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Using experiments with 58 corporate managers and 215 auditors, we examine whether managers attempt to reduce the perceived intentionality of their fraudulent misstatements by perpetrating fraud via omission, as opposed to a more active form of commission, and how auditors evaluate the resulting misstatements. We find that managers choose to omit a transaction from the financial statements rather than record a transaction inappropriately. They also choose to omit critical information from supporting documents rather than provide misleading information. However, auditors generally believe misstatements involving omissions are unintentional. Specifically, we find auditors are less skeptical of an omitted transaction compared to a misrecorded transaction. They are also less skeptical of a misstatement that results from management omitting information from a supporting document compared to misrepresenting information. Overall, our studies identify a method of fraud—omission—that managers are likely to use, but that auditors are unlikely to judge as being intentional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on decision of Minnesota Supreme Court in the case Fenrich v. The Blake School on Minnesota tort law. It mentions special relationship issue, misfeasance/nonfeasance issue, and foreseeability issues recur in Minnesota tort law. It also mentions court held that there was no special relationship between the school and student that would extend to a third party injured by the student's negligence.

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper outlines a method for investigating the speed effect due to a time limit in testing. It is assumed that the time limit enables latent processing speed to influence responses by causing omissions in the case of insufficient speed. Because of processing speed as additional latent source, the customary confirmatory factor model is enlarged by a second latent variable representing latent processing speed. For distinguishing this effect from other method effects, the factor loadings are fixed according to the cumulative normal distribution. With the second latent variable added, confirmatory factor analysis of reasoning data (N =518) including omissions because of a time limit yielded good model fit and discriminated the speed effect from other possible effects due to the item difficulty, the homogeneity of an item subset and the item positions. Because of the crucial role of the cumulative normal distribution for fixing the factor loadings a check of the normality assumption is also reported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the case McArdle v. Mission Hospital Inc. The family of Joshua McArdle, a troubled Iraqi-war veteran, sued the hospital for negligence, gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the acts and omissions of its employees. The hospital escaped civil liability when the court ruled that it did not have custody over the patient after it discharged him without notifying the family.

The article focuses on constitutional issues and implications of holding someone criminally liable for an act or an omission when the statute does not expressly enforce such a duty in the U.S. It informs on Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri court case State v. Gargus addressing civil tort negligence liability upon criminal law. It also informs on due process issues when criminal liability is imposed without sufficient notice.

Assumptions regarding the effect of an abstention guide the theory and practice of abstention across the full range of democratic decisionmaking. Sometimes, however, these assumptions are false, and may prevent voters from achieving their objectives. This Article examines the effect that abstention has under common voting procedures, dispelling many assumptions that voters make about the effect of an abstention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a proposal to make a distinction between negative and positive duties as basis of criminal liability. It focuses on the negative duties and the ways of its infringement distinguishing between the infringement by action and the infringement by omission the negative duty. The article aims to highlight the need to interpret the criminal norm that creates Substantive Offences (Special Part) according to the existence of negative duties (and positive duties) beyond the distinction between prohibitions and mandates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that in our country it is an offence to keep defective food products in stock for sale, conduct which would be criminalized under article 315, paragraph 3 of our Penal Code. In the author's view, the existence of such an offence has passed unnoticed for most of our doctrine, because in the description of the prohibited conduct the law uses words that have, in a first or ordinary meaning, a consolidated use in law practice. In particular, the author analyzes the use of the word "presumption", which has been commonly understood by lawyers as referring to a particular rule of proof. However, that meaning is not the only one that can be attributed to that word: in certain legal contexts, the use of the word "presumption" implies the decision of the law-maker to establish a relation of equivalence between two concepts. This is what the author calls the "constitutive effect" of presumptions in law. Being this an arguable position, this article will try to justify such premise through a series of pragmatic arguments. Once this point has been proven, it will be possible to clearly appreciate the real content of article 315 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the manufacturers' legal duties of monitoring, warning and recall regarding their product in the criminal law of Chile, with a focus on the figure of product liability. Topics addressed include the concept of corporate criminal liability in Chilean criminal law; the principle of proportionality, particularly in cases of product recall; and the treatment of the process of monitoring, warning and recall according to the principle of criminal omission, including a comparison to Spanish and German criminal law.

The aim of the paper is to explore the content of the duty of care, which is the most important element of imputation by way of negligence. For this, the paper argues and defends three main ideas: First, these duties of care are constructed by an objective standard, which contradicts a mere psychological negligence that identifies a mental failure in the agent. Second, the notion of care is always inalienable, hence any dogmatic effort to change it by mere cognoscibility of the wrong is insufficient. And, finally, in order to define what the careful conduct according to context is, it is essential to take into consideration the specific knowledge and capacities of the subject, which denies those theories that focus in the knowledge and capacities of an abstract average man. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista CES Derecho is the property of Universidad CES and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the 1957 U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) case Lambert v. California which deals with a mens rea (criminal intent) requirement under American criminal law, focusing on the USSC's appointment of an amicus to reargue the case, crimes of omission, and constitutional law in the U.S. Legal vagueness principles and mistakes of fact are mentioned, along with legal ethics. A strict liability legal standard in America and attorney Samuel C. McMorris are also examined.

This essay discusses the "Evil Waiter Case," a famous hypothetical fact pattern that has been the subject of much debate in the German, Spanish, and Latin American criminal law literature, but that unfortunately has not found its way into Anglo-American scholarly writings. The case presents us with a waiter who notices that the filet mignon she is taking to her assigned table is covered in a poisoned mushroom wine sauce. She nevertheless takes the dish to the table. The patron eats the poisoned filet mignon and dies several minutes later. Did the evil waiter kill the hungry patron or did she merely let him die? This essay argues that the evil waiter's conduct shares morally relevant features of both actions and omissions, although it is neither purely active nor purely omissive conduct. It is, for lack of a better word, an "actmission" that is more blameworthy than a pure omission but less worthy of condemnation than purely active wrongdoing. Conduct counts as an actmission if it amounts to a failure to rescue (e.g. waiter fails to rescue patron) that is accomplished by engaging in a willed bodily movement (waiter places dish in front of patron). As a result of the hybrid nature of her conduct, the evil waiter should be punished more severely than if she had merely failed to rescue the patron, but less harshly than if she had actively killed the patron. More importantly, the Evil Waiter Case reveals that judges should not be forced to describe criminal conduct as either an act or an omission. Instead, American criminal law ought to recognize "actmissions " as a distinct category of conduct. Such actmissions should be punished more than pure omissions but less than entirely active conduct. Criminal law would thus be better served by replacing the act/omission distinction with the act/omission/actmission tristinction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Health Canada’s Summary Basis of Decision (SBD) documents outline the clinical trial information that was considered in approving a new drug. We examined the ability of SBDs to inform clinician decision-making. We asked if SBDs answered three questions that clinicians might have prior to prescribing a new drug: 1) Do the characteristics of patients enrolled in trials match those of patients in their practice? 2) What are the details concerning the drug’s risks and benefits? 3) What are the basic characteristics of trials? Methods: 14 items of clinical trial information were identified from all SBDs published on or before April 2012. Each item received a score of 2 (present), 1 (unclear) or 0 (absent). The unit of analysis was the individual SBD, and an overall SBD score was derived based on the sum of points for each item. Scores were expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible points, and then classified into five descriptive categories based on that score. Additionally, three overall ‘component’ scores were tallied for each SBD: “patient characteristics”, “benefit/risk information” and “basic trial characteristics”. Results: 161 documents, spanning 456 trials, were analyzed. The majority (126/161) were rated as having information sometimes present (score of >33 to 66%). No SBDs had either no information on any item, or 100% of the information. Items in the patient characteristics component scored poorest (mean component score of 40.4%), while items corresponding to basic trial information were most frequently provided (mean component score of 71%). Conclusion: The significant omissions in the level of clinical trial information in SBDs provide little to aid clinicians in their decision-making. Clinicians’ preferred source of information is scientific knowledge, but in Canada, access to such information is limited. Consequently, we believe that clinicians are being denied crucial tools for decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a reported split among various state courts in America in terms of liability for take-home asbestos exposure as of 2014, focusing on nonfeasance, the relationships between plaintiffs and defendants, and the legal aspects of the foreseeability of harm. A legal duty and transparency in court opinions are mentioned, along with Section 7 of the American Law Institute's "Restatement (Third) of Torts" treatise which deals with negligence, intention, and recklessness.

The article focuses on the internet defamation law and publication by omission. Topics discussed include the rules of publication for the purpose of defamation law, focusing on the liability of entities for the publications of third parties, the Defamation Act 2013 of Great Britain, and jurisprudential developments in the laws of online defamation in Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain. It also discusses the common law and statutory defences to defamation for internet publishers.

The article discusses the legal aspects of securities fraud in America as of September 2013, focusing on various issues such as material misrepresentations and omissions, insider trading laws, and various defenses such as good faith. Other topics include statutes of limitations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement mechanisms, and various developments in regards to Internet securities fraud. Wiretaps are examined in relation to insider trading prosecutions.

Copyright of Estudios Socio-Jurídicos is the property of Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ordinary people make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical and legal principles. Do those judgments derive from the controlled application of principles, or do the principles derive from automatic judgments? As a case study, we explore the tendency to judge harmful actions morally worse than harmful omissions (the ‘omission effect’) using fMRI. Because ordinary people readily and spontaneously articulate this moral distinction it has been suggested that principled reasoning may drive subsequent judgments. If so, people who exhibit the largest omission effect should exhibit the greatest activation in regions associated with controlled cognition. Yet, we observed the opposite relationship: activation in the frontoparietal control network was associated with condemning harmful omissions—that is, with overriding the omission effect. These data suggest that the omission effect arises automatically, without the application of controlled cognition. However, controlled cognition is apparently used to overcome automatic judgment processes in order to condemn harmful omissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Those arguing that the insurance mandate in the recent health care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), is unconstitutional have prominently and repeatedly advanced the claim that the mandate's punishment of personal inactivity is an unprecedented exercise of federal power. That contention is simply false. Federal criminal law contains scores of provisions that facially or in application punish inactivity by individuals. These criminal statutes regulating inaction include not just traditional crimes by omission, where a common law duty it violated, but also offenses related to registration, record keeping, possession, receipt, preventive measures, nondisclosure, organization, misprision, and obstruction. By providing this account of criminal laws punishing and regulating inactivity, this Essay puts the ACA's insurance mandate in the larger context of federal laws that would be in jeopardy if the mandate were held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The case of the ACA in regard to the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is not merely about the enforcement mechanism used for a single health care law as many have contended-it is about the shape and scope of federal criminal law that has been in place for over fifty years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departamento de Derecho Penal y Criminologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Plaintiffs commonly bring two distinct types of claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: (1) claims of material misrepresentations or omissions, and (2) claims of tradebased market manipulation. Despite the distinctive features of the two types of claims, courts have tended to treat them identically when applying the "fraud on the market" doctrine. In particular, courts have required both types of plaintiffs to make identical showings that the relevant security was traded in an "efficient market" in order to gain a presumption of reliance. The reasons for requiring such a showing by plaintiffs in a misrepresentation case are, however, inapplicable in market manipulation cases. Plaintiffs alleging market manipulation should not be required to demonstrate an efficient market in order to benefit from the fraud on the market doctrine's presumption of reliance. If plaintiffs are made to make any showing at all, it should be a showing of loss causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Ignorance of the law is no defence,' so we are told from an early stage in our legal studies. Or, to be more accurate, 'ignorance of the criminal law is no defence to a criminal charge.' That appears to be the rule in this country, apart from a couple of well-established exceptions and another possible one. I will argue that it is a preposterous doctrine, resting on insecure foundations within the criminal law and on questionable propositions about the political obligations of individuals and of the State. In developing these arguments, I will draw attention to the differing problems of ignorance of the criminal law in three broad areas - regulatory offences, serious crime, and offences of omission - with a view to suggesting that there is a great deal more that the State needs to do if the issue of ignorance of the criminal law is to be dealt with adequately and fairly. I begin by scrutinising the relevant rule of English criminal law and the justifications offered for it. I then go on to situate the 'ignorance-of-law' doctrine in the context of the principle of legality and the rule of law, those bastions of liberal criminal law theory. Part three then explores the three broad areas of the criminal law, and parts four and five carry the debate into the political obligations of individuals and of the State in these matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The familiar principle that there is no liability for nonfeasance but only for misfeasance is often presented as reflecting a merely factual difference between acts and omissions and is discussed as a discrete issue in tort law, alongside and after the treatment of general principles. In striking contrast, Francis Bohlen took this distinction to be normative, not factual, and wrote that none is more deeply rooted in and more fundamental to the common law. This article investigates whether his contention is sound and, if so, how it might be accounted for. Its main thesis is that, properly understood, the misfeasance requirement is a central organizing normative idea in private law, providing a unifying moral framework for specifying the varieties of private-law relations. Part ii fixes the meaning and the role of misfeasance through a discussion of a variety of situations in which the law denies liability for even foreseeable loss. We see that the misfeasance requirement makes a certain kind of protected interest, namely, an exclusive ownership interest, the necessary condition of liability in private law. But the character of this ownership and of the sort of relation that holds between individuals as bearers of this interest requires explanation. Moreover, the fact that misfeasance makes this the only relevant conception of protected interest needs to be justified from a moral point of view. Part iii provides an account of the conceptual–normative genesis of the basic private-law relation of rights and correlative duties involving interests of this kind, with illustrations drawn from different areas of private law. Parts iv and v take up the further question of the moral acceptability of the misfeasance requirement from the standpoint of liberal justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practices of criminalization, reflected in the surprising absence of convictions across a range of common law jurisdictions, imply that the threshold for liability in murder may differ depending upon whether the conduct element is an omission or an act. These practices hint at possible doctrinal ramifications of imposing liability for omissions. These ramifications, I shall argue, include the desirability both of a looser causal nexus and a stricter fault element. The looser causal nexus is justified so long as it remains fair to attribute the death of the victim to the wrongful conduct of the defendant, and I shall argue that it will be fair if there is a correspondingly stricter fault requirement, namely (direct) intention. By virtue of such fault element, doctrine is also able to sidestep certain issues of context and motivation that are of key significance for an appropriate model of responsibility where death is caused by omission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to requiring subjective culpability, criminal offenses typically, involve two objective features: action and harm. In the paradigmatic case, both features are present, but criminal law also allows for liability where either of them is absent. Rules governing omission liability enable punishment where the offender performs no act, while rules defining inchoate crimes (such as attempt) impose liability where the offender causes no harm. In different ways, these two sets of rules establish the minimum threshold of objective conduct--to use the classic term, the minimum actus reus--required for criminal liability. The absolute floor for a criminal actus reus, then, would be defined by the intersection of these two sets of rules. The prospect of liability for "inchoate omissions"--involving no act and no harm--exists at the frontier of the state's authority to criminalize conduct and, whether allowed or rejected,, effectively determines the outer boundaries of that authority. Accordingly, inchoate-mission liability raises fundamental issues about the nature and proper scope of criminal law. This Article considers those issues, asking whether criminal punishment for harmless inaction is legally possible, empirically observable, or normatively desirable and, perhaps surprisingly, answering all three of these questions in the affirmative. However unlikely or dubious the legal math may went, it turns out that zero action plus zero harm can, does, and sometimes should add up to a crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The difficulty in discovering a difference between killing and letting die has led many philosophers to deny the distinction. This paper seeks to develop an argument defending the distinction between killing and letting die. In relation to Rachels' cases, the argument is that (a) even accepting that Smith and Jones may select equally heinous options from the choices they have available to them, (b) the fact that the choices available to them are different is morally relevant, and )c) this difference in available choices can be used to distinguish between the agents in certain circumstances. It is the principle of justice, as espoused by Aristotle, which requires that equal things are treated equally and that unequal things are treated unequally that creates a presumption that Smith and Jones should be treated differently. The magnitude of this difference can be amplified by other premises, making the distinction morally relevant in practical reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution stems from a workshop on foundational issues in the philosophy of criminal law. This may raise expectations for a discussion of the core business of what is called substantive criminal law: the structure of crime, the concept of intention, complicity and participation, attempt and preparation; acts and omissions; or causation. However, most punitive sanctions--especially fines--concern regulatory offenses that are structured to a much lesser extent by such moral notions as culpability and wrongfulness, while the applicable burden of proof does not even come close to the presumption of innocence in the case of criminal offenses. This raises the questions of how the difference between regulatory and criminal offenses is to be understood and of the extent to which regulatory offenses (should)fall within the scope of the criminal law. The answers to these questions will be derived from an exploration of the historicity of crimes and regulatory offenses, and their relationship to the (modern) state. I will start off with tracing the emergence of contraventions and crimina in the course of the early and late Middle Ages and the subsequent advent of a domain of "police" at the threshold of modernity next to the already existing domain of "justice. "After this the strict separation of the domains of "police" (covering Polizeidelikten) and "justice" (covering Verbrechen and Vergehen) in nineteenth-century Germany will be discussed as well as the relationship of both domains to different conception of the Rechtsstaat and the État de droit. The math argument will be that understanding the difference between criminal and regulatory offenses in essentialist terms, such as the medieval malum in se and malum prohibitum, [does not make sense. Building on a nonessentialist difference I will suggest that differential procedural constraints should be based on pragmatic arguments, which, however, do not equate with utilitarian arguments. In line with philosophical pragmatism the separation of means anal end that characterizes utilitarianism is rejected and replaced by a pragmatic approach grounded in the normative position of a constitutional democracy in the sense of an État de droit or a substantive conception of the Rechtsstaat. This implies that the aim of punishing regulatory offenses is to sustain an effective domain of police under the rule of law, meaning that the punishment of regulatory offenses will have to be regulated by the same principles that inform the "fair trial. " This will allow the state to impose punitive sanctions, to prevent and retaliate violations of specific legal norms, while enabling citizens to contest the incriminated violation as well as the lawfulness of the violated legal rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negative and positive externalities pose symmetrical problems to social welfare. The law internalizes negative externalities by providing general tort liability rules. According to such rules, those who cause harm to others should pay compensation. In theory, in the presence of positive externalities, negative liability should apply: those who produce benefits should be paid a compensatory award by the gainers. Nevertheless, the legal system does not display such general negative-liability rules. Rather, it tackles the problem of internalizing positive externalities by implementing a set of different and often indirect solutions. My explanation for this asymmetry in legal remedies rests on three features of a negative-liability regime, relating to intent, incentives, and evidence. These features explain the scope and design of restitution rules, liability for nonfeasance, and other mechanisms for the internalization of positive externalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I challenge in this paper a popular view on the causal requirement of criminal liability. The view, which I call physicalism about the causal relation (or physicalism, for short), puts together the claim that the causal requirement demands that the agent causes a crime result (e.g., the death of a person) for her to be paradigmatically responsible for that result, with a conception of causation according to which a causal relation is such that it can only hold between actual events, and never between omissions (or other absences) and events. Physicalism's apparent merit is that it yields an account of the differential treatment actions and omissions receive in criminal law. However, I argue, it does so at the expense of rendering puzzling other uncontroversial features of the criminal law. Moreover, I contend that physicalism is groundless; it picks out a property that just can't play the role that the causal requirement is meant to play. I sketch, finally, an alternative construction of the causal requirement, one that doesn't fall prey of the objections I raised against physicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevailing theory in continental European and Latin American legal literature distinguishes two kinds of punishable omissions: the simple (or "authentic," "genuine") omission and the "inauthentic" or "pseudo" omission (also known as commission by omission, comisi6n pot omisi6n). In this article a tripartite classification of crimes of omission is proposed. On the one hand, there are crimes of omission that are identical to cases of active commission (for which we should reserve the term of commission by omission). These are based on the idea of responsibility for one's own organization. On the other hand, there are simple crimes of omission in which we punish a breach of a duty of minimum solidarity toward our fellow citizens. Somewhere between these two categories lies a third type of aggravated crimes of omission that are based on liability for a breach of a duty of qualified solidarity (derived 3qom specific institutions or relationships between people). Moreover, this threefold classification is based on the idea that differences between such omissions are a matter of degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Omissions in criminal law have often been a cause of perplexity among legal scholars in Europe and America. This article analyzes some of the main theoretical approaches to the question of commission by commission, criticizing the formalistic perspective of the "special legal duty" theory and proposing a normative approach based on the idea of the "sphere of autonomy." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, through its judgment in Jean Mpambara case, outlined the significance of culpable omissions, outlining three broad offences under which it could be used as evidence. While it is clear that an omission may be considered as evidence of aiding and abetting or joint criminal enterprise, it is still not clear whether omission of failure of duty to prevent or punish will be considered as part of Article 6(1) of the statute as done by the other trial chambers, or will it be considered as a different species of crime as concluded by the trial chamber in this case? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frankfurt-type examples seem to show that agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions even if they could not have done otherwise. Fischer and Ravizza's influential account of moral responsibility is largely based on such examples. I examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act. The solution to this problem has a surprising and far-reaching implication concerning the construction of successful Frankfurt-type examples. I argue that the role of the counterfactual intervener in such examples can only be filled by a rational agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ignored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be constructed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circumstances would have done what they did even if they could have done something else. This ‘counterfactual stability’ meets the same fate under determinism as does the ability to do otherwise. Thus the cases are irrelevant to the compatibility debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ayn Rand said that measurement omission is an essential part of concept formation. This essay argues that something else is omitted much, even most, of the time. The nature of measurement is explored in order to support the argument. The author agrees with Rand's more general claim that concepts are grounded in similarities and differences. However, he argues that her theory is partly flawed in claiming that all differences between similar existents are ones of measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the issues of identity theft and the potential problems brought by it. It discusses the court case Patrick v. Union State Bank wherein the plaintiff was a victim of negligent enablement of imposter fraud. It argues that considerations should be made from future plaintiffs who experience negligent application of imposter fraud claim, as well as more favorable treatment from courts.

There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this fashion, this yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself act in this fashion. Second, you may let yourself kill somebody by letting an action you have already initiated cause death, e.g., by not lending a helping hand to somebody you have pushed. This, too, yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself kill if you are in a situation in which killing is impermissible but letting be killed permissible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the associations between wit, judgment and misprision of similitude. Notions of wit as a cognitive faculty; Unreconcileable differences and the conflict between wit and judgment; Views on the unreliability of the paradox of similitude or literary figuration.

The article argues that though it is a well established in criminal law that liability may arise from omission as well as commission, it is often problematical just what circumstances give rise to such liability. The Roman law, for example, penalized homicide brought about by means of willful starvation, or by failure to complete a surgical operation. The latter problem, incidentally, reappears frequently in the history of criminal law. Logically it would seem proper to treat causation first, for people can ask whether an omission was criminal or not only when they are sure that the event was causally connected with the inactivity.

Food offers highly profitable opportunities to criminal actors. Recent cases, from wine and meat adulteration to milk powder contaminations, have brought renewed attention to forms of harmful activities which have long occurred in the food sector. Despite several scandals over the last few decades, food has so far received scant criminological attention and the concept of food crime remains subject to different definitions. This article assesses regulations in the United Kingdom (UK) and UK authorities' official reports published between 2013 and 2018 through a review of academic literature published in English. It charts the evolution of the food crime concept, its various meanings, and different harmful activities associated with food crime, which originate from unlawful acts and omissions. This article also points out that further criminological research needs to address the definitional issue of food crime and inform a more integrated policy approach by considering activities beyond food fraud and the protection of food safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents activities related to the article "Time, delay and nonfeasance" by Patrick Keyzer and Suzanne O'Toole which discusses issues relating to the administration of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003.