North Korea in several aspects. Pakistan has not reduced its conventional power construction since its nuclear armament. This suggests that nuclear substitution may be insufficient; thus, Pakistan is developing a conventional strategy in terms of “nuclear-conventional strategy interaction,” in which conventional forces play a pivotal role in implementing military strategies. This study supposes that the situation in North Korea is similar to that of Pakistan. North Korea could face a dilemma of additional costs for conventional power construction at a time when nuclear compensation is not as effective as expected. Therefore, this study focuses on why the North cannot expect nuclear substitution and which dilemmas are ahead for the North.

This thesis studies the influence of the United States on the Republic of Korea’s Nordpolitik and Neo-Nordpolitik policies, and the interaction between the ROK and the United States in the process of executing the two policies. The Neo-Nordpolitik policy is a foreign and unification policy currently being pursued by the Moon Jae-in government in South Korea, subsequent to the Nordpolitik policy of the Roh Tae-woo administration in the early 1990s. This thesis focuses in-depth on the practical role the United States played in the process of promoting and implementing the two policies. The research for this thesis finds that the United States treated the ROK largely with consistency and consideration over the period spanning these two policies but behaved quite differently toward the two policies themselves. The United States, directly and indirectly, took a supportive position regarding the Nordpolitik policy. On the contrary, the United States, in an indirect manner, has effectively taken a divergent position regarding the Neo-Nordpolitik policy. The thesis explains the different responses of the United States in terms of the two policies’ alignments with U.S. interests in the overall circumstances in the Northeast Asia region, which was strong in the first case but is weak in the current case.

Many people are in favor of South Korea enhancing nuclear deterrence options (the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or its indigenous nuclear weapons). Since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, a majority of those surveyed in opinion polls have favored enhancing nuclear deterrence. The results of these polls have attracted the attention of domestic and foreign media as well as those in politics and academia. However, questions remain, such as what this public opinion means both implicitly and explicitly, and what factors have prevented public opinion from influencing the government’s policy-making decisions. This thesis focuses on domestic political factors rather than international factors, such as the feasibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence options. This thesis argues that public opinion in favor of enhancing nuclear deterrence options did not influence the government’s policy formation due to 1) characteristics for the public opinion in favor of enacting a new policy, and 2) the existence of alternative policies to the enhancing nuclear deterrence options.

The DPRK’s WMD programs pose increasing threats to security in the region. To better understand that challenge, this thesis investigates specifically the consequences for U.S. and ROK strategic postures arising from current DPRK efforts to develop Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSB). This SLBM/SSB effort bears directly on the ROK Navy’s current efforts to counter wider technology and capability improvements by the DPRK Navy in the undersea domain as well as broader ROK interests in adopting a more global focus for its military posture. The DPRK’s SLBM/SSB ambitions also directly impact U.S. security interests on issues including extended deterrence assurances to the ROK, regional anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and wartime operational control of military forces on the Korean Peninsula. To address its focal concern, the thesis first presents the current status of the DPRK SLBM and SSB programs. The thesis then utilizes these details to estimate DPRK intentions in pursuing these programs. On this basis, the thesis then evaluates recent and prospective ROK responses. Overall, the thesis reaches two conclusions. On the one hand, given U.S. and ROK capacities, the potential threat posed by the DPRK’s aim to deploy nuclear-capable SLBMs will be negligible. However, the DPRK leadership’s overestimation of its SLBM/SSB capabilities could fuel risky provocative behavior eroding regional stability and deepen crisis dangers.

This thesis examines the developing response of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) range of threats as a case study of its approach to non-traditional security issues. Over the past two decades, ASEAN-led WMD/CBRN cooperation largely emphasized rhetoric, dialogue, treaties, and confidence-building measures, which were especially notable in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Although ASEAN leaders previously expressed their support toward international cooperation, they initially limited their activities to diplomacy, which frustrated their extra-regional partners. However, ASEAN’s activities within the last few years indicate that it has become more inclined toward developing the capabilities necessary for disrupting threat WMD proliferation efforts and responding to potential WMD/CBRN incidents. In 2018, defense leaders and practitioners of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting established the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Experts, or the “ASEAN CBR Network.” The following year, the ARF heads of state planned to conduct a tabletop exercise to address WMD disarmament, non-proliferation, and capability generation. This thesis reveals that ASEAN’s approach to region-specific WMD/CBRN security challenges is changing, although this shift has been mostly from diplomacy to consultation, education, and limited exercise planning.

In order for signaling to work on an adversary with a coercive purpose, one must convey to the adversary a strong capability and sufficient credibility. The reason deterrence worked in the Gulf War was that U.S. policymakers had a well-established and highly feared capability in hand, and establishing credibility was the primary concern in that scenario. However, cyber-based capabilities have not reached a potency to where they could coerce an adversary in and of themselves. The failure of the coalition to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait underscores the limits of compellence even when based on overwhelming conventional force; cyber capabilities are still not comparable to conventional forces in hurting power, which undermines their viability for coercion. Credibility is not an issue; the history of cyber conflict demonstrates that the only way nations establish capability is by the actual employment of capabilities against adversary targets, which solves the problem of credibility. Yet the most powerful cyber effects on critical infrastructure, such as those demonstrated in the Stuxnet attack, cannot permanently disarm an adversary and run the risk of escalation into a kinetic war. Research for this thesis indicates that signaling in cyberspace to an adversary for the intent of coercion is possible but unlikely to succeed while cyberweapons lack the capability to inflict sufficient harm on the adversary., Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis divides the controversy over THAAD into the phases of decision and deployment and assesses the influence of five independent drivers in this timeline: 1) changes in pressure from the United States 2) changes in pressure from China driving external structural changes in South Korea, 3) increases in North Korea’s nuclear threat, 4) the roles of the ROK’s powerful presidency and conservative South Korea’s policymakers, and 5) political participation of the public. The thesis evaluates how these drivers influenced Korea’s decision-making from the start of the debate to the deployment of the THAAD system. This thesis argues that, first, the North Korean threat played the most critical role in the decision itself and in accelerating deployment of THAAD throughout the timeline. Second, political pressures from the U.S. and China influenced Korea’s THAAD decision in different directions. Third, ROK policy-makers, a domestic factor, influenced the THAAD deployment decision but did not affect the deployment of THAAD equipment. However, the emergence of a progressive leader with different political tendencies contributed to the delay in the full deployment of THAAD. Fourth, participation of the public did not affect the THAAD deployment decision, but for a time delayed deployment after the THAAD decision. Finally, the external factors were hardly influenced by domestic factors, whereas instead domestic factors were influenced by external factors., http://archive.org/details/southkoreaandthe1094564914, Major, Republic of Korea Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Providing border security has not always been a priority of nation-states in Latin America. As the wars of independence created legitimate armies, governments began using their forces for border protection to encapsulate a collective identity. The problem lies in Latin America's soft borders. Some countries unwillingly harbor the transportation of illicit drug and human traffickers, illegal logging and mineral extraction operations, poachers, and individuals willing to harm indigenous people to achieve their illegitimate objectives. Another concern is travelers fleeing failed states, as witnessed at the borders of Mexico-Guatemala, Colombia-Ecuador, and Venezuela. The 4.6 million people who have fled Venezuela have traversed into adjacent nations. This does not account for the 1.3 million migrants who have crossed illegally to bypass national entry points, in fear of rejection. A way to better manage border crossings is through smart border systems. This thesis evaluates whether smart borders alter the geopolitics of borderlands and how the most advanced use of border management influences stability or instability in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis uses an exploratory design to qualitatively evaluate evolving border environments. The data relied on for this research encompassed border crossing metrics, traffic management and mitigation, entry point vulnerabilities, the smart border technologies used, and the effectiveness of these technologies against border threats.

According to conventional wisdom, a country’s population affects its ability to staff and fund its military. Japan analysts agree, making the case that Japan’s current demographic situation should be constraining manpower and funding in its military—the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). However, Japan has maintained both manning and expenditure levels for the SDF, despite its aging and declining population. Does the conventional wisdom not apply to Japan? If not, why? How has Japan maintained its military manpower and funding despite deteriorating demographic trends? Ultimately, the purpose of this research is to assess the prevailing opinion of Japan based on data gathered from academic and government sources. The first half of this research examines whether population decline has a negative impact on military manpower (i.e., poses a direct constraint), while the second half examines whether population decline has a negative impact on military funding (i.e., poses an indirect constraint). This thesis finds that Japan has successfully maintained both manning and expenditure levels for the SDF by (1) manipulating certain recruitment policies and (2) increasing its deficit spending., http://archive.org/details/japansdemographi1094564877, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The prevailing explanation today claims that security concerns motivate North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and that the motivation would decrease if the concerns diminish. Nevertheless, given that the international community since the 1990s has failed to prevent North Korea from securing nuclear weapons, questions arise as to whether it properly identified North Korea’s motivations and whether those motivations remained unchanged. In this respect, this thesis investigates the question: “Historically, to what extent have domestic political concerns been a driver for North Korea in deciding on its nuclear weapons program?” The thesis argues that domestic politics became the prevailing motivation for the program from 1994 to 2009. The security perspective explains that Kim Jong-il, who monopolized power, behaved on behalf of national interests, and that the growing South Korean military capabilities and U.S. hardline policy motivated him to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, many of Kim Jong-il’s actions in this period did not coincide with national security preservation. In this regard, the domestic political perspective explains that his domestic political interests motivated him to develop nuclear weapons and that he used the program as a source of money and useful pretext for legitimizing his regime. Especially, North Korea’s response to the U.S. sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia shows that Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests were the prevailing driver for the program., http://archive.org/details/domesticdriversi1094564101, Major, Republic of Korea Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The Department of Defense (DOD), private sector industry, and academia nearly universally agree that change in cyberspace is constant. This cyberspace change may be anticipated, but important dynamics are unpredictable or uncertain. To manage, mitigate, or anticipate change, an organization must strategize to be responsive to changes it cannot precisely predict. The DOD does not have the breadth and depth of expertise needed to prepare for these changes and tends to be slow to address unpredictability and uncertainty in cyberspace change in its strategy. This thesis investigates whether the private sector has strategy lessons that can be adapted or adopted by the DOD to build better and more robust multi-stakeholder strategies to address unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change. Publicly available industry strategies were analyzed from a range of large and small organizations. Comparison of DOD/government and industry strategies demonstrated a higher degree of specificity and inclusion of significant strategic elements within industry strategy, which can be used to inform DOD strategy. Recommendations include developing a new strategy of cyberspace systems integration and utilizing observed measures of success, milestones and timelines, and specificity in industry practices that can decrease ambiguity identified in DOD cyberspace strategy., Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

In recent years, adversaries of the United States have become increasingly more adept at operating in the gray zone, which sits above normal statecraft and below armed conflict. In 2016, Russia used cyber-espionage and covert influence operations to sow discord among the American population and interfere in the democratic process of the U.S. presidential election. This attempt was but one part of a broader Russian gray zone strategy in which it uses non-military means to achieve its national objectives and gain influence while avoiding a powerful response from either the United States or NATO. In this sphere, non-democratic adversaries of the United States are at an advantage as they are often more agile and expeditious at integrating all elements of state power, especially economic power and informational warfare. This thesis draws on interviews with subject matter experts to explore how the United States can best deter these gray zone actions and strategies in the future. In doing so, it provides a strategic assessment of Russia as a state actor, U.S.–Russian relations, and Russia’s use of the gray zone. Additionally, it analyzes the transposition of deterrence to the sub-conventional level. Finally, it illustrates ways in which the United States can deter parts of Russia’s gray zone strategy. Overall, this research finds that it is difficult but possible to deter Russian gray zone conflict., http://archive.org/details/deterrenceinthed1094564844, Outstanding Thesis, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Cyber operations are constantly evolving as states discover new tactics to achieve strategic goals. Thus far, they have remained below the threshold for armed conflict by operating within the gray zone. Since 2008, Russia has demonstrated a preference for using cyber operations with the primary goal to weaken enemies of the state and achieve strategic objectives delineated in Russian grand strategy. This thesis examines the intersection between Russian cyber operations and grand strategy to weaken NATO. Russian grand strategy attempts to strengthen its position as a world power, in part, by utilizing cyber operations as a tool to destabilize adversaries. Specifically, their cyber operations fundamentally changed the way information is disseminated to sow discord in NATO societies, with the ultimate goal of sabotaging elections and democratic processes. Russian cyber operations also attempt to destabilize the security of NATO member states through cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. Russia’s advances to grow its power have put it on a path to directly challenge the regional power balance with itself, NATO, and other European states. Russia’s hegemonic goals and threat perceptions of NATO as a potential cyber target are critical developments to recognize and respond to present and future cyber operations. It is essential that NATO policymakers understand the ramifications of these cyber operations in order to preserve NATO security and stability., Ensign, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines the past impact United Nations Command (UNC) has had on South Korean security. With South Korea’s security environment facing significant changes today, including the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the push to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC is under debate over whether it has to remain in the peninsula. This thesis seeks to analyze the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s security on a comprehensive security concept to give insight into the debate. This thesis analyzes the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s security before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the UNC’s role was changed. This thesis insists that the UNC has had different effects on the comprehensive security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea’s military and economic security but had a somewhat negative impact on political and diplomatic security. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive impact on South Korea’s military security and has played a positive role in diplomatic security. Based on these findings, this thesis proposes that South Korea should have diplomatic initiative to resolve Korean Peninsula issues. This thesis also suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for concessions in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. Finally, this thesis suggests that the UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role.

This thesis explores three aspects of post–Cold War Japanese security policy development. First, what significant security policy changes have occurred between 1989 and 2020? Second, what were the underlying factors that created the observed policy outcome? Third, how durable do those factors appear to be in 2020 and beyond? This thesis concludes with an assessment of Japan's probable future security policy trajectory, based upon the answers to the three foregoing questions. In seeking to answer the above questions, this thesis draws four primary conclusions. First, that Japan has maintained a consistent, but limited, security policy trajectory toward militarization over the observed period from 1989–2020. Second, that the observed trajectory is being driven by an interaction between external factors (China threat, North Korea threat, U.S. force presence, and U.S. diplomacy) and internal factors (antiwar norms, suspicion of revisionists, single-party dominance, and prime minister preferences). Third, that the factors driving Japan’s security policy trajectory toward militarization are currently durable in both vector and degree, while the factors resisting further militarization are situationally malleable. Fourth, and finally, that Japan is likely to remain on a long-term trajectory toward further militarization, in which Japanese technological and legal capability for use of force will continue to expand.

This thesis analyzes the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) objectives, the technical evaluation of ASW assets, and the consequences of the ROKN acquisition of possible nuclear-powered submarines. It looks at the Northeast regional maritime security environment related to submarines and the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) security environment, the ROKN’s objectives, and comparisons of various ASW platforms. Then, the thesis analyzes these data to weigh possible options for the ROKN to enhance its capabilities to achieve its objectives. Also, it explores possible consequences of the ROKN’s nuclear-powered submarines acquisition with North Korea, China, and the United States. It concludes that the ROKN’s capabilities will increase to achieve its objectives through the acquisition, but the ROK will face obstacles and harsh consequences after the acquisition, which will arise between China and North Korea, and before the acquisition, which will arise between the United States, in nuclear-powered submarines acquisition., http://archive.org/details/roknsnuclearpowe1094564843, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In order for signaling to work on an adversary with a coercive purpose, one must convey to the adversary a strong capability and sufficient credibility. The reason deterrence worked in the Gulf War was that U.S. policymakers had a well-established and highly feared capability in hand, and establishing credibility was the primary concern in that scenario. However, cyber-based capabilities have not reached a potency to where they could coerce an adversary in and of themselves. The failure of the coalition to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait underscores the limits of compellence even when based on overwhelming conventional force; cyber capabilities are still not comparable to conventional forces in hurting power, which undermines their viability for coercion. Credibility is not an issue; the history of cyber conflict demonstrates that the only way nations establish capability is by the actual employment of capabilities against adversary targets, which solves the problem of credibility. Yet the most powerful cyber effects on critical infrastructure, such as those demonstrated in the Stuxnet attack, cannot permanently disarm an adversary and run the risk of escalation into a kinetic war. Research for this thesis indicates that signaling in cyberspace to an adversary for the intent of coercion is possible but unlikely to succeed while cyberweapons lack the capability to inflict sufficient harm on the adversary.

Over the past six decades, Washington has recognized that its own security is closely connected with that of its allies around the globe. As a part of this policy, U.S. leaders and policy makers have endeavored to protect South Korea by extending deterrence against North Korea. Despite its ongoing promises, U.S. security guarantees have occasionally shown signs of faltering credibility. Moreover, given North Korea’s evolving nuclear capability, the credibility of U.S. security commitments, especially those tailored to the Korean Peninsula, still remain uncertain in the minds of some South Koreans. This thesis explores South Koreans’ recent perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence since 2010, and examines two key factors—U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM capability—that might affect South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. The thesis then reveals the correlation between South Koreans’ perceptions and the two key factors. It argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, these two key factors do not significantly affect South Koreans’ confidence, and the impact of those two factors on South Koreans’ perceptions is not considerable. In fact, existing South Korean doubt about U.S. extended deterrence has been overestimated, and U.S. security guarantees have generally remained credible in South Korean eyes. Nonetheless, the U.S.-ROK alliance must continue to strive for the elimination of any lingering doubt about U.S. extended deterrence., http://archive.org/details/usnuclearstrateg1094561333, Major, Air Force, Korea, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

During the Cold War, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was heavily focused on defending Japan from a Soviet invasion and ensuring sea lines of communications (SLOC) were available for U.S. naval forces in the event of a major conflict. After the Cold War, the JMSDF had to adopt new missions based on the constantly changing threat environment. This thesis assesses how well the JMSDF responded to a variety of threats to Japan during each of the three decades since the end of the Cold War. The main chapters look at the threats Japan faced each decade and then how JMSDF equipment and policy changed as a result of the identified threats. The research suggests that the JMSDF usually falls in the middle of the spectrum and adequately meets defense requirements. It also shows that there were times where the JMSDF was not prepared or was over prepared, but adjustments were made to bring the JMSDF back to the middle ground., http://archive.org/details/japanesemaritime1094561383, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis set out to apply the moral principle of utilitarianism to the policy problem associated with zero-day vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be understood as errors in coding that are potentially exploitable and unknown to either the creators or users of the software. If attack vectors related to zero-day vulnerabilities are completely dependent upon correctable coding errors, what should policy require when the U.S. government detects a zero-day vulnerability? Should it be disclosed publicly so it can be patched or restrict knowledge of it so it can be weaponized? This thesis applied revisionist John Stuart Mill’s unique and nuanced description of utilitarianism to the Vulnerabilities and Equities Policy and Process (VEP) to evaluate what aspects of the policy fulfilled Mill’s moral code and what areas could be improved. The improvement recommendation is made on strictly moral terms. This thesis acknowledges while moral policy has undeniable benefits, there are times where the moral can come at the expense of the strategic, and national interests can be compromised. Ultimately, much like the VEP, this thesis recommends balance., http://archive.org/details/zerodaysoneoblig1094562227, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The malicious insider threat is one of the most nefarious of potential cyber security breaches. There have been egregious insider data thefts in the last 10 years within the government. The Unintentional Insider Threat (UIT)—the individual who is incompetent or careless and accidentally divulges sensitive information—is also a major concern. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) expends considerable effort to identify both forms of insider threats. Meanwhile, the DoD hopes to recruit innovative information technology personnel to better meet current and emerging cyber threats to national security. Although in its infancy, organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit represent this focused effort. This thesis investigates whether innovative personnel will pose increased insider threat potential. Our preliminary conclusion is that innovative people would not pose more of a malicious insider threat, but the UIT and innovator share one trait together: risk taking. Furthermore, mental health issues and disgruntlement are two traits shared by UIT and malicious insiders. The DoD should explore screening personnel for risk-taking traits, for example with the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Finally, the DoD should continue to be alert to mental health issues, and first line supervisors should intervene quickly to help disgruntled employees.