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At its formation forty years ago on 8 August 1967, ASEAN (created by a joint political declaration rather than a formal charter) was an association of just five Southeast Asian nations in a Southeast Asia divided by the Cold War. In the immediate aftermath of konfrontasi, Singapore's separation from Malaysia and the Philippines' claim to Sabah, the top intra-mural concern of the time was rebuilding mutual confidence. It took nine years before ASEAN was able to convene its first summit-level meeting at which a blueprint for regional cooperation, the Bali Concord, was unveiled and the norms of neighbourly behaviour, written into the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) adopted. Since 1987, when the treaty was opened to accession by extra-regional states, there have been twelve non-ASEAN signatories including all the external partners in the East Asia Summit process. A second summit in Kuala Lumpur the following year marked the end of ASEAN's first decade. The third summit was stalled by the negative vibes in bilateral relations between Malaysia and the Philippines (the expected host by alphabetical rotation) on account of the lingering problems caused by the latter's claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah. Meanwhile in 1984 a newly independent Brunei became ASEAN's sixth member. The third summit was eventually held in Manila in ASEAN's 20th year (1987) in an atmosphere of anxiety following the overthrow of the Marcos regime by a "people's power revolution". ASEAN's third decade witnessed the gradual winding down of the Cambodia conflict. Regional reconciliation culminated in the historic admission of Vietnam--a hitherto regional adversary--into ASEAN. Vietnam's membership in 1995 was a significant milestone in the ending of the regionalized Cold War. "One Southeast Asia" would have been attained in ASEAN's 30th year but for the untimely coup against a coalition partner in the Phnom Penh government. Cambodia was eventually admitted in 1999, two years after the entry of Laos and Myanmar. Meanwhile, ASEAN had also begun to regularize its summitry into an annual event following the fifth gathering of Heads of Government in Bangkok in 1995. At the start of its fourth decade, ASEAN was afflicted by the contagious effects of the Asian financial and economic crisis with deep political consequences for certain regimes in the old ASEAN core--Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. For Indonesia, the linchpin of ASEAN, the crisis culminated in the fall of President Soeharto who had played a pivotal role in stabilizing his country's relations with its neighbours through regional association. The 13th ASEAN summit scheduled in Singapore in November 2007 falls in ASEAN's 40th anniversary year. Those ASEAN economies afflicted by the 1997-98 economic crisis are well on the mend. The region has not only recovered but seems poised for a significant make-over with the promise of an ASEAN Charter which will to be signed at this summit meeting. With the Charter a more integrated, rule-based regional community (in the political/ security, economic and social-cultural dimensions) with enhanced institutional capacity including dispute settlement mechanisms and, at long last, legal standing in international law can be expected. Significantly, the Charter in seeking to promote a "people-oriented" ASEAN has among its stated objectives, the strengthening of democracy, enhancement of good governance and the rule of law, as well as the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is even provision for a human rights body, albeit with terms of reference to be subsequently determined by the Foreign Ministers. The regional decision making structure, as well as the ASEAN secretariat which has been incrementally strengthened over the years, will be further enhanced. But ASEAN will eschew supra-nationalism a' la the European Union. Forty Years of ASEAN Several observations may be drawn about ASEAN in over forty years of regional cooperation. …

Introduction Globalization thickens interconnectivity among peoples and between nations but also accelerates the process of change in both the domestic and international realms. For a fast globalizing Southeast Asia, turning points have quickly become new defining moments but not always for the better in terms of security and growth. The region's recovery from the destabilizing effects of the 1997/98 Asian economic/financial crisis had been patchy, and although by 2002 most gross domestic product (GDP) levels had edged back to pre-crisis levels, per capita incomes had not and unemployment was on the rise. The 3.5 per cent growth in Indonesia was achieved over a low baseline. Its path towards economic restructuring, sustained economic recovery, and political stability remained tortuous. On the road to economic recovery two developments set back confidence and fuelled uncertainties. The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as "9/11") opened a new phase of international insecurity. How the United States would pursue the war against global terrorism and with what impacts on the Muslim world fuelled uncertainty. The more open regional economies focussed on the consequences for global travel, business confidence, and the international economy. In retrospect neither the United States nor the most open regional economy, Singapore, was too seriously affected. Within a year both economies had rebounded with Singapore in the third quarter of 2002 seemingly headed for a 4 per cent growth.1 In 2002 the Malaysian economy grew by 4.2 per cent while the fastest regional growth rate of 7 per cent was recorded by Vietnam. However, the terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, which killed 202 people, many of them foreign tourists including 88 Australians, dampened expectations of a rebound as Southeast Asia initially acquired an undifferentiated image in the minds of foreign investors and in travel advisories as an insecure region. American concerns that parts of maritime Southeast Asia with their local history of Muslim militancy and rebellion against central authority were vulnerable to penetration by the Al-Qaeda network in search of a "second front" resurfaced following the Afghanistan campaign which commenced in October 2001 and resulted subsequently in the destruction of the Taliban regime and disruption of the Al-Qaeda network. The year 2002 began with

This article broadly surveys the thawing of the various cold war rela tionships since 1989 and seeks to account for the trends underlining these international changes. The effects of various developments, such as the change in superpower relations and the emergence of muJtipoJarity, the shifts from geopolitics to geoeconomics, the decline of ideological affiliations, the democratization tendencies, and the persistence of regional disorder are discussed in turn. The impact and implications of such international changes upon the security environment of the Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN, are finally highlighted.

Since July 1981 there has been a distinct change in the style of political leadership in Malaysia. This occurred as a consequence of the resolution of the issue of political succession within UMNO's leadership ? the emergence of Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad as Prime Minister (holding in addition, the Defence portfolio) and Datuk Musa Hitam as Deputy Prime Minister (as well as Minister of Home Affairs). Domesti cally, this change is best reflected in the vigour with which efficiency and effectiveness are being pursued in government, while in foreign policy a new assertive style has become more evident. Although an overall assessment at this early stage would be both premature and imprudent, the discernible trends, however, indicate that continuity rather than substantive change characterizes existing Malaysian foreign policy. The new assertiveness in foreign policy is not reflective of a radical departure from the policies of the previous government; for all its promises of change, certain continuities persist. Both Dr Mahathir and Datuk Musa had served under the premiership of Datuk (now Tun) Hussein Onn, the former as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry and the latter as Minister of Education. They both had played important roles in the formulation or elaboration of policies (on North-South issues, protectionism, overseas education, and so forth) which invariably impinged on external relationships. Likewise, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, who replaced Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen as Foreign Minister, had been an important influence in foreign policy matters especially where these had a direct bearing on Malaysia's internal security. Tan Sri Ghazali had been Malaysia's Minister of Home Affairs. Many trends in the foreign policy of the Mahathir administration (such as the attenuation of old Commonwealth ties and a growing identification with the interests of the Islamic Conference Organization) can thus be traceable to the previous administration. But where sentiments had been harboured and kept low key in the past, they are now asserted in a forthright manner.

One may well ask whether the author of "The Three Kingdoms" on looking into the fortunes of Five Power defence relations would have been tempted to ruminate that alliances like empires, wax and wane; partners cleave, break asunder and recoalesce. There is perhaps an under standable inclination to understate the dramatic overtone of the parallelism. Yet the implication is quite apparent defence alliances freely entered into, often reflect an area of overlapping interests of their respective partners and hence are particularly susceptible to shifting national perceptions and the consequent redefinition of security interests. The fate of defence relations involving Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand (commonly referred to collectively as "The Five Powers") bear out this general observation; indeed is reminiscent of an exposed pool in which periods of strategic placidity are stirred by the winds of political change.