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This paper represents the intersection of three spheres of influence, relevant to the global research community interested in a more reliable understanding of capital market phenomena. First, as a timely context, we celebrate the 50-year legacy of an iconic event study of accounting information and the evolution of stock prices, namely Ball and Brown (1968). Second, we add our voice to the growing call for researchers to follow principles of “responsible science”. Third, using the Ball and Brown paper as the inspiration, we report on an experiment in which several teams of researchers follow a registration-based editorial process, which illustrates one fruitful avenue for fostering responsible research into the future.

This paper represents the intersection of three spheres of influence, relevant to the global research community interested in a more reliable understanding of capital market phenomena. First, as a timely context, we celebrate the 50-year legacy of an iconic event study of accounting information and the evolution of stock prices, namely Ball and Brown (1968). Second, we add our voice to the growing call for researchers to follow principles of “responsible science”. Third, using the Ball and Brown paper as the inspiration, we report on an experiment in which several teams of researchers follow a registration-based editorial process, which illustrates one fruitful avenue for fostering responsible research into the future.

Background In this virtual special issue (VSI) we acknowledge the contribution of Ball and Brown (1968) [BB68] and select some key papers from the Australian Journal of Management (AJM), published since its inception in 1976, that demonstrate how Ball and Brown influenced, and in many cases inspired, the research agendas of Australian and New Zealand researchers. AJM is particularly proud to acknowledge the connection with Ray Ball and Philip Brown. Not only did these scholars strongly influence the research agenda of AJM authors but Ray and Philip were both instrumental in the establishment and development of the Journal. The Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM), Sydney, launched AJM in 1976 with the aim to publish scholarly articles in the interdisciplinary field of management. Philip Brown was the first Director of AGSM and Ray Ball was one of the foundation faculty of AGSM and the founding editor of AJM...

We explore the relation between management forecasts and analyst forecasts to determine whether a moderating role exists for credibility. Two types of credibility are examined: management credibility and analyst credibility. Management credibility is evaluated by management's forecasting ability (based upon prior forecast outcomes) and the firm's underlying Corporate Governance (CG) structure. Analyst credibility is assessed by their forecasting ability only, based upon prior forecast outcomes. Two questions are addressed by this study: (1) does management credibility moderate the relation between management's initial forecasts and initial analyst forecasts? and, (2) is the relation between analyst forecasts and subsequent management forecast revisions moderated by analyst credibility?

A change in corporate control such as a takeover represents a significant event in the life of a firm, having short and long-term implications on firm value and shareholder wealth. Corporate insiders such as target and acquirer directors have knowledge of, and influence over imminent bids because they participate in takeover negotiations. Such foreknowledge of takeovers and involvement in the negotiations create a potential conflict of interest where these directors have opportunities to increase personal wealth or to further their careers and reputation. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show such behaviour in U.S firms where target directors increase their net purchases in the lead up to takeover announcements. On the other hand, target director trading can signal to investors the information on takeover type and terms, because their trading is connected to the realised takeover premium. As previous studies indicate differences in realised premium based on deal characteristics,1 it is plausible that target directors modify their trading decisions based on the foreknowledge acquired about these deal characteristics. Acquiring directors have also been shown engaging in informed trading around takeover announcements with small increases in purchases and decreases in sales (Seyhun, 1990). More recently, Shams et al. (2016) report opportunistic trading by Australian acquiring directors where preannouncement trading value is positively associated with abnormal return at announcement. Although insiders have information advantage over outside investors, in some cases, the information is insufficient or the market may disagree with management's decision to engage in takeovers. In these cases, learning or acquiring additional information occurs during the takeover process. Luo (2005) and Kau et al. (2008) demonstrate acquirer learning from the market where the market reaction to a takeover announcement predicts the likely outcome of the deal.

This paper investigates the effect of female representation on the board of directors on corporate response to stakeholders' demands for increased public reporting about climate change-related risks. We rely on the Carbon Disclosure Project as a sustainability initiative supported by institutional investors. Greenhouse gas emissions measurement and its disclosure to investors can be thought of as a first step toward addressing climate change issues and reducing the firm's carbon footprint. Based on a sample of publicly listed Canadian firms over the period 2008-2014, we find that the likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosure increases with women percentage on boards. We also find evidence that supports critical mass theory with regard to board gender diversity. These findings reinfo rce initiatives being undertaken around the world to promote gender diversity in corporate governance while demonstrating board effectiveness in stakeholder management.

Investigating ASX300 firms for the period 2002-2010, we find that the information content of director trading has a negative relationship with post-trade information asymmetry, but a positive relationship with information efficiency. These results are mainly driven by director purchases rather than their sales, and are stronger in non-executive director trading. Our results are robust to the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008. These findings back the claims of insider trading proponents, by showing that director trading plays a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry and in improving information efficiency for stock market participants.

In this study, we review the financial research on regulation in the Asia-Pacific region. We do this by analysing six leading regional accounting and finance journals - Abacus, Accounting & Finance, Australian Accounting Review, Australian Journal of Management, International Review of Finance and the Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. We identify five main themes of regulation research relating to: (i) banking and financial institutions, (ii) markets and trading, (iii) corporate governance, (iv) disclosure and (v) accounting standard setting. Our paper synthesises the regional literature in these areas and provide some suggestions for future directions.

We attempt to understand the personal incentives that motivate corporate insiders to engage in unethical behavior such as delayed trade disclosure. Delayed disclosure affects corporate transparency and other shareholders in the firm potentially suffer investment losses because they are unaware of insiders' activities. Using archival data from the 300 largest Australian firms between 2007 and 2011, the results show that risk factors such as insider age and tenure and wealth effects in the form of insider shareholdings affect the likelihood of delayed reporting. Governance positions such as committee membership mitigate this behavior. Our study highlights the importance of considering individual insider's wealth and risk factors. The self-monitoring role of governance positions is also indicative of the effectiveness of internal corporate governance in the prevention of illegal insider behavior.

An insider trading policy is a critical aspect of a firm's internal governance which ensures the maintenance of corporate transparency. We examine the effect of trading policies on the returns to trades by corporate insiders over two periods: one where the adoption of a policy is voluntary and another where it is mandatory. In the former, we find that the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading does not result in lower trade returns on days outside the permitted trading windows. Where adoption of a policy is mandatory, trade returns made during the restricted windows are higher and the requirement to notify prior to trading significantly reduces these returns. The mandatory disclosure of a trading policy is effective in reducing returns from insider trading, suggesting improved investor confidence through greater transparency.

Although substantial shareholders are often considered quasi-insiders, not much is known about the information they possess, especially around changes in corporate control events. We examine whether substantial shareholders in target firms possess information about future takeover activity and if they have such information, whether they trade opportunistically on it. The results show increased purchases by substantial shareholders close to a takeover announcement where these trades predict the likelihood of takeovers. However, they do not predict bid premiums nor other deal characteristics. A comparison of different types of substantial shareholders indicates that institutional shareholder trades are better indicators of takeover likelihood relative to the trades of managerial shareholders. These findings imply that substantial shareholders are indeed quasi insiders who have an informational advantage over other shareholders about future takeover activity and they use this advantage for their own benefit.

A firm's lifecycle consists of birth, growth, maturity and decline. We examine the strategies that firms choose when facing financial distress and present evidence that these choices are influenced by the corporate lifecycle. This influence is most pronounced in the choice of financial restructuring strategies such as reducing dividends or changing capital structure. We also examine if the way firms face financial distress affects the likelihood of recovery. We find that reducing investment and dividends are associated with recovery for all firms, but there is little influence of lifecycle.

We investigate incidences of delayed disclosure of trading by corporate insiders (directors) in Australian firms and link this activity to personal wealth incentives and f uture firm performance. Delayed disclosure represents discrepancies in timing between trades reported as they occur and trades as disclosed in the firm's annual report. Over the period from 2007 to 2011, the rate of late reported trading was about 6%, being at its lowest in 2010 at 5.3% and peaking at 6.8% in 2007. The rate of delayed disclosed purchases was higher than the rate of sales. The likelihood of delayed disclosure was affected by insider wealth factors such as total compensation levels, equity compensation, and shareholdings and their positions within the firm. When executive and nonexecutive directors in small firms delayed the reporting of their purchases, these purchases signaled positive future returns. In large firms, only executive directors' sales were indicative of one year ahead negative returns. These findings suggest that delayed disclosed trades have information content about future firm performance and compensation structures influence the decisions by some insiders to engage in such activity for personal gain.

We study the relationship between investor relations disclosure and analyst forecast properties in Australian firms, a setting dominated by small firms with limited analyst coverage and requiring continuous disclosure of price sensitive information. We find increasing disclosure in the time period investigated is associated with greater accuracy in firms disclosing fewer items. Disclosure was unrelated to forecast dispersion, possibly due to the low analyst following. In periods of uncertainty, the investor relations awards effectively discriminated quality from quantity of disclosure. These findings highlight the importance of active communication with analysts, particularly in firms providing less disclosure and during periods of uncertainty. 2013 AFAANZ.

We investigate the content, timing and relevance of firms' narrative disclosure about the effects of IFRS adoption in annual statutory financial statements and firm announcements to the stock exchange for 150 large listed Australian firms in the three-year period surrounding adoption (which occurred from 1 January 2005). We observe communication about changes in financial reports, even when the change relates to accounting rather than economic events. We record more disclosure by firms experiencing an adverse change in earnings, consistent with them being sensitive to signals about future earnings. When economic performance is stronger, firms provide less discussion of the accounting effects of IFRS. We also find the discussion of IFRS impact in both disclosure channels is value-relevant for firms with relatively higher levels of disclosure, providing evidence of the usefulness of transition disclosures. The Author(s) 2013.

Holding privileged positions within firms, insiders can acquire excessive private benefits based on their informational advantage. The bonding hypothesis suggests that this can be prevented when a firm is cross-listed on an exchange with higher regulatory and legal costs compared with its home exchange. When cross-listed insiders buy and sell shares, the returns earned are lower than in domestic firms. This difference is attributable to the increased shareholder protection in cross-listed firms that constrains the extraction of private benefits, such that when cross-listed insiders trade, they trade for non-informational reasons. 2011 The Authors. Accounting and Finance 2011 AFAANZ.

Shan, Y. G., Yang, J. W., Zhang, J., & Chang, M. (2022). Analyst forecast quality and corporate social responsibility: The mediation effect of corporate governance. Meditari Accountancy Research. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-02-2021-1200

Shan, Y. G., Yang, J. W., Zhang, J., & Chang, M. (2022). Analyst forecast quality and corporate social responsibility: The mediation effect of corporate governance. Meditari Accountancy Research. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-02-2021-1200