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This work was supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust (TRT0171). Embracing accountability to others for one’s responsibilities within relationships is important for flourishing, yet underexamined. An interdisciplinary team defined the construct of accountability and developed an 11-item single-factor Accountability Scale. In national samples with US census demographic representation (total N = 1257), we conducted psychometric analyses using methods from classical test theory (exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses) and item response theory. The Accountability Scale demonstrated internal consistency, construct validity, test-retest reliability, and incremental validity. Accountability correlated positively with relational variables (agreeableness, empathy) responsibility-oriented variables (conscientiousness, self-regulation), virtues (gratitude, forgiveness, limitations-owning humility), relational repair, perceived meaning presence, and flourishing, inversely with symptoms (personality disorders, temper, anxiety, depression), and weakly with searching for meaning and social desirability. Accountability scores superseded demographic variables, conscientiousness, and agreeableness to predict relational repair, perceived presence of meaning in life, and flourishing. We offer the accountability construct and scale to advance human flourishing research and applied work. Publisher PDF

This paper considers whether a divine-command theory of moral obligation (DCT) could justify morally horrible acts, partly by examining Kierkegaard’s writings. It argues that only the commands of a God who is essentially good could be morally justified, and thus no defensible version of a DCT could actually justify horrible acts. In Works of Love Kierkegaard defends such a DCT, and thus is committed to the claim that any actual commands of God must be aimed at the good. This is consistent with the claim that if we knew that a command that is alleged to be from God is directed at what is bad, the command must not be authentic. The issue raised by Fear and Trembling, where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes de Silentio considers the “binding of Isaac” story, thus raises crucial epistemic issues, which cannot be settled without considering how one might come to know that a purported revelation from God is authentic, as well as how one might come to believe that some particular moral belief is wrong. The paper defends the view that if one knew that a revelation from God was authentic, then one could be justified in holding a moral view on some particular issue, such as veganism, that clashes with the dominant views of one’s contemporaries.

Funding: We are grateful to the Templeton Religion Trust (Grant TRT 0171) for generous support that made this research possible. Welcoming accountability is a responsive and responsible virtue that can be shown in relation to people or to God, a higher power, or transcendent guide. Our interdisciplinary team defined transcendent accountability (TA) and developed a 10-item scale using classical and item response theory methods. Across diverse US samples (total N = 990) the scale exhibited internal consistency, construct validity, incremental validity, known-groups validity, and test-retest reliability. TA showed positive correlations with religious and spiritual variables, transcendent virtues (gratitude to God, eschatological hope), human virtues (gratitude, accountability, forgiveness), relationality (agreeableness, empathy), responsibility (conscientiousness, self-regulation), values-congruent autonomy, meaning, and flourishing. It had inverse correlations with negative attitudes and symptoms (personality disorder, anxiety, depression), and weak associations with searching for meaning and social desirability. TA predicted unique variance in spiritual flourishing, meaning, and relational repair. Transcendent accountability is a valuable construct that complements gratitude to God (GTG) and advances positive psychology. Publisher PDF

As scholars who have been engaged in interdisciplinary emic measure development, we provide our reflections on the prospects and perils of this kind of engagement. We contrast the approach we have in mind with other interdisciplinary activities; we commend engaging social scientists, philosophers, and theologians in collaboration across all of the phases of the measurement development process from the from the development of theory, through the creation of items, to the completion of construct validity work. We describe the values that emerge from interdisciplinary collaboration for emic Christian measure development: overcoming disciplinary limitations, benefiting from distinct knowledge traditions, generating new insights, and increasing communication beyond academic guilds. We next cover three kinds of challenges and obstacles that may weaken the likelihood of success. First, social scientists and philosophers/theologians may have certain assumptions about those from the other disciplines and each practitioner may be unaware of critical concepts of disciplines outside their own. Second, approaches to both method and content differ. Third, researchers from various fields are socialized into contrasting forms and conventions of dissemination. In the final section, we suggest means for overcoming these challenges through careful planning and the cultivation of collegial dispositions, such as intellectual humility, humor, hospitality, and trust.

This article argues that Platonism provides a plausible account of wisdom, one that is especially attractive for Christians. Christian Platonism sees wisdom as conceptual understanding; it is a “knowledge of the Forms.” To be convincing this view requires us to see understanding as including an appreciation of the relations between concepts as well as the value of the possible ways of being that concepts disclose. If the Forms are Divine Ideas, then we can see why God is both supremely wise and the source of all human wisdom. The account of wisdom provided helps explain the relation between wisdom and knowledge, the connection between wisdom and emotion, and much about how wisdom is acquired. The view also helps explain why someone who lacks extensive propositional knowledge can still be wise, and it helps us see why an understanding of the Biblical narrative and participation in the life of the Church can be important aids in the development of wisdom.

Jesus. The Apostle's Creed signals the importance of history for the Christian faith by affirming that Jesus 'suffered under Pontius Pilate', an actual historical figure, though doubtless one who would have little importance were it not for his connection with Jesus. The Apostle Paul tells the Corinthians that if the resurrection did not occur (and I believe it is clear that Paul conceives of the resurrection as an historical event), then 'your faith is futile and you are still in your sins'.1 It is not surprising then that Christians have usually followed the writer of the fourth gospel in affirming the importance of knowing about the life of Jesus. There, after recounting the 'many signs' that Jesus did that were performed 'in the presence of his disciples', and affirming that Jesus did many others, the author tells his readers that these were written 'that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have life in his name'.2 Though Christians have traditionally affirmed the importance of this historical knowledge (or rational belief),3 they have not been in agreement as to how this knowledge is obtained. In this paper I propose to describe in some detail two accounts of how this knowledge is supposed to be obtained, looking at both classical and contemporary versions of each. I shall term these two approaches the evidentialist and non-evidentialist accounts. These two accounts have often been taken to be rivals, but I

At the risk of a tremendous over-simplification, I believe it is helpful to categorize views of Christianity which have appeared in the west in the last two hundred years into three major groups. First there are the unbelievers, those for whom Christianity is straightforwardly untrue, unknowable, or unbelievable (or all three). This group would include those who try to salvage some form of essentially humanistic religion as well as those who simply turn away from religious belief altogether, either to put their ultimate hopes in political ideology, or science, or simply to attempt to limit themselves to hopes which are finite and non-ultimate in character. The second group I would designate 'the believers'. I have in mind here those who have retained their belief in the central Christian doctrines, as represented by the classical creeds. As in the first group, there is a tremendous diversity here. I believe it is possible to include in such a group Catholics, Episcopalians, Calvinists, Methodists, Baptists, and Pentecostals without so stretching the boundaries that the group becomes too ill-defined to make reference to it meaningful. I would include in such a group both those who simply repeat past formulas in a literal and perhaps sometimes unthinking way, as well as those seeking to reinterpret those formulas in such a way as to maintain and restore their credibility. The third group I would characterize as 'Adaptors'. By this term I mean to designate those who cannot or do not wish to desert Christianity for some form of religious humanism or simply to become irreligious, but who cannot or do not wish to believe the substance of classical orthodox Christianity. Of course, the line between the second group and this one may be difficult to draw. In an individual case it may be difficult (even impossible) to decide whether a theologian is reinterpreting a classical doctrine or altering it be yond recognition. The task of making this distinction is continually compli cated by the fact that Adaptors generally try to preserve as much traditional language and imagery as possible, no doubt for sound psychological reasons. The problem which the Adaptor is up against generally is how to preserve the pathos and inwardness of the faith of our fathers while altering its con tent. It is naturally a great help if the old language and imagery are preserved.

In a recent book, Religious Belief and the Will1 Louis Pojman has analyzed and criticized several forms of what he terms volitionalism, which is a position which regards beliefs as under the control of the will. Pojman distinguishes several kinds of volitionalism.2 First, he distinguishes prescriptive from descriptive volitionalism. Prescriptive volitionalism is a normative doctrine which holds that it is permissible, perhaps even obligatory, to will to hold certain beliefs. Descriptive volitionalism is a psychological theory which holds that the will actually does have the power to do this. Pojman also distinguishes direct from indirect volitionalism. Direct volitionalism treats the action by which a belief is formed as a basic action which can simply be willed. Indirect volitionalism regards the formation of a belief as an outcome of doing other actions. Both prescriptive and descriptive volitionalism can be either direct or indirect. In his book Pojman analyzes Kierkegaard as a classic example of volitionalism. He sees Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist who accepts both descriptive and prescriptive volitionalism. Indeed, Kierkegaard is said to hold the extreme position that all of our beliefs are acquired by direct acts of will.3 Kierkegaard and volitionalists in general are strongly criticized by Pojman on several counts. Direct, descriptive volitionalism is said to run afoul of psychological laws and to involve a conceptual confusion as well.4 While Pojman allows that we can and do modify beliefs indirectly, and thus concedes the truth of indirect, descriptive volitionalism, he claims that prescriptive volitionalism, direct or indirect, is subject to censure. A plausible ethics of belief must see truth-seeking as a strong, prima facie duty,5 but forming a belief through an act of will, which Pojman insists must mean forming it independently of evidential considerations,6 shows a lack of concern for truth. It is in fact a kind of lying to oneself.7