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The discovery of nearly 180-year-old cranial measurements in the archives of 19th century American physician and naturalist Samuel George Morton can address a lingering debate, begun in the late 20th century by paleontologist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould, about the unconscious bias alleged in Morton's comparative data of brain size in human racial groups. Analysis of Morton's lost data and the records of his studies does not support Gould's arguments about Morton's biased data collection. However, historical contextualization of Morton with his scientific peers, especially German anatomist Friedrich Tiedemann, suggests that, while Morton's data may have been unbiased, his cranial race science was not. Tiedemann and Morton independently produced similar data about human brain size in different racial groups but analyzed and interpreted their nearly equivalent results in dramatically different ways: Tiedemann using them to argue for equality and the abolition of slavery, and Morton using them to entrench racial divisions and hierarchy. These differences draw attention to the epistemic limitations of data and the pervasive role of bias within the broader historical, social, and cultural context of science., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

This paper arises out of my research which I have been conducting in the context of my dissertation project. It explores the relationship between teaching, research and collecting practices in Viennese anatomy during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In a time in which Viennese medicine tried to reinvent itself through both the creation of a new curriculum and several other institutional measures the practice of establishing comparative and human anatomical collections can be seen as a strategic key field of action. By concentrating on scientific journals, popular texts, catalogues, correspondences and specimens this paper aims at revealing specific social systems which must be understood as parts of the 'social history' of Viennese anatomy. By looking closely at these social aspects of anatomical teaching and research, this work tries to contribute to recent discussions addressed by historians of science and medicine.

The modern concept of the tree of life originated as a popular, iconic synthesis of the Darwinian evolutionary theory of descent by modification even if Darwin's own trees were hypothetical and abstract. It is generally thought that Ernst Haeckel in 1866 was the first to publish a true evolutionary tree which showed actual taxa. It is apparently forgotten that St. George Mivart beginning in 1865 made significant contributions to the development of evolutionary based trees of life which dealt with primate evolution, including human phylogeny. His trees were built on the most extensive sets of original data published up to that time, and were clearly articulated as working hypotheses. Mivart's trees were surprisingly modern for appearance and for content. Not only are most taxonomic names still in use today, but also many of the issues he raised are still under discussion in current scientific literature. The history of biology and especially that of primatology in the 19th century can benefit from a more thorough knowledge of how the image of the tree was used in scientific writings, especially after Darwin in the context of the theory of evolution by descent from common ancestors. A reappraisal of Mivart's scientific achievements is necessary to better establish the origins and the development not only of evolutionary trees but of modern primatology. The history of primatology, a discipline that is fundamental for investigating the place of humans in nature, would also benefit from a reappraisal of Mivart's role in Victorian biology.

The essay analyzes the influence of evolutionary thought in the work of Sigmund Freud. Based on Freud's initial occupation as a neuro-anatomist and physiologist certain aspects stemming from the history of nature and developmental biological reasoning that played a role in his endeavours to find a new basis for medical psychology will be pointed out. These considerations are to be regarded as prolegomena of the task to reread Freud once again, and in doing so avoiding the verdict that holds his neuro-anatomic and comparative-morphological works as simply "pre-analytic." In fact, the time seems ripe to reconsider in a new context particularly those evolutionary, medical, and cultural-scientific elements in Freud's work that appear inconsistent at first sight. The substantial thesis is that Freud, given the fact that he was trained in comparative anatomy and physiology in the tradition of Johannes Müller, had the capability of synthesizing elements of this new point of view with the findings and interrogations concerning developmental history and the theory of evolution. More over, this was perceived not merely metaphoric, as he himself stressed it (Freud 1999, XIII, 99), but in the sense of Ubertragung, that inscribed terms and methods deriving from the given field into the realm of psychology. The moving force behind this particular Ubertragung came from a dynamically-neurological perception of the soul that emerged in France since 1800, which Freud came to know trough the late work of Charcot.

Immediately after becoming interested in animal magnetism, and undoubtedly as a result of this interest, E.T.A. Hoffmann used automata as the central characters in some of his most notable works. This paper aims to show how this interest reveals the author's critical attitude towards a conception of the human being which, developing in parallel to anatomy-based medicine, had led in the eighteenth century to a doctrine whose most complete expression is to be found in "L'homme machine," by J.O. De La Mettrie. Nowadays we can see these tales, like those dedicated to animal magnetism, as a cry of alarm against one of the consequences of such a mechanical conception of a human being: the growth of "biopower," or of "biopolitics," terms coined by Foucault in his last works; but also against the risks entailed by the Promethean drive of modernity.

Historians of science, inasmuch as they are concerned with knowledges and practices rather than institutions, have tended of late to focus on case studies of common processes such as experiment and publication. In so doing, they tend to treat science as a single category, with various local instantiations. Or, alternatively, they relate cases to their specific local contexts. In neither approach do the cases or their contexts build easily into broader histories, reconstructing changing knowledge practices across time and space. This essay argues that by systematically deconstructing the practices of science and technology and medicine (STM) into common, recurrent elements, we can gain usefully "configurational" views, not just of particular cases and contexts but of synchronic variety and diachronic changes, both short term and long. To this end, we can begin with the customary actors' disciplines of early modern knowledge (natural philosophy, natural history, mixed mathematics, and experimental philosophy), which can be understood as elemental "ways of knowing and working," variously combined and disputed. I argue that these same working knowledges, together with a later mode-synthetic experimentation and systematic invention-may also serve for the analysis of STM from the late eighteenth century to the present. The old divisions continued explicitly and importantly after circa 1800, but they were also "built into" an array of new sciences. This historiographic analysis can help clarify a number of common problems: about the multiplicity of the sciences, the importance of various styles in science, and the relations between science and technology and medicine. It suggests new readings of major changes in STM, including the first and second scientific revolutions and the transformations of biomedicine from the later twentieth century. It offers ways of recasting both microhistories and macrohistories, so reducing the apparent distance between them. And it may thus facilitate both more constructive uses of case studies and more innovative and acceptable longer histories.

In 1828 Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876) published his seminal Uber Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere. Beobachtung und Reflexion. In the preface he announced that a second volume with one copper plate would be finished 'in a few weeks'. However, it took nine years until the unfinished second volume was released, with four copperplates. In his 'Autobiography', von Baer did not clarify the reasons why he did not finish his research program of comparative embryology. The paper attempts to elucidate them, furnished by archival documents and von Baer's unpublished embryological drawings. Our sketch of a few figures will show that (1) von Baer searched for 'analogies' (homologies) as a unifying principle and (2) explained the mechanisms of embryogenesis by physiological reasoning (electromagnetism). The main objective is to show that technical problems in illustrating and conceptual difficulties impeded von Baer's ambitious research program.

In 1730, shortly before his death, the Paris anatomist Joseph-Guichard Duverney wrote his will, leaving his anatomical specimens to the Académie des Sciences, of which he was a member. But the will was disputed by Pierre Chirac, supervisor of the Jardin du Roi where Duverney, as professor of anatomy, had performed most of the dissections that produced the specimens. The ensuing debate between Chirac and René-Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, arguing for the Académie, reveals the tensions surrounding both the concept of intellectual property in this period and the collective enterprise in natural philosophy. The differing roles and audiences of the Académie and the Jardin were central to this debate. In addition, this essay explores the origins and significance of the anatomical specimens themselves and their changing role in instruction and display, as well as the transition from the cabinet of curiosities to the natural history museum.

Haeckel created much of our current vocabulary in evolutionary biology, such as the term phylogeny, which is currently used to designate trees. Assuming that Haeckel gave the same meaning to this term, one often reproduces Haeckel's trees as the first illustrations of phylogenetic trees. A detailed analysis of Haeckel's own evolutionary vocabulary and theory revealed that Haeckel's trees were genealogical trees and that Haeckel's phylogeny was a morphological concept. However, phylogeny was actually the core of Haeckel's tree reconstruction, and understanding the exact meaning Haeckel gave to phylogeny is crucial to understanding the information Haeckel wanted to convey in his famous trees. Haeckel's phylogeny was a linear series of main morphological stages along the line of descent of a given species. The phylogeny of a single species would provide a trunk around which lateral branches were added as mere ornament; the phylogeny selected for drawing a tree of a given group was considered the most complete line of progress from lower to higher forms of this group, such as the phylogeny of Man for the genealogical tree of Vertebrates. Haeckel's phylogeny was mainly inspired by the idea of the scala naturae, or scale of being. Therefore, Haeckel's genealogical trees, which were only branched on the surface, mainly represented the old idea of scale of being. Even though Haeckel decided to draw genealogical trees after reading On the Origin of Species and was called the German Darwin, he did not draw Darwinian branching diagrams. Although Haeckel always saw Lamarck, Goethe, and Darwin as the three fathers of the theory of evolution, he was mainly influenced by Lamarck and Goethe in his approach to tree reconstruction.

Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895) was an English physician and biologist who had a deep impact on the Victorian age. More than any other at his time he introduced scientifically based values. As a member of London's school board he brought science into the curriculum, encouraging school-children to ask questions and to make their own observations. Huxley came from a lower middle class family with little money. By sheer determination and hard work he managed to get a medical education at Charing Cross Hospital Medical School. He then obtained a posting on H.M.S. Rattlesnake, which gave him a chance to explore the southern seas and to study marine species. The results were published by the Royal Society of which Huxley became a member at the age of 26, and later its president. After several years of uncertainty he secured a position at the Royal School of Mines, which he transformed into the Imperial College of Science. He was a prolific scientist with wide interests, doing valuable work in paleontology, taxonomy and ethnology. Huxley wrote numerous essays on philosophy and scientific subjects. He coined the word agnostic to explain his attitude to Christian dogma. His style was clear and direct, and his essays still read very well. However, Huxley is now mostly, perhaps unfairly, remembered for his defence of Darwin's theory of evolution. In his book Evidence as to man's place in nature, Huxley, in contrast to Darwin, deals with the evolution of humans, mainly based on comparative anatomy. Huxley advocated a firmly held belief that scientific truths will have a liberating effect on the minds of men. His lectures on scientific subjects attracted large audiences of people who had not had the benefit of a higher education.

In a recently published article, Gert Rehkämper takes a critical stance towards cladistic influences on modern comparative morphology. He singles out as culprits a pre-darwinian notion of homology, a neglect of functional thinking and a misunderstanding of the principle of actualism. Furthermore, 'history' should not be used as an explanatory principle. In contrast, I argue that most central notions in evolutionary biology carry a pre-darwinian heritage, especially the term 'adaptation', without compromising their usefulness in contemporary debates. With the advent of new techniques of phylogenetic reconstructions and comparative analyses, 'history' has become a powerful and quantitative explanatory resource.

The documents, reprints, books, correspondence of Grassi, found in his room at the University of Rome when he died, have been kept in the Institute of Comparative Anatomy, directed by Grassi himself from 1896 until 1925. This fund keeps documents concerning the whole life of the scientist, with a special reference to the Roman period. Numerous are the documents concerning his malariological studies between 1898 and 1910. A first reconaissance has been made in 1980 and then, twice in 1994 and 1998, the fund has been reorganized and an inventory of it has been made. It is collected in 48 boxes containing archivistic documents, 11 boxes of reprints and other publications. The inventory of archival documents has been computerized.

It is argued that Darwin's concept of evolutionary change is primarily based on the idea of functional adaptation. Genealogical aspects are seen as a secondary consequence of this hypothesis. Unfortunately, the reception of Darwin's work was concentrated on the genealogical aspects from the very beginning (Huxley, Haeckel) and thus channeled future development of evolutionary morphology in a very one-sided way. This direction of development led to the adoption of cladism as a very sophisticated concept of comparative morphology. Though cladism claims to contribute to our understanding of evolution, it is demonstrated that it suffers in this regard because of the incompatibility of "pure morphology" with the demands of functional thinking as an integrative part of Darwin's proposition.