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Perm Krai and the socio-political processes taking place in it are in many ways typical of Russia, and therefore of interest to a wide audience of researchers and political analysts. Based on the theoretical constructions of international elites studies and the Perm School of Political Science and elitology, we study the political and business elites of the region, their political behavior, aspects of identity, as well as the most politically sensitive topics in the life of the region. Relying primarily on the literature analysis and subsequent own semi-standardized in-depth interviews (N10) with representatives of regional elites - the following results were obtained. The identity of the elites and everymen in Perm region is somewhat vague, associated with the neutral notion of geographical region of the Kama region. Liberalism in the economic sphere and a relatively stable inter-elite consensus in the political sphere, based on technocracy, are characteristic of the region’s policy for some decades. The region is characterized by a low socio-political dynamics compared to the benchmark regions of the Urals and Siberia, due to lack of regionally oriented elites and businesses and the predominance of various kinds of “Varangians” in the political class. The socio-political and cultural landscape of the region (the Perm Cultural Project) becomes a starting place and a source of supplies for the elites, receiving back very little. Thus, the region remains a promising project that cannot be realized in any way.

Prices of natural gas, coal, and electricity have risen to the highest level of the last ten years in the last quarter of 2021. It's possible to express that energy prices in 2021 were much higher, compared to the crisis of 2020's Covid-19 breakout's historical descent in the first few months. There are a few factors to this rally. The epidemic caused structural fractions on a global scale. But in general, there is no doubt that crisis factors, which mainly concern Europe, are not limited (with) recovery process in the economy. With this notion, the main structure of this work's subject aims to analyze the lead-up to the energy crisis that became apparent in 2021. Also, in the work, the energy crisis that's been occurring will be analyzed thoroughly, with the help of its dynamics and causes. Within the scope of the study, the Hatemi-J (2012) asymmetric causality test was run using the weekly stock closing data of EU natural gas prices (EUGP), Gazprom (XGASPR), and Equinor (XEQUNR) for the period 05.11.2017-28.11.2021. As a result of the analysis, a causal relationship between the variables was determined. However, the work will positively contribute to the literature, being a guide to the current situations and overcoming the similar crisis that might occur in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012-18 Gazprom case, using a global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient to counterbalance Gazprom's strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. 'Swap deals' created by the decision facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom's potential market power. Such deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom's commitments expire by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, market design for gas transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early September 2021, the construction of the Northern stream – 2 рroject (NS-2) was completed. Its operator, Nord Stream 2 AG, has submitted documents for certification of the gas pipeline. The Federal Network Agency of Germany (BNetzA) is responsible for this process, which refused to grant the SP-2 operator an independent status. In November 2021, the German regulator agreed with him on the need to create a subsidiary in the Federal Republic of Germany. It must meet the requirements of German legislation and the Third Energy Package of the European Union. Contrary to the optimistic forecasts of experts and the expectations of Gazprom, the start of commercial operation of the project was postponed to 2022. BNetzA’s decision coincided with the adoption of the next US sanctions against the SP-2 participants and the creation of a new government coalition in Germany. Opponents of the project from the Union 90 / Greens party entered the new cabinet of ministers. The SP-2 is not mentioned in the coalition agreement that defines the future relations of Germany with the Russian Federation. The author, based on the analysis of original sources, examines the reasons for the delay in project certification; its role and place in the strategy of the new German cabinet of ministers; assesses the prospects for the start of commercial operation of the NS-2 in the context of continued opposition from Poland and Ukraine, as well as American sanctions mechanisms and confrontation in this matter from the US Congress and the President.

In tune with rapidly increasing environmental awareness, terms like sustainability and eco-friendly frequently occur and are exploited in discourse domains from supermarket advertising to corporate communication. In contrast to these discursive simulations of concern, Greenpeace (GP) activists have consistently used peaceful protests as a means to protect our planet. GP’s campaigns are designed to raise questions, to make people rethink the way they live and (ab)use the Earth’s environment, and, ultimately, to engage volunteers and raise funds. In a different vein, Gazprom (GZM) also attempts to advertise its corporate image and its mission to distribute gas through powerful technology, connecting entire continents through a grid of pipelines and ships, ‘energising’ anything from industrial plants to gas stoves in apartments and small cottages. The aim of this study is to analyse aspects of both GZM’s and GP’s modes of advertising their goals, particularly the multi-layered composition of their online videos, using a multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis approach from an ecolinguistic perspective. Both GZM and GP exemplify a tendency to“promotionalisation,” sharing the same codes and rhetoric strategies in a variety of advertising campaigns. Unpredictably enough, both utilise ‘green speaking’ multimodally. The implications of these striking similarities are discussed.

The aim of the article is to outline the prospects for the Russian natural gas market in the future and to present the Russian gas sector in comparison with the strategic “players” of the global market. The author examines the issues related to the production, transmission and sale of Russian natural gas. The main problem concerns the possibilities and limitations, that influence the power of the Russian “blue fuel” sector. The article presents briefly the results of the research, which were obtained mainly through the method of case study. The verification of the main hypothesis will be made from the top–down perspective, considering analysis of the actions of state decision-making centres. Less explicit impact, including the interaction of non-public actors (such as economic items), will be skipped, because their more precise consideration would provide to the interesting, but different direction of analysis of the sectoral groups of interest.

INTRODUCTION. The article examines the extent to which the Union’s internal market can be said to have been externalised, given the extraterritorial implications of the Union’s internal energy market rules and regulations. In this respect, the article investigates the exercise and control of EU regulatory power beyond EU borders by examining the crossborder reach of the Union’s regulatory power beyond its boundaries given its implications for Gazprom and Russia’s interests on the European market. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article pursues a doctrinal approach to the research methodology which includes the internal dimension of the Union’s energy policy and the extent to which the Union’s internal market regulation has been externalised and imposed on its external energy relations with Russia – this includes a detailed analysis of: (i) the Third Energy Package (TEP)’s ownership unbundling rules; (ii) the Third Country Clause; and (iii) the Union’s Competition law (given the recent decision of the EU Competition investigation of Gazprom’s sales in Central and Eastern Europe). RESEARCH RESULTS. A fundamental aspect of the EU’s rule-based market approach, is the perception that a fully liberalised and competitive EU market can facilitate energy security by way of enhancing diversification of suppliers. As such, the TEPs’ ownership unbundling; the Third Country Clause; and the EU’s Competition law have become significant mechanisms in the Union’s toolbox of instruments to further its rule- based approach and market-based agenda for the purpose of ensuring European energy security. The article illustrates the Union’s sectoral application of the acquis beyond its borders in its efforts to export its liberalization model and Europeanise its energy corridors in pursuit of European security of energy supply. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The article reveals a fascinating dimension to the Union’s role as a global actor by analysing the Union’s normative agenda which it pursues through the export of its acquis and rule-based market approach which it imposes on third countries and its strategic energy partner, Russia. In undertaking this analysis, the article shows that the EU’s efforts to reform Russia’s energy markets through its liberalization movement and European model, suggest an external dimension to its internal market rules given the implications for Russia and Gazprom.

This paper presents and has predicted events after 11 years since the last European gas crisis. The aim of the work is the projection and events taking place and that is indicating the possibility of facing Europe with shortages or with less supply of this strategically important energy source that could lead to natural-gas reductions and influence the prices of this energy-generating product and therefore to the economy of Europe and the world. The countries of Europe actively implement measures to reduce the risk of short-ages of gas as an energy source. The annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the complex relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the European Union and sanctions to Russia, the state of interdependence for distribution and continuous disputes are operatively specific individual factors in this paper. The risk of shortage or less gas supply is threatened if Gazprom halts delivery to Naftogaz (Ukraine), and the basis of the forecast is the expiration of the ten-year gas supply and distribution agreement that ends on December 31, 2019. Negotiations on a new contract are being carried out with the mediator -the European Commission. Gazprom diversifies distribution by construction and completion of North Stream 2 in the North of Europe and the Turkish stream in the south of Europe. The research methods used by the author are: with the methods of analysis and synthesis of the observed processes and phenomena in connection with the wider problems that occur in the region the aim is to use the proven hypotheses from the personal doctoral dissertation, the usual statistical methods, the abstraction and concretization method and the description of all relevant events. The result of the research can be the basis for a great knowledge in this area, contributing to the understanding of the gas industry as well as its further development and strategy in the region. The conclusion is that the diversification of gas supply is necessary for the integrity and security of the European Union and for the further development and growth of the GDP.

Doğal gaz ve elektrik enerjisinin iletim hatlarından transit geçişine yönelik hukuki rejimlerin kurulması, ilgili devletler nezdinde enerji tedariğinin güvenliği ve rekabetçi enerji piyasalarının kurulması açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Uluslararası hukuk nezdinde enerji transitinin bir çözüme kavuşturulamamış olması, uluslararası hukukun temel aktörleri devletlerin ikili ve çoklu anlaşmalar yoluyla bu soruna eğilmesi neticesini doğurmuş olsa da, bu tür alternatif yolların, uyuşmazlıkların giderilmesi konusundaki başarısızlıkları, tecrübe edilen uluslararası krizler bağlamında açık bir şekilde görünmektedir. 1994 Enerji Şartı Anlaşması, özellikle enerji transitine yönelik olarak bünyesinde bulundurduğu 7. Madde uyarısınca, bu tür sorunların uluslararası boyutta ilk olarak ele alındığı bir hukuki rejim ön görmüştür. Fakat 2000’li yıllarda ard arda gerçekleşen enerji krizleri ve enerji şartının bu krizlerin önüne geçme konusundaki başarısızlığı, akademik camiada ve üye devletler nezdinde Şartın etkinliği ve gerekliliği konusunda çok ciddi eleştirilerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. İş bu çalışma, bu eleştirilerin ortaya çıkmasının nedenleri ve Enerji Şartının enerji alanında ortaya çıkan uyuşmazlıklara ilişkin önceliklerini YUKOS davası ve 2009 doğal gaz krizi nezdinde detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir.

The implementation of the Nord Stream-2 project (from the point of view of Russia, it contributes to the strengthening of domestic and European energy security) is threatened. Poland and some other EU countries are its strong opponents. The USA (in accordance with the CAATSA law of August 2, 2017) promises to do everything to prevent the implementation of the project. The American administration threatens the European companies involved in the project with extraterritorial sanctions. The main arguments: Nord Stream-2 poses a threat to the energy sovereignty of Europe and Ukraine. The article analyzes the main advantages of the project, the chances and risks, as well as the prospects for its implementation.

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The continuous increase of gas prices in Moldova, and the current inability to deter this rise, has become a problem that greatly affects consumers increasingly weakens the country's vulnerable economy. Every price increase is seen in careful terms by the consumer as a dispute between the demand and the regulator, which gets exaggerated attention whereas the possibility to limit the final price are very limited. The effects are each time the same, so are the causes the essentially generate the chain price increase. At the same time, the directions where the efforts should be focused to mitigate the consequences brought about by higher natural gas tariffs are superficially explored. Given that Moldova is dependent on imported energy products, which are monopolized by natural gas purchased from a single gas provider, the need to take real action to redress the situation is imperative.

The paper seeks to develop an analysis of the South Stream project in view of the Ukrainian crisis. We cannot put aside the internal factor as Ukraine is facing serious internal issues such as corruption and instability, therefore Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can not be simply ignored in this pipeline project. The article uses mostly facts that happened throughout last years, as well as for and against declarations in the case of the South Stream project and its mother Russia. When we hear about South Stream, we think of Russia and since 2007, this pipeline has encouraged Putin’s faith in energy superpower. A good point to start with was to gather all declarations since then and cover all actions that regard the South Stream game. In Russian foreign policy for the South Stream race, Soft Power was used more than enough and it has recently made room for Hard Power, which is the Ukraine never ending episode. Insights of the South Stream story have been lately related both softly and hardly, this is the reason why I have chosen to analyse both sides in order to complete the energy landscape.

This article analyses the economical interests of Qatar’s Middle East policy. «Arab Spring» has brought to Qatar substantial dividends, which have allowed the world media to see in this country of a new regional leader. Further development of the Qatar’s economy is largely dependents on the development of the situation in the countries that have experienced the revolutions.

Corporate governance has been well known in the last two decades for making the attraction of investors its main objective. During communism, corporate governance was absent from economical life and thus quick steps were taken by former communist countries to adopt corporate governance, Romania and the Russian Federation are two countries that realized the strategy. Eventually after the collapse of the communist bloc both countries have moved in different directions based on internal and external factors. Romania has moved toward the European Union Model, while Russia experimented with building a different model by borrowing parts from Western values and at the same time using traditional values. These perspectives are clearly differentiated in Romanian Petrom OMV and Russia’s Gazprom.

O contexto geopolítico contemporâneo vive uma fase de profunda mutação. Novos países questionam profundamente a configuração unipolar que se criou após a fim da assim chamada “Guerra Fria”. A emersão de novas potencias econômicas e de estados que procuram um desenvolvimento autonomo é hoje um facto evidente. A fortalecer esta tendência está a criação de aliançais inter-estatais tanto regionais como a nível global (BRICS). Neste quadro a Federação Russa tem um papel central, e depois da década dos 90, que a viu ocupar um papel mundial de segundo ordem, volta a ser uma potencia reconhecida em nível planetário. Os instrumentos desta subida são: separação entre negócios privados e interesses estatais e fortalecimento do papel das empresas publicas; consolidação da própria presença na região; utilização dos próprios recursos energéticos (tirado das mãos dos privados) para financiar a própria economia e fortalecimento de aliançais com vários países e potencias econômicas nas varias regiões do mundo

The article deals with privatization in Russia’s energy sector with a special focus on a recent purchase of the private TNK-BP by the state-owned Rosneft. The author analyses the past, present and future privatization deals related to the Russian oil, gas and power generation industry as compared to accumulated international experience. For instance, the article displays the ways the Norwegian, Brazilian, French and British authorities privatized national strategic energy assets. The study presented in the article also aims to find out key advantages and disadvantages of state or private ownership in the Russian and global energy industry. For example, it sheds light on some considerable achievements of the Russian state-controlled companies in oil production amid a widespread belief that more than a decade-long growth in the Russian oil industry is due only to private firms that were created in the 1990s. Additionally, the state-controlled Norwegian oil and gas firm Statoil that shows strong operational and financial results on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and abroad is also in the spotlight of the current study. In line with the mentioned takeover of TNK-BP the author examines outcomes of the reorganization of RAO UES of Russia (the dismantled Russian electric power monopoly) that was seen as a massive privatization of the national power industry. Moreover, the study presents two groups of interests prevailing in the Russian government and energy business to give an outlook on the Russian energy industry.

Our paper provides an insight into the universe of Russian multinationals and their influence upon the Romanian economy. Even if statistical data on foreign direct investment stock by country of origin do not prove the existence of Russian capital in Romania, it is a fact that the high values of foreign direct investment stock from the Netherlands, Austria, Germany or Switzerland are largely due to the investment projects undertaken in Romania by Russian multinationals. Despite the lack of relevant statistical data, we can say that the impact of Russian MNC’s on the Romanian economy is huge. Among positive influences we can mention: global employment opportunities for highly qualified workforce in the region; the transfer of advanced technologies to Romanian enterprises and the local markets; the awareness of business partners and public opinion on social responsibility; the insert of higher performance standards, competitiveness and managerial ethics.

The author continues the analysis of the security scenarios concerning the main actors in the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) as well as of the nature of the relations between them, starting from Russian interests and policy in the region. Thus, for Russia, the energy geopolitics is closely related, in its relations with the EU, NATO, and especially the states in the WBSA, to the pursuit of some goals associated with its affirmation and confirmation as a great power. One of the scenarios mentioned by the author is that related to the Russians taking control over the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect the Russian Federation and its security forces in the area of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria with Crimea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether the Russian Eastern Energy Policy (EEP) corresponds to the widely shared perception that Russia uses energy resources as part of its domestic and foreign policy goals and to assess the role of Gazprom in Russia's overall governmental strategy. For this purpose, we have developed an ideal energy policy model grounded in the theoretical premises of realism--a so-called strategic approach to energy security. We will specify major features of strategic behaviour and their manifestations in reality (indicators), which are then searched in the Russian EEP in general and in Sino-Russian gas supply negotiations in particular. Research has shown that the Russian EEP largely corresponds with the theoretical model. One distinctive feature of this policy includes strengthening the role of state in the energy sector through Russia's state-owned energy companies, to the detriment of foreign players. The Russian government has also significantly interfered in Gazprom's external energy policy, especially after Putin's 2012 reelection. However, Moscow's policy framework is not the only factor which affects the future direction of Gazprom, as the company cannot be considered to be solely an instrument of the Russian government. Despite governmental pressure during negotiations with China, Gazprom has repeatedly demonstrated its determination to gain adequate profits from projects running eastward. The company also took into account both its position vis-à-vis domestic and overseas rivals as well as negative consequences in case of loss of future markets, if negotiations with China would be unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to develop an analysis of the South Stream project in view of the Ukrainian crisis. We cannot put aside the internal factor as Ukraine is facing serious internal issues such as corruption and instability, therefore Russia's invasion of Ukraine can not be simply ignored in this pipeline project. The article uses mostly facts that happened throughout last years, as well as for and against declarations in the case of the South Stream project and its mother Russia. When we hear about South Stream, we think of Russia and since 2007, this pipeline has encouraged Putin's faith in energy superpower. A good point to start with was to gather all declarations since then and cover all actions that regard the South Stream game. In Russian foreign policy for the South Stream race, Soft Power was used more than enough and it has recently made room for Hard Power, which is the Ukraine never ending episode. Insights of the South Stream story have been lately related both softly and hardly, this is the reason why I have chosen to analyse both sides in order to complete the energy landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this article is 1) to analyze the current status of the Russo-Korean pipeline natural gas (PNG) project; 2) to discuss major issues involved in this project; 3) to demonstrate costs and benefits of the projects from the viewpoints of various participants; and, 4) to forecast the future of this project. Mainly through literature review, the authors show that the idea of the Russo-Korean PNG project began to be discussed among the related parties in the early 1990s, and several feasibility studies have been undertaken since then. Though there has been a complex interplay among Russia, China, North and South Koreas, the pipeline from Vladivostok is ready to connect if North Korea can be viewed as a reliable partner. Although there is a fundamental convergence of interests among major participants from economic as well as political points of view, political risks will be incalculable, once the required investments are made. This is because North Korea will have additional leverage over South Korea by having the pipeline within its own territory. In addition, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea are in a situation of trilateral monopoly negotiation. In this situation, North Korea and Russia can demand to increase prices until the marginal benefits of South Korea equal zero. In addition, Observers may argue that the separation of political and economic issues can reduce the risks involved in this project, but historical experiences strongly suggest that it will not be possible. Price volatility of the PNG and transit fees is another issue as shown in the Ukraine case, which increased the transit fees over 100% in less than two years. In short, the Russo-Korean PNG project may be seen as a very attractive business arrangement from an economic point of view, but the political costs will be insurmountable unless North Korea becomes a reliable partner, which may not be realized for a long time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper provides an insight into the universe of Russian multinationals and their influence upon the Romanian economy. Even if statistical data on foreign direct investment stock by country of origin do not prove the existence of Russian capital in Romania, it is a fact that the high values of foreign direct investment stock from the Netherlands, Austria, Germany or Switzerland are largely due to the investment projects undertaken in Romania by Russian multinationals. Despite the lack of relevant statistical data, we can say that the impact of Russian MNC's on the Romanian economy is huge. Among positive influences we can mention: global employment opportunities for highly qualified workforce in the region; the transfer of advanced technologies to Romanian enterprises and the local markets; the awareness of business partners and public opinion on social responsibility; the insert of higher performance standards, competitiveness and managerial ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deep and multidimensional crisis of Gazprom in 2009-2010 is analyzed in this paper as a crisis of the specific geopolitical model of the "energy super-state" that was especially important for Russian foreign policy towards Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Russia's attempts to monopolize the sphere of gas production and gas transportation in this part of the world, institutionally represented by the state-controlled monopoly Gazprom, was a key element for sustaining this geopolitical model. It is argued that this policy was based on a configuration of Russian geopolitical and economic interests that could be economically sustained only in the period of high energy prices. After the start of the global gas market crisis and, specifically, Gazprom's crisis, this configuration has started to disappear. This may have a profound influence on Russian foreign policy towards Europe and the Former Soviet Union [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ÖZP - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)