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Whether it is Egypt, Yemen, Iran or Iraq, when it comes to threats facing the House of Saud, the popular media has focused almost exclusively on external factors. Yet, the greatest threat facing the House of Saud is not one of foreign aggression but one of domestic opposition. This thesis contends that the House of Saud has maintained control of Saudi Arabia by relying on three distinct pillars (or power facilitators): first, aligning itself with a strong and reliable outside power, second, preventing opposition groups from gaining a significant following by controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia, and third, creating a rentier state making its citizens dependent on the government largesse. Furthermore, this thesis contends that the House of Saud will have increasing difficulties controlling its informal networks, and that its rentier policies are utterly flawed and unsustainable. The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize Saudi Arabia in order to determine the future viability of the House of Saud in light of the numerous political, social, religious and economic challenges that it now faces. The House of Saud is analyzed through the lens of omnibalancing which this thesis argues best describes the House of Saudâ s propensities., http://archive.org/details/omnibalancingndh109452462, US Navy (USN) author

This thesis examines the origins and consequences of U.S. security assistance in the Persian Gulf. I argue that the American policy of creating regional superpowers' in the Gulf has failed to adequately secure U.S. interests. It has had the unintended consequence of increasing instability. The failure of the twin pillars' policy - as the Nixon Doctrine became known in the Gulf - is evidenced by the fall of one pillar (the Shah's Iran), serious domestic troubles in the second pillar (Saudi Arabia), and, most important, the advent of a large, continuous and direct U.S. military presence in the Gulf. Such a U.S. presence is what the policy was designed to prevent. Further, I offer an original interpretation of the origins of the Nixon Doctrine. Only tangentially related to Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was centrally concerned with the Gulf, and in particular with providing securityresources to Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard U.S. interests. The doctrine was driven as much by domestic political pressures as it was by geostrategic concerns. In order to implement the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. privately advocated raising international oil prices in the early l970s in order to allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to purchase advanced weapons systems, http://archive.org/details/securityssistanc109458949, Major, United State's Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis argues that pragmatic, neorealist interests-reducing Iran's international isolation, opening avenues for economic cooperation and commercial exchange, restoring religious and cultural links, and safeguarding the mutually advantageous relationships with influential powers in the region- are the true foundations of Iranian national security and foreign policy decisionmaking. Iran's imperative has been-and still is-focused on the pragmatic national security interests of the nation-state model vice the ideological potential for spreading its brand of Islamic revolution abroad. The causes of these Islamic revolutionary groups, no matter how noble in the Iranian leaderships' eye, do not outweigh the more classic nation-state decisionmaking process that the Iranian government undergoes when it determines the best course of action on an issue of foreign policy and/or national security) realpolitik. It is the neorealist approach which always wins out in national security matters of a state. Presented are four case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and four Persian Gulf States (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). What each reveals is an Islamic Iran's whose policy decisions and actions compelled by the rational, state model of neorealism and not ideology, http://archive.org/details/nationalsecurity109457744, Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis contends that the Central Asian states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the Caucasian state of Azerbaijan will continue to be developed through the Middle East because of the ethnic, religious, cultural, and historical ties each republic holds with the region. Despite the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will still seek foreign aid from the Middle East while attempting to mitigate the influence of foreign powers in their internal affairs. Because of growing US interests in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area, the US will seek to be become engaged and to expand its influence in the region through its Middle East ally, Turkey. Growing US and Turkish influence will come at the expense of the former regional hegemon, Russia, and the historic Middle East power, Iran. This complex interaction between old and new powers has the potential of leading to conflict. An understanding of this complex relationship is important to any country that has an interest in the., http://archive.org/details/thedevelopmentof10945980

The study of revolution is a very popular and intriguing realm of social science. Iran has been undergoing a persistent state of upheaval since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Previous study on revolutions by scholars like Theodore Gurr, Theda Skocpol, and Jack Goldstone, suggest that within the context of a revolution, the final results are never readily apparent because people rebel against the status quo and destroy associated institutions whether or not they had a positive influence. The passage of time, leads to a pendulum shift from one extreme towards moderation. Iran went from a pro-western secular stance to an anti-western theocracy; therefore the question arises whether Iran is ripe for a new revolution that may bring about a healthier equilibrium? Using the framework set by Theodore Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel, this work is attempts to analyze how Relative Deprivation has affected Iran. This method of measuring discontent will be used to see how the opposition stands up to the status quo in order to determine how the latter will end thus restoring the equilibrium, which has been proven throughout history and is elaborated upon by the abovementioned scholars of revolutionary movements and social upheaval., http://archive.org/details/isirripefornewre109456289, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia from a theoretical and practical view. It investigates how U.S. policies towards specific countries in the region have affected the region as a whole. Specifically, three case studies are used to explore the geopolitical implications of pipeline politics in Kazakstan, Azerbaljan, and Turkmenistan. This study concludes with specific options and recommendations for U.S. foreign policy makers to enhance and enlarge U.S. influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, http://archive.org/details/usforeignpolicyi109459117, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Iran's rearmament program has invited an array of interpretations of its current military capability to close or interdict the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) . The fighting in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), drove Iran's military forces down to minimal levels of equipment while increasing institutional disorganization. Air and ground assets ended the war in the poorest condition. Iran chose to rearm these forces first. However, in 1992, the focus widened to include the rebuilding of the Navy and those military assets physically near the Strait of Hormuz. This enlarged emphasis expanded Iranian military capacity to again challenge shipping transiting the SOH. With its new naval acquisitions, Iran is an increased threat to the interests of its neighbors and the West, particularly the United States. Now, the ultimate challenge for decisionmakers and strategic planners alike lies in accurately assessing the ability of Iranian forces to attempt to and, if possible, keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, http://archive.org/details/iranndstraitofho109458585, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Over 20 years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the actors have changed, but the political institution and structure remains nearly identical. There is no genuine hegemonic consensus in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); basically, the same political tensions that contributed to the revolution are prevalent today. The only drastic difference is the shift in anger from the majority of the population demanding democratic reforms from the West to the ruling clerics. Similarly, state structure, political, and socioeconomic policies from 1979 to the present have been consequential in producing an ideological conflict between the ruling clerics who seek power and authority and the reformists who seek to implement policy reforms. The outcome of this political dilemma will dictate domestic politics as well as foreign policy in Iran. This thesis argues that pressure on Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics comes from the need to reconcile international concerns of Iranian interests with domestic concerns of Shi'i Islam and revolutionary ideology, which limits the policy options available to the Iranian government. This thesis examines the ideological struggle for control within the ruling elite and the decisive constraints it places on the range of economic and political options available to the ruling ulama., http://archive.org/details/politicaltransit109455900, Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The study of revolution is a very popular and intriguing realm of social science. Iran has been undergoing a persistent state of upheaval since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Previous study on revolutions by scholars like Theodore Gurr, Theda Skocpol, and Jack Goldstone, suggest that within the context of a revolution, the final results are never readily apparent because people rebel against the status quo and destroy associated institutions whether or not they had a positive influence. The passage of time, leads to a pendulum shift from one extreme towards moderation. Iran went from a pro-western secular stance to an anti-western theocracy; therefore the question arises whether Iran is ripe for a new revolution that may bring about a healthier equilibrium? Using the framework set by Theodore Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel, this work is attempts to analyze how Relative Deprivation has affected Iran. This method of measuring discontent will be used to see how the opposition stands up to the status quo in order to determine how the latter will end thus restoring the equilibrium, which has been proven throughout history and is elaborated upon by the abovementioned scholars of revolutionary movements and social upheaval.

Over 20 years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the actors have changed, but the political institution and structure remains nearly identical. There is no genuine hegemonic consensus in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); basically, the same political tensions that contributed to the revolution are prevalent today. The only drastic difference is the shift in anger from the majority of the population demanding democratic reforms from the West to the ruling clerics. Similarly, state structure, political, and socioeconomic policies from 1979 to the present have been consequential in producing an ideological conflict between the ruling clerics who seek power and authority and the reformists who seek to implement policy reforms. The outcome of this political dilemma will dictate domestic politics as well as foreign policy in Iran. This thesis argues that pressure on Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics comes from the need to reconcile international concerns of Iranian interests with domestic concerns of Shi'i Islam and revolutionary ideology, which limits the policy options available to the Iranian government. This thesis examines the ideological struggle for control within the ruling elite and the decisive constraints it places on the range of economic and political options available to the ruling ulama.

In the course of the past twenty years, Iran has undergone profound social and demographic transformations. These changes have sharply altered the nation's social structure, and have produced a population that is increasingly youthful, literate, urbanized, politically conscious, and even globalized. In light of these developments, it is not surprising that Iran's population has, whenever it has been given an opportunity to do so, responded in an overwhelmingly positive fashion to the reform movement's promises of socio-political liberalization and democratization. Internal weaknesses within the reformist movement and, more importantly, fierce resistance and opposition from the so-called conservative camp, however, have up to now impeded the reformers from implementing their agenda. Their standards of living declining and their expectations remaining unfulfilled, Iranians have become increasingly dissatisfied and despondent, losing faith in the ability of the reformers to change meaningfully the nature of the Islamic Republic. The fundamental transformations in the nature of Iran's society, combined with the de-legitimization of the system, are gradually but inexorably eroding the foundations of the Islamic Republic. As a result, the stage is being set for a political transition that will alter Iran's formal arrangement of power, and will turn the country into more of a secular (though not necessarily democratic) republic. This document examines whether this transition will take place through peaceful and incremental or sudden and violent means.

Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only reconciling their diplomatic differences, but are also cooperating in numerous areas including oil, trade, and domestic security. Given their differences, what forces are lessening tensions and motivating them to pursue this new detente? More importantly, what are the implications of this new relationship? Shifting political sands in Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 90s, the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy, and the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords are bringing the two rivals together. It is, however, Saudi Arabia and Iran's dire economic conditions, worsened by the 1998-99 oil price collapse, that forces them to cooperate. The main vehicle for Saudi-Iranian cooperation is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The Saudi-Iranian detente holds vast implications for oil and stability in the region. Their cooperation ensures higher oil prices, which adversely affect the world economy. These higher prices, however, salvage both countries' economies, improving their domestic stability. The reemergence of Iran onto the Gulf political landscape also serves to lessen tensions in the region. The resulting improvement in inter-Gulf relations creates possibilities for establishing a stable regional security framework that may affect the United States' role in the region.

This study examines the relationship between Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Islamic opposition movements in the neighboring Central Asian republics. Despite alarming rhetoric to the contrary from Central Asian political leaders, Taliban ideology is unlikely to spread beyond Afghanistan's borders. The Taliban are an idiosyncratic phenomenon whose anachronistic ideology and violent behavior are more attributable to an obscure tribal code and the sociological repercussions of warfare than to any conventional expression of Islam. Islamic culture in the Central Asian republics was somewhat secularized by 70 years of Soviet domination. The small but growing Islamic opposition is attributable not to the appeal of Taliban-style fundamentalism, but to distinctly domestic factors such as political oppression and economic stagnation. Central Asia's authoritarian regimes are essentially causing the Islamic insurgency they seek to suppress; the Taliban are only significant to the extent that Afghanistan's instability exacerbates ongoing economic and political problems throughout the region. These findings have significant policy implications for the United States and other interested powers, which must deal more urgently with Afghanistan's instability, and should augment military support to Central Asian governments with an equal or greater emphasis on political and economic reform.

For the last two decades, the United States and Iran have fostered a relationship of enmity and distrust. The United States imposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic, in an effort to isolate the regime and limit its ability to finance terrorist acti~ity or to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Since 1996, however, Iran has undertaken a diplomatic "charm offensive" aimed at opening up to regional rivals and to the international community. It has sent some signals that it seeks to distance itself from terrorism and from antagonistic relations with its neighbors. Its burgeoning relations with Europe has left America alone in its implementation of sanctions, and has put Washington at odds with its European partners. This thesis looks more closely at the nature of U.S. policy against Iran, examining key issues with regard to its conventional and unconventional security posture, the regional security environment that defines that posture, and the linkage between Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its sponsorship of extremist organizations such as Hizballah. It argues that Iran has legitimate security concerns that drive its current foreign policy. In this context, there may be room for rapprochement with Tehran.

This thesis contends that the Central Asian states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the Caucasian state of Azerbaijan will continue to be developed through the Middle East because of the ethnic, religious, cultural, and historical ties each republic holds with the region. Despite the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will still seek foreign aid from the Middle East while attempting to mitigate the influence of foreign powers in their internal affairs. Because of growing US interests in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area, the US will seek to be become engaged and to expand its influence in the region through its Middle East ally, Turkey. Growing US and Turkish influence will come at the expense of the former regional hegemon, Russia, and the historic Middle East power, Iran. This complex interaction between old and new powers has the potential of leading to conflict. An understanding of this complex relationship is important to any country that has an interest in the.

Over the years Bonn and Berlin's policy and decision-makers adopted a pragmatic multilateral attitude that serves Germany's interests best. Today, Germany executes the concept of a civilian power. Supranationalism and institutional cooperation, followed by integration are the key ideas to formulate and represent power and national interests. As one of the largest industrial and trading nations, Germany is dependent upon a stable and well-functioning economic system that is committed to free trade relying largely on imported raw materials and energy - i.e., low-cost oil from the Middle East. In this context, German politics has an interesting and unique position. Germany's policy in the Middle East is somewhat ambiguous. The Federal Republic's dependency on oil inclines Germany toward the Arab states. The second factor is the historical moral burden bequeathed by the Third Reich that tends to tilt German diplomacy toward Israel. Germany's dilemma is its polarized Middle Eastern policy; German leadership carefully maintains a political neutral position keeping the country's economic interests in mind, along with considerations of an evenhanded approach toward the Middle East.

Whether it is Egypt, Yemen, Iran or Iraq, when it comes to threats facing the House of Saud, the popular media has focused almost exclusively on external factors. Yet, the greatest threat facing the House of Saud is not one of foreign aggression but one of domestic opposition. This thesis contends that the House of Saud has maintained control of Saudi Arabia by relying on three distinct pillars (or power facilitators): first, aligning itself with a strong and reliable outside power, second, preventing opposition groups from gaining a significant following by controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia, and third, creating a rentier state making its citizens dependent on the government largesse. Furthermore, this thesis contends that the House of Saud will have increasing difficulties controlling its informal networks, and that its rentier policies are utterly flawed and unsustainable. The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize Saudi Arabia in order to determine the future viability of the House of Saud in light of the numerous political, social, religious and economic challenges that it now faces. The House of Saud is analyzed through the lens of omnibalancing which this thesis argues best describes the House of Saudâ s propensities.

This thesis argues that pragmatic, neorealist interests-reducing Iran's international isolation, opening avenues for economic cooperation and commercial exchange, restoring religious and cultural links, and safeguarding the mutually advantageous relationships with influential powers in the region- are the true foundations of Iranian national security and foreign policy decisionmaking. Iran's imperative has been-and still is-focused on the pragmatic national security interests of the nation-state model vice the ideological potential for spreading its brand of Islamic revolution abroad. The causes of these Islamic revolutionary groups, no matter how noble in the Iranian leaderships' eye, do not outweigh the more classic nation-state decisionmaking process that the Iranian government undergoes when it determines the best course of action on an issue of foreign policy and/or national security) realpolitik. It is the neorealist approach which always wins out in national security matters of a state. Presented are four case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and four Persian Gulf States (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). What each reveals is an Islamic Iran's whose policy decisions and actions compelled by the rational, state model of neorealism and not ideology

Since 1963 Turkey has been struggling to join the European Union (EU) . Despite strong Turkish aspirations, it appears unlikely that Turkey will be accepted as an EU member in the near future due to Turkey's shortcomings in its political, economic and social structure. Applications submitted prior to December 1999, were rejected by the EU Commission on the basis of poor democracy, human rights abuses, restrictions on political and cultural rights, a high level of influence of the Turkish military in political affairs, weak economy, and disputes with Greece and the Cyprus problem. The EU has certain criteria for membership: a functioning democracy, respect for rule of law, protection of minority and human rights, functioning market economy and settlement of disputes with other member states prior to accession. Turkey is seeking an immediate EU membership to improve economy and democratization, and take an undisputable place inside the European order and civilization. To this end, Turkey has to adopt the necessary reforms and regulations that will help strengthen democracy, economy and social and cultural rights in Turkey. However, Turkey's present domestic infrastructure does not provide a suitable situation to commence key radical political reforms in the immediate future.

The Turkish officer corps has developed into a professional body of personnel with a high degree of autonomy. Turkey's participation in NATO and the U.S. military assistance it received over the course of almost fifty years are key contributing factors to the modernization of the force. However, contrary to Samuel P. Huntington's proposition that maximizing military professionalism leads to objective civilian control of the military, the Turkish officer corps is not under civilian control and continues to play a major role in domestic politics. The reason why the military is not under civilian control is that its definition of military professionalism differs from hat normally attributed to Western militaries. The officer corps regards itself as the guardian of the ideology of Kemalism, named after Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. Rather than focusing exclusively on national defense, military officers are indoctrinated in and become occupied with the preservation of Kemalism against internal threats such as political Islam and Kurdish separatism.

Iranian foreign policy, like any state's foreign policy, is the product of various pressures originating in domestic, international, cultural, historical, institutional, and even individual factors. However, the greatest amount of understanding and potential for prediction can be obtained using the historical institutional method, focusing on Iran's history of foreign domination, the role of Twelve Shia Islam, and the particular institutions of the Islamic Republic. These three factors both drive and constrain foreign policy decisions in every case. They can be used to understand the prospect for rapprochement between the United States and Iran in the present circumstances, as well as guide future U.S.-Iranian relations. As a major producer of oil and natural gas, Iran's foreign policy is relevant to U.S. interests. Furthermore, Iran's location as the bridge between the Middle East and Central and South Asia, as well as its long Persian Gulf coastline make it a strategic state. Lastly, Iran's foreign policies have a dramatic impact on U.S. interests such as Israel, stability in the Persian Gulf region, and access to Central Asian resources.

This thesis examines the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia from a theoretical and practical view. It investigates how U.S. policies towards specific countries in the region have affected the region as a whole. Specifically, three case studies are used to explore the geopolitical implications of pipeline politics in Kazakstan, Azerbaljan, and Turkmenistan. This study concludes with specific options and recommendations for U.S. foreign policy makers to enhance and enlarge U.S. influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia

This thesis examines the origins and consequences of U.S. security assistance in the Persian Gulf. I argue that the American policy of creating regional superpowers' in the Gulf has failed to adequately secure U.S. interests. It has had the unintended consequence of increasing instability. The failure of the twin pillars' policy - as the Nixon Doctrine became known in the Gulf - is evidenced by the fall of one pillar (the Shah's Iran), serious domestic troubles in the second pillar (Saudi Arabia), and, most important, the advent of a large, continuous and direct U.S. military presence in the Gulf. Such a U.S. presence is what the policy was designed to prevent. Further, I offer an original interpretation of the origins of the Nixon Doctrine. Only tangentially related to Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was centrally concerned with the Gulf, and in particular with providing securityresources to Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard U.S. interests. The doctrine was driven as much by domestic political pressures as it was by geostrategic concerns. In order to implement the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. privately advocated raising international oil prices in the early l970s in order to allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to purchase advanced weapons systems

Over the years Bonn and Berlin's policy and decision-makers adopted a pragmatic multilateral attitude that serves Germany's interests best. Today, Germany executes the concept of a civilian power. Supranationalism and institutional cooperation, followed by integration are the key ideas to formulate and represent power and national interests. As one of the largest industrial and trading nations, Germany is dependent upon a stable and well-functioning economic system that is committed to free trade relying largely on imported raw materials and energy - i.e., low-cost oil from the Middle East. In this context, German politics has an interesting and unique position. Germany's policy in the Middle East is somewhat ambiguous. The Federal Republic's dependency on oil inclines Germany toward the Arab states. The second factor is the historical moral burden bequeathed by the Third Reich that tends to tilt German diplomacy toward Israel. Germany's dilemma is its polarized Middle Eastern policy; German leadership carefully maintains a political neutral position keeping the country's economic interests in mind, along with considerations of an evenhanded approach toward the Middle East., http://archive.org/details/germanysinterest1094510998

For the last two decades, the United States and Iran have fostered a relationship of enmity and distrust. The United States imposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic, in an effort to isolate the regime and limit its ability to finance terrorist acti~ity or to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Since 1996, however, Iran has undertaken a diplomatic "charm offensive" aimed at opening up to regional rivals and to the international community. It has sent some signals that it seeks to distance itself from terrorism and from antagonistic relations with its neighbors. Its burgeoning relations with Europe has left America alone in its implementation of sanctions, and has put Washington at odds with its European partners. This thesis looks more closely at the nature of U.S. policy against Iran, examining key issues with regard to its conventional and unconventional security posture, the regional security environment that defines that posture, and the linkage between Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its sponsorship of extremist organizations such as Hizballah. It argues that Iran has legitimate security concerns that drive its current foreign policy. In this context, there may be room for rapprochement with Tehran., http://archive.org/details/usiranirelations1094544380, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only reconciling their diplomatic differences, but are also cooperating in numerous areas including oil, trade, and domestic security. Given their differences, what forces are lessening tensions and motivating them to pursue this new detente? More importantly, what are the implications of this new relationship? Shifting political sands in Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 90s, the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy, and the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords are bringing the two rivals together. It is, however, Saudi Arabia and Iran's dire economic conditions, worsened by the 1998-99 oil price collapse, that forces them to cooperate. The main vehicle for Saudi-Iranian cooperation is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The Saudi-Iranian detente holds vast implications for oil and stability in the region. Their cooperation ensures higher oil prices, which adversely affect the world economy. These higher prices, however, salvage both countries' economies, improving their domestic stability. The reemergence of Iran onto the Gulf political landscape also serves to lessen tensions in the region. The resulting improvement in inter-Gulf relations creates possibilities for establishing a stable regional security framework that may affect the United States' role in the region., http://archive.org/details/endofislamiccold1094511009

Since 1963 Turkey has been struggling to join the European Union (EU) . Despite strong Turkish aspirations, it appears unlikely that Turkey will be accepted as an EU member in the near future due to Turkey's shortcomings in its political, economic and social structure. Applications submitted prior to December 1999, were rejected by the EU Commission on the basis of poor democracy, human rights abuses, restrictions on political and cultural rights, a high level of influence of the Turkish military in political affairs, weak economy, and disputes with Greece and the Cyprus problem. The EU has certain criteria for membership: a functioning democracy, respect for rule of law, protection of minority and human rights, functioning market economy and settlement of disputes with other member states prior to accession. Turkey is seeking an immediate EU membership to improve economy and democratization, and take an undisputable place inside the European order and civilization. To this end, Turkey has to adopt the necessary reforms and regulations that will help strengthen democracy, economy and social and cultural rights in Turkey. However, Turkey's present domestic infrastructure does not provide a suitable situation to commence key radical political reforms in the immediate future., http://archive.org/details/turkeyeuropeunio109457815, Lieutenant, Turkish Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This study examines the relationship between Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Islamic opposition movements in the neighboring Central Asian republics. Despite alarming rhetoric to the contrary from Central Asian political leaders, Taliban ideology is unlikely to spread beyond Afghanistan's borders. The Taliban are an idiosyncratic phenomenon whose anachronistic ideology and violent behavior are more attributable to an obscure tribal code and the sociological repercussions of warfare than to any conventional expression of Islam. Islamic culture in the Central Asian republics was somewhat secularized by 70 years of Soviet domination. The small but growing Islamic opposition is attributable not to the appeal of Taliban-style fundamentalism, but to distinctly domestic factors such as political oppression and economic stagnation. Central Asia's authoritarian regimes are essentially causing the Islamic insurgency they seek to suppress; the Taliban are only significant to the extent that Afghanistan's instability exacerbates ongoing economic and political problems throughout the region. These findings have significant policy implications for the United States and other interested powers, which must deal more urgently with Afghanistan's instability, and should augment military support to Central Asian governments with an equal or greater emphasis on political and economic reform., http://archive.org/details/thetalibanndisla1094510944

The Turkish officer corps has developed into a professional body of personnel with a high degree of autonomy. Turkey's participation in NATO and the U.S. military assistance it received over the course of almost fifty years are key contributing factors to the modernization of the force. However, contrary to Samuel P. Huntington's proposition that maximizing military professionalism leads to objective civilian control of the military, the Turkish officer corps is not under civilian control and continues to play a major role in domestic politics. The reason why the military is not under civilian control is that its definition of military professionalism differs from hat normally attributed to Western militaries. The officer corps regards itself as the guardian of the ideology of Kemalism, named after Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. Rather than focusing exclusively on national defense, military officers are indoctrinated in and become occupied with the preservation of Kemalism against internal threats such as political Islam and Kurdish separatism., http://archive.org/details/professionalismi109459422, U.S. Army (USA) author, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Iranian foreign policy, like any state's foreign policy, is the product of various pressures originating in domestic, international, cultural, historical, institutional, and even individual factors. However, the greatest amount of understanding and potential for prediction can be obtained using the historical institutional method, focusing on Iran's history of foreign domination, the role of Twelve Shia Islam, and the particular institutions of the Islamic Republic. These three factors both drive and constrain foreign policy decisions in every case. They can be used to understand the prospect for rapprochement between the United States and Iran in the present circumstances, as well as guide future U.S.-Iranian relations. As a major producer of oil and natural gas, Iran's foreign policy is relevant to U.S. interests. Furthermore, Iran's location as the bridge between the Middle East and Central and South Asia, as well as its long Persian Gulf coastline make it a strategic state. Lastly, Iran's foreign policies have a dramatic impact on U.S. interests such as Israel, stability in the Persian Gulf region, and access to Central Asian resources., http://archive.org/details/therootofiranifo1094513701, U.S. Air Force (U.S.A.F.) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.