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Problem definition: Despite extensive research on buyback contracts in supply chain management, little attention has been given to a direct comparison between a traditional full-quantity, partial-credit (FQ) buyback contract and an alternative full-credit, partial-quantity (FC) contract, especially when considering the behavioral biases of the retailer. This study aims to fill this research gap by exploring how these biases influence contract performance and offer practical guidelines for suppliers. Methodology/results: Through controlled laboratory experiments and structural model estimation, we show that the ordering decisions made by human retailers are jointly affected by three behavioral biases—loss aversion, prospective accounting, and psychological cost of inventory error—and these biases differ in magnitude between the two contracts. Incorporating these biases into a behavioral retailer's utility function, we then analytically examine which buyback policy the supplier should choose. When the wholesale price is exogenously given, the supplier should adopt the FC contract for high-margin (low-cost) products. Conversely, when the supplier has the power to set both the wholesale and buyback prices, the FC contract is generally more beneficial for low-margin products. Finally, when the product cost is sufficiently high, a wholesale price contract may be advantageous over buyback policies. Managerial implications: The managerial implication of this paper is significant for suppliers who have to choose between different buyback policies. The paper suggests that the supplier should carefully consider not just the economic, but also the behavioral dimensions when making contract decisions, particularly when dealing with a retailer influenced by behavioral biases. Specifically, the choice between FQ and FC contracts is influenced by two key environmental factors: the production cost of the product and the nature of wholesale pricing. Understanding these elements allows suppliers to be flexible in contract choices and design appropriate return policies for their downstream supply chain partners. Funding: P. Yu was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72371038 and 72033003] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant 2024CDJSKPT16]. T. Feng was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72131004]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0574. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to explore the traffic safety evaluation model for downstream intersections of urban expressway exits and make up for the shortcomings in safety research on downstream intersections of urban expressway exits. We constructed a comprehensive traffic safety evaluation index system, established a traffic safety evaluation model, and divided precise safety evaluation levels using the AHP–Matter-Element analysis method, establishing a traffic safety evaluation index system consisting of eleven indicators. The effectiveness of this method was validated through an assessment of traffic safety at the intersection of Dongsheng Street and Free Road in Changchun City. A theoretical basis for improving traffic safety at downstream intersections of urban expressways and a reference for subsequent related research were provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the recent recalls of contaminated pet food and lead-painted toys in the United States, we examine patterns of risk perceptions and decisions when facing consumer product-caused quality risks. Two approaches were used to explore risk perceptions of the product recalls. In the first approach, we elicited judged probabilities and found that people appear to have greatly overestimated the actual risks for both product scenarios. In the second approach, we applied the psychometric paradigm to examine risk perception dimensions concerning these two specific products through factor analysis. There was a similar risk perception pattern for both products: they are seen as unknown risks and are relatively not dread risks. This pattern was also similar to what prior research found for lead paint. Further, we studied people's potential actions to deal with the recalls of these two products. Several factors were found to be significant predictors of respondents' cautious actions for both product scenarios. Policy considerations regarding product quality risks are discussed. For example, risk communicators could reframe information messages to prompt people to consider total risks packed together from different causes, even when the risk message has been initiated due to a specific recall event.

Abstract. This paper studies a global sourcing problem where a buyer sources a product from a supplier to satisfy uncertain market demand. With the increasing length and complexity of today's [...]

This paper studies how to design service outsourcing contracts to ensure fast, quality services from an independent service provider. The outsourcer does not have perfect information about the service provider's capacity cost (i.e., cost of providing fast service) and quality cost (i.e., cost of achieving a high quality level). Moreover, the two unknown costs may be positively, or negatively, correlated with each other. We solve for the outsourcer's optimal outsourcing contract, and show that the structure of the optimal contract depends on the relationship between the costs. Specifically, we highlight the following observations when the two costs are negatively correlated: First, under certain conditions, the outsourcer may be able to squeeze the supplier's profit (information rent) to zero for an intermediate range of cost realizations; second, it is possible that the service supply chain is coordinated by using the outsourcer's optimal contract. We then examine the performance of two classes of commonly observed contracts that are relatively simple to implement. It has been found that these simple contracts generally perform well when the costs are positively correlated, but they could perform much worse when the costs are negatively correlated. Our results therefore caution outsourcing companies that the potential trade‐off between capacity cost and quality cost may require a careful design of outsourcing contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]